



**THE HOMOGENEITY OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE: A
STUDY OF THE SOMALI BANTU ETHNIC COMMUNITY**

By

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***Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Studies Education.***

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DECLARATION

I, Mohamed Abdulkadir Eno, declare that no part of this dissertation has been submitted for any award other than this degree, according to the best of my knowledge, unless such references were duly acknowledged.

Signed: -----

Mohamed Abdulkadir Eno

(ii)

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(iii)

DEDICATION

This Dissertation is dedicated to 'LOOMA-OOYEYAASHA', in other words the oppressed autochthons of Somalia known as the Jareer/Bantu Negroid, and all the ethnically marginalized and stigmatized people in the world.

- Note:** 1. The district capitals, district boundaries and the main roads are not shown in this Map, as they do not serve any purpose of the study.
2. From Hiran region down south to the Lower Jubba region is the territory where the Bantu/Jareer people of Somalia are the dominant settlers.




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THE HOMOGENEITY OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE: A STUDY OF THE SOMALI BANTU ETHNIC COMMUNITY

ABSTRACT

For a long period of time, a general belief has reigned in the academic and non-academic circles that Somalis are an extremely exceptional people, in that theirs is a homogeneous society composed of men and women from one eponymous father from Arabia, celebrating monoculturality, monolinguality as well as monotheologicality! In the background of all the said shared commonalities, this study intends to argue that the Somali people have a composition of various communities of distinct ethnic background, with each ethnic community practising its own distinct mode of living and culture in the midst of a conglomeration of multi-ethnogenic societies.

Therefore, subsequent to the believed universality of Somali culture and origin, the study aims at clarifying the vagueness of Somaliness or Somali citizenship, and that distinct identities, ethnicities and cultures are categorized or marginalized in the melting-pot of Somaliness. The core theme, however, is to put in the limelight the social situation of the

Jareer/Bantu people amidst the racist nature of pastoral Somaloid stock. Relatively, the study intends to investigate the subject by focusing on some basic questions such as:-

- (a) Does Somalia constitute a homogeneous society of Arab origin?
- (b) Do the Somali Bantu/Jareer suffer ethnic marginalization?
- (c) Who is a Somali and by what criteria is the paradigm of Somaliness/Somali-hood determined?

PART I

Chapter One

Introduction

Somalia is on the Eastern Horn of Africa with a population estimated at around 8 Million. It has the longest coastline on the African continent, covering about 3,300 kilometers. It borders the Indian Ocean in the east while on the north it is annexed to the Gulf of Aden, which joins the Red Sea. The modern Republic of Kenya lies on the south and Ethiopia in the west. With an area of about 638,000 square kilometers, Somalia is estimated as being a little bit smaller than the US State of Texas.

The Horn of Africa country is semi-desert with inadequately low rainfall experienced in most of the regions, and at times, several successive seasons of rainlessness in some parts. Most of the land is flat plains and swampy areas in the south with the higher northern mountains rising about 2,000 meters or so.

The main export potential of the country is in livestock and agricultural products supplied respectively from the northern and southern parts, although large numbers of animals are taken from areas of the southern regions. The agricultural sector in southern Somalia is predominantly the mode of production of the inhabitants of the inter-river regions through which the country's only two rivers, Jubba and Shabelle, pass. These areas are mostly populated by Jareer/Bantu communities whose villages are geographically located on the mouth along the banks and in the interior not far from the rivers. Most of the residents here practise subsistence farming with a very little or no surplus at all for most of the families for many years before and during the civil war. Starting from the Ethiopian

highlands, Shabelle is longer than river Jubba. It is about 1,800 kilometers long, more than half of it flowing through Somali territory. It joins Jubba in high flow periods, while Jubba itself flows into the Indian Ocean. In the Lower Jubba region of the valley, particularly Sanguini, is where the equator intersects through Somalia.

Somalia has two rainy seasons, which are 'Deer', October to December and 'Gu' April to June. The 'Jiilaal' between January and March brings the hottest temperature of the year, while the 'Xagaay' of July to September has uneven showers. Climatic vagaries sometimes result drought and famine caused by failure of rainfall, while floods from river overflow sweep away houses and crops whenever the rivers break their banks.

Although there has been no structured educational administration since 1991, some educational institutions operate privately, either through personal investment or donor assistance. Before the inception of the Somali script in 1972, the Somali education policy was under the influence of Italian, English and Arabic systems of education. These distinct cultures provided alternatives to parents who might have favoured for their children one orientation to the other. These learning institutions were all established up to the secondary level after which jobs or scholarships for further study were sought. Until the revolution of 1969, the National University had a small annual in-take with limited faculties for a few selected candidates.

The Somali National University was put into the limelight by the military administration through the expansion of faculties and an increase in enrollment. However, one of the problems facing the institution at the time was lack of regulatory measure or policy in the determination of the medium of the institution where Italian, Somali, Arabic and English culture-crushed, each language having official status as an institutional medium. There were technical and vocational tertiary colleges and institutes as well as private schools for

languages, the latter emerging as a result of a drop in foreign language learning upon the introduction of the Somali orthography and the subsequent adoption of Somali as the national language and as a medium of instruction in the institutions of formal education.

Notable among these institutions were:

- a. Somali Institute for Development, Administration and Management (SIDAM), which in affiliation with Fresno University in the USA offered MBA studies, the highest academic qualification in the country at that time, and
- b. Eno School of Languages, a prestigious institution specializing in the teaching of ESL, Arabic and Italian languages.

While SIDAM was a public institution performing as a parastatal, Eno School of Languages was a private center of learning with various branches in the capital.

During the partition of Africa, the European colonialists who expanded their colonial conquest into East Africa divided Somalia into five parts. The western zone of the country namely Ogaden, was annexed to Ethiopia; the southern edge including parts of the Tana area and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) was joined to Kenya and currently constitutes the Northeastern Province of Kenya; Djibouti, also called the country of the Afars and Issas, was put under French colonial administration; while the northern and southern regions were preyed under the domination of British and Italian colonial rules respectively.

In 1950, the UN put southern Somalia under Italian trusteeship after a couple of wars with Britain over the control of the whole Somali territory. It led to the independence of the two regions north and south and their subsequent unification on 1st July 1960. It is essential to note here that British Somaliland also known as 'Woqooyi' north got its independence on

the 26th June, 1960, about four days earlier than that of the much larger southern part, Italian Somaliland.

Internally and externally, scholars have always portrayed Somalia as a uniquely homogeneous society, which belongs to the same ancestor of Arab origin, sharing the same language, same culture and religion. Prominent orientalist and a section of Somali scholars have featured the Somali people as one nation of a predominantly nomadic pastoral society whose relationships and political structures are based on segmentary kinship and clanism. However, recent scholarship, 'revisionists', suggests that Somalia's homogeneity and the Somali people's genealogical attachment to Quraishite Arabs, the tribe of the Prophet of Islam Mohamed ibn Abdullahi ibn Abdul-Mutallib, cannot stand scrutiny. In any case, arguments of both faculties of thought are the subject matter of the next chapter of this study.

After unification in July, 1960, Aden Abdulle Osman was nominated as an interim provisional president till July of 1961, when he was fielded for presidential candidature against Sheek Ali Jimale. Osman was re-elected to stay at the helm until 1967 when parliament ejected him out by voting in Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the second president of the Republic of Somalia. During the successive epochs of both Osman and Sharmarke, the political situation was marred by tribal rifts coupled with underdevelopment, eventuated by poor leadership of neocolonialistic nature, clan chauvinism and corruption in the corridors of the top administrative echelons.

Amid such pervasive rifts and internal political wrangles created by the vacuum left behind by Sharmarke, who was assassinated in Laas Caanood by a bodyguard, the successful military coup of Siad Barre was accelerated out of this political humdrum which might have apparently led the country into civil strife and political chaos. On 21 October 1969,

Siad Barre and other high ranking army officers plotted a bloodless revolution whose ideological propensity would cause unproportional socio-political transformation for the evils of everything. However, on assuming power the military suspended the national constitution, dissolved the civilian government and the parliament, disbanded the existing political party (parties), detained or, as it is often euphemistically claimed, “held in protective custody” the political leaders of the former regime.

Unfortunately, most military leaders in Africa have the tendency to claim that they will relinquish the state power back into the hands of civilians after a short period, but it is a known fact that most of them cling to power longer than they had promised, plunging the nation into collapse, which in the Somalia case both collapse and anarchy became reality.

Dictatorial rule and clan-based politics have deteriorated the living standard as a new elite of army officers emerged to misuse their ranks as an avenue for achieving personal gains. Top civilian leaders also joined in the looting of public funds and expropriation of individually owned agricultural land of the inter-riverine Bantu/Jareer community. Competing classes rushing for the embezzlement of public resources rubbed shoulders in the financial institutions in solicitation for loan facilities and/or individual development funds masqueraded in the name of ‘Iskaashato’ Cooperative Society.

Dissatisfaction with Barre’s dictatorial regime and ethnocentric aggrandizement have procured the uprising of a section of the society who took up arms against a brutal military dictator in a battle that abruptly changed into a Hawiye-Daarood clan war whose mystery finds itself in the background of the ethno-historical feuds in a society characterized as a ‘harmonious homogeny’.

Since Somalia's independence, the Daarood have utterly manipulated the political arena and the privileges associated with it. In late December 1990, a group of armed Hawiye-militia joined forces to overthrow the Daarood regime led by General Mohamed Siad Barre. As a result, the Hawiye waged a heavy street fighting to which Barre responded with massive artillery bombardment of Mogadishu, the capital city. Subsequently, Siad Barre was expelled from Villa Somalia, the presidency, by untrained youths who consisted of sections of the neglected young population living in the streets of the capital as glue-snufflers, locally known as 'ciyaal koolo'. Whatever the effects, the war prolonged into anarchy and atrocities that saw the dehumanization of the unarmed communities and abuses against the oppressed peoples.

For almost a decade and a half, endless conferences, alliances, self-imposed administrations, peace and reconciliation symposiums and billions of US Dollars in humanitarian assistance and development aid, could not lay the groundwork for the reformation of a functional Somali statutory structure. The last Somali National Reconciliation Conference, which was the 14th of such reconciliatory initiatives organized by the well-wishers among the international community, continued in Kenya for a period of about two years. The conference was concluded with the formation of an interim federal parliament, an interim president and an interim cabinet, none of which is functionally effective as of now (November 2005). Also, the institutions are in disagreement over the seat of the government.

During the civil war, hundreds of thousands of people became either internally displaced or crossed the borders over to Ethiopia and Kenya as refugees while others went as far as Yemen by boat. Thousands of others managed to travel as far as Europe and America to seek asylum. In Kenya, the Banadiri and Barawan communities were beneficiaries of US resettlement programmes awarded to the vulnerable minority communities affected by the

war. Both communities resettled a combined number of about 7,000 refugees. Anyhow, the milestone resettlement programme came in 1999 when the US government accepted over 13,000 Somali Bantu refugees for resettlement as a durable solution.

The Somali Bantu/Jareer resettlement came as a result of a worldwide advocacy mission conducted by Bantu elites; the UNHCR's recommendation based on Jareer vulnerability in Somalia and the oppression which they have lived under even before the civil war; the US concern on human well-being; and astonishing evidences of oppression revealed by international aid workers and non-governmental organizations that worked in Somalia at the height of the civil war and the subsequent drought and famine which mercilessly devastated the agrarian and agro-pastoral communities in certain regions in the inter-river area.

Background to the study

This study bridges together areas of my interest in the Social Studies discipline. The prolonged civil war in Somalia, the social status of the Bantu/Jareer people and an insight into the conflicting identities of the Somali people has influenced me to study the subject. The concentration, however, is not only in the social history of the people but more so also on the effects of the dynamics in the contemporary social life. Having a wide knowledge of the Somali peoples, their cultures and their social systems, and involvement in various spheres of the social development field over the years, have become a basis for my desire to examine the realities about the different communities in Somalia and their interplay with and effects on each other.

By reading the next chapter, the reader may think of this study as a general discussion about Somalia presenting the traditional culture of nomadic pastoralism in its entirety, but

the bottom-line is to set the stage for an extensive understanding of the Bantu/Jareer people whose historiography has been denied the due locus it deserves in the history of the Horn, particularly in Somalia. In the proceeding chapters, except Chapter Two, and the culmination of a survey elaborating the status of the Jareer and the stigma they tolerate under the guise of Somali 'homogeneity' and 'brotherhood', the study will maintain its limits within the said perimeters.

Method of Study

In conducting this study, several methods and underpinning tools have been utilized in order to exploit each method where it suits appropriately. Unlike the concept of some researchers and scholars who would deem preference of one method to the other, I opted for Indian social scientist Prof. Mukherjee's accommodating suggestion that, "Quality – Quantity is not a dichotomy," because according to him, "...there is no 'either/or' between them. There is a relationship between them."¹

Embarking from the idea of relationship, I tried to utilize tools from both qualitative and quantitative methods, with an observance of their relativity. When data collection was necessary to follow the anthropologist's system, the choice was made to be so, and the participant observation method was employed because, as Best and Kahn present it, "The very nature of the in-depth, detailed description of events, interviews and the like, is what makes qualitative research so powerful."² Through these contacts made with oral historians and traditional intellectuals, I held several workshops and provoked some brainstorming sessions in Somalia and in the diaspora, and elsewhere used open-ended interviews in order "...to access the perspective of the person being interviewed,"³

To supplement this information gathered in the formal way, a lot of informally acquired data was also accommodated where necessary. In undertaking this study, personal experience in journalism, career in teaching as well as training in research methodology have all availed a degree of support in their respective approaches, utilizing useful data from the web as well. This thesis has therefore benefited from multiple disciplines in the area of social studies, which I carefully consulted frequently.

Constraints

However the magnitude of the effort, there are often limitations that confront the researcher/s in the process of data collection, especially in a lawless country where authority rests on the shoulders of gun-wielding militia protected by the clan and its unscrupulous bigwigs; so this study was not an exception. Although assistants were trained adequately with theory and practice, and questionnaires were designed for uniformity of responses, a small number of the interviewees have not responded to certain questions adequately while others have not returned their questionnaires.

Meanwhile, almost all the subjects who had a literacy of some level have responded well. But as some interviewers completed their duty within a fair period, others had to delay due to rains and lack of logistics to commute them back to base. Also the banning of flights to and from Somalia by the Kenyan authorities, though temporarily, had cost a bit of delay. In some locations, the armed militia posed a threat as the collection of the survey data was to reveal some of the atrocities they were inflicting on the local people; it was not very easy but a prompt intervention by members of the local community has made the work smooth.

What makes this a study with a difference is that, except from the questionnaire respondents, data was collected from several informants representing the various communities, whether oppressor or oppressed. It was a strategy based on learning from the knowledge and views of the people on what they know about the area of my study. From some informants, I had to take notes while others had to be videotaped and/or audiotaped in Somalia and overseas. In this respect, I tried to avoid concerns which many communities had raised over “misrepresentation and misinformation which used to happen in old days,”⁴ lamenting orientalist researchers who collected data from “northern informants narrating about intricate socio-cultural subjects on the south with which they (informants) were unfamiliar.”⁵ In later days, these researchers and their misguided studies were not only subject to criticism but the cause of disrepute as well.

Unlike some scholars who would depend on translators who, as humans, may not be free from bias, particularly in investigations concerning ethnocultural issues about Somalia, I had the opportunity to conduct my interviews in Af-Maxaatiri, Af-Maay and Kiswahili which are popular among the individual communities, and was able to access from certain communities sensitive and vital data which otherwise a translator from the periphery of the community would have been unable to decode with accurate interpretation. For example, Catherine Besteman⁶ notes Virginia Luling’s inability to access information from the ‘habash’ of the Geledi, whom the latter described as “uncommunicative”.

My intention is in no way to undermine the superb works of the foreign scholars who did appreciable research of sound quality based on fieldwork, such as those in the Jubba and Shabelle valleys at a time when it was almost impossible to carry out such studies, but literally it makes a difference when one is a polyglot who is able to communicate in several languages as spoken by the target communities. As Jan Vansina strongly recommended, that prior to collecting the oral data of the community being studied, one

must first learn their languages, culture, and the environment they live in; and in my case, I was born and brought up among the communities under study.

Accordingly, I had to give the quantitative method and tools due consideration since the study contains a survey intended to gather the view of a sector of the community as a sample for investigation. It was, therefore, inevitable to apply a statistically based measurement to compare the views of the interviewees concerning the variables under observation.

Quantitative research method, popular for its numerical aspect of analyzing data, focused on the quantification of factors related to oppression and ethnic marginalization. Through this method, I was able to collect data from a large number of people by employing the questionnaire, combining structured and open-ended questions, in agreement with Best and Kahn who wrote “a questionnaire is used when factual information is desired.”⁷ And in this core segment of the research activity, the aim was to study and produce a representative document on whether or not sections of the so-called ‘homogeneous’ Somali society suffer marginalization in effect of their ethnicity. Therefore, Part Three is mainly dedicated to the elaboration of the survey on segregation and marginalization employed as a result of the concerned community’s ethnic diversity. The study will however respect the quantitative survey by introducing it with its Method of Study.

Whatever the methodic approach may be, qualitative and quantitative research methods are both useful and sometimes even combinable in one single study. Both methods can be incorporated to justify the description or measurement of certain variables or phenomena under investigation without necessarily compromising the ethical issues of conducting the research with validity, reliability as well as verifiability. In her discussion about the Stability and Reliability of Measures, Mary Ngechu clarifies that “If the tool is

reliable, the responses to it (data) are valid and therefore reliable. It occurs and is achieved when the response measure is stable.”⁸ Remarking on the importance of validity, Drew defines that “Internal validity is the technical soundness of a study.”⁹ So, the investigations were carried out considering the research ethics and qualities of its validity, internally and externally.

Oral Tradition/Oral History and Scope of the Study

I considered oral tradition because we can acquire from the historians what they know about their social history as a result of the information inherited from one generation to the other. What is in their memory is actually a virtual representation of what they are conscious of, concurring with Catherine Besteman’s assumption that, “Memory is part of the social consciousness.”¹⁰ I therefore selected distinguished oral historians according to age, expressiveness, and knowledgeability on the subject as well as their reminiscence of the sources so as to ascertain their relationship.

I was already familiar with some of my informants while others have been made aware of the purpose of my visit in advance. Some of these historians are poets too, a factor so advantageous in social oral literature in Somalia. The recitation and flow of the verses help confirm the event under current discussion by refreshing the memory into the past. Some of these traditional intellectuals reconfirmed with poetry the narratives recounted by other historians. Due to their support, it became possible to reconstruct the chronology of certain past incidents. Interestingly, most of these historians had a clear separation between recent history i.e. colonial era / pre-colonial period (which some of them had witnessed), and what they termed as “taariikhdi horo” the ancient history, or “taariikhdi antikada” the ancient ‘antique’ history whose focal point was circumscribed to unearthing the nitty-gritty surrounding early settlements and antecedence in migration.

Contrary to Klein who cited the embarrassment involved in the collection of data from descendants of emancipated slaves, I happened to discuss in one session with the offspring of an ex-slave and an indigenous member; they cooperated in the retrieval of the information and in reminding place names. I have noticed neither embarrassment nor inaccessibility as mentioned above in the case of Luling or Klein.

Since the study encompasses divergent stocks of Bantu/Jareer ethnic groups, I had to carry out my interviews among communities in diverse regions where the Bantu practise a predominantly sedentary mode of production. These areas included Banadir (Mogadishu), Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, areas of what used to be known as Upper Jubba (before their political separation by Siad Barre), including Bay and Bakool, and parts of the wider Jubba Valley. The riverine dwellers in the Shabelle zone were mainly approached for what constituted the history of the autochthonous 'Negroid' Jareer population, though not exclusively – because of the presence of descendants of an ex-slave stock – while Gosha is rich with the history of the diaspora breed of the more recent 19th century migration from Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique.

After completion of the primary data collection, selection was one task I gave much consideration. I tried to make a cautious selection of the traditions and histories that have been severally repeated and confirmed by a majority of the older historians. For instance, if a certain episode was narrated by two separate informants in two different areas and then repeated by a source in another distant area, I would investigate it deeper for its usable validity. The secondary data consists of published and unpublished works selected from a variety of sources, with consideration to their pertinence to the discipline and situation. But, as the voluminous bulk of the data collected in relation to the subject can

not be accommodated all in this study, only the relevant parts were taken, leaving some of it to appear separately in Omar Eno's coming work and also some of my own.

Among other factors, the consideration of the various narratives and traditions has been necessitated partly by:

- (a) The embryonic stage at which the investigation of the history of the autochthonous Somali Bantu currently is.
- (b) Paucity of written material / documents in individual or institutional custody.
- (c) Neglect by the Somalist scholarship and Somali governments to record the versions of the indigenous Bantu oral historians.
- (d) This author's recognition of the availability of abundant traditions and historical oral literature, which are archived in the memory of many oral/traditional historians and contemporary poets of renown.
- (e) The academic need to emphasize the variance between the parallel histories of the Shabelle and Jubba valleys, in other words, the aboriginal natives and victims of the East African coast Arab slave-traders and their Somali counterparts.
- (f) The necessity to collect from the living traditional intellectuals and oral historians the knowledge they can impart, so as to avoid inaccessibility into the memorically saved data after their death, a sad situation experienced by Besteman who recalled in her dissertation:

*Sadly, one of the most knowledgeable of the local historians died during the course of my fieldwork. There was no one else in the village who could match him for historical knowledge.*¹²

(g) To fulfill partly, Cerulli's plea concerning fieldwork among the Negroid populations of the river valleys.¹³

Organization

This dissertation is arranged in three parts and ten chapters, separated according to content and sequential focus of context.

PART ONE

Chapter One: An introductory note on Somalia – the subject matter of the study – and the methodology.

PART TWO

The second part contains the body of the thesis which is comprised of five chapters in the following sequence:-

Chapter Two: introduces an ethnographic focus of the non-Bantu Somali society, their origin, culture and mode of living while attempting to cover some cultural contrast between the north and south of the country and some of the inhabitants living therein.

Chapter Three: gives an overview of the historical background of the Somali Bantu/Jareer community. It bears an elaboration of the two model histories of the Bantu/Jareer people, distinguishing between (a) the indigenous autochthons and (b) the diaspora; not sparing to provoke once again the debate on the Shungwaya issue as a relevant subject to the matter.

Chapter Four: illustrates the social status of the Somali Bantu/Jareer people through a discussion encompassing four separate perspectives such as: (a) colonial period, (b) post

colonial civilian regimes, (c) Siyad Barre's military rule, and (d) period of civil war and anarchy.

Chapter Five: intends to circumnavigate through the civil war period of almost a decade and half and its impact on the Somali Bantu/Jareer community, with specificity on their displacement and their plight as seen in some of the refugee camps in Kenya.

Chapter Six: lays its concentration on the subject relating to majority-minority clan distinctions and the general environment of the 14th Somali National Reconciliation Conference held in Kenya, the participation of the Somali Bantu/Jareer community and the Somali participants' reaction towards them. The chapter gives some insights into the recent phenomenon of 4.5 apartheid system of clan power sharing formula dividing the community into Somali and non-Somali. The chapter paves the way for the discussion on "Somaliness" in the subsequent chapters.

PART THREE

Chapter Seven: discusses several of the criteria employed for qualification to somaliness and the tools used to measure the degrees of Somaliness. It also serves as a prelude to the quantitative segment of the study dealing with the phenomenon of ethnic marginalization and other practices of Apartheid form.

Chapter Eight: defines quantitatively the results of an investigation conducted to study the nature of stigma and the ill impact of ethnicity which Somalia has inflicted particularly on the Somali Bantu/Jareer community, thus controverting the general belief about Somalia's homogeneity which was promoted by a section of colonial scholars as well as dubious Somali 'nationalists'.

Chapter Nine: presents the analysis and discussion of the results of the survey furnished and interpreted in its preceding Chapter Eight.

Chapter Ten: covers the conclusion of the entire study.

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PART II

Chapter Two

An Introduction to the Non-Bantu Somali People

There are several approaches which the Somali people can be classified, and which system to employ depends on who is using it and /or for what purpose. Though according to Ioan M. Lewis,¹ a general perception exists in the fact that the clan stands as the center-pole of the nomadic political system that holds the kinship together, suggesting the existence of about 4 to 6 clan entities, others may make it even more, by taking into valid consideration the separate units of Reer Xamar (Banaadiri), Barawaans (Reer Baraawa), Midgaan, Madhibaan, Jareer² etc., and the list could go on and on. In this way, Lewis thinks that the often memorized patrilineal genealogy is to the Somali the same as “what a person’s address is in Europe.”³

Another method of categorization would fall all the communities in the Somali peninsula into the two polar units of Jareer and Jileec (hard hair and soft hair) without putting into context the genealogical affinity of each group, but rather through a classification established on the basis of physical composition of the people themselves as Negroid and non-Negroid. To the more conservative person, this approach may seem to intimate an indulgence in a system not utilized earlier, but we can try to make it the baseline of this study without violating the composition of the clan systems existing in their own traditional rights. Therefore, the adoption of this method represents yet [another] attempt of contributing to the ethnic classification or stratification method, a useful categorization which functions practically as the reality on the ground. So, in order to grasp the essence behind the Jareer and Jileec diversification, we start with the latter, the Jileec Somalis, in other words the Non-Bantu, Non-Negroid Somali people.

