

# **KURDISH ISSUE - PROGRESS AND SOLUTION**

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## **Abstract**

The Kurdish Question is Turkey's number one issue. It started with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and has claimed the lives of 40-50 thousand people. It has further caused many unsolved murders, imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people, eviction of thousands of settlers, relocation of millions of people and a colossal financial loss around 1.5 trillion dollars for the last thirty years. The entirety of society has had very high expectations for the resolution of the problem. Harsh methods were imposed within the last thirty years viewing the problem merely as a security matter. However, these methods not only failed to resolve the problem but also amplified it. The problem gradually spread out to the larger parts of society. It seems that it proceeds in a direction that may result in the secession of the state unless the problem is resolved. Strong perceptions have formed in society regarding the issue as a result of the unjust treatments during the thirty years of low intensity war and due to the social facts, events and actors. When we look at the building process of these perceptions, it is seen that they have been built throughout ninety years. Although there have been some mutual attempts to resolve the problem through dialogues and reconciliation since 1993, these attempts have failed due to the extent of the resistance formed by social perceptions.

This study analyses the model of democratic autonomy which is proposed as a democratic and political solution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Different models of autonomy have been implemented in various parts of the world in order to resolve ethnic-national conflicts. This study aims at analyzing this specific concept of democratic autonomy within a theoretical framework of these different models of autonomy.

**Keywords:** democratic autonomy, the kurdish question, territorial autonomy, conflict resolution

## **Introduction**

The Kurdish question, which started with the adoption of an ethnic identity in 1924, has long been defined as "ethnic separatist actions and concepts such as "Kurdish identity "and" Kurdish problem" have not been used. 2010's Turkey, still have not found a solution, of course, is closely associated with this delay.

The Republican Administration and the One-Party Government defined the Kurdish rebellions as bandit resistance and suppressed the resistance of the Kurds with harsh measures. During Adnan Menderes' prime ministry, although a socio-economic and democratic policy was mentioned about the Kurds and the Southeastern region, denial of the Kurdish identity and the Kurdish question continued until the 1990s. The Kurdish movement, which has been rising since 1960, has been evaluated within this framework. In fact, during this period, Kurdish groups, on the one hand, demanded recognition of their identity, on the other hand demanded autonomy. With the emergence of left Kurdish groups, socialist tendencies began to emerge in the demands of the Kurds. The PKK, which incorporates the Kurdish movement in 1984, Turkey, Iran, the Kurds in Iraq and Syria has adopted an independent Kurdistan concept combining under one roof. Until today, the armed actions of the PKK have continued. In fact, the PKK also organized in European countries and tried to provide political support from these countries.

The 1990s, in other words, the end of the Cold War, witnessed significant changes in the nature of the Kurdish question. During this period, the Kurdish problem was accepted by the political actors, in particular the President of the time Turgut Özal, and the search for a democratic solution to the problem began. However, since it is not possible to break the traditional approaches to the Kurdish issue, the search for a solution remains a discourse.

In the 2000s, the discourses of the previous period turned into concrete steps. The most important reason for this is the rise of the concepts of human rights and democracy that began with the end of the Cold War. Turkey, in order to adapt to the international liberal system, solving all problems have been confronted with the necessity of democracy. In this sense, the goal of full membership in the European Union can be regarded as the driving force.

Ultimately, the Government proposed the Democratic Initiative Project for the solution of the Kurdish question. Today, the Democratic Initiative Project is being heatedly discussed. However, when the demands of the Kurds and the views of political actors are examined, it is concluded that the project is not operational. In particular, the Kurds' demands for general amnesty, mother tongue education, recognition as a separate nation and regional autonomy are seen as "separatist ambitions by political actors. For the time being, the military and opposition parties do not approve any initiative other than the recognition of individual rights and freedoms.

### **The Rise of Kurdish Movement**

The 1924 Sheikh Sait Rebellion marks a turning point with regard to the Kurds. After the rebellion was suppressed, it was not possible to establish any basis for reconciliation with the Kurds. There are two reasons for this.

The first is the policies implemented by the Republican Administration in the region after 1924. In this period, the state's Kurdistan policy was shaped by anxiety not to lose control in the region. The reason for the sensitivity shown in this sense is the reinforcement of the perception of threats against the Kurds after the Sheikh Sait Rebellion. It is a fact that not only the rebels but the people of the region paid the price of the rebellion. Thus, the democratic approach that attaches importance to the participation of Kurds has been replaced by the authority of Takrir-i Sükun after the rebellion. With the Law of Takrir-i Sükun (1925), martial law started to function in the region. The Independence Courts were reactivated within the framework of Takrir-i Sükun and their powers were expanded to cover the whole country. On the other hand, all kinds of symbols regarding Kurdish and Kurdish identity are prohibited (Akyol, 2006: 101-107).

The second is the reaction of the Kurds to the new order that was tried to be established after the proclamation of the Republic and the Kurdish rebellions that continued until 1938. The resistance process, which started with the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, continued with another rebellion almost every year until 1938. First, in 1925, the Sason Rebellions began. During the suppression of these rebellions, the Agri Rebellion began. This process continued with the 1927 Bicar Rebellion, 1928 Resul Agha Rebellion, 1930 Zeylan Rebellion, Tutaklı Ali Can Rebellion and Oramar Rebellion, 1934 Buban Rebellion, 1935 Abdülkuddüs Rebellion, Abdurrahman Rebellion and 1937 Dersim Rebellion in the following years respectively (Ş.Vedat, 1980).

In the Kurdish uprisings, there seems a serious Kurdish movement. In most of the rebellions, the activities of the Azadi and Hoybun organizations in Kurdistan have been very effective. At this point, it is necessary to clarify a matter. What exactly were the demands of the Kurds from the state? Kurdistan Azadi Organization's greater role in the rebellion, including the request from the Republic of Turkey and the Sheikh Said Rebellion prepared after the report estimated that is greatly enlightening;

1. The Kurdistan Committee is not the instrument of any state. Its purpose is to obtain legitimate national rights. That said:
  - a. Having an independent center and independent management in services and internal affairs by separating and determining national borders,
  - b. Acceptance of Kurdish as an official language within its national borders,
  - c. Having their own officers,
  - D. The gendarmerie belongs to the Kurds,
  - to. The creation of special continents in the joint army (the army of Turks and Kurds) demands that Kurdish soldiers and officers be subjected to training and training in the Kurdish language.

2. The war will continue until the national goal is achieved. The material and moral responsibility of the sister blood flowing with external and internal damages rests with the Government of Ankara.
  3. The Committee is ready to negotiate the case peacefully and to the branches where it is desirable.
  4. In the rate of bloodshed, the conditions that the Kurds will put forward will become more severe.
- Kurdistan Independence and Liberation Committee Headquarters (Bardakci, 2009).

The last rebellion paralleling these demands was the Dersim Rebellion of 1937. In 1937, the tribes in Dersim came together under the leadership of Seyit Riza and started an uprising with an ultimatum, which states that "they do not want the state to intervene in any internal affairs, including school and road construction". The suppression of the rebellion was harsh and bloody. According to the decisions of the Council of Ministers on 4 May 1937 on Operation Tunceli Tenkil, the rebellion was demanded to be resisted. In this context, air operations were organized for the rebellion regions. The resistance in Dersim was so strong that the operations of the air force ended only in 1938 (Sezer, 2003: 21).

### **Republican Government's Official Approach to Kurdish Issue**

In all the rebellions, including the Dersim Rebellion, the Government's response to the demands of the Kurds was far from settling the case peacefully. Both security-oriented interventions and the policies of Takrir-i Sükun reveal that there is no attempt to reconcile with the Kurds. During the Takrir-i Sükun Period, the rebellions continued and the East became a serious problem, which led the statesmen to seek more comprehensive solutions. At this point, it should be noted that the way the state evaluates the problem is limited to the expressions such as "tribal resistance", "provocation of foreigners" and "banditry" (Yeğen, 2006: 159). As can be seen from the statements, there is a need for a "threat" and a "precaution karşılık. For this reason, the solution plans that are created are not plans for the solution of the problem but for the elimination of the problem.

In this period, Fevzi Çakmak, the colonial administration; Kazim Karabekir, through the clergy to provide control of the region; The First General Inspector Abidin Özmen explicitly proposed "assimilation". Another proposal is the two-stage plan developed by the then Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya for the rehabilitation of Dersim. According to the plan, the first collection of weapons was envisaged. The second step was to ensure that tribal lords and tribal lords could be removed from Dersim. In addition, the need to provide state services such as making roads and opening schools to Dersim was emphasized. Northern Dersim people, the region is steep and unfavorable because of the placement of other places and to ensure the control of the security forces, some villages were thought to be united (Mumcu, 1995: 63-74).

In accordance with this plan, the Settlement Law was adopted in 1934. The reasoning of the law is the statements that criticize the politics of the Ottoman administration for the tribes.

The main policy of absolute administration was to leave the tribes to their own state, even to increase the populations of the chiefs and aghas on the tribe, to connect them to the government through the aghas and the gentlemen, and to maintain the contradictions between each other and the settled people. He saw and recognized all the laws, edicts and fatwas of the old and new Ottoman administration, tribal squire, principality, autonomy and mayor of a commune between us (Mumcu, 1995: 84-85).