Versions of Inconsistent Traditions

The oral traditions go that, in the beginning, an Arab immigrant arrived somewhere along the shores of what is located in the northern coastline of Somalia. He was washed away on the shores after experiencing trouble with his dhow, which was wrecked. He was received by the local residents in the area, married from them and caused an unusual human germination of massive multiplication, demographically outnumbering the host community. One Sheikh Ismail Jaberti, as he was called, became a symbol of a rare case as an immigrant hero who later became the factor behind the biogenesis as well as genealogical 'transformation' of an entire race of black Africans into what Ali Jimale ironically describes as "Arabs with a tan."⁴

Douglas Collins writes about a tradition, which suggests that this 'noble' Arab was cast adrift many centuries ago as a boy and upon reaching manhood, fathered the Darod clan through his marriage to a local girl called Donbira. According to Collins, it was "Bereda, a small coastal fishing village," that his informant Yusuf told him as the place where "Darod, an Arabian noble, many centuries ago was cast adrift as a small boy and later in life married a Somali girl named Donbirro and so founded the great Darod section of the Somali people."⁵

A very peculiar situation arises in the implement of the traditions regarding the arrival of Darod as an individual, whether as a boy or a grown-up, or even if we consider, for the purpose of this discussion, that Jaberti Ismail begot him. Throughout the traditions, we are told about the coming of Darod, Issak or Ismail Jaberti (some traditions putting as Jaberti Ismail) as individuals who married from the local communities. Later, we find in the lineage construction that all the Somaloid stock, including Digil, Issak, Reewing (Mirifle), Darod, Hawiye and many others have descended from Samaale whose

ascendancy is connected to Hiil, then Aqil and then further back to Qureishite lineage of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam.

In another tradition, 'A Handbook of Abyssinia' presents that the eponymous ancestor, one Sheikh Jaberti "was wrecked on the NE. Coast where he settled and died, leaving a son Darod, the father of the Darod branch,"⁶ who was later to foster the 'noble' people that make the great nation of the Darod clan, whose descendant sub-branches constitute the Marehan, Majerten, Ogaden, Dhulbahante and others. For this reason, the 19th century scholarship consisting of certain writers from the colonial regimes that occupied Somalia, have focused on the northern part of the country as being probably the cradle of the Somali nation since it was believed as the entry point through which the Arabs had arrived. Commenting on one of such writers, specifically Lewis, Christine Choi Ahmed says that the "first and best-known scholar to examine Somali society... almost all his field work was done in the northern Somaliland."⁷ Yet Lewis himself acknowledged the paucity of factual substance in the content of the Somali traditions, often lacking in precision in dating and in names.⁸

The more peculiar scenario about Somali genealogy is in its lack of even two identical lineages in the more than five versions leading to the Arab ancestral father Aqil. Although generations of people kept the concept alive through the rehearsal of 'abtirsi' the count of the genealogy, few have thought of the nature and origin of names, which sound more Cushitic/African than Semitic/Arabian. Several of the same lineages are also often counted inconsistent with one another; for example, whereas some count 23 forefathers to their ancestor, others do fewer generations. The occurrence of such divergences and inconsistencies invite the notion that every Somali group has concocted at will a supposed chain of names to represent phoney ancestors of unreal existence.

Some of these traditions narrate about the arrival of an Arab immigrant who dug a well in a strange newfound land. He helped a young herdsman to water his flock from 'his' well. After sometime, her father who had been surprised by the good health of his animals followed her. Upon arriving at the site of the well, the Arab immigrant refused to open 'his' well unless and until the girl's father promised him a marriage to his daughter. After he was made the promise, the Arab immigrant removed the cover from the mouth of the well and watered the flock. Though doubtful the tradition is, what is so certain about it is its contradiction with the Somali saying of "wax la yaqaan guurso, wax la yaqaan ha lagu dhalee", which encourages marriage to someone known so as to foster offspring whose origin is known and propitious.

This narrative though, seems to be a reconstruction of a modified replica of the Qur'anic story of Moses⁹ who, after committing a crime, emigrated from his home to a strange land where he helped to water animals for two sisters. He was called for by their father and upon agreement of providing service for several years, Moses was promised marriage to one of them. After the completion of the stipulated duties, Moses married the girl and later acquired prophethood from God.

The dissimilarity of the two traditions lies in the fact that Moses was watering the two girls' small ruminants from an existing well whereas in the Somali traditions, Darod dug the well himself in a strange land. How only one man could dig a well in a territory where he was alien, and how he acquired the tools are arguments that the oriental anthropologists and historians did not investigate substantively. The tradition also suggests that perhaps no other citizens either knew about this well or used it to water their flocks; or even possibly that Donbirro and her father were the only life existing in the area.

In the Darod clan family, a section of the traditions say that Darod himself, the noble Arab, was cast adrift as a young boy, and that he got married to a local girl Donbirra upon his adulthood. Yet, it is bizarre that there is no mention of who Darod's foster parent/s were, since this version of the historiography suggests Darod as an underage child. More doubt also entails how and where he acquired the cynical non-Arab name of 'Darod'. Another question pursues about his 'nobility' because many immigrants fled from their home in Arabia due to persecution as slaves, and some or all those who might have allegedly escaped to the northern Horn region (if the Somali pedigree is one of them) could have as well been fugitive slaves who sought freedom away from their masters, the same as we have seen in the case of the Wa-Gosha people of Somalia. But none of the various traditions and scholars thinks about other possible postulates, nor did the early orientalist scholars present a variant speculation of the topic except the suggestion of population pressure being the reason of the Arab immigrants seeking a safe haven in Somalia.

The historical construction as seen here, needs more corroboration. Obviously, it is not by genuine coincidence that all these foreign Arab immigrants arrived in the Somali peninsula at various dates while at the same time all trace their 'asal' origin, across variant routes, to Qureishi tribe or 'Reer Banu-Hashem' the offspring of Banu-Hashem. Because we do not have any evidence of Hiil, the descendant of Aqil stepping foot in Somalia, can one be of any hypothesis of whether his descendants Sab and Samale had an earlier plan to settle in separate parts of Somalia i.e. south and north, and transgerminate with the local females a new breed in the name of Somali and later to become the genealogical representatives of Qureish in the northern Horn of Africa? Even if we accept the idea as that, how can we justify an Arab naming his children Sab and Samale, Cushitic names he was unaware they existed?

For the section of the traditions which suggest Jaberti Ismail as the Arab newcomer marrying Dir's daughter Donbira, we encounter a controversy because we hear some traditions opinionating the descent of Dir and Hawiye from Irir, who also came from Samale, one who tracks Hiil as his agnatic forefather. This version seems to support the thought that Dir fathered both the Ishak and the Darod, as Ioan M. Lewis illustrates.¹⁰

More suspicion encompasses the origin of some of the names in the 'abtirsi' genealogy, like 'Kombe', which can be classified as ethnic Bantu rather than a Semitic Arab name. Whatever the case, it is rather hard to regard credibility to any of these traditions because of their inconsistency and the controversies that make none of them plausible.

Most of the Somali progenitors have their traditions based on imitations of either ancient Arab stories or other Cushitic traditional heroes found on a tree or watering animals from a well. Abdalla Mansur's¹¹ details on the subject reveal not only the confusion surrounding the topic but they also devaluate the authenticity of Qureishite genealogy of those who deem a high regard for the affiliation of their identity to an Arabite eponym.

This specification being a basis for Somalia's claim for Arab origin, which some scholars justify was exacted by population pressure from that region of Southern Asia in the proximity of Somalia, coupled with a recent Somali migration from the north Horn to the south of the country, have misled many seasoned scholars by placing northern Somaliland as the point of origin of the Somali race. As Professor Gunther Schlee enlightens, "Not only the more general historians (e.g. Low 1963: 321) but also the best specialists (e.g. Hunting Ford 1955:19; 1963:65-6; I.M.Lewis 1955: 45; 1980: 22-3) have succumbed to this error."¹² In a similar contention, Ali Abdirahman Hersi comments on the trend as "...puzzling," explaining the implausibility of the theory as he states, " Stranger

yet is the fact that so many authorities have persisted in these far-fetched and untenable explanation.”¹³

Another link to Arab genealogy is deemed to the Isaaq clan, which is comprised of the Idegalla, Habar-Jecel, Habar-Yoonis, Habar-Awal, and several other sub-groups that stand perceptually firm as the descendants of Sheikh Isxaaq (Issak). According to the traditions and their perceived extrapolation, Sheikh Issak was an Asiatic-Arab from Kerbala in Iraq and stayed in Hadramut in Yemen for some years. He is claimed to have been a close kin of the prophet of Islam, Mohammed bin Abdullah bin Abd-ul-Mutallib, with some of the traditions placing their relationship as cousins.¹⁴

Sheikh Issak, just like his other immigrant counterpart Sheikh Jaberti, lived among the local people. He married a local African woman of the Dir¹⁵ community, and laid his name as the ancestor of ‘mulatto’ generations later to uphold a noble pedigree that connects them biogenetically to Mohamed the Prophet as their consanguinal relative. However, Sheikh Issak’s arrival in Somalia falls in a much later date than Sheikh Ismail Jaberti’s, the eponymous ancestor of the Darod clan.

According to Georges Revoil, the arrival of the Darod clan’s patriarch, whether Sheikh Abdirahman son of Ismail Jabarti or Darood or anyone else, is set at the 75th year after the Islamic Hijra from Mecca to Medina.¹⁶ But in *The Modern History of Somaliland*, British anthropologist I.M. Lewis, renowned as ‘authority’ on Somalia, set the date at some time around the 11th century.¹⁷

While former Ambassador Hussein Ali Dualeh on the other hand avoids a possible controversy from the complications related to historical dating, Ali S. Muhamad was able to track Sheikh Issak’s arrival in northern Somalia to the year 548 A.H.¹⁸ corresponding

approximately to around 1153. Dr. Lewis opines his version as 12th or 13th century.¹⁹

Whatever the arrival date, the unanimity as per the chronology of arrivals is unequivocal about Sheikh Ismail Jaberti or Sheikh Abdirahman or Darod preceding in the migration from Arabia than that of Sheikh Issak, thus further defending the conception that the Darod (as far as the Somali context is concerned) have by far acquired their Arab pedigree earlier than the Issak clan whose ancestor set foot in the Somali peninsula a few centuries later.

Though both immigrants are dubbed with the title Sheikh²⁰ attested to their names, a title which is earned in more aspects than one, it is the latecomer, Sheikh Issak, that more teaching is attributed into his portfolio. But by analyzing the dates Hersi cited from Muhammad's article in the Somaliland Journal, if that is anything to go by, Sheikh Issak came to Zaila in 548 AH, having left Baghdad in 498 AH.²¹ By employing simple differential calculation, we see that Sheikh Issak, though his age at the time of his departure from either Baghdad, Kerbala, Hijaz or any other transit point was not satisfactorily and reliably established, landed on Somali soil at around half a century later than his year of departure from Baghdad. What age exactly he was at the time of the commencement of his incursion is not illuminated either beyond any reasonable doubt.

If we assume that he was a mature and stout young man of 30 years when he departed from Iraq, upon his arrival on the north coast of Somalia he is already an old man of 80 years, teaching Islam to his in-laws at that age, tolerating painstakingly the effects of gerontology with 16 years of Islamic pedagogy as well as raising young children from his African wife/wives, before setting on another journey to yet another strange territory, the Arussi area.

To increase the confusion, Lewis gives elsewhere in his volume *Saints and Somalis* (p.14), that a certain Sheikh Ali Sh. Ibrahim who detailed the hagiography of Sh. Isaaq, records 727AH as the year of Sh. Isaaq's death. Reconciling these dates becomes a constraint since logic denies rendering credence to one version against the other for their inconsistencies. The discrepancy is so wide that it suggests Sheikh Issaq's life span to over two centuries, and that he was bearing children at that unthinkable age.

The extrapolation in this postulate somehow differs with the average rationale, regardless of how much benefit of doubt considered in its favour. For Sheikh Issak to have begotten children at old age may not be the only point under contention, but more questions remain unanswered for the traditions regarding his eponymy to relate constructively. He was said to have journeyed with an entourage of about ninety people, but there is obscurity over what has become of the lives of the entourage. Who of them have reached Somalia with Sheikh Issak? How many of them have also married from the local community and how many had come with their Arab wives? Have any of them returned to Arabia ever since, taking some of their offspring and/or wives with them? Which sub-clan/s represents the descendants of Sheikh Issak's relatives among his entourage? All these and many more questions in fact lack the answers they beg for, hindering to facilitate the reconstruction cohesively for the clearer reckoning of the historiography of the Issak nation of families.

Comparatively, the same investigation is applicable to Sheikh Jaberti as controversy also surrounds the identity of his wife Donbira, the so-called Somali girl married off to him. Some sources narrate that the early people to whom Donbira belonged were Galla who lived in the region prior to the arrival of the Somalis. Other traditions have it as Hawiye or Dir whom Donbira belonged to. Whichever source is considered, the conundrum toward the achievement of a satisfactory response to the hypothesis of immigrants of unsubstantial number exceeding their respective sedentary host communities does not

only sound miraculous but also seems historiographically irresolvable. What has caused the disappearance from the scene of the local African people? Why are the Somalis more related to the Boran/Oromo, Baiso and Rendille culturally, physically and linguistically than to the Arabs?

In another extreme but substantiated discordance with early colonial scholarship, current Somalists – Somalis and non-Somalis - provide their argument based on well-elaborated hypothesis regarding the Somali phenomenon of Arab origin. “There is no way to reconcile this erroneous view with the evidence of historical linguistics or cultural history...”²² Schlee disputes, with the postulation that Somalis need not look far across the sea for their origin, but within the vicinity of the East Africa region where other peoples of similar origin, cultures and languages dominate. Observing these significant cultural characteristics and linguistic similarities shared with societies settled in various parts of the Eastern Africa region, Schlee asserts confidently that “The general attitude behind all these phenomena, namely the pleasure taken in naming social events, in counting and calculating, seems to me to be so deeply rooted in Lowland Eastern Cushites that personally I do not feel the need to look to South-west Asian high cultures or elsewhere for its origin.”²³

The cultural relationship of the Eastern African Cushitic settlers, particularly Somalia and certain tribes such as the Rendille of Kenya and the Galla – Orma, found both in Kenya and Ethiopia gives one the assumption of a similitude whose attributes extend further than coincidental. Nor could those customs and traditions be regarded as an acquisition through minimal acculturation, notwithstanding the Somalis’ deep predilection for Arab pedigree, which in ancient times was used as a qualification for the gain of access to the top seat of rulership.

One of the most critical literatures on the Arab origin and homogeneity of the Somali people, whose contributors mostly consist of contemporary Somali professors and other distinguished scholars, professor of history, Mohamed Mukhtar comments that the Somalis' claim for Arab origin "remains enigmatic," arguing, "One would wonder, in the first instance, how the offspring of just two individual Arabs could become not only the dominant people of the northern part of the peninsula, but also the majority of the whole Somali nation today."²⁴ However, Mukhtar blames the concerned scholarship and Somali authorities in his retribution that, "Efforts have been made to discourage scholars from studying other Somali themes. Valuable sources for the study of Somalia's past were ignored, among them, Arabic, Italian, French and German sources."²⁵

In his volume, *Search for a New Somali Identity*, Dualeh wrote in the opening pages that all the Somali clans come from different Arab immigrants who escaped from persecution in Arabia; their port of entry was Mait and that Issak was the last to arrive – a reason why he (Issak) established himself in Mait town on the coast of Somaliland. Dualeh said:

*It is widely believed that the Dir was the first to arrive at the Somali coast, followed by the Hawiye and the Darod. The last to arrive was the Issaq clan, whose habitat today is the original point of entry for all the other Somali clans, the present Somaliland. The other Somali clans that preceded them have filled the hinterland, and therefore the Isaq was forced to live at the coastal areas.*²⁶

In his argument, the ex-army man turned diplomat points out that the Somali people belong to either one of the five groups of Dir, Issaq, Darod, Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle, all amalgamating into a one Somali tribe which otherwise consist of:

"...A confederation of genealogically un-related clans. There are also a number of minority clans.

*There are no blood-links or other affinity between these five clans, or for that matter between the smaller clans... The commonality is the language and the religion... The genealogical descent shows that the five main clans, have no blood-links whatsoever.*²⁷

Dualeh contributes the philosophy that Sheikh Issak, the assumptuous forefather of the Issaq clan of families as one who "...belonged to the Hashemite tribe...he got married to a Sudanese girl. She gave him four sons." He so certainly writes that when Sheikh Issak arrived in Somalia, he came with his Sudanese wife and their four children. And after that, "In Mait he got married to a girl from the Dir clan...she gave him four sons."²⁸

Dualeh's presentation of the narrative about Issak, like the others, relates all the praise of a legendary hero and his magical multiplication of a nation of nobles, but one acutely not short of controversy. Of more than four Issak informants, including a woman, none was aware of their supposedly four siblings from the Sudanese mother. Nor did Dualeh explicate the names of Issak's Sudanese/African firstborn children or whom their present-day descent lineages constitute, and whether they have returned to Sudan ever since Issak's death. A clarification of the Sudanese woman's children would have enriched the discussion as an inceptive point for further study. Other oral literatures mention an Abyssinian first wife, but unfortunately Dualeh does not contribute any one of his sources.

In another observation, Dualeh presents Issak and his presupposed compatriot Arab predecessors as arriving in numerous contingents of separate clans. He remarks above, "The other Somali clans...have [filled] the hinterland, and therefore the Issaq (Issak) was [forced] to live at the coastal areas." (Emphases mine.)

Here Dualeh seems to be negligent of specificity in dealing with the subject. At one point he sounds to present individual immigrants before reproducing the same as nations of

clans with each cluster clan moving into the Somali peninsula as a separate group of its own. His argument of the other clans filling the hinterland, thus earmarking high population density and/or population pressure inside Somalia, is better explained by Hersi who wrote about a quarter of a century ago that, "Two hundred years ago the Somali population could not have been a quarter of its present magnitude."²⁹ Nevertheless, the indication we get from all these traditions exposes the extent to which the Somali genealogical myth had interplayed with the average social psychology with intent to pave way for the achievement of interest in the social pursuit for nobility and the attainment of power.

The debate on this subject heats up as two schools of thought encounter. The 'orientalist' school promoted the Arab genealogy of the Somali people, with the insinuation that all the Somali people, as an outcome of the 'abtirsi' which traces its roots back to the prophet of Islam, belong to a common ancestor and, for that matter, make a homogeneous nation who belong to one genealogy (Quraishite Arab), one culture (nomadic pastoralism), one language (Somali) and one religion (Islam).

In this regard, and apart from I.M.Lewis, Dr. Thomas Eriksen also considers Somalia "...one of the few sub-Saharan states that are truly ethnically homogeneous..."³⁰. And in Saadia Touval's words the Somalis are "...a rare case of a homogeneous ethnic group, inhabiting a large territory and united by culture, religion and tradition."³¹ Yet in the widely read *Somali Nationalism*, Touval writes intensely about the composite groups of the Somali nation, without exempting the outcaste communities and the artificially self-made cohort of noble clans.

On the other hand, the revisionist scholars do not only dispute the Arab genealogy but also stay firmly opposed to Somalia's ethnocultural homogeneity. Outstanding Somali

sociologist, Abdi Kusow, presented some of the most recent radical theories regarding the subtlety of the Somali lineage system. Succinctly, he defines some of the reasons that led to the purportedly long-enduring homogeneity narrative as, "...an assimilative process [which] is in many ways made possible by the fact that the sponsors of the lineage-based narratives directly or indirectly controlled most of the post-colonial Somali political structures."³² On that narrative, Kusow concludes: [It] assumes that the Somali society is homogeneous on an [abstract] idealized level, but in its everyday reality, consists of different groups with different social values and modes of production. ³³ (Emphases added.)

In dehomogenizing the efficaciously traditionalized paradigm of Somali homogeneity, Kusow presents a self-axiomatic case of the outcaste communities such as: Tumaal, Yibir, Midgaan and the Madhiban, who represent a section of the oppressed populace under the homogeneity banner, elucidating, "despite the mythical equality, though, this narrative has been successful in effectively marginalizing and stigmatizing a significant portion of the Somali society as having an unholy origin."³⁴ In a similar sentiment, however, literary critic, Dr. Ali Jimale Ahmed, approaches the debate with a scholarly concern in his postulate that "These perceptions have contributed to the creation of a Somali that is *in* Africa, but not *of* Africa."³⁵ [Italics original.]

From another perspective, Somali Bantu rights advocator and scholar Omar Eno, clarifies the distinction authoritatively in a grand expression, reiterating that "Somalia is a diverse nation holding together peoples from different cultures, traditions, languages, values and destinies. Somalia should celebrate the cultural differences that exist, which could ultimately be a strength."³⁶

In the paragraphs above, I have tried to present some of the pervading faculties of thought regarding Somali genealogy and homogeneity and the basis of their contentions. In this norm, the scope of classification within the Jileec group of Somalia varies. So far, our discussion was focused on the northern part of Somalia, as it is the place many scholars believed as the birthplace of the Somali nation. In the following section, the discourse will turn its course to the southern counterpart and the general predication of the comparative schools of thought, this time quoting written documents and oral traditions where necessary.

The Digil-Mirifle/Sab group

In Somalia, the groups mainly constituting the Digil-Mirifle,³⁸ sub-branches of the Hawiye clan, and groups of the coastal area, though pursuing different cultures and modes of living, find themselves agglutinated erroneously as practicants of the nomadic culture of pastoralism. But the variant cultures, distinguished by settlement, ecology, and language are distinctly separate and stand as entities of their own as practised by their people.

Located in several regions along the riverine areas where the two rivers Juba and Shabelle stream their course, the Digil-Mirifle clan of families is symbolized by the distinctive texture of their Af-Maay³⁹ language, which, in every sense of the word, enjoys a lingua franca status in southern Somalia - from Middle Shabelle to Lower Juba. Different communities and regions do speak varieties of Af-Maay (Maay language), which are intelligible among the interlocutors employing it as their vehicle of communication.

Unlike their northern brothers, whose loyalty is vested vehemently in the dia-paying (blood-compensation) group or the kinship by lineage, the Reewing (Raxaween) culture puts 'Arlaada' the country/the land, at the heart of its integrity. Selected elders lead the political hierarchy and are respected for their wisdom and experience, inconsiderate of

their wealth as characterized by the northern nomadic pastoral structure. In the execution of their social duties, the leaders are supported by “akyaar” - a council of elders. “The social organization of the Sab,” compares Touval, “is much more hierarchical and formal than that of the Samaale.”⁴⁰ Likewise, because they are settled, the Reewing, and for this purpose the entire cluster of the wider Digil-Mirifle confederacy are, yet in Touval’s words, “less- warlike, less individualistic, more cooperative and more biddable than their Samaale brethren.”⁴¹ These cultural characteristics are clear distinctions between the inhabitants of the north and the south of the country.

The Reewing family of clans count their “abtirsi”⁴² (patriarchal lineage) back to their ancestor Sab, the supposed brother of Samaale, ancestor of the stocks of clans comprised of what is mainly counted as the major clans: Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Isaaq. As the late Helander informs us from the Hubeer, the Reewing sub-group he studied, the acquisition of membership is not necessarily only through ascription by birth but equally also by culture,⁴³ lending reconfirmation to Mukhtar’s definition about the gradual decline in the disappearance of ‘abtirsi’ or ‘abtirsiinyo’ as one goes further south of the country.⁴⁴ These ideals being some of the distinctions between the Somali communities, the major dimension of extreme genealogical polarity concerns the so-called eponymous ancestor, the father of Sab and Samaale, coupled with the disagreement regarding the original dispersal point of the Somali people.

The revisionist scholarship contends that, contrary to the adherence to Arabness and blood relationship with the prophet and his Qureishite tribe, the Somali people have nevertheless originated not far from the region. Mukhtar provides several reasons why it would not be suitable for Arab migrants, who had escaped persecution in their countries, to have settled in a closely reachable territory where they could be pursued by their

enemies,⁴⁵ as had happened earlier. His assumption tends that the area was unattractive to the Arabs due to four possible reasons, among them: -

- (i) "The region's proximity" to Arabia where these immigrants could be reached by their persecutors, as had been witnessed in earlier events where missions were sent for the extradition of fugitives who had run away from persecution.
- (ii) Lack of "urban centers" in the area: as Islamic culture fostered in urban life, the predominant culture of nomadic pastoralism, symbolized by extensive wandering for the search of water and grazing land for livestock, could offer little attraction to a more civilized Arabian in pursuit of comfortable living.
- (iii) Absence of "natural harbours" and precarious maritime journeys on violent seas would make a migration to this part of Africa less attractive.
- (iv) "The lack of viable economic resources" was another disadvantage towards the persuasion to settle in the area.

These aside, cultural and traditional similarities among the Galla/Boran, Rendille, Baiso and the Somali are so evident that one may draw a perception of contact/relationship which lasted over centuries; similarities unobtainable in that complex nature through borrowing. Arguing against the Somali genesis from Arabian migration, Schlee discredits the theory as one not more than "a massive ideological construct."⁴⁶ This ideological construct, which Schlee contested, is not only an image vastly accepted by a majority of the Somali people, but also as we have seen earlier in this chapter, a belief to which the 'authority' on the subject have capitulated.

Disproving the north-south migration as the original movement of an Afro-Arabised Somali people, Kusow supports the opinion that the 16th or 17th century migration was preceded by a previous exodus which took the Somalis from the south to the north of the Horn, and

that the scholars who researched on Somalia had obviously based their hypothesis on the second migration which was actually a reciprocity of the former south-north movement. Kusow clarifies: Western anthropologists, particularly Cerulli and I.M.Lewis, postulated well-organized and rather elaborate north-south migration routes and trends based on an otherwise highly mythical but ideologically enduring northern Somali oral tradition.⁴⁷

An examination of the chain of names leading to the ancestral father provides enormous discrepancy of numerous non-Arab names. How such names intruded into use by Arabs who were alien to the speech community, (if not by mythical Somali oral tradition) is also suspect and highly mysterious. Linguist Abdalla Mansur raises suspicion over how an Arab could use such name as “Kablalah”⁴⁸ and others that are so alien even in the southern part of the country.

As researchers shifted their speculation from Arabia to more focus on Southern and southeastern Ethiopia, the Cushitic factor of Somali origin developed more weight and credence. Murdock,⁴⁹ among other writers, was of the view that the Somalis could be related to other Cushitic groups like the Oromo, with the hypothesis that the original dispersal point was from southern Ethiopia up the northern Horn where Somalis settled for a time. Later on, Herbert Lewis⁵⁰ and Fleming⁵¹ wrote in support of the same theme, which so far stands firm, albeit the impossibility in convincing a majority of Somalis about the new shift in their ancestral father from Arab to African, the latter being an identity the Somalis look down upon in disgust, as is revealed in their protest against the “ status under the law of the Colony of Natives of Africa” which classified them as Africans, against which they preferred that, “They should be recognized as Asiatics.”⁵²

Mukhtar’s reasons (mentioned above) aside, historical linguistics elucidates that the southern-spoken Af-Maay of the Digil Mirifle ethnic community could have been the proto

language spoken by a proto-Reewing proto-Somali people prior to the early south-north migration, in that Mohamed Nuuh Ali's lexicostatistical investigation illustrates the distribution of the language as it impacts on communities along the riverine south through central and upwards in the northern regions.⁵³ Ali's linguistic assessment produced heavier density of speech population in the south, assuming gradual decrease across and over the regions towards the north. The result purveys an indication of the southern and southeastern Ethiopia territory in the vicinity of the Digil-Mirifle habitat as a possible original dispersal point of the proto-Reewing -Somali ancestors, who, in Ehret's view, afterwards developed to a proto-Somali offspring.⁵⁴

In my opinion, the fact that there are about three times more Af-Maay dialects in use today than the Somali-proper, further regards less disputable support to the Maay-Maay distribution hypothesis and its decline as we go along the north where not as many 'Af Maxaa' or 'Maxaa-tiri' Somali proper dialects are in practice among the nomadic communities in those areas. The decline in the dialect frequency, therefore, nurtures the presumption of the linguistic effect the geographical distance has impacted on the growth of multi-dialects as we move towards the north. After every caution is considered, I can safely argue about more Maay-Maay dialects than there exists of its "Maxaa-tiri" Somali proper counterpart.

Another contention between north and south surrounds the interpretation of the name 'Somali' itself. Whereas the north base the nomenclature on the imperative compound verb 'Soo-maal' interpreted as "go-milk", the Maay language presupposes the same but with an added connotation:

- (a) 'So-maal' = go milk (any animal) a term usable by both languages Maay and Maxaa, but which the northerners prefer for the camel.
- (b) 'Sa'-maal' = go milk (the animal referred being a cow) specific to only Maay.

The second sentence is suggestive of the agro-pastoral mode of the Reewing as well as some Hawiye sub-groups who herd cattle rather than camel. Touval gives a more variant interpretation and puts it as 'Zu-mal', which denotes a wealth-owner, and also as 'Soumahe', which is the Amharic equivalent to 'heathen'.⁵⁵ Being more analytical in his observation, Hersi acknowledges that, "out of five popular explanations, three are based on Arabic etymologies, the other two being naturally enough, from Amharic and Somali sources."⁵⁶

Hersi's explanation enriches his consent with earlier explications given by Lewis,⁵⁷ Drake-Brockman⁵⁸ and Johnston.⁵⁹ But to overshadow history and limit the scope of knowledge, Somalia's curriculum and instructional texts, particularly in the Social Studies, were tailor-made to suit the ideology of Arabness and homogeneity, a mythical belief that compromised Somalia's African identity. Of all the above-mentioned explanations, only 'soo-maal', 'go milk' was often highlighted in the school textbooks with the multi-ethnic communities in the country sausaged into one genealogical ancestor that originated from Arabia.

In any case, another mystery surrounds the inception of the name Somali. Its recent appearance in the history of the Horn could be an explanation of the beginning of a conglomeration of diverse peoples. Probably, they had had no blood affinity but had joined under that name to face together what might have been a universal threat that they were unable to tackle as individual units, the likelihood being Abyssinia and the Christian culture.

The corroborated contention focused on Somali-Qureishite pedigree does not intend to militate any devaluation against the significance of the immigrant community: Arabs,

Persians and other Asiatics in the Somali history. The effect of their varied roles in the cultural and commercial domain is remarkably vivid in multiple spheres affecting the wider Somali culture. But the re-evaluation of the traditions and the revisitation of the historiography of the country, where necessary, need to be regarded as tasks paramount in the academic realm. In another sense, where a certain theory or a social belief has been investigated to produce a divergent result from what was the paradigm, then the amended version must be studied comparatively at par with the existing theory, if at all it is not discredited.

Horn Culture in Context

A further discussion takes us to a study of some of the cultures and traditions of the African peoples living in the closer periphery of Somalia, notably those in the very neighbourhood, their sociocultural similarities and the possible relationship they might have harmonized with Somalia. Numerous customs and traditions believed in Somalia as part of the social culture, are also widely practised by other communities in the neighbouring countries, so we look at a very few of these practices.

‘Tuf’ (Blessed spit)

We begin with the tradition of ‘tuf’ or ‘tufta’ which is often practised in Somalia in thanksgiving and communal gatherings, during which a blessing is given by ‘spitting’ lightly onto someone sick or to be blessed. Sometimes the spit is breathed into a bowl of water ‘tahlil’ as a blessed/propitious drink for an ailing person suffering from a kind of disease or spirit possession. Alternatively, one may use this traditional religiously blessed medicine for shower in driving away sickness. This tradition might have been part of a culture derived from a proto-Somali people. Superstition apart, the proto-Rendille culture of “hanjuf” the spit with the blessings, or the belief of the ‘dahanti kulel’ the hot hand⁶⁰ that hurts, is primarily a presupposition of an earlier cultural contact between a proto-Rendille

and a proto-Somali people. One may contend beliefs of paganism as entwined in this religious ritual, especially considering Islam as the faith of present day Somalia, but we are engaged in a discussion about socio-cultural beliefs that existed in pre-Islamic eras, specifically when paganism, sky-worshipping and idol-anointing were cherished prevalently as a mode of communication with the omnipotent metaphysical being.

The second significance of this cultural practice is in its linguistic domain, which renders opulent etymological value to the relationship of the spoken word between Rendille and Af-Maay, for the reason that the term 'hanjuf' is semantically as well as phonetically congruent in both languages. The equivalent of 'hanjuf' in the northern Somali-proper dialect is (candhuuf), while in the southern Somali dialect it is pronounced as (cantuuf).

'Megel' (real man/worthy- man)

Subsequently, the tradition of beneficence involving the gift to the needy, whether in camel or in any other commodity, which Somalis are proud of and which makes one 'deeqsi' (generous), and hence 'a man', is invariably also part and parcel of the cultural life of the Somalis' closest cousins, the Rendille, who call 'mejel' (man enough) to such a daring benefactor who parts with a camel as a gift.⁶¹ Again, despite a slight variance in the phoneme situated in the middle consonant 'j', the terminology is very intelligible with the Af-Maay word 'megel' (man), and would very likely qualify for a version of the multiple dialects which the Maay-Maay language is a proto in many regions of the country.

'Arbaca mugdi u dambeeyso'

Another 'paganic' tradition, one which has endured over the centuries, is the avoidance of the last Wednesday of the month, popularly known in Somalia as 'Arbaca-mugdi-u-dambeyso' meaning the last Wednesday falling in the dark period of the waning moon.

This day is often avoided in the initiation and/or undertaking of social activities such as ceremonies, engagements, business ventures and marriages. The 'dark' Wednesday is associated with misfortunes and disadvantages; therefore it is depicted as a matter of great fear for its presumably negative future consequences. It is not by coincidence, however, that the same sociocultural beliefs are shaped in the social customs of the Boran/Oromo and the Rendille living in the East Africa region, particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia.

'Dab-shid-ka'

Cerulli expressed in another tradition that the Somali New Year⁶² is celebrated with a festival of 'dab-shid' the lighting of fire. Unaware of Cerulli's research at that time, but conducting an independent study for a local English weekly, this author commented severally about 'dab-shidka' cultural event as follows:

In the evening before the Aw-Dangole performances are over, everybody on either side of the bank [of the river] lights a small heap of fire in front of the house, and everybody steps over it saying, "BAASOOW BANAAN BAX – BARAKOOW IMAAW," which means "BEGONE, EVILS, BEGONE – COME BELSSINGS, COME," in order to usher in the new year and its blessings. This is what is known as DAB-SHIDKA (The fire-lighting), and it is observed in many parts of the country too.⁶³
(clarification in parentheses recent.)

However, 'Dab-Shidka', the fire-lighting, is one of several ways to mark the celebration and festivities observed in welcoming the New Year. Other equally enduring traditional activities like 'Istunka' stick-fighting are held in some parts of the country, Afgoie being the most famous town for the stick-fighting. As Schlee manifested in writing, the chants performed during this fire-lighting ritual, the Rendille, Boran/Oromo and Sekuye tribes remind one of the "...remnants of their earlier Somaloid (proto-Rendille-Somali) language which have been preserved in this conservative ritual context."⁶⁴

Dr. Hersi tends to deem 'Istunka' stick-fight as a tradition adopted from the people of ancient Egypt, who also have a similar event known as 'tahtib'.⁶⁵ But considering the numerous cultural concordances Somalia shares with the Cushitic neighbours, for the Oromo do have and perform 'fute'⁶⁶ stick-fighting to celebrate their new year, I would personally make the basis of my argument that, though an in-depth study on comparative cultural studies is beyond the scope of this work, the custom has emerged not far from precincts within East Africa rather than the postulate of its importation from a country as far as Egypt on the North of the continent.

Shanti-Aleemood, a sub-branch of the Digil-Mirifle, settled in Wanla-Weyn (Daafeed) between Afgoie and Bur-Hakaba, are also practising observers very fond of the stick-fight. In Bay, it is observed regularly though not by 'fighting' every year. To mark the occasion, even unorganized or little organized youths perform it in their own way by conducting a simple replica of the fight in some districts. By doing so, Ismail Ibdi Issa narrates that the youth enjoy the welcoming of the New Year so that they too get its propitious blessing.⁶⁷

In Afgoie, the southern Somali town whose name is often coined with 'Istunka', the inception of the stick-fight is attributed neither to Egypt nor to the Cushitic race in Eastern Africa. The inhabitants rather believe that the five male children of an earlier ruler called 'Au-Adeer', who at the time held the hegemonic leadership in Afgoie, have started this traditional performance. I am not ultimately making a conclusion on the originator or initiator of the custom, but this is part of the tradition as narrated to me by elders of over 80 years old at the time of my interview with them in the late '70s and early '80s as part of my personal interest in the culture of 'Istunka':

*Whenever Istunka is mentioned, its roots go back to the five brothers born to one of Afgoi's most famous of ancient Sultans, Au-Adeer, called Shanta Au-Adeer (the five of Au-Adeer), who first were the brains behind what stands at the present day as one of the most celebrated festivals held in the southern regions of the Somali Democratic Republic.*⁶⁸

In Afgoi, the elders are great repository of the history and traditions as these are passed from one generation to the other. As far as 'Istunka' is concerned, most of them have been participating (in the words of one of my interviewees) - "...ever since we opened our eyes."⁶⁹

Although Afgoi and other areas in Somalia may undertake the new year festivals of Istunka and Dabshidka as their neighbouring Oromo and other peoples elsewhere, despite being unaware of each other's observation of the custom, it carries much more cultural significance for the Afgoians as the occasion avails every able 'laashin' bard with an opportunity to produce his poetic talent in the creation of spontaneous 'mar'⁷⁰ verse, to which the background chorus group can dance and chant. The 'Shirib' or 'Shurub'⁷¹ as it is called, a chanting procession, is an opportunity for the rival groups on either bank of the river to visit their counterparts on the other side and criticize/taunt their rivals poetically of the lewd or indecent acts committed by any of their kin since the last 'Istunka'. As such, it is a very significant celebration embedded with socio-cultural values. It marks an unadulterated connection between the society and their culture, an aspect which gives considerable importance to the reason why the 'Shurub', 'Dab-shidka', 'Istunka' and other related celebrations are culturally interwoven values of the social identity.

Though I deal with Afgoi/Istunka theme elsewhere as an independent study, I may throw here just an illustrative example of the social connection to the celebrations and subsequently why we consider the oral traditions so indispensably, by studying the next verse:-

A 'laashin' bard from the west bank and his team crossed to the east and produced this 'mar' verse:-

1. *Ninki Sheey dad qaato Shuqulaa u yaal*
*Shukri ii Shariifoow Sheelaraa la geeyi.*⁷²

Translation:

Whoever squanders public property, takes oneself to task,
*For, Shukri and Shariffoow are in custody at Sheelaro.*⁷³

This verse corresponds to an article by Virginia Luling, where she confirms in part, while writing about the municipal administration of Afgoi, saying: "...During my stay in Afgoi, however, this office was there in abeyance since its last two incumbents had been imprisoned for embezzling funds..."⁷⁴ At the time of her visit, Luling was probably unaware of this verse, which now restrengthens her story of the incumbents under custody for embezzlement and how the local traditional intellectual measured the event in his bardic verse.

A brief deductive analysis of this verse shows us:

- (a) The connection between the verse and the two incumbent office-bearers Luling mentioned in her article though she did not give names, that actually these two were Shukri Sheck and Shariff Hassan, alias Shariffoow, two prominent social figures in the district of Afgoi whose imprisonment was a town-talk at the time. Also many more verses exist but will be cited elsewhere.
- (b) How in the oral literature, the traditional intellectual/poet produces his creativity related to social events as realities of the day.

- (c) The significance of the verse (and other social festivities of Istunka/Dab-shidka) to the social history as a retrievable material archived in the human/social memory.
- (d) That historical narratives archived safely in the human/social memory can be accessed in times of necessity for the recounting and narration passed from one generation to the other via memorization. When I (author) first heard the verse, I was a young boy in my early teens, but in my forties now when I quote that same verse effectively as part of a historical reconstruction linking the verse to relevant evidence which a foreign scholar (Luling) had published in an academic journal.

The extrapolation given here is not to explore in detail about the prominence of the Istunka and its Dab-Shidka festival, but to show a reflection of the people's adherence to the customs as events worthy of commemoration, hence their collection and memorization of the verses reminiscent of 'Istunka' as an occasion of particular social significance.

As I noted earlier in this study, the Arabo-Persian migration in particular, and Asia in general, has achieved a memorable historical place in the Somali society in multiple spheres. Long time maritime links were established as Hourani explicates that, "Persian relations with the African coastal regions were largely via this maritime trade networks."⁷⁵ As far as China, the land of the Berbers (Somalia) was known to seafarers and geographers in pre-Islamic periods, with a noticeable un-Islamic culture⁷⁶ which Duyvendak elucidates among other writers, where references of toponyms such as 'Bobabi' (Somali) were given.⁷⁷ Although in the 12th century Al-Idris⁷⁸ writes about the Somali coast of Zeila as yet a city under Christian influence, a few centuries later, Asian travelers witnessed how Islam was flourishing along the Somali littoral, including Brava (Baraawa), Mogadishu (Muqdisho) and Zeila (Seylac) which Ibn Batuta⁷⁹ comments as

important sources of commercial commodities like rhinoceros horn, ivory, hides, tortoise shells and aromatic merchandise rarely available in other parts of the world. These commodities, according to the historians, were supplied to Asian countries and Egypt. To say the least, the Islamization of Somalia is as a result of the arrival of Asian immigrants, whatever their other motives might have been.

Notwithstanding the commercial connections, the most visible legacy from Asia is the generations of people who originated from there, but took residence on the coastal towns of Somalia, bringing in a culture and civilization that marinated a harmonious interplay with the cultures, traditions and general mode of living of the host communities. But when all the credit due is adequately acknowledged, we are left with no satisfactory evidence of traces of agnatic link with Qureish as it is claimed in northern Somalia, except the fabrication of chains of patrilineal names leading to a humdrum of Cushitic and Arabite mixture.⁸⁰

Moreover, early explorers provide a clear account that they had not encountered any meaningful evidence attributable to Arabness in culture, character or otherwise in the areas mentioned as the first arrival points of Somalia's Arab forefathers. Instead, it is cities like in the Banaadir coast, with proven cultural, technological as well as architectural evidence, where a genealogical relationship to Arabia could be claimed, but the case is quite different here. This particular territory, where the cradle claim is most purported, Hersi acknowledges, has provided little attraction to Arab immigrants and thus much less mention in the records, a theory which enhances more approval to Mukhtar's four reasons referred above in this chapter.

Further shedding more light on this particular coastal area allegedly affected by population pressure from Arabia, and which is situated between the north of Mogadishu and east of

Zeila, Hersi registers: "Medieval geographical and historical sources are all but silent about this Coastal stretch. An immediate and also the most reasonable interpretation of this silence would regard it as meaning that there were no significant Arab settlements or activities along that coast." ⁸¹

Certainly, the conundrum associated with the Somali identity is a multilayered puzzle of kaleidoscopic internal and external dimensions. Somalia is entangled in a dilemma of choosing between an African identity which it has denigrated and despicably ignored over the years - as has been seen in its protest and subsequent rejection of the colonial native ordinance categorizing the community as Africans (see above note No. 52) - and an Arab origin which has failed proof in all the tested genealogical conceptions.

Critical of the ideology of Arabness and the ensuing homogeneity which offered little or nothing to respect equality among all the communities, Omar Eno deplores the former constitution of Somalia as a document that had "...no clear criteria for citizenship qualifications ..." He further emphasizes, "The constitution [to be enacted after the civil war] must therefore clearly define who is a Somali."⁸² (Elaboration in parentheses mine.)

In the shadow of Omar Eno's strong criticism lies Somalia's appointment to top positions of Somali - Kenyan and Somali - Ethiopian citizens as Mariam Arif reconfirmed later:

*...a Somali born in Djibouti, Kenya or Ethiopia had the right even to become a president of the republic of Somalia... One of the former Ministers of Defence was originally born in the Northern Frontier Districts of Kenya and had served as a Kenyan Military Officer for many years... There were members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, army and police generals and officers, Ministers, ambassadors and other high-ranking government officials who were treated like any other Somali citizen.*⁸³

In the pretext of predilection for Arabness, Somalia has deliberately compromised the identities and cultures of diverse communities in the country who were debased due to their ethnic African origin and/or with regard to invented forms of tribal hierarchy. This reality, as Kusow⁸⁴ would agree with me, agitates the debate that Somaliness itself is determined primarily according to pre-set limitations governed by geographical location, ironed out through clan categorization. The psychosocial dictum concealed in the distribution of the degree of Somaliness is well preserved as a medium for creating self-ennoblement and superior clan and cultural identity. In a more elaborate fashion, it means that those closer to the cradle where the mythical Arabness had had its initial contact with Somalia (by clan and location) are contextually genealogically more Somali than others whose geographic settlements and patrilineal adjacency are metaphorically distantly located. This system of dichotomy and stratification has been cautiously 'midwived' that it engineered an artificial deficiency for every component of culture and clan, while 'pure nobility' is regarded only to the immediate descendants of Darod and Issak, the two immigrants allegedly hailing from Southern Arabia.

As a discussion on the topic may lead us way beyond the limits of this study, an understanding of the phenomenon remains worthwhile. As I already argued about the Jareer and Jileec division of the Somali people, we are still in our exploration in the understanding of the clan divisions paramount within the Non-Bantu Jileec communities of Somalia. We have focused thus far on the Digil/Mirifle and the so-called descendants of Sheikh Issak and Sheikh Jabarti who 'ennobled' themselves as the supreme descendants and Somali proper, demeaning the rest of their brethren into a lower status than theirs, but somehow higher than the others outside that genealogical bracket. We now turn to the Hawiye clan of families and the phenomenon of linguistic supremacy among the Somali speakers of the Samale descent, with a contrastive form of Af-Maay language.

The Hawiye

Categorically, the Hawiye make a part of the Jileec Somalis. The widely believed traditions describe them as descendants of Hirab who is a brother of Darod. In unraveling through the lineage and genealogical patterns, which are large in number, it is really hard to select the authentic version among them, a concept that in itself narrows the reliability of any of them.

The four sub-clans of Abgaal, Murusade, Hawadle and Habar-Gidir mainly numerically dominate the Hawiya clan. In settlement, the Habar-Gidir share boundaries with elements of the Darod in the central region while their Hawiye brothers are towards the south. The Abgaal allegedly constitute the largest number and are found in several areas from somewhere in the proximity of the central towards regions in the south. The Hawadle are adjacent to the Habar-Gidir in the central part and share sections of the Shabelle River with the Reer Shabelle, Makanne and Reer Isse Jareer communities. The Murusade sub-clan's settlement is subtle. Some of them live in parts in the central, others in the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, while more segments live in various regions in the south. The Murusade are said to be related to the Karanle Hawiye who settle in the proximity of Ethiopia, living with units of the Sheekhaal, also of the Hawiye.

Except the Habar-Gidir who depend on nomadic pastoralism, the other three sub-clans practise a mélange of pastoralism and farming, although certain units among them may engage in these modes separately according to their environment. Sometimes the mode of living depends squarely on the community that accepted them earlier as 'Sheegad' clients, like the Murusade in parts of the south as well as the Abgaal and Habar-Gidir who settled in locations away from their demarcated ethnic territories. Chapter Three will give some discussion about 'Sheegad/Sheegato' client phenomenon.

Linguistically, the Hawiye communicate in dialects of the Somali language proper as conditioned by their geographic location as well as the sociolinguistic community among whom they live. For instance, linguistically, it is indistinguishable between a Jareer speaker and an Abgaal counterpart who grew up both in Jowhar. Likewise, some Murusade, Garre, or Gaaljecel in Afgoie and its environs all speak Afgoie dialect of the Somali Maxaatiri version although they may also speak fluently one or more Maay dialects as spoken by the sedentary residents.

Additionally, every community's interlocution is in its own distinct dialect of the Somali language, an accent that typifies the particular clan of the speaker, especially if one is brought up among one's sociolinguistic community. May be a few sentences can help to compare the familiar Abgaal dialect to that of the north, contrasting them simultaneously with Af-maay:

Af-Maay/Maay language	Abgaal/Hawiye (southern dialect)	Woqooyi (northern dialect)	English
Maay fathaase?	Xaad rabtaa?	Maxaad dooneysaa?	What do you want?
Surungkuungaa ka neebsathooyne	Mahaanaan isaga bajeeynaa.	Halkan baan isaga nasaneynaa.	We're just resting here.
Meelaa iska roog. (Meelaa surunaaw)	Rabtaan iska joog. (Mahaaga iska rorog)	Halkan iska joog. (Halkaaga taagnoow)	Just stay here. (Be where you are)
Igaarti kooyteey?	Igaarti ma timid?	Wiilashi ma yimaadeen?	Have the boys come?
Ikoroooy	likaadi	Isug	Wait for me.

Table author's.

In this respect, it is relevant to note that in Somalia, linguistic stereotyping exists constructively. I may agree though, with Allport,⁸⁵ about stereotypes not being always negative, but only when in the opinion of Taylor and Simard as explained by Hewstone and Giles, "...that out - group stereotypes may lead to the positive outcome of mutual

social differentiation.”⁸⁶ But like in the genealogical domain, the sociolinguistic registers, styles and variations in accent are categorized as less pure as we move from the north to the south, and are therefore regarded as adulterated versions of the ‘pure’ or ‘standard’ Somali language as spoken by the self-ennobled clans. The basis for this stratum does not take into account the paradigmatic reality of social status and geographical area reflected in the speech - community’s language but often it is extended well beyond. Linguistic stratification and negative stereotyping, in the Somali social etiquette, run parallel with clan stratification, opposing the linguist’s method of measuring or assuming one’s language according to one’s class.

Sociolinguistics, in the Somali context, is an area not yet sufficiently researched, but nevertheless a useful tool utilized as a basis for ethnic stratification where the further one is from the south, one’s language is deemed more ‘noble’, better and purer in form and lore. Situations are usually witnessed where an interlocutor from the southern regions is prejudiced: “Af-Soomaali ma yaqaan” doesn’t know Somali language, despite the fact of one’s citizenship by birth and breed (see also Luling, Somali Sultanate). This episode happens simply because one doesn’t belong to the sociolinguistic group of the northerner person criticizing. For this reason, linguistically the Somali language itself plays a more divisive role than its external display as a unifying factor.

Contrary to the northerners’ belief of their dialect as the uncorrupted original accent of the language, the southern speakers think that it is actually the northerners that speak the ‘sullied’ Somali, hence their reference to their northern brothers as ‘Soomaali qaldaan’ which is ‘mistaken or error-bound Somali’ - a phrase denoting that the northerners are erotic in the dialect of their spoken Somali.

According to this observation, ethnic nobility does not give justification only in the genealogical composition of the northerners but also a superior rank for their dialect of the Somali language, because it was legitimated effectively through language policy and language planning (LPLP) during the standardization of the Somali orthography and upon its inception in 1972.

Some southern intellectuals like Jamal Mohamed Hagi⁸⁷ admit that the Somali social system operates from a self-ennobled nomadism. That indoctrination simply but effectively determines that whatever is related culturally to nomadism is by any standard superior to all the rest. Because there is little understanding of the language science, we may find very few who would accept that all dialects of the same language have equal importance to the speech communities concerned rather than inferiorate them due to the psycholinguistic substance conditioned by their society and environment.