The Republican Administration reveals its politics regarding tribes as follows; The dissemination of assets of the population whose mother tongue is not Turkish, and thus the preservation of national unity (Mumcu, 1995: 87). These authoritarian statements are important in terms of reflecting the state approach of the period. Given that this idea, whose only problem is to protect national unity, cannot tolerate a language other than Turkish, the name change is not meaningless. In the 1930s, expressions such as "Kurdish", "Laz", "Circassian" and "Kurdistan" were banned and non-Turkish place names were abolished (Heper, 2008: 241). In 1935, with the Law on the Organization of Munzur Province bilinen (abolished in 1940), known as the "Tunceli Law", the name of Munzur was changed to Tunceli.

"The Tunceli Law" is in fact the product of the Eastern Trip, in which Prime Minister İsmet İnönü came out to examine the existing problems in the region. In his report after the trip, İnönü proposed a special form of government for Dersim's reform. Accordingly, the governor of an active corps commander approved the appointment of active officers as governor, and that the officers were non-indigenous retired officer. With the Tunceli Law, this administration was put into practice and, depending on İsmet Pasha's findings, the governor of Tunceli was given martial law powers (Mumcu, 1995: 119-128).

The assertion is assimilation. In this context, along with the Settlement Law, the Sun-Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis are accepted as assimilation tools. The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun-Language Theory are not directly related to the emergence of the Kurdish question as they are parallel to the construction of the nation-state. However, the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish Historical Society had some work involving denial of Kurdish ethnic identity. During this period, historical studies have been conducted explaining that Kurds are actually Turks and these claiming that Kurdish does not exist (Yeğen, 2006; 92-98). At this point, the understanding of nation, which defines Turkish ethnic identity as a higher identity covering other sub-identities, is overcome.

### **Governments' Approach to Kurdish Issue**

In his book *The Kurdish Question in State Discourse*, Mesut Yeğen points out that Turkish governments repeat certain discourses that reject the Kurdish question. According to Yeğen's findings, rebellions during the Republican period were evaluated by the state such as "tribal resistance", "provocation of the foreigners" and "banditry and this situation continued during the Single Party Period (Yeğen, 2006: 159). .

However, after the Second World War, with the transition to multi-party system in Turkey in policy towards the region, visibly seen that a change has occurred. During this period, the Republican People's Party preferred a settlement with the tribal leaders in the region. The CHP has sought to gain political support by accepting the local interests of the notables of the region (Kirişçi and Windrow, 2002: 112).

The policy of the ruling Democratic Party towards the Kurds was quite moderate according to the policies of the One Party. After 1950, the Kurdish question was not considered to be eliminated, but as a social and economic problem. Numan Esin's memoirs of the 1960 military coup included the statements of Adnan Menderes; "Our solution was democracy. With the freedom to give to the public, we thought that a solution would come to this. We moved in that direction. Thus, we chose to connect the people to the government and the country. Ak (Aköz, 2007).

In this context, Adnan Menderes allowed the representatives of the leading Kurdish families to enter the Parliament as deputies. On the other hand, Altan Tan does not consider Adnan Menderes' approach in his book "Kurdish Question" as a search for a democratic solution. Tan interpreted the entry of Kurds into the Assembly as integrating these representatives into the system by corrupting them in the Ankara maze (Tan, 2009: 328). The reason for this criticism is that the Democratic Party considers the Kurdish question basically as "the problem of backwardness" or "development problem". Because at that time, DP's policies were not satisfactory for the Kurds.

"We could have handled this Southeastern issue before and searched for a political solution. But remember... In the first period of the Motherland, there was a struggle for transition to the civilian regime. Approximately 1.5-2 years, some of my ministers, more than me, listen to Kenan Pasha. They shook me not from me... First of all, we had to overcome the bottlenecks of the economy and the foreign exchange issues. In a country that had come out of the military regime, we had to do this to prevent new military coups. " (Barlas, 2001: 15)

When the period evaluations of the 12 September Administration were examined, the internal cause of the violence was defined as social unrest and all movements that wanted to make their voice heard were called as "terrorism" (Prime Ministry, 1983: 80). The Kurds, together with the Turkish Left, were

the ones who paid the most for this definition. With the decisions of the coup, even talking about Kurdish ethnicity and Kurdish nationalism was forbidden. The first task of the administration was to ban the use of Kurdish in 1983. The activities of the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Association have been increased, and the discourses suggesting that the Kurds are Turkish have been revived (Kirişçi and Windrow, 2002: 118). In a nutshell, it has returned to Turkey in 1930.

What should be noted here is the impact of the 1980 military coup on the Kurdish question. In fact, it is thought-provoking whether this Marxist-Leninist group is enough to create a revolution for itself in the explosion of the fraction of the Turkish left. The data obtained according to the analysis of the period indicate that the attitude of the Military Administration fed the PKK. For this reason, it is stated that the PKK was embodied in Diyarbakır Prison (Türköne and Yayman, 2009: 9). At this point, one can ask the question; violence ruined the whole left movement, why didn't there be another reaction, why Kurds?