The Hawiye, therefore, are adjusted in a social place better than others but lower in degree than the higher premise occupied by their northern brethren, because genealogically, geographically as well as linguistically they are situated away from the cradle point where Somali nobility was born.

The Outcaste Groups: The Un-Islamic Nature of Somali Monotheologicality and the 'Nasab-Dhiman' Phenomenon

These are groups who are despised and considered their place not at the lowest level of the Somali social strata, but in fact outside of it. They are akin to the aforementioned Somali proper but were outcasted because of their lineage ancestor's allegedly unholy act of eating meat from an animal unslaughtered in the 'halal' accepted Islamic way. Though the traditions suggest his hunger during the committal of the act [which is permissible according to the Mohammedan doctrine], ever since that day, all the descendants of that

forefather have been banished as unclean human beings unapproachable for certain social relationships like marriage, but who otherwise are used for occupational tasks such as iron-smithing, circumcising children and other menial activities which the 'pure' clans scorn.⁸⁸ Notably, and according to the traditions, the forefather of the outcaste communities committed the act together with his brother, the pedigree of the noble branch. They allegedly both ate the 'decayed' meat but the nobles banished the outcastes because the ancestor of the latter had eaten to satisfaction rather than just a little as was done by his brother.

These communities are called Tumaal, Yibir, Yaxar, Midgaan, Madhibaan, and are subject to a continuum of attachment to and detachment from a clan as per the dictation of the concerned clan's convenience. These so-called outcastes are normal human beings like others: polite, respectful, born-Muslims, respectable, pretty, intelligent and inseparable by look and complexion from the other Somalis; but they suffer under perpetual social castigation administered against them by none other than their own Somali brethren. As a result, they can't enjoy equal status in the society.⁸⁹

In what Ioan M. Lewis and others termed (fallibly?) as 'pastoral democracy', these outcaste groups have encountered unfair mistreatment under undemocratic pastoral society. As has been enlightened by Lewis himself, they (outcastes) are not allowed to sit and contribute their point as equals in the nomadic council of meeting. The pastoral 'nobles' consisting of the lineage members in the 'shir' meeting, as the tradition recognizes, reach the decisions. In such segregation, one may query with concern why a scholar of the caliber of Dr. Lewis failed to demarcate between discrimination and democracy!

The claim of 'pastoral democracy' contradicts the values of democracy on the platform of an artificially moulded social stratum in contravention of the principles of Islam and of homogeneity. Exclusion coupled with debasement of any magnitude do not foster accommodation to democracy when important elements of the social texture are marginalized due to idealized divisions set on the basis of ethnic interests. Analyzing the situation, Marian Enow opines that the dominant nomads, to the social disadvantage of the dominated, determine social places.⁹⁰ Under these circumstances, the reality behind the concept of "all men are councilors and all men are politicians,"⁹¹ serves as a continuum of oppression.

Generally, egalitarianism can not exist in synchrony with pervasive discrimination in the decision-making ranks but should encourage the provision of unbiased access for equal distribution of wealth and other opportunities for social mobility - vertically much so as horizontally. But antithetically, the status of the outcaste groups uncovers a hidden system of prolonged unjust which is indignity to the philosophy of democracy and practice of egalitarianism. If anything, Lewis had better reserved his comments on the pastoral injustices that regulate the culture of the Somali nomadic life than compliment it as democracy.

Equal status, opportunity and distribution of power and resources are concepts entwined with the ethics and cultural values of any given society, but in the Somali pastoral structure, elements of moral decay such as discrimination and degradation are pursued pragmatically. These realities have laid a demarcation line that places the privileged in the egalitarian status and the underprivileged or unprivileged off it in the periphery. The thesis, in form and character, absolutely disqualifies the ideals of either democracy or egalitarianism.

The inference henceforth renders that the decisions reached by members of the so-called nomads in the 'shir' council meeting, are not in any way based on just regarding the proliferation of interested-party interference. For, in the sad eyes of the outcastes discriminated, the practice is tantamount to localized imperialism void of any moderate consolation. The social institution itself is seen as nothing short of a promoter of ethno-political preponderance, which decides the limitations of the rights of the 'other' group within the community! This cultural behaviour has developed disintegration among a society so characterized by an outwardly homogeneity, thus prompting another contending statement by Eno who writes:

*Normally within a homogeneous ethnic group, an intense feeling of group solidarity develops and an attitude of egalitarianism becomes evident. However, there is no solidarity whatsoever to be seen in Somalia. The ethnic dichotomy is in fact much deeper than in any other heterogeneous society on earth.*⁹²

In his article, "Caste Discrimination", Smita Narula describes the caste system as "...a hidden apartheid of segregation, modern-day slavery, and other extreme forms of discrimination, exploitation and violence."⁹³ The Somali outcaste groups are subject to similar oppression and abuses as mentioned by Narula. They have been systematically kept off-board the societal framework. The ethnocentric system of the Somali society has denied these groups even the ownership of a tribal land. In essence, they cannot settle as an independent social body of their own, unless they are attached to other clans as dependents and subordinates.

Like the Osu of Nigeria, the Baraku of Japan and the Dalits of India and Sri Lanka, the Somali outcastes suffer under extensive discrimination and are subject to permanent social prejudice. They are demeaned as pollutants within the social fabric. Moreover, Somalia's widely exaggerated uniqueness as a homogeneous nation of one society

sharing the same origin, one language, same religion and so on, declined to accommodate and address the outcastes with an equal status. They live in the status of subordinate humans. "Midgaan-Madhiban have never had any secure rights or protection in Somali society. Even in overseas Somali society, they still face hatred, harassment and abuse," as revealed in the words of Asha Samad,⁹⁴ who articulated her concern in a paper about the undesirable social situation of the Somali outcastes.

I partly agree with Dipankar Gupta on the notion that "caste-based stratification displays very different characteristics",⁹⁵ in that it constitutes, in the Somali perspective, multifaceted phenomena under the manipulation of the perpetrating 'noble' groups. One of these characteristics is that, although in the U.S.A. or in other racial societies, blacks and whites etc. may contract into marriage, it is highly impossible in Somalia for such a social institution to bring together an outcaste and a 'self-ennobled' into a unit of one family, irrespective of sameness in colour, clan or creed. Still, within the context of the characteristics of caste-based stratification, I disagree with Gupta on the misplaced opinion in his study of 2000 which reads in part, "No caste would agree that members of other castes are made up of substances better than theirs,"⁹⁶ which he emphasizes again in his later work 'Caste, race, politics' when he says, "No caste would like its people to marry outside the community. No caste would like to merge its identity with any other caste."

First of all, and for all practical purposes, the caste system is employed in multiple ways than one. Each method of practice in the institution has its orientation as a result of the cultural effects on the belief and social behaviour of the community concerned. But there is one aspect which casteism condones everywhere, taken as a form of racism or otherwise; that it is an inhuman social phenomenon based on the oppression of an advantaged group against a disadvantaged breed whose social identity is often under

suppression and stigma. Under this reality, the matter of concern should not be displayed in the simplistic symbiosis adopted on personal opinion, but holistically in the context of the destructive impact it holds on the wider societal dimension because it is worshipped, socio-psychologically, by the oppressors, as a sacred component of the social values.

Secondly, when there is awareness of the ill practice of casteism among the society as the tutelage of the social culture, no individual would indulge in his/her desire for exogamy, marriage beyond the societal confine the caste system has adjusted, because the social system is the framework that has appropriated delimitations and cynic social demarcations as a burden the oppressed cannot cross beyond.

Thirdly, because casteism encompasses identity, superiority, alienation, degradation and other symbolically abstract beliefs, it would inflict more loss of identity to the superficially constructed high caste 'noble' community than the stigmatized because, as Marian Enow believes, "Equality for all poses threat to the beliefs of supremacy and nobility of the oppressors."⁹⁷

Finally, social mobility in the spheres of politics, economy or in any other individual achievement (by a lucky few) in the metaphors of the physical world cannot be adjudicated as a variable of meaningful inferential compensation for counter-balancing the afflictions of moral devastation accrued against the outcaste communities. The consequence extends well beyond any degree of privileges or achievement - call it Sanskritization or whatever - acquired by a few among generations born into an inherited, socially ascribed stigmatization and oppression into a class as the social scum. But in retrospect, when the basis for social interaction is harmonized on respect for human value, dignity and equal opportunity, even the learned Gupta would not need to postulate

about the newly developed class of “upwardly mobile sanskritizing caste,” because the mobility should have rather been based on meritocracy than on castocracy or ethnocracy.

The concern, in holistic terms, engulfs into the confines of the metaphysical domains affecting the social conscience, consciousness, values, morale and all the other intuitive properties that dignify every human nature with a desire to be appreciated. Put in another way, if a certain opportunistic group has bankrupted the aspirations and social esteem of a sector of the community as to validate the maintenance of identity supremacy, the outcome transforms the societal network into a hub of a clinically supervised disintegration, which Somalia is contemporary evidence.

As in many parts of the world outcaste societies launched advocacies for their well-being, in Somalia such effort has been muted by the corrupted image of an outwardly homogeneity. It facilitated for the nomadic pastoralists a territorial expansion maneuvered by means of hegemonic domination. The fate of Somalia’s outcaste communities has come into the limelight only recently, in the early days of the civil war when scores of them were massacred as scapegoats for Siad Barre’s misdeeds and poor governance. In a sense, it is employed as a kind of misplaced aggression.

In the Hindu system, Das and Choudhury believe that “Caste perpetuates social distance with the help of religious sanctions.” Similarly, Somalia’s Islamic priests, doctrine, and concept of monotheologicality remain all silent about equality of all Muslims especially when it condones the purpose of caste equality and mobility.⁹⁸ And as such, Somalis are strong believers and adherents to a rigid caste system and social stratification based on the worship of ethnocentrism as a religious ritual without which the practice of Islam remains imperfect!

However, when all is said, there is no concrete evidence whatsoever to substantiate the exact source of the alleged impurity of the outcasts as per the allegations devised by the 'noble' clans. Also the place of the 'fallacy' and the approximate date thereof are in vain of mention. Relatively, the invention of the 'Nasab-dhiman' outcaste system by the 'nasab' noble predecessors must be deeply rooted in the nomadic avarice for surfeit in a culture characterized by lust for power and quest for superior identity, a complexity which Islam denounces its indulgence.

When examined in contrast to its Indian counterpart, though, the Somali caste system appears eccentric in nature. In India, it is alleged to have begun as an issue of two races: the light-skinned Aryans invading the dark-skinned Dravidians with the imposition of an unfamiliar stratification which misconceived the dark-skinned as unequal, inferior and uncivilized people. In the Somali situation, one observes that the colour, clan and creed of both the discriminating majority and the socially distanced outcaste minority are utterly inseparable and basically one and the same people. They are in fact indistinguishable in every sense of their features and racial background. This culture, which in the Somali social organization depletes the human value of such a social sub-group, leads one to disagree with Ghurye and Risley⁹⁹ who view caste as an institution that celebrates its birth as a result of racial divisiveness, because in the Somali situation, there is no evidence of racial difference although the system has taken an equal dimension in a different form and construct.

Actually a section of the traditions suggest blood affinity between the so-called 'nasab' nobles and the 'nasab-dhiman' outcastes before the ancestor of the latter fed to satisfaction on the meat of a dead animal that was not slaughtered in the Islamic way. How that consanguinal relationship was terminated to debase one and not the other, when both brothers had eaten together the meat from the dead animal, is not a point the

nobles would be pleased to take for further discussion. Nor does anyone ask the type of the animal concerned: was it camel, cow, goat, or sheep? Or was it a wild animal whose consumption for human nutrition Islam had prohibited? The approximation in time of the event is not also clear. The traditions are contained in absolute silence about the answers to such questions. This episode, which has probably occurred in Somalia's pre-Islamic days, cannot in any circumstance be a contemporary justification to undermine the rights of anyone. The picture we get from this allegation is not reason enough to ennoble one offender at the expense of the de-ennoblement of the other.

In observing the same subject from another angle, the inception of casteism in Somalia can not be prefigured in advance of the understanding of the Somali nomadic pastoralists' obsession for a rewarding identity and crave for clan supremacy as vehicles to the attainment of nobility, leadership in power and the associated luxuries and privileges. "It is an artificially created system of deliberate inferioration of the non-nomadic societies and cultures, in order to gain legitimacy for self-promotion," examines Abukar Mungai.¹⁰⁰

The Asharaaf

Another perplexing case in the Somali lineage metaphor is the group calling themselves Asharaf. Members of this group claim they are the more respectable, more praiseworthy and more honoured than the rest. The significance in that belief is borne in the title 'Shariff' situated before their real names. According to their traditions, they have descended right from the prophet's household, hence their double purpose of the term Shariff which serves as a personal title distinctive only for this stock, and its common noun version Asharaf (Ashraf) which suits as the clan name, legitimating the title 'Shariff' for every male and 'Shariffa' for the female from the community. The Somali 'claim' Hashemite descent just like the Asharaf but none sticks to the use of 'Shariff' as a title before their names. But the Asharaf, who favour themselves as more Hashemite than the

non-Asharaf Somalis, feel offended if the title is misplaced elsewhere other than their extraction.

In linguistic terms, the Arabic word 'Shariff' comes into use as a name of an individual's choice. Secondly, it may be used as an adjective qualifying a noun in the case of one, anyone, irrespective of clan or origin, who is regarded for one's respect and honour to others. As the Arabic saying (transliterated in English) goes, "Man Sharafa nafsahu, fahwa Shariff" – whoever honours himself (abstains from doing evil to others) is certainly honourable (by others).

The Arabite origin of this sub-group of the social thread is also suspect because they narrate diversified traditions. When I posed a few questions to some elderly Ashraf informants in the course of my discussion with them, they were unable to respond satisfactorily. The three of them could not agree on the lineage of one progenitor. They could not provide comparative definitions concerning the Asharaf among the Banadiri, the Asharaf of the Reewing and the numerous Asharafs scattered among the Somali subgroups. Surprisingly, the 'Abtirsi' genealogy sometimes gives elements of non-Arab names, which no informant could explain. Shariff Hussein Shariff Mohamed was eventually inclined to agree that the nature of the Asharaf relationship to the Arab is not any different from that of the Somali tribe with the Qureish, "because they all belong to a Qureishite pedigree."¹⁰¹ This suggestion encourages us to believe the existence of a finely woven genealogical myth also in the traditions of the Asharaaf.

When I asked them why they give their tribe name first-hand as Asharaf, and not Qureish or Banu-Hashem because the Qureishite do not use "Asharaaf," as a tribal identity, they were quick to react that the Somalis know them by that tribe name, while one of them, Shariff Osman Shariff Samad Shariff Ali, answered that it was actually the Somalis who

first gave that tribe name to the Asharaaf. Then I asked how Somalis, as outsiders, could prefer a name on a whole tribe without first knowing that ethnonym from the ethnic community. In response, they said that they were not there when it happened but that I (author) should not doubt their Qureishite/Hashemite origin.

In another question, I asked them to discuss about the distribution and distinction between the Asharaaf in the Somali sub-clans living in the north and south of the country, in parts of Ethiopia and their agnates found also in parts of Kenya. Was it only one Shariff who came and fathered all the Asharaaf in the diverse regions or were there many Shariffs who arrived in Somalia at various dates and places as to assume the Asharaaf affinity to the Somali tribes/clans of the distinct modes of living? The responses were incongruent: Shariff Osman held the opinion that all these groups of Asharaaf came from one immigrant Shariff and acquired his offspring by polygamy with women from diverse Somali clans. In a variant view, Shariff Abdinassir Elmi Shariff Mohamed (alias Quleel) thought many Asharaaf immigrants came and settled among the Somali clans at various dates and points. He also speculated that the Asharaaf among the Banadiri and Barawans came later than those living among the Somali proper. Then I reminded the early arrival date of some of the Barawaans and the later arrival date of some of the Banadiri Asharaaf in reference to Banadiri traditions, and what they could make of those histories; the Asharaf informants were not anywhere near a suitable response.

When I mentioned the difference in the lineages of all these Shariffs who suggest a connection to the prophet of Islam but who do not know or are not recognized by their kinsmen in other regions in Arabia, one informant responded that [possibly] the Asharaaf in Arabia must have forgotten their migrated kinsmen. Shariff 'Quleel' however raised the possibility of the Arab Qureishites ignoring the Somali Asharaaf as a result of their marriage relationship with the African women.

After two days of discussions about the subject, my Asharaaf informants seemed short of reconciling the distinction between their own genealogies and that of their ethno-history regarding their migration. Some of the stories sounded as a copy of the Somali myths in search of a more 'reputable' identity than the African one that haunts the average Somali nomad in the northern regions. The ethnohistorical data I collected from the three historians are not corroborative any more than the multiple Somali versions of their origin. Similar to the Somali traditions, the Asharaaf myths cannot be considered as valid stories of truth-value.

Coastal Dwellers

Next in the discussion come the coastal dwellers, the Banadiri (Reer Xamar), the Bajuni and the Barawaans. These are speculated as the descendants of immigrants from Arabia and Persia although the Amarani of Baraawa, according to I.M. Lewis,¹⁰² and other sources, are alleged of being the descendants of Israelite escapees who might have fled from their ancient settlement in the era of Islamic expansion.

The Barawaan

The Barawaans are sailors, traders, fishermen, as well as artisans in hand made/embroidered hats and shoemaking, popular in Somalia as 'koofi Barawaan' and 'kabo-Barawaan' (Barawaan hats and Barawaan shoes) respectively. They are active merchants and speak Chimalazi, a language which the Somalis simply call Af-Baraawa (the language of Baraawa), but which scholars classify as a Swahili dialect.

Unlike the outcaste groups, and despite the Barawaans' endogamous culture, there has been a relatively low intermarriage with the Somalis who do not despise the Barawaans like they do to the other 'kabo-tol' shoemakers of the outcaste Somalis. The Barawaans

achieved a certain degree of upward mobility regarding their officers in the army and navy of Mohamed Siad Barre's military regime, as well as other civilian posts in the administrative and diplomatic functions. In any case, the Barawaans are numerically a minority and subject to harassment due to their non-Somali origin. Regardless of their origin, within the Jareer and Jileec classification, the Barawans are Jileec and are thus technically but temporarily (for the purpose of this study) deliberately lumped with the rest of the Jileec population.

Upon first hearing, the ordinary person assumes Baraawa as a clan or tribe but it is a toponym of the territory rather than a fibre of consanguinal lineage composition of its multiethnic/multiracial population. It is a settlement for people of diverse background consisting of the indigenous local community and their counterpart from Persian and Arabian Diaspora.

As a coastal city-state, Barawa shares a long history with the other Swahili city-states that emerged along the East African coast. This history, in my perspective, is not exempt from paradox when we examine this ancient city-state from two dichotomous standpoints paramount to its social activities. For one, Baraawa stands as a cosmopolitan ancient city-state that has produced great Ulama (religious scholars – singular 'alim') like Sheikh Uwees (Uways), Sheikh Nurein Sabir Al-Hatimy, Moallim Nuri and so on. These scholars, according to Mohamed Kassim,¹⁰³ were leaders who were 'mufti' well read/learned in a variety of disciplines in the field of Islam. Indeed, they contributed invaluable to the spread of Islam in the country and overseas.

The second axis, which Baraawa distinguished its name emerges in the realm of slavery and as a slave trade center. From this notion, we see a city-state keeping in parallel rivalry the two repellant social paradigms of Islamic education and slavery institution, despite the

silence of Somali scholars on the latter subject. Further giving some slave-related evidence, Robecchi Brichetti¹⁰⁴ has analyzed Baraawa around late 1800 or early 1900 as having not less than 800 slaves among a community Guillain¹⁰⁵ estimated at about 5,000 people in 1847, figures that suggest an average of one slave to every six people, in other words, one slave to every family of six members.

Though the contribution to the proselytization process has been praised with due appreciation, Somali scholars, particularly the learned elite from the south, shy away at the threshold of discussions surfacing the theme. Saqaawa Abu, a member from the Tunni community of Baraawa believes, "Except very few genuine scholars, most of the so-called Ulama were protecting their own interests, individually and socially."¹⁰⁶ The statement of this Tunni elite and the revelation of slave ownership by Brichetti surmise a postulation at discrepancy with what is traditionally preferred about those religious scholars.

In general view, these clerics are portrayed as sagacious erudite capable of establishing reputation across the border as prominent crusaders of Islam, great proselytizers in the wider East Africa region. What often is deliberately downplayed though is their failure to achieve the same for the abolition of slavery. In their own abode and among their own society, we have in record neither success nor even a tangible attempt these priests have come forward in crusading for the abatement (if not altogether the abolition) of the dehumanization of disadvantaged people including women and children under slave subjugation in Baraawa and its environs. And as we shall see later in Chapter Four of this work, they have been compromised by the colonialists from whom they received gifts and other materials and thence betrayed Islam and the community.

The thriving civilization of Baraawa, therefore, to say the least, did not emerge only as a result of the immigrant community who arrived with their different cultures and skills but also by the vast economy and accumulation garnered at the cost of wagelessly exploited human resources; men, women and children who were made 'hanti' property either through the Ulama's misinterpretation of the Qur'an to suit special social interests or through negligence in practice in the presence of the so-called 'mufti' Islamic priests. Resources and profits realized under heinous circumstances founded on human exploitation nevertheless played a remarkable role in thrusting Baraawa into fame as a coastal city-state, while one can not exonerate the town-elite, past or present, as direct or indirect beneficiaries of that slave economy. As Saqaawa Abuu (alias Abti) emphasizes, "From the so-called Asharaaf to the Amaraani, they were all slave-herders."

I may, at this point, opine that as long as the Ulama ignored criticism of the booming slavery business and its religious implications, the common slave masters remained as devoted followers. The Ulama, as we witness from the social life of their day, probably concentrated on selected areas of Islam, which avoided elite collision in regard to the slave trade and slave exploitation. On the vice versa, if extremity in Sufism has reputed the Ulama, its opposite in slavery certainly is a living disrepute to them.

The Banaadiri

The Banaadiri people are also called Reer-Xamar and are featured as being of Arabian descent. They live in the Lower Shabelle coastal town of Marka and the capital Mogadishu. They are business people and sartorial skillsmen, but some of them practise fishing. Certain versions of the oral traditions say that, after arriving in Mogadishu, they have opted to change their original tribe names and affiliated themselves to the Negroid Zenji as "Sheegad"¹⁰⁷ clients. Certain sources of the traditions suggest that the main Banaadiri sub-groups are Dhabarweyne, Bandhowow, Moorshe, and Iskaashato. These

subgroups are not based on strict clan lineage but consist of a combination of communities who formed an alliance under the toponym Banadir for mutual social purpose and coexistence in a unity.¹⁰⁸ Some of the Diaspora communities are said to be of Russian origin, others of Persian while another portion is associated with the Zenj stock representing the indigenous Negroid Jareer people.¹⁰⁹

Unlike the Barawaans who are members of the larger Digil-Mirifle confederation, thus counted among the Digil sub-groups, the Banaadiri/Reer Hamar stand on their own in the socio-political domain and pledge loyalty to their own ethnic party. Although they suffer minority status, also related to their ethnic background, they do sometimes intermarry with the Somalis, this not happening as often as they keep that social institution endogamously.

According to the traditions, the local Zenj Negroid, in other words the Jareer autochthons have had Mogadishu under their hegemony. They have settled the 'gibil-cad' light-skinned Banaadiri of mixed origin upon their arrival at different periods. The Somali scholarship is controversial about the leadership of a Jareer (Swahili-speaking) ruler in Mogadishu before the Asiatic newcomers received support from Arab Sultans ruling other coastal towns along the East Africa littoral. In a way, Chittick's speculation of a Swahili-speaking ruler in Mogadishu or Shungwaya and the traditions by the Banaadiri historians support each other. However, more about this subject is the concern of the next chapter.

The Banadiri and Barawaans are less aggressive people and peaceful by culture. The sedentary social groups among whom they live shaped them in many aspects of the social interactions. Though they are accorded a status not much desirable as that of the Somali proper, they occupy a social stratum above the outcastes and the Bantu/Jareer communities.

The Bajuni

The Bajuni, like the Barawaans, stretch their social relations from the southern coast to the East African coastal towns of Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa in Kenya and Zanzibar and Tanga in modern Tanzania. They speak a Kiswahili dialect and fishing shapes their living economy. They are a minority and are therefore at the far tip of the perimeter of Somaliness. They are not considered as an outcaste populace, but an affinity with their Bantu neighbours and intermingling with other Swahili people makes them undesirable for closer ties with the nomads of the northern culture.

It is noteworthy that the Bajuni are considered by some sources as a sub-branch of the East African Bantu population while other sources suggest an Indonesian origin or culture. Whatever their lineage, their cultural context, language and the sound interaction with the Bantu around their environs have acquired them an enviable multiculturalism in unity. Mzee Juma Bakari says, "Many say we are Arabs, others Iranians; an intermarriage with them (Arabs and Persians) cannot change our culture as Bantu."¹¹⁰ In his view, another elder from the same community, Mzee Hamisi, expresses his indignation because "These (scholars/researchers) who write about social history write from 'dadka xukunka haayo' – the ruling elite – not from us."¹¹¹

The latter oral historian's remorse is a representation of the non-nomadic Somalis' disapproval of the contamination of their true identity and culture under a pseudo homogeneity which categorically identifies them with the nomads, in denial of the fact that theirs is a culture quite inconsistent with nomadism or even pastoralism in all facets of their social life.