The answer to this problem is the date the Republic of Turkey. Kurds, as a result of policies implemented after 1924, Turkey's undeniable that become brittle element. The unwanted problem has fallen in every crisis and surfaced in 1980. Given the economic inadequacies of the region, it became easier to stand against the state. Furthermore, the fact that members of the organization fled abroad and had the chance to settle after the military coup played a significant role in strengthening the organization. Turkey, made shortly after the 1980 military coup in order to ensure social peace, in 1984, has faced re-acquainted with the PKK and the Kurdish issue.

In the 80s, it was not difficult to create a conflict between the Kurds and the state, since Turkish governments did not seek a solution beyond security-oriented rhetoric and policies. The assumption of the PKK as the spokesperson of the Kurdish people strengthened the prejudices of the Turks against the Kurdish people.

**Table1: Kurdish Political Parties from HEP to BDP**

Party Name	Leaders	Foundation Date	Abolishment Date	Note
<b>HEP</b> <i>Peoples Labour Party</i>	Fehmi Işıklar, Feridun Yazar, Ahmet Türk	07.06.1990	14.07.1993	Entered 1991 elections with SHP
<b>ÖZEP</b> <i>Freedom Equality Party</i>	Mahmut Alınak	25.06.1992	04.07.1992	Joined HEP
<b>ÖZDEP</b> <i>Freedom and Democracy Party</i>	Mevlüt İlik	19.10.1992	30.4.1993	Closed itself
<b>DEP</b> <i>Democracy Party</i>	Yaşar Kaya Hatip Dicle	07.05.1993	16.6.1994	Never ran in any elections Closed
<b>HADEP</b> <i>Peoples Democracy Party</i>	Ahmet Turan Demir, Murat Bozlak	11.05.1994	13.03.2003	Closed
<b>DEHAP</b> <i>Democratic Peoples Party</i>	Veysi Aydın, Mehmet Abbasoğlu, Tuncer Bakırhan	8.8.1997	20.11.2005	Joined with DTP

<b>Özgür Parti</b> <i>Free Society Party</i>	Ahmet Turan Demir	06.06.2003	26.06.2007	Closed
<b>DTP</b> <i>Democratic Society Party</i>	Nurettin Demirtaş, Emine Ayna, Mustafa Sarıkaya, Aysel Tuğluk- Ahmet Türk (Co- chair)	09.10.2005	11.12.2009	Closed
<b>BDP</b> <i>Peace and Democracy Party</i>	Mustafa Ayzit, Demir Çelik, Selahattin Demirtaş Gülten Kışanak (Co- chair)	02.05.2008	12.07.2014	Closed itself. Name changed into Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (DBP).

Source: [www.tbmm.gov.tr](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr), [www.yargitaycb.gov.tr](http://www.yargitaycb.gov.tr)

**Table 2: Elections Results of Kurdish Political Parties**

	HEP- SHP	HADEP	DEHAP	DTP (FREE)	BDP (FREE)	BDP	BDP-HDP
<b>1991 G</b>	5.066.571 (%20.8)	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>1995 G</b>		1.171.623 (%4.16)					
<b>1999 G</b>		1.482.194 (%4.75)					
<b>2002 G</b>			1.995.804 (% 6,23)				
<b>2004 Y</b>			1.129.049 (%5.1)				
<b>2007 G</b>				1.835.486 (%5.2)			
<b>2009 Y</b>				1.661.117 (%5.16)	36 (%0)		
<b>2011 G</b>					2.819.917 (%6.59)		
<b>2014 Y</b>						1.738.372 (%4.18)	2.575.113 (%6,19)

Source: [www.ysk.gov.tr](http://www.ysk.gov.tr), [www.tuik.gov.tr](http://www.tuik.gov.tr)

## **European Court Of Human Rights' Point of View Regarding The Kurdish Issue**

Democracy, respect for human rights, minority rights and freedom of expression in the European Convention on Human Rights are the basic values that make up the European Union. As is known, all the states that are party to the European Convention on Human Rights have integrated the Convention with their national legislations. In this way, the European Convention on Human Rights has become a part of the domestic legal system and binding for national courts and all public authorities. The conclusion drawn here is; the European Convention on Human Rights is binding for all party states and if a judgment taken by national courts is reversed by the European court of human rights, the decision made by the ECtHR will be valid. Turkey is a country which is party to the European Convention on Human Rights. For this reason, the decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights, which gives a ruling in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, are important in terms of knowing about Turkey's situation on the subjects of fundamental rights and minority rights and understanding the EU's perspective on these issues. Turkey has still a serious problem about the violation of Human rights. It can be seen this reality in the ECtHR decision (see <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160479.pdf>).

The freedom of expression is primary in fundamental human rights and freedoms and it is the basis of all other rights and freedoms as a right need to be discussed before demanding. In this regard, we will focus wider on the freedom of expression. When we look at some of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights about Turkey, we will see that there are very serious problems in Turkey related to the freedom of expression. This situation could also be the source of the Kurdish problem because you can't hold a free discussion without a free expression and there can't be a free thought without a free discussion. In an environment without free thought, conflicts are inevitable.

The Article 10 of the convention, which regulates the freedom of expression, consists of two paragraphs. While the first paragraph defines the freedoms to be protected, the second one defines in which circumstances a limitation can be made. Accordingly, freedom of expression is defined as follows in the first paragraph. 'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises'. The first paragraph guarantees three elements of freedom of expression.

1. Freedom to hold opinions 2.Freedom to receive information and opinions 3.Freedom to impart information and ideas (Macovei, İnsan Hakların el Kitapları, no:2, p. 12).

When we look at not only international reports but also decisions made by the ECtHR, we can say that Turkey does not have a very pleasant situation on this issue. For example, in the ranking, which was conducted by the International Organization of Reporters without Borders on 20th September 2010, Turkey was ranked 138th place out of 178 countries regarding World Press Freedom (Evrensel Gazetesi, 18.02.2011). Again, according to the reports of Organization of Reporters without Borders the situation of Turkey in this field gets worse each year. For example, while Turkey was ranked 102nd out of 173 countries in 2008, it was ranked 122nd out of 175 countries in 2009 (Cumhuriyet gazetesi, 28.01.2011), (Press statement of president of ECHR, 28, 01, 2011).

We can say that report of Turkey is not so good when we look at the decisions of the ECtHR. ECtHR sentenced Turkey in 278 cases in 2010 for violating at least one of the articles of European Convention on Human Rights. Russia with 217 cases, Romania with 143 cases, Ukraine with 109 cases, and Poland with 107 cases followed Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has become a country which has been sentenced by the European Court of Human Rights at the most. Turkey also ranked first with 356 condemnation decisions in 2009 (Türk Hukuk Enstitüsü, 28.01.2011). Again, in 2006, 35 of 62 thought crimes resolved by the ECtHR belonged to Turkey. It is also seen here that Turkey is well ahead in this field as well. Turkey is followed by Austria with 7 cases and Switzerland with three cases (Türk Hukuk Enstitüsü, 28.01.2011).

We can list the laws, which made Turkey sentenced by the ECtHR, due to violation of freedom of expression: the former law on the emergency state, the former law to fight terrorism, the law to protect Atatürk and decisions made by State Security Courts closed in 2003. The state of emergency was completely abolished on 1st December 2002 and the State Security Courts were closed in 2004. The law to fight terrorism is still one of the most problematic laws. Similarly, the Article 301 of the Turkish criminal law, which regulates the insult to "Turkishness" as a crime is an article that is discussed since it is open to interpretations, and it seems that in the future Turkey will mostly be sued in the European Court of Human Rights for this article of the law (Türk Hukuk Enstitüsü, 28.01.2011). This situation takes place almost in every progress report published by the European Commission annually. (for more information see European commission's progress report on Turkey, 2008, 2009, 2010).

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is about the right to life. Basing on the Convention bodies interpretations about Article 2, we can say that states have 'negative' and 'positive' liabilities concerning the right to life. While the negative liability orders 'not to kill!' except for the lawful purposes proposed by the Convention, the positive liability requires the state to take preventive measures to protect the right to life, even if the security forces are not involved in the killing event. In broad terms, measure requires the state (a) to protect a person in case of a real and unavoidable danger, (b) to make a rapid and extensive investigation in case of a killing event despite everything. The states which are party to the Convention but do not fulfill the obligations, are deemed by the ECtHR to have violated Article 2 the Convention (Çiçekli and Eryılmaz and Yılmaz, 2007, p.38).

### **Some Discussions On The Resolution, The Basque Model And Democratic Autonomy**

How can living together be enabled in an environment when even the PKK, which emerged with the idea of an independent Kurdistan, has given up the idea? What kind of a solution is recommended by the parties to the discussion and how possible are these recommendations in practice in Turkey? Of course, to answer these questions, we can benefit from the implementations in some countries with similar problems. For example, the Basque model in Spain has always been discussed as a model for Turkey. As is known, Spain is a country ruled by the kingdom and for the moment it consists of 17 autonomous regions. Separatist organization ETA emerged as a response to the period of Franco's dictatorship. However, with the new democratic term in 1978, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic diversities were adopted and put under protection in the concept of status of minorities. The 78 Constitution didn't explicitly use the minority phrase and didn't consist of the name of any minorities. However, minorities were implicitly included in constitutional arrangements with the recognized status of autonomy and the emphasis on cultural and linguistic diversity. Article 2 of the Constitution laid emphasis on national unity in the presence of the autonomous communities that were given comprehensive authorities (Özer, 2010, p.702).

"The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish nation and the common and unbreakable homeland. It recognizes the constituent nations and regions' right for autonomy and ensures solidarity between them' (Özer, 2010, p.702). In this context, the constitution appealed to separate identities with the emphasis on "constituent nations".