Conclusion

This chapter has given some reflection on to the debate surfacing the origin of the Somali people and the subsequent migration from north to south, which the revisionist scholarship has overturned with new evidence based on culture, language and geographic location. This thesis falls in accordance with an earlier south-north migration, suggesting a dispersal point in the eastern/southeastern lowland of Ethiopia and a most likely origination from or genealogical affiliation with Cushites of a probable proto-Reewing people.

We have seen how the Arabs and Persians had interplayed with Somalis through commerce, culture and intermarriage, but without a tenable evidence of Somali genealogical link with either the prophet, the Qureishite people or with any other traceable Arab tribe to that connection. The different clans and cultures were also discussed, and their respective relationship and status in the Somali social thread with some light on linguistic stereotyping. The discussion now guides us to turn to the Jareer people who are the subject matter of the next chapter.

Endnotes: Chapter Two

1. Lewis, Ioan M., *Peoples of the Horn of Africa – Somali, Afar, Saho*. London; International African Institute (1955: 96-97). Usually Somalis like to divide the clans into what they term as 4 major clans and a minority group. See also 'A Pastoral Democracy by the same author.
2. Jareer refers to 'thick hair', 'kinky hair' etc., also sometimes called 'timo adag' in Somalia; the reference is attributed to the Bantu, Negroid community who are counted outside the Somali clan lineage and eponym. 'Jileec' means soft, and is an attribute given to the non-Bantu Somali, and signifies softness of hair and "nobility". According to this significance, other

clans who are not even Somali proper like segments of the Reewing, the Banadiri (Reer Xamar), the Barawaans, the Midgan, and Madhiban and so on, come as one unit since they all use the word 'Jareer' as a derogatory term preferred to call the Negroid stock.

3. Lewis, I. M., *A Pastoral Democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. African Publishing Company (New York. 2nd edition. (1982: 2), (First Published in 1961.)
4. Ahmed, Ali Jimale., "Day Break Is Near, Won't You Become Sour?" in Ahmed, Ali J., (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia*. Red Sea Press Inc. (1995: 140.)
5. Collins, Douglas., *A Tear for Somalia*. Jarrolds Publishers London Ltd.(1960:110)
6. *A Handbook of Abyssinia*, vol.1, June 1917, the British Naval Staff Intelligence Division. (Kenya National Archives – Nairobi) p.148
7. Ahmed, Christine C., "Finely Etched Chattel: The Invention of a Somali Woman", in Ahmed, Ali Jimale, (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.162.
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12. Schlee, Gunther., *Identities on the Move: Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya*. Gideon S. Were Press, (1994: 43-44).

13. Hersi, Ali Abdirahman., "The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influences in the Somali Peninsula." Ph.D. Dissertation 1977. University of California, Los Angeles.
14. A Handbook of Abyssinia, op. cit., pp.147-148
15. Dualeh, Hussein Ali., Search for a New Somali Identity. Printed in the Republic of Kenya. (2002: 9).
16. Revoil, Georges., La Valle Du Darror, Paris: Challamel Aine, Libraire – Editeur, 1882.
17. Lewis, I.M., The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State. New York: Fredrick Praeger – Publisher (1965: 22)
18. Muhammad, Ali S., "The Origin of the Ishaq People", Somaliland Journal, (Hargeisa, Dec. 1954). Cited in Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History.
19. Lewis, I.M., The Modern History of Somaliland, op.cit.
20. In Arabic Language, Sheikh may mean 'an old man,' 'a religious scholar'
21. Hersi, op. cit.
22. Schlee, op. cit., pp.44.
23. Ibid., p.90.
24. Mukhtar, Mohamed H., 'Islam in Somali History: Facts and Fiction', in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed.), op. cit., pp.9 & 15.
25. Ibid., p.21.
26. Dualeh, Hussein Ali., op.cit., pp.9 – 10.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Hersi, A.A., op.cit., p.25.
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 36. Eno, Omar A., 'Sifting Through a Sieve: Solutions for Somalia', in Janzen, Jorg (ed.), *What Are Somalia's Development Perspectives? Proceedings of the 6th Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) Congress*. Berlin, Dec. 1996. *Das Arabische Buch – Berlin* (2000:64)
 37. Dia-paying: "Dia" is a kind of blood compensation paid by the kinship of a killer to the kinsmen of the victim.
 38. Digil-Mirifle is composed of a confederation of clans whose kinship is based on mutual co-existence among all the settlers, rather than clan affiliation or genealogical relationship. However, they have their ancestor Sab who is the brother of Samaale who fathered the other Somali clans.
 39. Af-Maay, also known as Maay-Maay, is a language spoken mainly in

Southern Somalia, particularly along the majority of the riverine belt of Juba and Shabelle. It is not intelligible with the Maxaa-tiri version of the Somali language.

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41. *Ibid.*
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66. Interview with Oromo elders in Pangani Estate, Nairobi, 2004.
67. Ismail Ibdi Issa; Discussion in Nairobi. 2004.
68. Eno, Mohamed A., "ALL ROADS LED TO ISTUNKA (A Grand Mock-Fight

at Afgoi)” in HEEGAN NEWSPAPER, Friday, Aug. 1, 1986; and Part II, Friday, Aug. 8, 1986.

69. Au-Isman Sadiq – Interview in Afgoi, July, 1980. Such idiomatic expression is used to refer to what one remembers since childhood.
70. ‘Mar’ sometimes ‘Magac’ is a poetic verse, which has an equated level of rhyme and alliteration according to a key phonemic sound.
71. Shrub/Shirib: The two can sometimes be exchanged. A kind of traditional, processional singing, dancing and chanting in which singers in two parallel lines recite the verse by sharing it as the front group and the rear group, taking turns in their singing. Each group repeats its part after the other until the ‘Laashin’ traditional bard whistles to compose a new verse.
72. In this verse, two municipal officers, Shukri and Shariffo, had been arrested and summoned in court in Mogadishu for misappropriation of public funds, so it was a good opportunity for the rival group to taunt these culprits and their kinsmen of the disgraceful acts they committed. They were later charged and dismissed with disgrace.
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Chapter Three

THE ETHNO-HISTORY OF THE SOMALI BANTU/JAREER PEOPLE

The Bantu/Jareer people of Somalia have their settlement in the inter-riverine area along and in the hinterland of the country's two rivers Jubba and Shabelle. They heavily occupy nine out of the country's eighteen regions, though other sources mention ten regions. Apart from Mogadishu (where they are not a numerical minority in ethnic terms), they constitute the majority sedentary community in all these regions.

The Bantu people practise mainly, but not exclusively, an agrarian mode of living, making use of the rivers that pass in their regions. As agriculture shapes the economy of the rural dwellers, in urban areas the Jareer consist of the highest number of skilled technicians: masons, electricians, mechanics, carpenters, and plumbers etc., know-how acquired usually by years of apprenticeship. However, these and a variety of other occupations are not regarded much by the nomadic culture, which believes only low people should live by such 'dirty' jobs.

Jareer is an epithet which (though more acceptable than other terms) means 'hard hair', 'kinky hair', 'thick hair', or 'coiled hair'. It is a connotation whose descriptive implication reflects African genealogy rather than an Arab origin as claimed in nomadic Somalia. Other pejorative terms such as 'Habash',¹ 'Adoon',² 'Bidde',³ are also often used for the Somali Bantu as a manifestation of their distinct ethnic origin, deciding their un-Islamically framed lower social class.

The Jareer, insignificant of the uniformity of their physical feature, which is typical of the black African muscular frame, are a community of heterogeneous ethnic composition. They celebrate cultures that are different but otherwise existing in complex harmony.

They are different because according to settlement, some live along the river Shabelle while others are along the river Jubba, each of which belong to a unique culture of its own; but because all the Somali Bantu/Jareer share unrestricted social interaction among themselves – including intermarriage – regardless of creed, their cultures communicate as a façade of fusion. Notwithstanding the cross-cultural cooperation, the Somali Bantu belong to two distinguishable histories that are neither often discussed by the scholarship nor acknowledged by the Somali people. The Bantu along the bank and in the interior of the Shabelle river are suggested by recent scholarship as “...Negroid groups present before the Somali migration,”⁴ supported by a report which says that “some are descendants of pre-Somali Bantu population; others are descendants of slaves from East Africa.”⁵ Except very few researchers, almost the entire Somalist scholarship has followed one of three groups:-

- (a) Scholars who, due to avoidance of controversy, express difficulty in separating the autochthons from the Diaspora.
- (b) Researchers like Turton who opted for an accumulative sum up of all the Jareer as slaves or their descendants, despite abundant evidence and means for classification in written records and traditions;⁶ and
- (c) Authors who take a precautious, non-committal position when writing about the issue of the Negroid/Jareer people of Somalia.

In the Shabelle area, the historical tiding is different from that of the 18th or 19th century importation of slaves from parts of Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. Despite the disregard by the scholarship, the local oral traditions, archival records and an attachment to the exploitation of the land are a segment of the tangible evidence easily available, some of which I will present in this study in their pertinent manners. A panel of expert anthropologists who investigated the subject concluded by saying, “...we may reckon

those [Bantu/Jareer] tribes in all probability represent remnants of a pre-Somali population...”⁷

Derek Nurse observed the undermining by the Somalist scholarship as they portrayed all the Bantu people in the country as either slaves or the descendants of slaves. This inadequately investigated subject, which put all the community in the same characterization as slaves, was probably a plot aimed at serving favourably the economic interests of both the Italian colonial system and the Somali slave owners. Therefore, Nurse gives his opinion on the Somalists’ indecisiveness on earlier Bantu presence in the present day territory of Somalia by stating, “The possibility of earlier settlements is admitted but not emphasized.”⁸ The opinion is well placed, considering the negligence with which the specialists have approached the area, falling short of exhausting the topic to considerable satisfaction rather than justifying the neglect as a ‘difficulty’ in distinguishing, though none has mentioned impossibility.

Over the years, very rich debates have been going on about the separation of the historiography of the Bantu people, discussions which further contributed more knowledge not on this particular episode only, but some which necessitated scholars to conduct studies on other relevant peoples in neighbouring Kenya’s coastal and Tana areas such as the Segeju, Mijikenda, Pokomo, Duruma etc., whose oral traditions of a dispersal region or regions in Somalia remain a unanimity. These communities have repeatedly related about a migration from Shungwaya centuries ago, after having been living there for a long span of time prior to the exodus. At this juncture, it is necessary to review the Shungwaya phenomenon and the possible connection with the inter-riverine Bantu of Somalia, though a discussion so brief and limited, to respect only its academic merit and relevance strictly where it is due.

Quoting Turton, Kusow writes, "According to Turton, there are no evidences that show these pre-Cushitic inhabitants were Bantu speakers because both archaeologists and linguists have failed to provide any reliable information to support such conclusions."⁹ Also referring the same author as Kusow, Ali somehow daringly acknowledges by adding "... even though there are Swahili speaking communities in Barawa and the Bajuni islands along the coast."¹⁰

Both scholars, Mohamed Nuuh Ali and Abdi M. Kusow have quoted Turton who also derivatively borrowed the theory from, or in other words reaffirmed, Morton's suggestion directed towards the Shungwaya. Unfortunately, both Somali scholars have not given sufficient corroboration to further detail as to why they supported the Turton hypothesis and opinion. Nor did they both show any attempt for investigation through the available literature for grasp of the other equally mention-worthy version of the historiography before the rapid conclusion denying pre-Somali Bantu presence in Somalia.

Both scholars admit (through Turton's work) the lack of archaeological and linguistic evidence, contrary to the documented fact that these, to some considerable extent, if not satisfactorily, are available in the literature of outstanding research scholars' publications who dealt with the topic from the aspects of variant traditions as well as proven substantive linguistic perspectives. One of these Somali scholars, Professor Kusow in particular, suggested that the Bantu – Mijikenda Shungwaya issue was a matter of suspicion as the Kitab-al-Zenj (the book of the Zenj) which contained the Mijikenda - Shungwaya migration and ethno-historiography was also suspect because the tradition does not arise in other documents.

First of all, there is little dispute about the existence of Shungwaya. A substantiation of that evidence is clearly provided by Morton who, despite his argument, acknowledges some evidence, which stands as a support to the traditions, and the Kitab-al-Zanuj:

There seems to be real evidence that a city called Shungwaya once stood on the southern Somali coast. It is so placed on (one) British and (several) Dutch maps, the earliest being the Linschoten chart, 1596. Versions of the Kilwa and Pate chronicles mention Shungwaya, the former as an important city in the Shirazi colonization of the coast, the latter as a city brought to heel along with Kismayu, Baraawa and Mogadishu by Sultan Omar of Pate in the fourteenth century. The Portuguese mentioned Shungwaya (Jungaya, etc.) but apparently they had never stopped there.¹¹

Morton, however, happens to slap invalidation on the Kitab al-Zanuj with the claim that the Mijikenda and the coastal Arab had an interest in continuing a custom which was disregarded by the British colonial administration of that time. If, agreeing with Morton, the Mijikenda and the other coastal tribes had a custom-based interest, subsequent questions posed to him would be: What interests did the British and Dutch have particularly in mapping and locating Shungwaya as a place opposite Pate Island or at/around Bur Gabo in Southern Somalia? What special interests were there for the Kilwa and Pate chronicles to have mentioned Shungwaya, other than that of social and thus chronicled to serve the next generations? What about the ancient authors who have recorded an event of Shungwaya sending an Ambassador to China? And where do all these evidences come in to satisfy the interest of the custom of the Mijikenda, the “ill” agenda of the Kitab al-Zanuj and other weak evidence construed by Morton? The answers to these questions militate against Morton’s hypothesis and reveal its unsubstantiveness.

Turning to Mohamed Nuuh Ali and Abdi M.Kusow, and particularly on the issue of linguistic evidence, which the former recognizes as a “diachronic record”¹² regarding its historical function in reconstruction, I am tempted to think that we need to consider a semantic evaluation of the root forms of the etymological properties of the language spoken by the farming communities of the Jareer people, or to present results of any studies the scholars conducted on the historical ethnography of the claimants of Shungwaya – be them the riverine Somali Bantu or their kinsmen who migrated to Kenya as a result of intolerable male castration and attacks by the Galla/Cushites¹³ and the “Wa-Katwa” Somalis.

Several ancient Arab travelers have written about ‘Bilad-ul-Bont’, but in English orthography without any justifiable reason translates as ‘The Land of the Punt’, undermining the reality that pragmatically an equivalent of ‘p’ is absent in both Arabic and Somali scripts and therefore stays as a misrepresented sound. The speculation thence leads us to consider ‘Bunt’, ‘Bont’ or ‘Bantu’ which may sound possibly the same for the non-native speaker.¹⁴ From another angle, Derek Nurse reasons: -

*Somali society was predominantly pastoral, the Bantu-speakers predominantly, though not exclusively, agricultural. If such a contact situation lasts for more than a short time, some form of mixing or symbiosis is likely to occur, and the most obvious linguistic signs would be loanwords. Specifically, we might expect some southern Somali dialects to have absorbed words relating to agriculture taken from one or more Bantu languages.*¹⁵

Therefore to satisfy his intuitive academic curiosity, Nurse took an excursion “...among a community of agricultural Somali between Mogadishu and Merca... and produced the following:-

Yambo	-	‘hoe’ (cf. Swahili jembe, northern Swahili yembe).
Bangat	-	‘machete’ (cf, Swahili panga)
Kombe	-	‘coconut’ (sic) (cf Swahili ki-kombe)
Jiko	-	‘cooking stove’ (cf Swahili jiko).” ¹⁶

In linguistic terms, Nurse classifies Miini (ci-miini) spoken in Baraawa, as a “(northern) Swahili dialect.”¹⁷ Therefore, postulating the possible relationship between Miini and the Sabaki-speakers (Pokomo and Mijikenda), he reconstructs his analysis and the presumable inducement as below:-

Much more likely is contact in Somalia. Both the Mijikenda and the Pokomo claim to have “come from” “shungwaya,” which in the words of the Book of the Zinj had at least the twin components of town-dwellers and people along the Juba who cultivated and kept stock.

If we assume the town-dwellers spoke Miini and the people on the Juba spoke Pokomo/Mijikenda, then we would have an explanation for the foregoing contact-induced borrowings. Miini was the language of the town or towns, but was also used as a trading lingua franca by the people on the Juba. Since it was not the first language of the latter they misused it, modified its verbal morphology and the modifications were ultimately adopted by the first speakers of Miini.¹⁸

In addition to the hypothesis and loanwords suggested by Nurse, more corpus could be injected in to the list which, in my opinion, may sound loanwords to the non-Bantu Somali-speaker but a normal tongue for the Jareer person. These are:-

Somali (Bantu etymology)	Kiswahili	English
Lin, lim	- ku-lima	- to dig (farm)
Kumi	- kumi	- ten cents

Taano	-	taano	-	five (cents)
Uumid (uun)	-	ku umba	-	to create
Cambe/Cambo	-	mwembe	-	mango/es
Boombo (farm)	-	boma	-	abode,farm
Baamiye	-	bamia	-	Lady's finger
Qalinfur	-	karafu	-	cloves
Dan	-	damu	-	blood
Nyanya	-	Nyanya	-	tomatoes
Moxog	-	mohoga	-	cassava
Ruux	-	roho	-	Spirit/heart
Mardaaf	-	madafu	-	coconut
Mashaqo	-	Mashaka	-	difficulty, problem,
Maaji	-	maji	-	water
Hoodi!	-	Hodi!	-	anybody at home?

The above are some examples of a vast corpus, which augment to Sutton's idea that "Swahili culture has its origin in the first substantial contacts between the coastal Bantus and the Islamic world." He also gives Kilwa, Mombasa, Malindi and Mogadishu as examples.¹⁹

Morton, Turton and other authors might have some reasons, albeit their weakness, but Shungwaya is neither the historians' myth nor the traditionists' creation. It is preserved in voluminous records including human memory of successive generations and proven by expert historians and linguists who examined, re-examined, evaluated and re-evaluated their findings. Thomas Spear, who has devoted a considerable period of his academic life to the Mijikenda and Shungwaya narrative, has this to contribute:

*We have seen how the Singwaya legend can be viewed equally on different levels as a charter of social institution and as a coherent historical narrative of a 16th century migration. As narrative, the intricate inter-weaving of several traditions, the identification of spurious elements and the addition of documentary, linguistic and cultural evidence all established its accuracy.*²⁰

Spear retorts firmly in noting, “The fact that Swahili originated along the Somali coast around Brava makes it imperative that Sabaki speakers were present in the immediate hinterland of Shirazi settlements there to have given rise to the pidginized language.”²¹

Yet in another linguistic evidence, the renowned scholar quotes, “Hinnebusch is quick to admit that there is nothing in the linguistic evidence to dispute possible Singwaya²² origins for his Sabaki group...”²³ Spear was commenting on linguistic findings presented by Hinnebusch who had a disagreement with an earlier study done by a different method. Sounding satisfied with Hinnebusch’s “genetic classification of Swahili within the Sabaki group,”²⁴ he writes convincingly, “Swahili shares a common proto-language or origin, with the other members of the Sabaki group – Mijikenda and Pokomo... there must have been historical interaction between Sabaki and Arabic-speakers somewhere along the northern east African coast... the earliest permanent Arab residents on East African coast settled around Brava and Mogadishu. These settlers probably arrived in the 9th century. The African components of this syncretic culture were more than likely contributed by Sabaki - speakers dominating the hinterland of Brava, and the most important one was undoubtedly Swahili language.”²⁵

Spear’s postulation definitely leads us to the hypothesis that, upon arrival, the Arab or other migrants in Brava and Mogadishu were not significant in number. Secondly, they were not Swahili-speakers either upon their arrival. Thirdly, with their small numbers, they wouldn’t have settled in a strange land without obtaining first-hand information regarding

security and socio-cultural regulations of the landlords/hosts by which they were to abide if they were to be accommodated in that country. Jacob Kimaryo notes the belief that cultural and linguistic transformation of certain Swahili African communities “originated in Shungwaya alias Shirazi.”²⁶ But strange colonial documents always fond of obscuring the contribution of the African culture, credit immigrants onto the East African coast as first settlers, early settlers etc., while the indigenous African people and their culture are reduced to a ‘receiver-status’ with no recognition of their contribution to the societal interplay as the dynamics of cross-cultural movements nourish one another.

Kusow and Ali seem to have posited similar views over the Shungwaya issue as a contentious subject poor in archaeological evidence, without putting in place a substantive argument of their own but simply reflecting on what has been opined by Turton, Morton etc. Their uncorroborated invalidation of a pre-Somali Bantu settlement in the country is partly, notwithstanding the scholarly discussion, an agitation whose contemplation is based probably on the grooming of a proto-Reewing ancestral as well as linguistic origin, whereby a history none other than Rahaween precedence prevails in Somalia. With that underpinning, a pre-Somali Bantu presence may disrupt or, in other words, interfere with the entire hypothetical set-up of the proto-Reewing-Somali origin theory, hence the infirm quotation of Morton and Turton whose works on the Shungwaya topic were academically criticized by the experts involved in researching the field.

In any case, “Ruins of a fortified settlement together with Kwale-ware pottery dating from the 11th to the 15th century at Munghia near Brava suggest Bantu occupation, as does the continued presence today of some autochthonous Bantu-speakers in the Juba valley...”²⁷ This being aside, scholars have provided copious research and results to correct and criticize Morton in his theory of the Shungwaya legend.

Neville Chittick posed his argument, as Allen tells us, "...largely on internal evidence, that the Book of the Zenj could not be fraudulent in Morton's sense."²⁸ Chittick also published his proposition on the availability of documentary evidence written before 1895, which agree on Shungwaya and the Mijikenda origin, "...implicitly if not explicitly."²⁹

In a succinct elaboration of the traditions and the Book of the Zenj, especially name places and/or name transference, Chittick notes, "a town of the same name [as *Shungwaya*] at the modern Bur Gabo," as he cites Grottanelli.³⁰ (italics mine.)

Needless to list all those toponyms transferred to later settlements in commemoration of the earlier home settlements, a few such as the below outlined, may serve the purpose of evidence too:

1. In the late 17th century, a settlement further south in the Pate region carried this name.³¹
2. By about 1914, Sungwaya was a kaya on the northern side of the Sabaki River west of Malindi.³²
3. The name Kirao appears also to have been transferred. Morton locates the place west northwest of Malindi.³³
4. Mangea lies west of Malindi, significantly, the Book of the Zenj tells us that the Kashur moved the Juba to the place named Giriama beyond (or after) Munghia. More interesting is the location of a Munghia on the Somali coast between Merca and Barawa; this is a Bantu name, and we have here another example of the transference of names.³⁴
5. At Munghia are the ruins of a fortified settlement, and the pottery picked up at the site is of the period from the eleventh /twelfth to fifteenth century date.³⁵

In his Doctoral Dissertation titled, "The Arab Factor in Somali History," Dr. Hersi neglected the emphasis reckoning Bantu presence in pre-Somali epochs while the evidence was idiosyncratic in several of the documents he cited:

1. In Awdah Al-Masalik, Ibn Sibahi provided an illuminating distinction between the people he describes as he wrote "the Berbers (Somalis) were a nation...between the Abyssinians and the Zenj."³⁶ In this statement, Ibn Sibahi mentions (a) Berbers (or Somalis or whoever that might have been), (b) the Abyssinians and (c) the Zenj. This mention is a clear evidence of Zenj or Bantu or Negroid presence, despite the interchangeability of the group names, including Jareer.
2. Al-Idris's 12th century visit recorded in his Nuzhat Al-Mushtaq illustrates the south as "The country of the pagans...They take erect stones as their gods...eating fish, shellfish, frogs, snakes, rats...and many other animals which are not eaten." We cannot relate the characteristics of this episode to the Somali whose mode has always been linked to nomadic pastoralism. Also the pre-Islam Somalis worshipped 'waq' or 'waaq-waaq' which is often narrated to refer to the sky or at times a kind of bird. In terms of alimentation, we expect a pastoralist's meal to contain 'cad iyo caano'³⁷ a piece of meat and milk paradigmatic of the Somali nomadic culture. Traditionally, the nomads have expressed disgust for the smell of fish and its nutritional value as a diet. Burton tells us that noble Somali despise fish-eaters.³⁸ In his volume entitled 'The Road to Zero' former diplomat Mohamed Osman Omar mentions how after the Revolution a national campaign was introduced as a measure to encourage the consumption of fish, because it had earlier been disdained. This brings us to the speculation that the fish-eaters were possibly the Zenj or Bantu people of the pre-Somali occupation, most probably the indigenous Jareer that presently

strengthen the social thread of what is indiscriminately enmeshed together as Banadiri, but otherwise the autochthons who occupied the region before the appearance of the Hawiye, the light-skinned Reer-Xamar migrants from the Diaspora or any other Somali or Galla arrival.

3. Dr. Hersi noted northern Somali loanwords such as:- “doobi, Miis,” and so on, in display of early Indian presence in the northern Somalia, ignoring the alternative reference of the linguistic legacy in the agronomic culture as we have seen above.
4. We see often that ancient Somalia was rich in the export of commercial commodities such as ivory, ostrich feathers, leopard skins and rhino horns; but Hersi does not enlighten the veracity that hunting has never been a pastoral occupation and that, if any thing, it is a living mode detested by the Somali pastoral culture. Ioan Lewis proposes affirmatively “Noble Somali do not themselves hunt.”³⁹

Therefore, if we cautiously examine the different socio-cultural modes of the Somali social segments as we see them today, and considerately think of the quantity of merchandise involved, I conclude that such activity would require exceptional expertise and skills in overcoming the hazards involved in hunting and approaching such animals.

Here again, this item leaves us with a hypothesis that these people should have been practicers of hunting gathering, thereby positing the Eyle people of the Jareer ethnic community as the possibility. This hypothesis is strengthened by the oral traditions of the Eyle themselves and facts in the academic books that this group resorts also to agriculture as a substitute subsistence occupation only in times of rains.⁴⁰

5. The ruins of medieval settlements on the Shabelle valley⁴¹ and discoveries by colonial officials of old agricultural settlements in some parts of the north before their decline,⁴² and taking into account the Somali nomads' disdain, disgust and disrespect for the pursuance of agriculture as a means of living, a thought begs for postulation as to who they could be those people mentioned as the sedentary community who practised agriculture in those localities Hersi mentioned in his study!.
6. A substantial proof, which Hersi fell short of explaining, but which the traditions, Neville Chittick⁴³ and Shariff Aidurus⁴⁴ are all in accordance is that, not only about early Bantu residence but much so in leadership. Chittick suggests that a Bantu ruler who spoke Swahili ruled in Mogadishu, while the traditions are in consent with that. Relatively Shariff Aidurus's book recognizes pre-Somali Bantu settlers in Somalia with the picture of a Bantu youth displayed in one of the pages, most probably as an illustration distinguishing the Bantu from the Somali; but Hersi dared not hint at that – for whatever purposes!
7. Trade and commerce are activities, which are the engagement of a sedentary culture. Pastoralism, specifically nomadic pastoralism as we know it in the Somali culture and context, as is also widely believed elsewhere, is a form of living characterized by extensive wandering, constant mobility, migration, instability and rampant with factionary feudal warfare. At this juncture, the question most wanting to answer remains: who could be the sedentary, stable people pursuing the oft-mentioned trade with foreigners? Most of the merchandise mentioned by the early writers are available in the hinterland and therefore would need people living in the hinterland to hunt them, prepare them and bring them for sale. Which Somali culture endures this type of work? Which community among the Somali society is characterized as hunters-gatherers? Certainly we know of the Eile, who are Negroid/Jareer in all aspects

of their life, as one possibility; but what about communities of the Somali-Arab lineage: who among them pursues a hunting mode of living? Hardly any 'noble' Somali accepts this as part of his/her culture.

With the provision of the above evidences encompassing traditions, documents, archaeology and genealogy pertinent to Shungwaya and the migration of its ancient settlers before they lost their dwellings to Somalis and Galla, we may now focus on the traditions and available records of the Somali Bantu with specificity to the autochthons of the riverine south.

Dr. Chhabra reminds us that "History is a witness that all over the world ancient civilizations developed on the banks of rivers like Indus valley civilization, Nile valley civilization etc. In the ancient past, all important cities were founded near river banks."⁴⁵ For centuries, the Shabelle river valley has been a center of agricultural settlements of thriving polities within their own territories. The dwellers of this valley constitute a consortium of peoples who remained behind during what oral historians describe as "dudka" the exodus or the great Bantu migration in the 16th and 17th centuries in the wake of Somali and Galla insurgencies in the area.

Virginia Luling, who accomplished an extensive research period on segments of these people admits, "Before the Somali penetrated the area in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a population of Bantu-speaking cultivators inhabited the river lands."⁴⁶ The inhabitants of the area believe, in their own traditions, that they are the autochthons of the riverine, the earliest settlers. Their adaptation to and control of the environment inform us a lot. The division and delegation of social activities are elements of proof that only a keen observer can learn. As one oral historian Ismaaciil Aliyoow Baxaar⁴⁷ put it, "How can this land be claimed by anyone other than a Bantu? Who can control the crocodiles,

hippopotamus and the other species in the river bed, other than a Jareer?" He convinces to answer proudly that unlike what Luling wrote about the mythical narrative of the Gaalabax 'kooyto' comers in Afgoie, "All the Baxaar⁴⁸ everywhere along the rivers are Jareer, and none is Jileec."⁴⁹ We can also consider Faay Muudeey Shongow's statement of the Baxaar duties belonging to her Jareer people as was also quoted by Luling,⁵⁰ who maintains in another substantiation that one of her informants " ... claims that the area once belonged to short people with flat noses, strong muscles and big jaws, mostly living by the rivers, whose descendants are still here".⁵¹ Perhaps we can also multiply our evidence demonstration by invoking another one from Faay Muudeey Shoongow telling Luling, "Our ancestors [were] born here; they did [not] come here."⁵² (Emphasis added.)

The Jareer and the Jileec live together in many towns and villages on the banks of the rivers, but it has since time immemorial been an indispensable social duty of the Bantu/Jareer as the owners of the land, to bear responsibility of control over the species in the river. The Jileec would have developed means of control over these creatures had they been the earlier inhabitants to live in the area. They would have developed a means of taming these species by utilizing the river.

No matter how much learned or respected one may be, but once the Bantu/Jareer Baxaar sanctions the suspension of the use of the river, no other settler can lift the ban, be he a Sultan or Sheikh or any other member of the community. The ownership and operation of the boats as means of transport is another duty, which falls also under the ancestrally designated responsibility of the Jareer. The managers and caretakers of these social tasks are the Bantu. It is their sense of belonging to the environment and closer attachment to it that separate them from the "kooyto" comers who settled with them first as 'sheegat',⁵³ then later overturning the mutual co-existence into serfdom, only after gaining support from kinsmen from far. But whatever the trends and tidings of time, the Jareer

stay attached to their land which is a significant indication of their “maguuraan” sedentarism, despite perpetual attempts to uproot them either by war or by coercive attachment to a Somali clan.

The traditions recount endless events of how the non-Bantu Jileec communities were initially accepted as new settlers and associates of the ‘gunta’, the community. Mentions have been neatly narrated in well-preserved Jareer poetry, three of such being the following:

- (a) *Shiikh ii Sharaf-kiina Sheegataa-tihiin,*
*Minaa i-Shumeeynin waa nii Shawihaa.*⁵⁴

Translation

From Sheikh to Sharif (of the Jileec) you are clients
If you disdain kissing (my hand in respect), I will chase you (out of my land).

- (b) *Duurka ii Dugaagtaa Diriskaada ahaay*
Anaa ku Dadeeyi Deeganka ku siiyi

Translation

In the jungle, you were a neighbour of the wild animals
(It is me) I gave you settlement and made you a human being.

- c. *Mugii Aradneedoo Afkaada Uraayi*

Aboow Ileheed Adoon ma Eheen!

Translation

When you were shabby (unworthy) of malodorous mouth,
You used to call me ‘Abow’ (respected older brother), not ‘Adoon’ (slave).

Traditionally, before one is qualified and accepted as a member of the ‘gunta’, he would approach ‘Akhyaarta’ or ‘Ul-gaduudda’ the council of elders, present his request and procure a formal acceptance or rejection. Upon the procurement, the person gets membership but under a ‘sheegato’ client status. He becomes part of the community

culture and the institution of the social customary charter then protects the new member, as he is also obliged to abide by it. "But these 'sheegato' clients from the Jileec have caused us betrayals and irreparable damages,"⁵⁵ recalls Aaw Bukoow. "At the beginning, they plead for mercy and help, later when they are satisfied with their number, they breach all the 'gaanuun', the customary social canon regulation, and pose a threat,"⁵⁶ explains Aaw Diinle Aliyow. Ioan Lewis,⁵⁷ the anthropologist, would agree with these elderly historians if he would stand by his evidence that Somalis become strong by allying themselves to foreigners, particularly Arabs in his view. But I would not be exaggerating if I also added the Italians into the list because of the forced labour conspiracy, which was executed jointly with the Somalis, a discussion I shall visit in Chapter Four.

In ancient times when the Bantu were the only settlers in the inter-riverine area before and even after 'dud-ka' the mass exodus of the Jareer migration took place, the Somali were joined to the community as clients. Cerulli, the Italian ethnographer who wrote extensively about Somalia, mentions members of Hawiye sub-clans including the Hilibi, the Moobleen, the Daa'uud, the Baadi-Cadde and the Moolkal who initially settled along the Shabelle River as clients under the patronage of the sedentary Jareer farmers. These members were not merely absorbed on client basis but were even assimilated and have left their pastoral culture to adopt farming instead. Other remarkable instances are the Waceysle who have been long inhabitants of Shanlo village⁵⁸ while others are scattered in adjacent villages like Dhagaxow.⁵⁹ In yet another more interesting evidence, Dr. Francesca Declich writes about a possibility that such social interactions may also lead to linguistic impact.⁶⁰

In a similar occurrence, the 'gunta' community of 'Aruundaale', present day Afgoi (Afgooye), welcomed the Gobron and the entire Geledi confederacy, upon their arrival. The Eelqode communities, possibly the Aytire leadership at the time, welcomed them as religious people, and were later assigned as bird-controllers who would read Qur'an and

give propitious blessing to the production and multiplication of crops. Writing about this group, Lewis explains, “Their blessing protected the crops from birds – the same power attributed to saints elsewhere in the farming districts of Somalia.”⁶¹

The Gobron were religious people, not only that, they are very well known for their sorcery and superior spiritual powers. They were experts in unleashing strong magical powers (caziima) to enemies and other undesirables. Normally, in those days, their task would categorically focus on the prediction and occult manipulation of the results of the wars. Their knowledge of that supernatural magical manoeuvre of ‘saac’- the favourable timing of operations, and the employment of other spiritual powers to disadvantage the foe, were among the advantages that have facilitated - if not accelerated – the synchronous decline and rise of the Aaytire and the Gobron respectively.

The Geledi themselves as a community, are not popular for fighting, a reason why they tolerated, including the Goobroon, the long duration of Silcis occupation and slavery to the extent of paying tribute even for the use of the water from the river and from the harvest of their crops. In addition, there were other unbreachable customs and traditions, such as that of (Todoweeyisi) - a Silcis male first celebrating honeymoon with every Geledi bride for seven days before she could enter the official matrimonial honeymoon with her official Geledi bridegroom.

However, this subjugation was terminated after the arrival of the Wacdaan who overran the Silcis in a devastating battle. The oral tradition, one of the ISTUNKA festival, produced in response to the Galadi’s taunting of Shukri and Shariffow (mentioned in Chapter Two), confirms that custom in this couplet:

2. *Tuug waa Tirisateen waa Tilmaansateen*

*Wax luu Todoweesti Tolkeeya ka keen.*⁶²

Translation:

You have counted and (virtually) marked culprits/stealers (from my kinship)

But can you mention from among my community (a female) who has undergone her 7-days honeymoon (other than with her husband!!)

The 'Laashin' poet from the community of Shukri and Shariffoow, on the east bank of the river, was exasperated by the taunt of the rival group and 'bixii' produced/cited the above 'mar' verse, which in retaliation caused vexation among the entire Geledi population on the west bank of the river. It was morally more painful in taunt because it revealed a historical shame of the sultanate, which many Geledi people (especially those who exalted themselves to self-ennoblement) avoid to reminisce. It is about traditional experience referring to the period of the Silcis-Gorgaate (Hawiye sub-clan) domination of Aruundaale when it was 'Xeer' [customary] for every Geledi bride (supposedly virgin at that time) to celebrate her honeymoon [first] with a Silcis-Gorgaate male before she could celebrate the occasion with her official marital husband. As a consequence of the un-Islamic act involved, a majority of the Geledi 'ul-gaduud' elders feel it contemptuous at the reminder of any historical narrative related to those days, because it questions the authenticity of the biological parenthood/relationship between the children born at that time and their symbolic fathers, as it was very likely that many of those children were conceived during the first honeymoon with the Silcis-Gorgaate male, before the official Geledi bridegroom had sexual contact with his [deflowered] bride.

Leaving that as it is, the name Ceelqode (Eelqode), which is said to have been given to the Tolweyne, is first of all the name of the Jareer eponymous ancestor of the real Ceelqode clan who are the sedentary people of "Oraxsin" west Afgoie, the indigenous settlers. Although Luling did not elaborate it explicitly, because she was given a version

irreconcilable with some of the known traditions, the meaning of “Ceelqode” is equivalent to the English ‘well-digger’ or ‘borehole-digger’ and pronounced in the official local Maay language as “Eelqode”. My argument now follows: -

If the Tolweyne are the ‘nobles’, and ‘Eelqode’ is the digger of the well or borehole: who digs the borehole according to “Jiinka” riverbank tradition, the noble or the ignoble? There is no tradition or history whatsoever which suggests that nobles in Aruundaale (Afgooye) ever dug wells. It is a heavy duty and therefore belongs to the undesirables at the lower stratum of the social hierarchy. Let me also add for the sake of ethnological benefit, that people who don’t dig the grave [of] their own deceased kins are least expected of digging a well [for] everyone else, including the ignobles. In this case, since the name is attributed to someone who qualified to dig wells, and it is the Jareer that undertake this kind of activity, it is plausible only to consider the tickling fact that the so-called ‘nobles’ of the Tolweyne have adopted by subscription the name of the Jareer borehole digger, Eelqode. For this matter, we may politely accommodate the presumption or even perception that the one whose name has been adopted so widely to stand as the ancestral eponym of the whole clan/lineage is most certainly the original settler/s who hosted those immigrants who later ‘sheegteen’ ascribed to his name. Otherwise it sounds irrational and of course demeaning for a “noble” clan to have accepted in any other circumstances, to take the name of a low man, and in this case Eelqode – well digger. Here again, my predisposition sustains that the multipurpose Somali phenomenon of ‘Sheegat’ as narrated by many Somali and non-Somali scholars might have been promptly abused, this time by the Geledi and the entire so-called ‘noble’ people attached to the Eelqode of Afgoie.

The pastoral societies of Somalia are often dependent upon the ‘sheegat’ system for grazing opportunities. For the urban dwellers from the nomadic culture, one often

associates oneself to the community through marriage or even at times by other dubious ways of identity manipulation and misinformation as Gunther Schlee witnessed in Kenya:-

*I once asked a Marsabit businesswoman from the 'Idagalle of Isaaq, who claimed that "idagalle was just another name for the Rendille clan Elegella, how she came to believe this. She pointed to the similarity of the two names, an argument that did not convince me. She then gave her argument a pragmatic turn: 'It is much better to have people than to be alone.' That is why she and her family shegdeen' Elgella since their arrival in Kenya, had become known as 'the Somali of Elgella' to the Rendille. Many Somali traders relied heavily on the help of such Rendille 'brothers' in the beginning and only later, when they had accumulated wealth, developed cultural arrogance towards these 'pagans'.*⁶³

Schlee expresses astonishment over this experience by saying, "I have not met a Somali who regarded this ubiquitous type of relationship as shameful."⁶⁴ The above paragraph defines one of several aspects, some mentioned here, which the Somalis exploit to attach themselves to a 'buur' a mountain – in other words, a strong tribe or clan, if one is away from his kinship or has a hidden peculiar interest, because the nomadic culture teaches about the habitualization of this suspicious tradition, as it advises: "Buur noqo ama ka mid noqo", others put it as "Buur ahow ama mid ku tiirso" which respectively mean 'Either be a mountain (strong tribe) or adhere/adjoin yourself to one' and "Be a mountain or be leaning on one."

Another illuminating factor in Professor Schlee's statement is how the Somali revert to arrogance and superiority immediately upon achieving their goal. This negative description fulfills the argument of the traditions of the two Jareer historians Aaw Bukoow and Aaw Diinle, referred above in 45 and 46 respectively, which the Jareer poets have also commented on the dimensions of its treachery in disgust.

An aspect of the 'Sheegato' client phenomenon of clan affiliation extensively stays vivid among the Digil-Mirifle confederacy of tribes. The traditions and even written documents mention sub-clans like the Hadama who absorbed numbers of people from the Dir and the Daarood.⁶⁵ Many people previously believed as part of the Digil-Mirifle social organization, who shared lineages cognate to the Reewing, have in a dramatic somersault re-allied with their reactivated original Daarood sub-clans like Ogaadeen, Dhulbahante and Majeerteen. The self-detachment from the host clan and resuscitation of one's 'original' clan, took their toll in the wake of the civil war when shifting alliances and clan confederacies became the resort for protection, a paradigm so characteristic of the nomadic way of life. Against the Digil-Mirifle, those previously most attached to the clan, i.e. born and bred in Baydhaba Jannaay and its affiliate Reewing territory inflicted the most devastating havoc.

The negative legacies which the indigenous Bantu people inherited from the accommodation of the Jileec Somalis into their social system are characteristically variant, but the most damaging are the loss of their ancestral identity, language and culture which all disappeared as a consequence of assimilation under the guise of Somali 'brotherhood', culminating in a serfdom status created against a community who otherwise deserved respect as beloved hosts and human philanthropists.

The previously accepted collateral communal relation, as cited by Schlee, changed into arrogance and intolerable lust for hegemony. The traditions reveal endless wars that were fought between the Somali pastoralists and the Jareer remnants that waged persistent protest against Somali wish for subjugation.⁶⁶ Most of these battles were fought due to the aboriginal Bantu people's hatred against dominance whereas the Somali, with their fondness and belief of slave ownership as their Qur'anic right,⁶⁷ it was regarded shame for them to have been resisted by the Bantu, especially after overwhelming the Galla into subjugation, reducing them to "Qowsaar" pastoral slaves.⁶⁸ "As the 'Raagaay'

(ancient forefathers) passed to us, in one day over 40 Somali Jileec fell 'goobyaal' (dead in the battlefield). The Jareer lost a few as they were in 'gaadiilo' tactical ambush. After that battle in Balcad, Jareer went out in peace."⁶⁹

These traditions, acquired from different sources and supported by written documents, could not convince Somalis and colonists Italy as well as Asian oppressors from categorizing all the Bantu people as slaves. The most plausible rationale behind this categorization would put the Somalis in a class of their own and above the Jareer so that their claim for Arabness would be superiorly but superficially maintained. In his opinion, historian Omar A. Eno refutes this unscholarly misinformation and argues, "A myth perpetuated by Somali officials and by some scholars suggested that the entire Jareer population in Somalia consists of a small number of imported slaves from East Africa, an argument which is not supported by any historical or anthropological evidence."⁷⁰

In my contentious view, for all the Jareer/Bantu to have been imported as slaves for cultivation, the masters should have been sedentary settlers along the rivers prior to their acquisition of the slaves; but it is the other way round because the Jareer remain until today the only race with dominance on the river banks, even after the departure of their kins. Alternatively, the so-called 'imported slaves', notwithstanding their previous occupation, would have been made 'Qowsaar' pastoral slaves herding camels or attending to other pastoral livestock, the nomad's area of economic domination.

In promulgation of his point, Eno cites none other than Turton⁷¹ who conceives that in their process of expansion, the Galla and the Somali encountered Bantu-speaking people as their main rivals for control over grazing land in order to achieve a complete control over large areas in the riverine region.⁷² Apparently, if this particular group under discussion,

the Bantu-speakers, were imported slaves, they wouldn't have had a right to land ownership as they themselves were 'owned' by the Somalis, a fact which, of course, would disagree with the notions of an "encounter" because slaves would not be expected to dare disobey their masters. Clearly said, a property cannot own another property, therefore the "encounter" to uproot them envisages another concrete evidence that they were the indigenous settlers whose land was, for all perceptible purposes, the bone of contention for the Galla, the Somalis as well as the Italians, as history has chronicled.

From the picture of this argument, we can screen that the Bantu population have found themselves between the hammer that constituted biased colonial scholars who have remained silent from refining the historical distinction between the Bantu stocks, and the anvil that was the Somalis who had an insoluble crave for Arabness and ethnic supremacy over the African race. These two anti-social forces have, at different times and degrees, sufficiently orchestrated the contamination, if not contemporary demise, of the historiography as well as ethno-cultural identity of the entire Bantu community. Although I gave a brief overview of the Somali motives in the few lines above, a detailed account, incorporating even that of the colonial motive, will be a task in the next chapter.

Just as the New world was not actually new to the aborigines, in other words, the natives belonging to and settled in that world, Somalia was not Somalia for the Jarer as they lived there before that abstract, theoretical name could be attributed to the shaping of a people 'half' Arab and 'half' African, with their insatiable obsession to attach themselves wholeheartedly to the Quraish tribe of Arabia. Is it the geographical territory that became to be known as Somalia after the arrival of the mythical Arab immigrants, as in any case Samale could not have existed in Somalia prior the eponymous Arabs' visits to this land? Or should the attribute take an abrupt logical shift to the reality that this country has

acquired its original toponym as Bantuland and not 'Puntland' as the Arab writers might not have heard [p]unt from the early settlers they met during their visits?

A strong point of contention rests in the later formation of the pseudo name 'Somalia' or the 'Somali' and how all the various sub-clan segments enjoined to clan segmentations and yet all take a single name Somali as a banner. As history and the current socio-ethnic realities teach us, there existed groups of people who were neither Somali nor even knew about the existence of a country or a place by the name Somalia, but who, according to their own socio-cultural behaviour, lived as kinship of their own whose contact with the periphery was mainly characterized by peaceful co-existence

The ancient maps and archival documents all support invariably the presence of non-Somali, non-Arab and non-Cushitic peoples in what they called 'Bilad - 'I Punt' which highly suggests 'Land of the Bantu', supported by descriptions of Negroid or Zinj physical characteristics which are loathsome to the noble-claiming Somali people and which to them are biological properties and complexions of 'low-born' inferior Africans.

According to the Arabic script, there is neither an alphabetical letter nor a phonetic sound equivalent to the English or Latin phoneme 'p'. The circumstances under which the English or European translators invented the Arabic sound corresponding to the English letter 'P' is very questionable since that sound could not have occurred in any way in the Arabic version of the text. The Somali phonetic sounds are also in support of this evidence because of the inexistence of a 'p' phoneme or letter in the Somali orthography.

What happened in what is today known as Somalia is conceptually in resemblance to the emigrational phenomena that took place in other parts of the world where a continuum of human transplantation and cultural importation have caused the concealment of the

indigenous aboriginal people and their culture through domination. The outcome of this kind of migration, in our limits within the Somali case, was the creation of what Omar Eno termed “Landless Landlords and Landed Tenants,”⁷³ the title of his Essay elaborating on the dreadful consequences of settling an alien with a subversive agenda.

In order to account for the complex factors of identity, mobility, cultural supremacy and ethnic-ennoblement, the self-Arabized Somali nomads had to put in place an ethnic stratification policy to place themselves above the sedentary people who landed them initially as ‘sheegad’ or ‘sheegato’ clients and ‘brethren.’ The wider effects, though, would be seen in the creation of slavery and Slave Empire, ethnic marginalization, political domination and cultural genocide. According to Adam Kheerow, “There was already black colonialism in our midst in Somalia against the ‘mano fero’ (iron hand or Jareer people) before the arrival of the white colonists.”⁷⁴ As Shiikhe Ismaan Sadiiq opinionates, “The arrival of European colonialism has played [only] a complementary role to the localized Somali colonialism of the Jareer because both colonists, Italians and Somalis, were in mutual concordance in the colonization of the Bantu/Jareer people and the expropriation of their land.”⁷⁵ Therefore, both systems have led to the marginalization of the Jareer as an inferior people with little human ‘value’ and ‘cognizance’, people whose potential was not considered beyond the boundaries of the lowly and burdensome duties derided by the artificially ‘Arabized’ Somali nomads.

Ancient travelers who recorded about the people they met in parts of what is now Somali territory, have talked about Pagans who were not the least Muslims. They mentioned the rule of Abyssinia (Habashini) in regions, which make now part of Somalia. But all along we know that Somalia has been mentioned as “Berbers” by a section of the ancient travelers who made contacts with Somalia. Axiomatically, as we know it today, “Berbers”

are one of the ethnic communities in northern African countries like Algeria and Morocco and are a community subject to discrimination.

The northern African “Berbers” actually have organizations such as ‘Amazighin’ overseas and even inside their country, which advocate for their rights and equality. This very aspect may lend us a perception (though distant) that possibly these “Berbers” escaped persecution as slaves in their country and found another home in ‘Somalia’ where ‘Berbers’ were seen. Scholars have not established the Berber connection as to make some enlightenment on the cause and effect of that migration, if at all it is true that “Berbers” have ever visited Somalia from the Africa north. So far, it seems that no studies have been carried out to exhaust the truth substance of the Berber connection.

Historians have undertaken fabulous studies concerning the East African coast, but the investigations carried out on the interior, particularly in the hinterland of the Somali coast of Banadir, seem to be scant and therefore inadequate. The lack of less scholarly interest in this area until recently has made intricate, as some scholars admitted, the separation of the Bantu Negroid population in the country, so as to offer an in-depth understanding of the social and cultural constitution of these people. For instance, just to mention a few among these communities, we have such as:-

- (a) Bantu/Jareer who consist of a considerable number of what is cumulatively lumped as Digil-Mirifle, whose association is not genealogical but a heterogeneous confederation of population of diverse ethnic background. Whatever the social status might be, formerly or currently, the keynote is the affiliation and social interaction that interlock the Jareer peoples to the rest of their Jileec counterparts with whom they live. The Hubeer, the Gabaawiin and the Harin represent examples of such mixtures, even making it safe to say that

in a properly conducted census, the Jareer would count numerically higher than their Jileec 'brothers' in the same sub-clan. The Elai and Eyle need not further mention in their quantitative supremacy as they are often referred as distinct Negroid groups bearing identical physical recognition in contrast to the Jileec of the Reewing.

If, due to their culture and mode of living, the Sub (Digil-Mirifle or Rahanweyn) are despised by the Somali, their brethren of the nomadic pastoral culture north of the capital, the Reewing themselves, as Jileec, look down upon the Jareer/Bantu Negroid people living among them. The nature of their contemplation is epitomized in veritable terms, appellations and epithets like 'boon', 'madde' and other words equivalent to the Af-Maxaa 'Adoon', 'Bidde', 'Habash' etc., which are all low strata-related derogatory registers used by the average Jileec in degradation of the Jareer.