Spain has confirmed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities<sup>11</sup>. The European Charter was ratified on 9 April 2001 and entered into force in August of the same year. In the European Charter Declaration submitted for the approval of the European Charter remarked that the official languages in Basque Country, Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Galicia, Valencia and Navarra autonomous communities and the traditional languages protected by the autonomous status of the communities will be accepted as regional or minority languages (Tan, 2009, p.548).

According to the valid autonomy law in Spain, the Oskara language (spoken in the Basque region) has the same status with Spain in the Basque region. The Oskara language is also used in public sphere

and official relations. The government in the Basque Autonomous Region is required to train Officers knowing this language. While both the Oskara language and Spanish language are allowed in the parliament, it is unconstrained to speak the Basque language in judiciary. It is also unrestricted to make all kinds of radio and television broadcasts in the Basque language. At the same time, it is optionally enabled to get primary and secondary education in the Oskara language. Besides, education in the Basque language is available at universities in the branches of philosophy, geography, history, language and educational sciences. Road, city and village names are written in two languages. After briefly explaining the Basque model, we will look what the Kurds demand.

In an environment where Kurds have a phobia of being assimilated and Turks bear a phobia of being divided, the basic needs to find solutions to the Kurdish question, the biggest problem in Turkey, are for the freedom of expression as first and foremost and for the discussions of these ideas freely. Having tried to present the on-going problems in this regard, we will now look at discussions in Turkey about the issue keeping in mind that the first condition is the freedom of expression.

According to Altan Tan, an ethnic federation is neither possible in Turkey nor appropriate to the realities of Turkey because approximately 60 percent of the Kurdish population lives in the west. In addition, there is a very high level of economic cooperation between Kurds and Turks who similarly get married with each other to a significant extent. Altan Tan said that a federation system based on geography might be possible instead. Tan explains this as follows; 'The problem is to democratize the whole Turkey. Hakkâri should have schools training in Turkish and Istanbul should have schools training in Kurdish. People should go to school they want'.

Again, the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan also says similar things; "The democratic autonomy model we put forth bases on democracy, not the ethnicity of Kurds, Turks or Arabs alone. For example, a democratic autonomy could be built in Hatay and Adana where Arabs can predominantly express themselves. Our Democratic Autonomy isn't based on a single belief, it bases on peoples, different social bases, social classes and social groups. The mentioned Democratic Autonomy concerns not only Kurdistan but also the Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia Regions" (Firatnews.com, 14 October,2010). Noting that Turkey could be divided into 20-25 regions within this framework, Ocalan says that a self-governance could be determined in accordance with particular conditions of the region.

The 8th November 2007 dated Democratic Society Congress (an umbrella structure consisting of Kurdish parties and Kurdish politicians and later adopted by the Peace and democracy party as well. The DTK is a non-governmental organization that invites the Turkish left, liberals and democrats to the meetings as much as possible, described the democratic autonomy as follows;

- 1- 'Proposes a radical reform to ensure democratization in Turkey's political and administrative structure.
- 2- Bases on the self- sufficiency considering that problems can't be solved by changing the state system alone.
- 3- Progresses on the philosophy of local empowerment and enabling the people to have a voice in speech and decision in the methods to be developed for solving the problem.
- 4- Defends democratic participation and based on the parliamentary system in all local units to include the public in decision-making process.
- 5- Defends a regional and local structure to enable the free expression all cultural differences rather than understanding of an absolute 'ethnic' and 'land'- oriented autonomy.
- 6- Proposes the creation of democratic self- governance in each regions and autonomous unit with its own colors and symbols in company with validity of 'flag' and 'official language' for all Turkey's nation.

7- Democratic self-governance is organized as ‘regional assembly’ and the member of assembly are defined as ‘regional assembly representative’. The assembly elects the council president and executive board members, to conduct works in their fields, separately. President and executive committee members are proposed to be responsible for execution of the decision made by the assembly.

8- Each of the regions will be mentioned with the special name for that region with the name of the largest province in jurisdiction of the regional assembly.

9- In the democratic Autonomy model, provincial governors are responsible for implementing the decision taken by both central government and the regional executive committee. The provincial organization of the minister will also be subject to the same procedure. Other administrative structures such a provincial Councils Municipalities Neighborhoods will continue to exist’ (Sol Haber Portalı, 06.08.2011).

Just as ethnic exclusion is “inimical to democratic principles” (Horowitz 1993, 25), the incorporation of the Kurds into the polity can greatly contribute to deepening and strengthening existing democratic institutions in Turkey. Kurdish inclusion through devolution of power can not only “help avert separatism” (Horowitz 1993, 36), but also build a pluralist democracy that can usher in changes for other smaller, “forgotten” ethnoreligious minorities throughout the region. In a country that once viewed non-Muslim religious minorities as an obstacle to its national unity and security, the Kurdish HDP nominated members of Aramaic-speaking Syriac (Assyrian) Christians and Yezidis, whose ancient religion draws heavily on Zoroastrianism and has become nearly extinct after centuries of oppression. The HDP’s Garo Paylan became one of the first Armenians to enter the Turkish parliament (Yackley 2015).