- (b) The two main Aaytire tribes, the autochthons of the Geledi territory in Afgoie, make another stock of Bantu people, so numerical but co-existing with Jileec peoples of Digil-Mirifle. In fact they accommodated the Gobron as Ulama, and other clans of the present Geledi confederacy of tribes in Afgoie district. Dissatisfied with the formation of artificial genealogical supremacy, the Aaytire have reneged the social hegemony of the Gobron sultanate and re-crowned their Sultan separately. Presently, at the helm is Suldaan Abdullahi Baansa, whose coronation was held in a fabulous ceremony in Afgoie.
- (c) The Tuni are composed of a broad segment of Jareer population who, in spite of the linguistic differences, many outsiders may confuse them with their counterparts in Baraawa. This sub-group of the Jareer also are regarded as

members of the Digil-Mirifle population. Among the people they live, they keep tolerating the effects of an adversely stratified social class.

Within the inter-river area, among the Reewing and as a branch the Digil segment, these people's ethnography as well as ethno-history have erroneously been associated with lineages they really do not belong to. To that effect, and despite the segregation they suffer, it incites dissatisfaction in some quarters at the mention of the separate identity of this people.⁷⁶

Apart from the commonly-shared and externally celebrated identity, "The Jareer are rarely accepted by the Jileec into an exogamous social institution with the 'brothers' and 'sisters' outside the Jarer genealogical bracket," insists Hassan Faqay,⁷⁷ a member of the Jareer community in Lower Shabelle region. But as a certain category of these Jareer people may be classified as descendants of ex-slaves, others are residues of the indigenous Sabaki/Bantu speakers who could not make it during the Mijikenda-Pokomo-Wa-Nyika migration up along the Tana area and other parts of the Kenya coast.

The discussion takes us to analyse the situation according to Professor Kusow's⁷⁸ thesis about the link in authority between the first-born and the water and/or land usage system, which may probably be right for particular groups of the Reewing community. Examining the same postulation from another perspective, this time that of the sedentary Jareer agriculturalist, there exists a more complex social institution in which land and water usage is vested, and which constitutes a hierarchical organization with each level fulfilling a given obligation at that stage or level, according to the dispositions of the "gaanuun" canon customary regulations of the Jareer people.

Therefore, since the latter system offers a wider divergence in the regulation of these essential social activities, there is more reason to think that the system might have universally been practised by the Jareer/Bantu agricultural communities, before its adoption at a later date by the Reewing pastoralists, including the Maay-speaking portions in Afgoi. Logically, if the Somali brethren of the Reewing were migrating such a long distance in search of territories where they were to be 'first-born', they would have probably left certain assimilations traceable to them, except the few Jileec whom they might have left as "Sheegat" among the Jareer.

However, if a mechanical contention is imposed to validate this theory, then it will absolutise the other parallel but more tenable concept of an early settlement on the Somalis' migration routes by Bantu farmers who were then the 'first-born' to the others that had to settle away from the riverbanks and far in the northern regions. Therefore, considering Dr. Kusow's hypothesis of the 'first-born', it will determine the Bantu, and not the Reewing or proto-Reewing, as the earliest settlers in Somalia beyond any reasonable doubt, because it would mean that the Somalis, who earlier on dispersed from the Ethiopian Lowlands in their first migration South-North, would have settled all the Bantu populated areas as first-borns, a golden opportunity which would help them claim ownership. But the fact that they pushed the Sabaki-speakers (Mijikenda/Pokomo) in their second (return) migration from the North to the South in search of a better environment, and the current distribution of the Jareer people in the south, especially the largest productive areas, I don't think we can suggest other than these 'Negroes' (whether 'Habash', 'Adoon', 'Boong', 'Maddo', 'Jareer', 'Bidde', 'Beyle-Sanbuur' or 'Sankadhudhi') being the first-born, because they have the water and the land together as a historical identity of their cultural dominance, in comparison to those intending to acquire the same territory through encounter, by battle and bloodshed.

In another observation of Professor Kusow's well/borehole (war) and first-born authority regulation, it gives us a want to consider the arrival of the proto-Reewing peoples in water abundant areas along the rivers Jubba and Shabelle, not as first-born, but as migrants themselves in search of habitation; they were further forced to another migration in a domicile where the clan's exercise as a first-born stock akin to that settlement would be legitimate.

In any case, the Bantu/Jareer people's proximity in wider part to the easily accessible water points, i.e living in the majority of the villages and towns in the vicinity of the rivers, remains a clear indication of who were the first-born. In the given theory where the first settler becomes the first-born of an area, it would give us how many first-borns! The concept of first-born, according to the general norms, functions in true biogenetic paradigm where by birth the child, (male child in partilineal cultures) is the first one born to a lineage, and the thesis may bear negative consequences on its application to dry land farming.

Kusow's dry land farming hypothesis may stand a bit shaky since the Jareer farming communities normally cultivate on adequate land whose distribution and availability do not depend on who is first-born or non-first-born. Newcomers, in this case, are either given a parcel after acceptance for settlement, or denied altogether. If the practice exists among the pastoral Reewing people, I believe that it cannot cover all farming communities because the Jareer is born to a settled people who are already in possession of land and water and who are first-born in the village or villages where they live. Therefore, they have been saved from migration elsewhere, wandering in search of open land to claim first-born status. In fact, it is this kind of migration of the proto-Reewing/Galla-Somaloid peoples that supports the Jareer indigenoussness in Somalia because they all mention arrivals from areas distinct from what we know as Somalia today.

The loss of identity following the migration of the bulk of the Wa-Nyika tribes has expunged the remnant groups into affiliation as 'subordinate' humans to the bellicose Somali as the dominant lot. Subjugation by various Somali sub-groups was perfected against them, ultimately disappearing their ascendant lineages and consanguineous tribal identity that became remote down the generations.

Among other probabilities, one of the reasons for coercive adherence of the most vulnerable to a Somali tribe or sub-clan was the need to exploit the Jareer male as manpower in the events of warfare in which the Somalis encountered each other frequently. So, as long as the Jareer's 'Abtirsi' ('ab' = ancestor, and 'tirsi' = is from the term 'tiro' meaning count, number) patrilineal count to the forefathers has been absorbed into the Somali tribe or sub-tribe officially, though artificially, the Jareer had no safer alternative but to abide by the cultural norms and values of their Somali oppressors.

When English speaking colonial scholars wrote about the Bantu/Jareer peoples, most of their fieldwork, if not all of it, was based on territories and settlements away from the primary subjects of the study. They relied on sources that were not in possession of the facts, thereby publishing inferential data of mendacity. Many of the few that claim to have carried out their fieldwork in the south, have not had an opportunity to talk to the subject Jareer people as their initial contacts or as their interests had shown more focus on the non-Jareer. This is to argue that certain researchers have been "investigating" the Jareer community while the bulk of their information was sourced from the dominant Jileec who form the so-called 'leaders' or 'elders' at the top of the social structure. Accordingly, data collected through such measures and tools were used to study the social and historical aspects of the Jareer.

Under the tutelage of stigma and oppression during an interview, the Jareer/Negroid autochthons could not portray their identity independently in the presence of the Jileec people, whether interpreter or self-made nobles. Dr. Besteman comments on the undesirable effects against the Bantu social situation as she says, “A stigmatized identity does not create ethnicity.”⁷⁹

Quite a number of Bantu people were interviewed in the presence of the Jileec, either as interpreters or ‘ex-masters’, in which case, a series of answers were given to please the third person than to present the actual truth. On the other hand, a section of these investigators might have arrived at the field with the misconception of researching on ‘Jareer slaves’, ignorant of the ethno-historical variation of the Jareer, thereby floundering into dissatisfaction and information inaccessibility as in the case of Virginia Luling in Afgoie, who in her own words admits that she got her information “...partly, from accounts given to me by Nobles, since those former slaves that I met were uncommunicative.”⁸⁰ My guess to such embarrassing experiences hints at the possibility of the inaccessible informants either not being “habash slaves” but “habash aborigines”. This kind of situation may be experienced when the unaware investigator compromises certain processes such as overlooking prior arrangement with the ‘habash’ informants for familiarization. For instance, Besteman informs us how she took care of the issue concerning confidence-building during her fieldwork in the Juba Valley. Therefore in the former’s case, as a reaction to what they saw as a socio-psychological offence against them, the ‘habash’ opted to protest by boycotting to respond hence Luling’s concentration to collect data from the “opposite” self-ennobled group.

To sum-up this debate, let us now turn to the other history of the second Bantu/Jareer community, consisting of the Diaspora, immigrants who were brought to Somalia as victims of Arab slave trade.

The second history of the Somali-Bantu population belongs to a section of the Jareer people who are the inhabitants of the Juba valley. They consist of heterogeneous peoples composed of an autochthonous stock and an immigrant counterpart who settled along the valley about two or three hundred years ago. Ethno-historically therefore, the valley is a composition of fugitive run-away slaves and indigeneous groups who lived there before them, but united as a community. Numerous names are used for these peoples, such as 'Gosha' (people of the un-inhabited forest), 'Mushunguli', 'Dhal-Goleed' (the offspring of the un-inhabited bush) and so on. They are described as "distinct groups like the Zigua, Zaramo, Magindo, Makua, Manyasa, Mushunguli and Yao".⁸¹

The traditions and archival documents tell us that there was famine in the original settlements of these people in Tanzania when Arab merchants lured them with promises of a more productive land and better living, a deceitful promise, which Grottanelli⁸² explains exhaustively. Subsequently, they were transported in dhows and sold into slavery to the coastal Somalis. Understanding the deception and the exchange of hands between the Arabs and the Somalis, the ill-fated victims of slavery had to make a decision for emancipating themselves, an opportunity which did not come rather easy. Defining that episode, Mzee Mkomo says, "The mistreatment and malnourishment were intolerable to the Mushunguli for they had neither expected nor experienced slavery."⁸³ Omar Eno⁸⁴ cites Lt. Christopher's report on the latter's visit to the Benadir in 1842, concerning the Somali mistreatment of slaves, a thesis that supports Mzee Mkomo's story. Robert Hess, in evidence, describes the inhuman condition of the slaves as "...often kept in manacles and fetters, overworked and underfed."⁸⁵

As a consequence, the malnourishment and mistreatment by the Somali spiralled to devastating proportions. Several plans were made after secret contacts among the people

have been established. Women and children would be the heaviest burden in the wake of an engagement in battle en route to emancipation, but nevertheless, everybody had to face the burden together in an event Mzee Mberwa⁸⁶ termed as “kufa na kuona” (to die and be relieved), in other words ‘do or die’. In connection to slavery, therefore, the Bantu victims from the diaspora had to cope with the complexities arising from the dreadful implications of a bestial institution away from home, which in the late Walter Rodney’s comments “...meant migration of labour in a manner one hundred times more brutal and disruptive.”⁸⁷ The only difference in the case of the Mushunguli or Wa-Gosha, is the colour of the master which in this concern is a mythically Arabized black African Somali.

The Gosha people’s determination to free themselves from subjugation at any cost would not please the Somali slave owners, particularly the Reer Hamar, the Amarani, the Biimaal and other Hawiye groups who pursued to realize high economic ambitions by means of exploitation. Robert Hess suggests that without slave labour, “The Biimal who had the nomadic Somali’s traditional disdain for agriculture would be reduced to subsistence economy.”⁸⁸ Being the might and machinery for the income generation, there was no possibility the Jareer could abandon their work stations en masse without contemplation of fatalities, especially when the base of social prosperity and other Somali trade economy was built on the grain produced by the slaves,⁸⁹ which also played as an avenue for opening up barter business with other traders.

With the passage of time, some of the slaves managed to escape and disappear, while others did so by sacrificing their lives for the freedom of generations to come – although the stigmatization of an unending slave status would live permanently with them. The leadership of the escape plot rested over the shoulders of a female, Wanakooka (others call her wanakoocha), a seer, who gave instructions that there would be no looking back once the journey to freedom had started; also, anyone who abandoned his people would

be dealt with by the ancestors' wrath and curse. She boosted her army's war psychology by reminding them the harsh inhuman penalty and punishment awaiting a failed escape attempt, so it would be a manly act for one to die rather than live a submissive life under Somali oppression. Elaborating on the consequences of escape failure, Lt. Christopher of the British Naval Army concedes witnessing an instance of escapee punishment in which a shackled slave was fetching water from a well to supply labourers about four miles away.⁹⁰

As Mzee Juma Chivalo narrates, "When the Mushunguli reached the Juba valley, they were received and absorbed into other existing Bantu aborigine/Negroid communities who were scattered in small and large villages on both banks of the river."⁹¹ The traditions sound more emphatic on the later arrival of non-Mushunguli runaways as well as individual escapees who had lost the way and reached upto Afgoi and Mogadishu before tracing their kinsmen back in the Juba valley.

Upon settling in the valley, each village had a leader and every few small villages had a structure under one leader. Here they established themselves as polities with strong social interaction, united under the banner of wa-Gosha people, harmonizing the differences of their multi-ethnic background. The oral historians I met in Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam, Kakuma, Marafa, Swaleh Nguru and Jomvu, were unanimous about Wa-Gosha engagements in several wars. The instigation behind these battles was based on Somali desire for re-enslavement of the fugitive Gosha ex-slaves, with the inclusion of the indigenous freeborn Jareer. Similarly, elders video-taped in Mogadishu narrated about vicious attacks by Somali pastoralists who had been attempting to dispel the Jareer diaspora and their autochthonous hosts from the area. Most imminent of these wars were two fought separately with the Biimaal and the Ogaden. Between the two, more reminiscent is the battle in which the Ogaden were subdued.

Under the leadership of Nassib Bundo,⁹² around 1890, the wa-Gosha people had established autonomous villages and cultivated abundantly. They produced surplus to trade with other communities and practiced fishing to exploit the river. The Somali were envious of the improvement of the living situation of the Bantu and the order and stability prevailing in their settlements. In reference, Omar Eno remarks, "The state of Gosha was surrounded by enemies, the Somali nomads."⁹³

As a result, suspicions of war with the Ogaden have been precipitating for some time because quite often the belligerent Ogaden pastoralists were intruding the Bantu by derogatory abuse, trespassing and grazing their livestock on mature crops and sometimes beating children. All these aggressions represented acts of provocation but the Bantu persevered, concentrating on their economic improvement and the maintenance of good neighbourliness. In time, the Ogaden had received support men from their clansmen, which explains deliberate intentions for an attack for a long time.

When Nassib Bundo was informed about the suspicion of an Ogaden build up for war, he summoned several elders in a secret meeting at night. They discussed thoroughly on the possibility for war. Within a few days, the elders reported to Nassib on their support in another meeting, which lasted till dawn. However, the Ogaden, as it appeared, were not aware of wa-Gosha preparation in a unified defence; and on that fateful day when the battle erupted, they were overrun overwhelmingly beyond their expectation. The Bantu ran amok. The Ogaden pleaded for mercy but Bantu vexation piling up over the years has exploded beyond its normal bounds of tolerance. The traumas from earlier grudges of Somali mistreatment and inhumanity under slavery have now found a healing mechanism for vengeance in this war, and the Ogaden had to bear the painful burden. The damage was immeasurable. The magnitude of the Ogaden devastation, in man and morale, would

remain unrecoverable for decades to come; and the peace that prevailed in the region thereafter brought more restoration of pride and dignity for the 'Dhal-Ooji' children of the Oji/Jareer in the Juba valley.

The most significant phenomenon of this war, which is reminiscent to the present, is the Ogaden plead for mercy in the battlefield, constantly repeating the three-word sentence 'Ooji-yoow abuur reeb'⁹⁴ meaning – Ooh Ooji (Gosha people) leave some offspring behind; don't exterminate all of us, please!⁹⁵

Reviewing the sources of the multiple traditions, gives the inference that several core factors have contributed to the defeat of the Ogaden:-

1. The leadership at that time, Nassib Bundo and his council of elders at the realm of the villages were wise. Nassib had sought the opinion of the elders who then won the trust of the masses before their stipulation for war. Because Palmer and Perkins tell us that in the absence of strong and sound leadership, "morale is totally useless, if indeed it can exist at all."⁹⁶
2. By seeking the elders' opinion, Mzee Bundo was evaluating the community's morale because he wouldn't dare a defeat in the duel once he had committed the community into it. He and his council were probably adept about social morale as during crisis, according to Morgenthau, "it permeates all activities of a nation, its agricultural and industrial production as well as its military establishment...its presence and absence and its qualities reveal themselves particularly in times of crisis."⁹⁷ And this was a time when the freedom of the entire Gosha was at stake.
3. The people had experienced a very successful harvest in the previous season and as such had adequate grains to survive in the event of a prolonged battle.⁹⁸

4. The Wa-Gosha were full of exasperation because the Ogaden had sent several threats for the Bantu either to submit to clientele and serfdom status, quit the valley or prepare for war.⁹⁹
5. Determination was a key influencing factor, according to the traditions. According to Omar Muya, the Wa-Gosha had to choose between repulsing the Ogaden once and for all, or suffering perpetual slavery; because even in the advent that they relocate elsewhere after a defeat, more Somali temptation to conquer them would be imminent thereby changing only masters but not status. They opted for an ultimate war.

The Ogaden – Bantu battle has an undertone of remote as well as immediate causes. Among the dynamic agents was the Ogadens' desire to convert the entirety of Jareer of Gosha into slaves looking after their livestock and undertaking other menial jobs, and/or working for them on agricultural bushland, cleared by the Gosha farmers and cultivated in favour of the Ogaden who would then reap the profit. However, the immediate cause of acceleration into the war, according to a section of the traditions, was the murder in Mofi Village of Mamgala Maligo Mazale, the sister of Mkoma Maligo Mazale then the Sultan of Mofi.¹⁰⁰

In this particular incident, the Ogaden, led by Sheck Ambulo,¹⁰¹ waged a surprise attack without any provocation whatsoever. The people escaped to take cover in Mukuy Gamila village across the river where the wa-Boni people live. Mamgala was pregnant and reluctant to flee, because she wanted the people to defend themselves. When the Ogaden found her, she was tortured against her silence to make a confession of where the people had gone. They cut her womb, killing her and her unborn baby boy. When the men returned, they were disgusted by the callous act of the Ogaden.

Messages were communicated to the other Bantu Sultans who joined for the burial of Mamgala and her prematured child. Prominent leaders like Shongor Mafula, Mzee Chaima of Hindi (Bula Mareer), Mzee Kalindima of Kwak-Kwam (Bandar-Jadiid), and Nassib Bundo of Kamsuma, had a big task in their hands.

After strategizing their people within a short period of time, they sent a mission one night and the Ogaden leader Sheck Ambuulo, was abducted from his residence.¹⁰² He was brutally murdered in vengeance for Mamgala's death. The Ogaden were deeply astonished and embarrassed upon the knowledge of their leader's mysterious disappearance and subsequent death. They got boosted with a massive reinforcement from their different clans and tribes for a final strike to engage the Jareer and subdue them into another Somali conquest.

An amalgamated Ogaden force in the leadership of Mohamed Heren Daboolo, Omar Godane and Leflef took up arms and attacked from different fronts including Migua, Bulizaga, Miono, Kamsuma, Makalango, Mofi and Mugambo, at different intervals. However, the miscalculation of the Ogaden was that they had not anticipated a pan-Jareer conglomeration of forces to go into battle side-by-side. One Ogadeni leader, Heren Daboolo, was killed in Mukuy Gamila. Omar Godane was shot with a poisonous arrow while drinking water from the river at Chirua (Lama-daad) and instantly died there. The fourth Ogadeni war leader, Leflef, was 'goobyaa' (death casualty in the battlefield) in Migua. In the course of these annihilations, the Ogaden realized that the Bantu were irresistible. They were dispersed, sought after, overpowered and humiliated. They had neither recourse nor intercession as they pleaded "Oojiyoow abuur reeb! Oojiyoow abuur reeb! Oojiyoow abuur reeb!" It was too late, as the puss of anger could no longer be kept in the bulging wound of perseverance.

Sheikh Murjan, a respected Bantu clergyman, convened a high-level inter-clan reconciliatory meeting in Mwana Mofi between the Bantu and the Ogaden, as the latter felt survival heat at the imposition of tribute for watering their livestock at the river. At times, their tribute was rejected with orders forbidding them from the vicinity of the wa-Gosha/Jareer settlements. With the reconciliation meditated by Sheikh Murjan, however, the relationship was normalized and peace and tranquility were restored.

Whatever the cost of the war, the Bantu diaspora's intolerance to slavery, their victory over the Somalis coupled with self-pride, and an astounding leadership recognized by their Somali rivals, provided them some consolation and self-esteem. Nassib was probably the only leader in pre-independent Somalia and even after independence, to rally a willing and formidable army estimated from twenty to forty thousand men.¹⁰³ Kenneth Menkhaus and Catherine Besteman, who both conducted superbly refined studies in the Juba valley and on the Gosha Bantu/Jareer communities, have visited this version of the oral traditions about the Ogaden-WaGosha war in their respective research.

Diplomatically, Sultan Bundo was in a class of his own. He developed relationship with all peoples of good intentions for mutual co-operation. Many countries recognized his authority as a Sultan of the Gosha. He had respect for his colleagues and the community as a whole. He was against injustice and was kind to the people in times of need. He was not dictatorial and was less bellicose, though he was a shrewd military leader and good strategist in time of war.¹⁰⁴ Due to his resistance to colonial injustice; he was imprisoned by the Italian colonial administration and died in incarceration in Mogadishu.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to separate the two histories of the Somali Bantu/Jareer people into two distinct groups composed of pre-Somali indigenous inhabitants and the diaspora. I

established the relationship between Shungwaya/Mijikenda – Pokomo and the present Bantu/Jareer population on the valleys of Juba and Shabelle rivers, and the available evidence in the traditions and in documents. The wa-Gosha people's determination out of bondage and struggle to oppose slavery for ever was also highlighted with some reflection on the war against the Ogaden Somalis. Bantu leadership in war and in peace, politics and prosperity were also recounted.

In the next chapter, the discussion will intersect through the four eras of (a) colonial period; (b) post-colonial civil administrations; (c) Barre's dictatorial military regime, and culminating in; and (d) the outbreak of the civil war. The next chapter therefore intends to capture the situation of the Bantu/Jareer people in all these eras of contemporary Somalia.

Endnotes: Chapter Three

1. Habash - is a derogatory word applied to the Bantu Somalis. It means Abyssinian pagan.
2. Adoon - means slave. It is pejorative and is used to abuse all the Jareer/Bantu Somalis regardless of status.
3. Bidde and 'Beyle-Sanbuur' are the equivalent of Habash, Adoon etc. The northerners to derogate the Jareer often use them.
4. Montclose, Marc – Antoine Perouse de. The French scientific Research Institute – www.ceped.ined.fr/cepedweb (Also read Report on Minority Groups in Somalia: Joint British, Danish, and Dutch Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, 17-24 September 2000.
5. UNDP Human Development Report – Somalia 1998: 23-24.

6. Turton, E.R., - "Bantu, Galla and Somali Migrations in the Horn of Africa – A Reassessment of the Juba/Tana area." *Journal of African History* 16 (1975):519-537.
7. Bulletin of the International Committee of Urgent Anthropological and Ethnical Research; pp.28-29. No.3, 1960; with the help of UNESCO.
8. Nurse, Derek. - "Shungwaya and the Bantu of Somalia: Some Linguistic Evidence. Kenyatta University college.
9. Kusow, Abdi M., - "The Somali Origin: Myth or Reality", in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia*. Red Sea Press.
10. Ali, Mohamed Nuuh, "Somali History: Linguistic Approach to the Past", in Kusow, Abdi M., (ed.), *op. cit.* p.24.
11. Morton, R.F., "The Myth of Shungwaya Origins of the Mijikenda: A Problem of Late Nineteenth Century Kenya Coastal History" , *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5 (1972):397-424. Also at the Kenya National Archives – Central Government Library: (83-528) – 149. 3MOR.
12. Ali, Mohamed Nuuh, *op.cit.*, p.18.
13. Ibn Sibahi, - "Awdah al-Masalik, *op. cit.* See also Lewis, I.M., *Peoples of the Horn of Africa*, p.45.
14. Doke, C.M., - "The Earliest Records of Bantu" reprinted from *Bantu Studies* – vol. XII, No. 2; June 1938.
15. Nurse, Derek, "Shungwaya and The Bantu of Somalia – Some Linguistic Evidence, Kenyatta University College.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. Sutton, J. E. G., "Early Trade in East Africa"; *Historical Association of Tanzania*. First Published 1973. East African Publishing House.

20. Spear, Thomas T., "The Kaya Complex – A History of the Mijikenda Peoples of the Kenya Coast to 1900, Kenya Literature Bureau, Nairobi (1978).
21. Ibid.
22. Thomas Spear uses Singwaya instead of Shungwaya.
23. Spear, Thomas T., "Traditional Myths and Linguistic Analysis – Singwaya Revisited." La Trobe University. (1977).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Kimaryo, Jacob L., "East African Coastal Historical Towns: Asiatic or African? A paper presented to the Conference: U-landsforskning 2000. January 13-15, 2000, University of Goteborg, Goteborg, Sweden.
27. Spear, Thomas T., "Traditional Myths..." op. cit.
28. Allen, James de Vere, "Shungwaya, The Mijikenda, And The Traditions." International Journal of African Historical Studies; vol. 16(3) 1983 pp. 455-85.
29. Ibid.
30. Grottanelli, V.L., "A Lost African Metropolis," Afrikanistische Studien Berlin, 1955, 231-242.
31. Krapf., Travels., c.f. Chittick, op. cit.
32. Champion, A.M., The Agiryama of Kenya; Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper No. 5 London, 1967: 6-7.
33. Morton, R.F., "Shungwaya" 401. cf. Chittick, op. cit.
34. Cerulli, :Libro degli Zenj," 253, n.3; cf. Chittick, op. cit.
35. Chittick, H.N., "An Archaeological Reconnaissance of the Southern Somali Coast," Azania, IV(1969), 118-120.
36. Hersi, A.A. op. cit.
37. "Cad iyo caano" – respectively mean 'piece of meat and milk', the supposed diet of Somali pastoralists.