While the Kurdish PYD of Syria has embarked on establishing its own “relatively peaceful and democratic administration” with an emphasis on liberating Kurdish and non-Kurdish women (McKernan 2017), several Kurdish-run municipalities in Turkey introduced measures aimed at reconnecting with the region’s multireligious and multiethnic past. In an effort to resuscitate the nearly extinct Armenian and Assyrian cultures in cities where these two Christian communities once held sizeable populations, the Sur municipality of Diyarbakir (a bastion of Kurdish nationalism) helped reconstruct the Surp Giragos Church in 2011. Furthermore, it erected the Monument of Common Conscience in 2013 to raise awareness about the atrocities committed against these communities in the past and to incentivize a democratic coexistence commensurate with Mesopotamia’s diverse and rich history. It also began an initiative to offer services in four languages: Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian.

The Kurdish movement can also strengthen democratic institutions and culture in Turkey through its push for a gender-equal society. The real divide between Western and majority-Muslim countries lies in Western ideological support for equal rights and opportunities for women (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Fish (2002) ascribes the democratic deficit in Muslim societies to the “subordination of women.” Moghadam (2004, 3), highlighting the key role the empowerment of women plays in the quality of democracy, concludes that “women may need democracy in order to flourish, but the converse is also true: democracy needs women if it is to be an inclusive, representative, and enduring system of government.” The Kurdish HDP has been described as “prowomen” and is credited for reaching out to a variety of minority groups excluded by other parties (Robins-- Early 2015).

By the same token, the crackdown on the Kurdish movement carries the risk of undoing the progress made toward gender equality and “threatens a haven of gender equality built by Kurds... in a region where patriarchy is generally the rule” (Nordland 2016). Moreover, it is likely to result in reversing the sociopolitical environment that allowed for having a meaningful debate on how to reconcile the region’s bloody past. In the aftermath of removing dozens of elected Kurdish mayors, the state-appointed trustee replaced the sign on the Sur municipal building (in the above-mentioned district of Diyarbakir that was written in four languages and emphasized the multireligious and multiethnic past

of the city) with a Turkish flag.

## **Conclusion**

A Kurdish-speaking people called 'Kurds' is both the subject and the object of this problem. The geography inhabited by the Kurds for thousands of years constitutes the heart of the Middle East and the Islamic world. The Kurdish population of 25 million people has problems everywhere. The starting point of these problems is affected by the disinfection bombardment of the public. Turkey public the recovery from these effects and without accurate information, the Kurdish issue and to understand the issue from all aspects of lighting is not possible to resolve. In order to clarify again this issue is correct and lasting solution today next to comprehend the social and economic situation of the world, Turkey's event lived from Ottoman historical process, subsequent developments from the Reformation, our Union-Progress Party and the Republican era of political history at a very detailed the way you need to know. It should not be forgotten that the gates of the Middle East were opened thanks to the Kurds who entered the service of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Selim I. The alliance with the Kurds will pave the way for Iraq, Azerbaijan, Aleppo and Damascus.

Under the conditions of the First World War, the systems that were forced into all Islamic geography by force and deceit have caused deep suffering throughout the century. We need to re-discuss concepts such as nation, nationalism, nationalism and racism and examine this framework by making a new analysis.

shown and reference to the Kurdish problem in Turkey about 50 thousand people have lost their lives, it is sufficient to show how we could be faced with a serious question. Every square that changes in regional and international platforms is almost directly related to the Kurdish question. The Kurdish problem for the forces wanted to defeat the weakness Turkey is an extremely useful tool. The issue of what solved, Turkey can show the desired performance nor able to solve the problems of the region.

The political, social and economic dimensions of the Kurdish problem remain important. The Kurdish problem stands as a very important reason for foreign states to put the country in trouble. Solving this problem will be the cornerstone of ending the many difficulties that are at the beginning of the country. In order to solve the problem, firstly, it must be understood and defined correctly. It is not possible to pass treatment without success and be successful. Either the Kurdish problem will be established within the framework of human rights and universal legal rules and a modern democracy will be developed by integrating with the EU, our industrialization will accelerate or it will remain an underdeveloped, authoritarian and oppressive country. This progress will only be achieved through a strong democratic movement that will be formed by freeing progressive, democratic, patriotic Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals from any prejudice. It is not possible to overcome such a movement without a sense of mutual alienation and distrust between Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals. The greatest source of power to find solutions to problems in unity is reserved in our history.

In our last thousand years of history, there have been three important points of contact between Turks and Kurds:

1. With the opening of the gates of Anatolia to Muslims with the victory of 1071 Malazgirt, Turks and Kurds acquired Anatolia and lived under the same roof.
2. The aid of the Kurdish religious scholar Idris-i Bitlisi, who helped the Ottoman Empire against Shah Ismail in the 16th century, and then the Turkish-Kurdish relations,
3. One of the most critical and meaningful contacts of Turks and Kurds in history is the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Kurds, which was defeated by European countries after the First World War.

Following the deaths of thousands of people for 30 years, the most important point we have reached

today is the fact that those who are at the top of the administration have accepted the existence of such a problem. Behind this acceptance will also bring the solution. In order to reach a solution, it is necessary to discuss the social structure of the Kurds and the concept of the Kurdish question, which is parallel to this and has many differences in definition. In the social structure, knowing the origin, religion-sect, population and span of the Kurds will constitute an important reference point in solving the issue.

With the ethnic structure of the Kurds, knowing the above-mentioned historical past and actions, truths and wrongs will ensure that the decisions we will make are correct. To see how big the insoluble wounds caused by the understanding that there is only Turkishness that became the first state policy with the 1924 Constitution and how this wound was re-bled with coups, and finally how the process became positive with the efforts of the Kurds to understand the state policy in 2002, and permanent decisions will be taken to solve the problem. From the Sheikh Sait Rebellion to Dersim, seeing the trauma that occurred in the Eastern people as a result of the coups made every ten years shows the sociological and psychological origin of the problem.

The history of the Kurdish question, which has undergone so much from past to present, has also been different in terms of the definition of the Kurdish question. In this context, we have seen in our historical experience that as a result of the very different views of traditionalists, nationalists and communists on the Kurdish question, the three currents have created great difficulties in establishing unity against the Kurdish question. While the traditionalists advocated the CUP, the nationalists, although there were a few differences of opinion among themselves, had the general idea of gathering under the roof of Turkishness, but the socialists took the issue to a separate Kurdistan.

Today's political parties' search for a solution to the Kurdish problem constitutes an important part of the solution. The fact that the recent parties see the Kurdish question as a 'problem and conducting comprehensive studies in this field has made the writing of this chapter essential. Even though the parties whose main purpose is to find a solution to the Kurdish problem seek different solutions to diversify the solution, they have also blocked some points.

Today, the Kurdish question stands as a problem that is spoken by all segments of the public. In parallel to this, the perspectives of the traditionalist Ali Bulaç, nationalist Mümtaz'er Türköne, our left-winged intellectual and our Kurdish intellectual Tarık Ziya Ekinci, who have different views of the world, have contributed to the solution. In fact, the common point of the approach of the three intellectuals to the Kurdish question, which they want to solve sincerely; urgent democratization.

The country's support for the Kurdish issue at large has led to a general mobilization at the grassroots level and civilian research organizations have also taken the lead in contributing to this process. The reason for giving importance to these non-governmental organizations is that they are working with important academicians and the results of their studies have been realized in practice.

When we filter the problems of the Kurdish problem, we have three main problems. First of all, it is the acceptance of the concept of en the other en that makes itself felt in the region. It should be to ensure that Kurdish and Turkish people are free from this idea of othering throughout the country. This output will be by using the references we made together from the past to the present. It is a great reference that Turkish and Kurdish martyrs were killed in the same grave during the Gallipoli War. The second big problem is that ignorance is the ruling order in the region. There is a serious gap in both positive and positive sciences. Studies on education and training should be carried out with the opinion leaders of the region. The state should apply positive discrimination in the region. Thirdly, the economy is very bad in the region. The fact that the region is in a historical and commercially important position constitutes a position where the economy can develop rapidly. As soon as possible, the first two problems in the region will be solved and the economy will improve rapidly in the region.

Denial of the reality of Kurdish or Turkish state, and beyond that to deal with the Kurdish opposition in Turkey insist on the use of military force, are seen as serious risk for more blood and chaos. As

Wadie Jwaideh (2006, xvi) predicted in the late 1950s, “Kurds play an increasingly important role in the Middle East. His conduct is one of the most important factors in the future stability and security of not only the Kurds, but the entire Middle East.”(Jwaideh, 2006)

The size of the Kurds and their lands; which Turkey, Iran, the divide between Iraq and Syria; The collapse of state authorities in Syria and Iraq, which strengthened Kurdish groups in these countries; and the Kurds in the Middle East, the emergence as an effective partner in the fight against Islamic radicalism, complicate the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and the Kurds want a comprehensive solution to the problem. As Barkey and Fuller (1997) observed, the Turkish state has almost always taken the initiative, so the responsibility for bringing sustainable peace lies with the Turkish state. Without a real democratic compromise, the situation will likely result in a broken society and a weak state followed by the country. (Barkey and Fuller, 1997)

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