38. Burton, R., *First Footsteps in East Africa*. London (1894:109).
39. Lewis, I.M., *Peoples of the Horn of Africa*, op.cit., p.75
40. Notes from videotaped Somali Bantu oral historians, 2003. Mogadishu – Somalia.
41. Hersi: A.A. op. cit., p. 172.
42. Ibid. 173
43. Chittick, Neville cf. Hersi op. cit. (fn 81 pp 103-104).
44. Aidarus, Sharif Aidarus Ibn Shariff Ali; - *Bughyat al-Amal – fi-Tarik – As Sumal*; Mogadishu, Stamperia A.F.I.F. 1955. I have also had several personal discussions with Shariff Aidarus in his residence near the border zone between Hawl-wadag and Wardhigleey (near Radio Marina) in the 1980's and he personally gave me a copy of the book. The Shariff was a friend of my father and a close friend of one Hagi Sufi of Bondheere, who was also my father's friend.
45. Chhabra, S.S., *Fundamentals of Demography* (2001) Surjeet Publications.
46. Luling, Virginia, "Colonial and Post-colonial Influence on a South Somali Community". *Journal of African Studies*, Spring, 1976 volume 3, number 1.
47. Ismail Aliyow Baxaar – personal discussion in Saudi Arabia and recorded audiotapes 2002.
48. Baxaar – is the caretaker of the species in the river such as crocodiles and hippopotamus and so on.
49. Ismail Aliyow Baxaar, see No. 47 above.
50. Luling, Virginia, *Somali Sultanate* op.cit. p.118, fn.9.
51. Ibid. p.117. fn.7.
52. Ibid. p.116
53. Videotaped workshop for Bantu elders, op.cit.

54. (a) Sacdi Mumin Hassan
(b) Maxmadeey Ismaan
(c) Muridi Maaxi Mumin
55. Aaw Bukow Ahmed – personal interview, 2003, Afgoie.
56. Aaw Diinle Aliyow – personal interview, 2003. Dhajalaq village, District of Afgoie.
57. Lewis, Ioan M., *Peoples of the Horn of Africa*. op.cit. p.14.
58. Cerulli, Enrico, - *Somalia, Scritti editi ed inediti*, vol.III (1964) Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato.
59. Shanloow and Dhaxoow are two villages of the Shidle Jareer community in Middle Shabelle region. They are at times read together as ‘Shanloow – Dhagaxow’ without the conjunction.
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61. Lewis, I. M., *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society*. London. Haan Associates, (1998:86).
62. Laashin Sacdi Mumin Hassan.
63. Schlee, Gunther, op. cit.
64. Ibid.
65. Lewis, I. M., *Peoples of the Horn of Africa*. op.cit. p.40.
66. Videotaped workshop. As above.
67. Speke, cited in Besteman, Catherine L., “The Invention of Gosha”, in Ahmed, Ali J.(ed.) op.cit., p. 49.
68. Ibid.
69. Sheikh Abukar Gaafaay, in videotaped workshop in Mogadishu. op.cit.

70. Eno, Omar A., "Landless landlords and Landed Tenants" in Kusow, Abdi M., (ed.) op. cit.
71. Turton was an opponent against the Bantu settlement in the riverine area and the associated Shungwaya issue. In an abrupt turn-over, he suggests an encounter and rivalry between the Somali/Galla and riverine Bantu.
72. Eno, Omar, A., "Landless Landlords". op.cit.
73. Ibid.
74. Eng. Hagi Adam Kheerow – personal discussion, 2003 Afgoie, Somalia.
75. Shiikhe Ismaan Sadiiq – personal discussion, 2003 Afgoie, Somalia.
76. Eno, Mohamed A., "Jawaab", Wargeyska Runta – 16-30 Maajo, 1996; Cadadka 10aad, Bogga Saad.
77. Hassan Faqay. Interview in Nairobi, 2003.
78. Kusow, Abdi M., "The Somali Origin: Myth or Reality", in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed.), op.cit. pp.81-106.
79. Besteman, Catherine, "The Invention of Gosha", in Ahmed, Ali Jimale, op.cit.
80. Luling, Virginia, Somali Sultanate, op.cit., pp.126-127.
81. U.S Department of State; Human Rights and Labour – March 2000.
82. Grottanelli, Vinigi., "I Bantu del Giuba nelle tradizioni dei Wazegua." *Geografia Helvetica*, VIII, 3, p. 254.
83. Mzee Muya Mkomo, personal interview in Kwedhi - Kwazo, Tanga- Tanzania, 2004.
84. Eno, Omar A., "Landless Landlords". op.cit.
85. Hess, Robert L., *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*; The University of Chicago Press, 1966:87-99
86. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, personal conversation in Mbagala, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. 2003.

87. Rodney, Walter, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. East African Publishers. 2001
88. Hess, op.cit.
89. ASMAI – Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, (Roma, Italia) 1905.
90. Christopher, William. "Extract from a Journal by Lt. William Christopher, commanding the H.C. Brig. Of War Tigris on the East Coast of Africa. May 8th, 1843." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 14 (1844: 76-103).
91. Mzee Juma Chivalo, personal interview in Kwedhi Kwazu, Tanzania. 2004.
92. The traditions say his real name was Makanjira but was popularly known as Nasib which was a name given to him by the man who found him as a young boy and fostered him. Nasib means 'luck'.
93. Eno, Omar A., ' "Gosha/Heer-Goleet" (people of the forest): Runaway slaves in the Juba valley of Southern Somalia'. *Unfree Labour and Revolt in Asia* University of Avignon.
94. Ooji, or Oji is a derogatory term often referred to the Juba valley people. Despite its referral use, the exact meaning of the word is obscure. Some sources suggest that it is derived from the Italian word 'Oggi' the equivalent of 'today' in English, because of Gosha people thinking that is limited only to what is today and not beyond or in the future. But obviously the word must have been used earlier than the arrival of the Italian colonialists. In the Shabelle valley, the reference is attributed to someone who has been enslaved and it is used (not in their face) for people who are known to have been enslaved; the Jareer also use that to a known descendent of slave.

The expression 'abuur' means seed/s, and 'reeb' stands for 'to spare, to leave behind'; therefore 'abuur reeb' symbolizes not only the admission of defeat and submission for mercy, but also an imminent annihilation and wanton extinction

of a generation or generations, hence the pleading to spare some 'abuur' offspring as a future evidence of the existence of our present generation under extinction.

95. Arbo, Mohamed Ramadaan, Personal discussion (several occasions in the late 90's) on the historical background of the wa-Zigua people.
96. Palmer, Norman D., and Perkins, Howard C., *International Relations*; Third revised edition; A.I.T.B.S. Publishers and Distributors, 2002.
97. Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace*. Sixth edition. (2001) Kalyan Publishers.
98. Extracted from the manuscripts of Omar Muya Mberwa, Kakuma Refugee Camp – Kenya, 2004.
99. Ibid.
100. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, Chairman of Somali Bantu Refugee Community in Kenya, discussion in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya, 2004.
101. Sheikh Ambulo: the Wa-Gosha call him Sheikh Mambulo.
102. Majority of the sources say that extensively administered magical power was used for Sheikh Mambulo's abduction to Mkoma Maligo's house in Mofi.
103. Mukhtar, Mohamed H., in Kusow (ed.) *op. cit.*
104. Hadija Msharemo Mwali, discussion in Chogo Refugee Camp, Tanzania, 2004.

Chapter Four

CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA AND THE STIGMATIZATION OF THE BANTU/JAREER COMMUNITY

I. The Colonial Occupation: From Slavery To Slavery

The Berlin Conference of 1884 - 1885 is a vicious historical event of a rare kind. Several European countries, particularly Britain, Germany, France and Portugal embarked on a transcontinental mission across Africa for the exploitation of African resources in man and material. Indeed, it was the implementation of the philosophies exchanged during the various sessions of this convention which later inherited Africa multi-dimensional problems that triggered several transnational wars, ultimately transforming forever the living conditions of many Africans.

Europe's penetration into Africa characterizes a unique formulation by the individual powers concerned, not exempting the option of force and coercion in order to realize each country's set goals for its colonial expedition, with no consideration to the will of the local people. In the epistemological perception of Olatunde Odetola and Ade Ademola, "It was a case of imposition of foreign rule upon an indigenous people irrespective of the wishes of the people concerned."¹ In a more generalized sociological undertone, Kayongo-Male and Onyango state, "European and Arab contact with Africa initiated highly disruptive changes which affected African life. New economic systems changed family production systems; political actions led to forced labour, racial segregation and alienation of land - all of which had implications for family life; and religious proselytization altered the symbolic meaning of family life."²

The colonial powers, specifically Britain and Italy, had similar objectives of exploitation but engraved in different attributes. After stationing a garrison in Aden, Yemen, in 1839, Britain has developed the concept of working out some measures of importing livestock from Somalia. Thereafter, the British started settling in the northern coast of the country right in the vicinity of Yemen. To that effect, economic geographer, Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar writes that the livestock sub-regime at the time was “the most important commodity in the Somali trade with the outside world.”³

In the southern part the interest was in the agricultural sub-sector, which the Italian colonial administration desired to develop and exploit for its own benefit. Before the partition, the Sultan of Zanzibar had the Benadir Coast under his rule. This consisted of Barawa, Mogadishu, Merca and Warsheikh. However, Egypt showed her interest in the country around 1875, but due to other commitments in the Sudan, her presence was brief and rather insignificant. Nevertheless, it was after Egypt's arrival in Somalia that the European concept of colonization gained momentum.

The Italian government assigned explorer Antonio Cecchi to conduct an expedition, an idea which was raised by then Foreign Minister Pasqual Mancini. Among Cecchi's assignments were to see about the situation of southern Somalia and attract Said Bargash, Sultan of Zanzibar, into commercial relationship. The Italians were present in Zanzibar because Filonardi, prior to expanding his business activities into Somalia, had established commercial operations in the archipelago, dealing in cloves, which Zanzibar is active even today. It was after negotiations and recommendations that Filonardi got a grant for business expansion from the Bank of Rome⁴ in simultaneity with an approval as Italy's representative in Somalia.

Archival documents show Italy's interest in the acquisition of Kismayo by purchase from Bargash⁵ but it did not materialize. In another development, the European states of Germany, France and Britain were determined to edge the Arab Sultan out of the East Africa Coast or at least make away with a chunk of the territory under his control. Sultan Said Bargash found himself and his rule in extreme threats from stronger European states willing to create all havoc.

France, Britain and Germany dared Bargash to the extent of sanctioning delimitations on his areas of control in the Banadir coastal towns, not exceeding about 10 kilometers into the hinterland.⁶ The area constituted Kismayo, Merca, Brava, Warsheikh and Mogadishu. On the Italian side, after the death of Bargash, Filonardi was still pressing hard his successor, Sultan Said Khalifa, for the acquisition of Kismayo. In a quick diplomatic turnover, Said Khalifa approved the transfer of the Kenya Coast to Britain in 1888, operating on the institutional name of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). But Italy finally succeeded to seal the Benadir coast deal in August 1892. A British official named Portal represented Sultan Said Ali of Zanzibar and Cottoni signed on behalf of Italy. The amount involved was 160,000 rupees, which as a result legalized the Benadir concession.⁷

Before the arrival of the Italians, the pastoral Samaale/Somali used to manage booming businesses in the sale and purchase of slaves often transported from the Tanzanian coast in Arab dhows, and in the exploitation of the slaves for their human resources in the agricultural sector. The previous chapter mentioned how slave muscle was responsible for the attainment of material benefit for many Somali tribes. But the new Italian administration announced the expropriation of all land as the property of the Italian government. The second matter was that, according to the Italian policy, slave trade was no longer tolerable.⁸

Filonardi tried to establish his business empire in Somalia but that did not come rather easy. The amounts he received from the Italian authorities in subsidies were less than adequate to cover his operating costs. Despite the efforts he exerted, the results were much less than the aspirations. Occurring in time with that was the Italian defeat by Ethiopia in 1896, which brought about the downfall of the Crispi administration. Italy was ashamed and internal criticism surmounted due to this incident; a European colonial power devastated and humiliated by an African country. Therefore, as far as the new Italian administration was concerned, Filonardi had to be replaced by what was known as Societa del Benadir or the Benadir Company.

Through this period of changes and debacles, Britain took over the northern part of Somalia, France chunked off Djibout, the territory of the Afars and Issa, Italy colonized Southern Somalia while Britain later annexed Ogaden to Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier Districts to Kenya. Both of these last territories were under British hand upon their rejoinder to the respective countries.

Although the concessions for the Benadir and the approval to occupy Kismayo were signed in November 1889, decision had not been made on the boundaries of the territorial administration separating both colonial powers, Italy and Britain.⁹ Italy was considering these trends in its favour because it was mainly Britain that played quite a commendable role in Italy's success in obtaining these concessions.¹⁰

During that time, the settlers of the Juba valley, Kismayo and the vast area of its surroundings were living in autonomy. They faced threats and harassment from the neighbouring bellicose pastoral Somalis, but they maintained a high degree of concentration on tilling and the enhancement of their production and livelihood.

Menkhaus reports that the Juba valley community “produced regular yields of surplus grain which they sold to trading posts of the sultanate of Zanzibar.”¹¹ They also enjoyed trade relationship with the interior where business people purchased from them either by barter or by money. But Italy had the intention of utilizing colonial mechanisms to produce abundantly and realize vast accumulation by export supply. In the Shabelle area, several communities were self-dependent on their low subsistence scale production while surplus was marketed often to urban marketplaces for family income.

Apart from grains which contained the staple food maize, and other crops like sesame, beans and a variety of other vegetables and fruits, many rural farmers had constructed ‘dool-shini’ beehives and produced honey for the household as well as for the market. Many Jareer communities had members who possessed herds of cattle, producing milk and butter, though scholars don’t often mention the practice of the latter mode of production as they prefer to describe the Bantu as a purely agrarian economy, overlooking this other sub-sector.

However, slave trade and slave exploitation have gained economic advantages to many communities in the Shabelle river area. The Bimaal, Mobleen, Reer Hamar, Amarani, Geledi, Wa’daan and other tribes were the prime beneficiaries of slave economy as they utilized the slaves for different purposes, as concubines, domestic servants and as the basic workforce in the agricultural production. Due to these vital economic advantages, Italy’s announcement of intolerance to slavery and slave trade had a long way to go with Somali convincement. The pastoral Somalis were not willing to relinquish their “right” to slave ownership, claiming that their Islamic faith was the basis for their entitlement to own people as ‘hanti’ property.

Upon the replacement of Filonardi Company, Antonio Cecchi came to Somalia presumably for several purposes but, among others, the two evident objectives were: (a) to support the influence of the newly appointed Societa del Benadir, and (b) to stop Ethiopian expansion in Luuq, Baidoa and other riverine areas in Abyssinia's proximity. An anticipation of a possible danger from the Ethiopians has led to Cecchi's seeking of alliance with the Sultan of Geledi. The operation of the Societa del Benadir, which Cecchi had recommended to take over from Filonardi Company, was marred by delays. The prolongation of the inefficiency of the new company was also partly due to the Italian government's lack of clear-cut policy in meeting the financial prerequisite towards the company's coffers.

In late 1890, Cecchi organized an army of men including hired Somalis and Italian sailors to move to Baidoa and Luq area to contain the Ethiopian expansion. His encampment at Lafole came suddenly under attack. The askaris abandoned the caravan and fled for their lives. The devastation was so enormous that the commander of the caravan, Cecchi, was killed there. All, except a very small number of less than ten men, survived the incident.¹² After the humiliating defeat by the Ethiopians in Adowa, Lafole was another Italian shame under African fighters, a blow which the colonial administration had to deal with seriously. In fact, as a schoolboy, when we passed Lafole area on the way to our farm in Dhajalaq, Afgoie district, my father told me on several occasions how "a dying Italian soldier swallowed his gold ring, before a Somali cut his belly open and removed the ring". Although I can't recall, my father had told me the exact name of that Somali man.

After a few months, Commander Giorgio Sorrentino was sent to find out the causal attributes of the Lafole massacre. Through his investigation, the Commander concluded that the incident had no relationship with nationalist sentiments. Rather, it was an incitement triggered by two Arabs in Mogadishu. It was discovered later that the two were

actually one named Islam bin Mohamed and the other Abu-Bakr bin Awad, an interpreter who enjoyed a good status and reputation at his employment in Filonardi company.¹³ They were threatened by the new appointment of Societa del Benadir and thus sought to cause disruption. They instigated the local Wa'daan and Geledi tribes to wage a surprise attack on the Italians. They were apprehended and sentenced outside Somalia, probably in Zanzibar.

What was not secret though, was that Filonardi and Cecchi were both aware of the existence of slavery in the Benadir coast, but they were lenient. Cecchi was also reluctant about abolition of slave trade, with some of the sources noting that he had a female teenage servant of the Galla tribe. Sorrentino realized the slave situation and servitude problems in the Somali coast of Benadir but he too, could not jeopardize the delicate relationship between his country and the local people.

In the north of Mogadishu, on the coastal strip of the Majertinia, the land of the Darood, the Italians were availed with an opportunity to colonize by the local pastoral inhabitants, through their Sultans. The colonial archives reveal that as early as 1888, Sultan Yusuf Ali sent a delegation to Zanzibar. His message to the Italians was that he was seeking protection from that country.¹⁴ Robin Hallet supports these colonial documents about the Majerteen call for Italian protection, and writes, "Early in 1889, the rulers of two northern Somali sultanates with capitals in Obbia and Alula decided for reasons of calculated self-interest, to place their territories under Italian protection."¹⁵ Barely two months after the visit, Yusuf Ali formally leased his sultanate for about 1,200 Maria Theresa thalers, the currency at that time, and officially signed agreements chartering Italy as the protector of his sultanate. Subsequently, his son-in-law, Sultan Osman Mohamud who ruled Alula entered into negotiations with Italy and struck a similar deal for protection in April of the same year.¹⁶ Some sources suggest that Osman Mohamud had made an offer to

Germany to put his sultanate under them on September 6, 1885, but that it had not been ratified in Germany.¹⁷ In a similar trend, certain colonial documents evidence the signing of an agreement between Yusuf Ali and Germany in November 1885, with Claus von Anderson signing as a representative from the German East Africa Company.¹⁸ In the Benadir area, several local traditional chiefs in el-Athala have signed treaties of cession with Italy after an earlier resistance and infliction of casualty on the Italians.¹⁹

The exchange of hands and the Italian purchase of favour from the notables of the tribes and the elites continued even through Sorrentino's tenure, as Hess tells us that "At Brava, Merca and Mogadishu, Serrentino presented the walis, notables and cadis (religious judges) with gifts of turbans, Arab garments, syrups, incenses and Maria Theresa thalers. It was an inexpensive total investment of 296 thalers in gathering friends for Italy."²⁰

In the northern Somali coast, the first treaty with the British dated to the year 1827 when an English crew suffered shipwreck off the Somali coast. This was approximately twelve years before the British conquest of Aden in 1839. It was however the Aden occupation that carries a greater significance in the establishment of business treaties between the Somalis and Britain. At any rate, the British expansionist policy was facilitated, like it happened in the south, by tribal treaties that brought under Britain all the territories of what came to be known as a British Protectorate. Jardine, a former secretary to the administration of Somaliland (British Somaliland), described the territory as "the only country in our East African Empire that was then self-supporting."²¹ This statement from a former official of the protectorate convinces us that Somaliland at the time was benefiting Britain more than could be imagined for the reverse. And considering the fact that export commodity from this region heavily consisted of the small ruminants of goats and sheep, the effect must have substantively frustrated the productive policy of pre-colonial pastoralism; an economic tragedy scholarly presented by professors Samatar and

Samatar as they elucidate, "The rise of commercial pastoralism principally affected small ruminants and therefore, the economic domain of women and children."²²

This negative effect was the birth child of the British colonial strategy which had to fulfill the dual purpose of meat lot supply to Aden and an access in reigning part of the Indian Ocean where they could monitor maritime movements to and from India. Another purpose could as well be to wane off total domination of the area by rival European colonialists. So, with these strategic architectures and tribal treaties facilitated through payments and promises for protection, vulnerable Somali territories, north, south and any other zone, fell prey to colonial expansionists. In any aspect, a very analytical observation of the economic impact on the rural Somali, whether pastoral or agrarian, concurs well with O'Connor's concept of the functions of imperialism, defining it as a "formal or informal control over local economic resources in a manner advantageous to the metropolitan power, and at the expense of the local economy."²³

Although horrendous drawbacks were suffered in relation to the subversive tentacles of colonial contact, the contrast between Italian and British Somalilands in the pre-colonial era and during colonial domination is that the latter was characterized by the intervention, and may be invention of a class of profiteers who garnered accumulation for personal capitalistic gains without meaningful change in the welfare of the rural producer - specifically the family, while the south had a reputation for basing the family production on the abuse of human ethics and values, and the exploitation of a labour force from slaves, economically boosting the social status and income of the slave owners.

The emanation of this analysis is the existence of two distinct social cultures, embracing also distinguishable means and processes of production. In elaboration, whereas the northern pastoral could sell his livestock at wish, albeit the strangled commodity prices, he

was exercising his liberal individual right in accepting or declining primarily the investment of labour in the mode and subsequently the offer made for the product. In the south of the country, a potential human superpower owning another weaker and socio-ethnically disadvantaged human being as property 'hanti', was the determinant of the price stipulation while the labour input was materially exhausted from the muscle of a shackled slave.

Slavery Scandal And Somali Sheikhs' Resistance To Abolition

With time, the escalation of anti-slavery campaigns in Italy and humiliating exposures in the Italian papers has given reason for an investigation. The drastic situation, which the colonial government found itself in, was aggravated by lack of total commitment over a prolonged period of time which the regime left the colony in the hands of representative companies. As Eno suggests, "Italy's initial concern was to promote efficient colonial administration in Somalia than to abolish slavery. As a result some of the Italian officials turned a blind eye to the ongoing slave trade."²⁴

The debate on the rampant situation of slavery in Somalia was put into the limelight by disclosures contained in the report of Chiesi and Travelli.²⁵ The two-man commission, of whom the latter was a renowned lawyer, illuminated the extent as well as intensity of slave trade and slavery in Somalia and the indifference with which officials of the chartered Italian companies responded regarding the containment of the widely diffused problem.

In a measure to deactivate the heightening global criticism over its colony, Italy couldn't pursue a better framework than direct government administration in southern Somalia. The colonial regime's action dissatisfied the slaveholding Somali tribes as they contemplated the inevitability of their disenfranchisement in the lucrative slave business. Protests and uprisings were marked in a bid for displaying to the Italian administration the

magnitude of dissatisfaction and contumaciousness in the slaveholding quarters. Some of these protests, in writing and in rebellion, were made by highly regarded 'Islamic primates' of respect for their knowledge of the doctrine and their reputable position in the society.

The sultan of the Geledi and his people were among the strong voices advocating for the retention of the status quo. Chiesi and Travelli note their complaint:

We have protected the trade routes and remained faithful for fourteen rainy seasons. Now our slaves no longer get returned to us. Ill will grows among our people, especially among the poor who, having only a few slaves, when these flee, lose all means of earning a living and don't know whether to leave or stay.²⁶

Despite the grievances by the slaveholders, the Italian occupationists had to find a solution to ease the pressure off the government at home. The ordinance of abolition had to be upheld, whether for better or for worse. It took a reasonably long time, about 12 years or so, from the time Filonardi first moved into Somalia and when the government directly took charge. The period also marked dismissals of officials linked to the chartered companies, culminating in the revocation from Filonardi and Societa del Benadir their rights as representatives of the Italian administration. In early 1905, the government took over the administration.

Feuding hostilities led to several confrontations between Italy and the Somali tribes. Eno reveals, "Merca, Jilib, Jesira and Dhanane are some of the notable battlefields where the Bimaal (Hawiye) pastoral tribe engaged colonial soldiers constituting Somalis."²⁷ Nevertheless, revelations such as by Italian naval officer Gaetano Bossi had already done the damage. He recommended the pertinence of a more organized government role. Commander Onorato di Monale who undertook an investigation upon the early announcements of the Benadir Coast slavery scandal wrote another equally discrediting

report. Some excerpts of the report, including information given by the local chiefs and other outstanding figures of the community, read:

...not only did slaves enter Benadir ports, but that the last slaves to enter the town date back only to last December. Slaves are bought and sold in the Benadir towns, not only under the eyes of Italian authorities...but according to registry of the cadis of Mogadishu...with the sanction of those authorities. In the Benadir, a slave can be bought, sold, imprisoned, inherited, given as a gift, exploited, and rarely liberated. Far from taking steps towards the gradual disappearance of domestic servitude, the company is perpetrating it and aggravating the condition.²⁸

In a gesture to consolidate its colonial activities firmly, Italy succeeded in the purchase of the Benadir ports for the estimated amount of 3,600,000 Italian Lira , the equivalent of 144,000 British pounds, an achievement seen as a step forward. But within the colony, as Italy was aware, resistance was unavoidable since some tribes were discontented by the abolition policy.

The Somali slave owners, as is paradigmatic of the nomadic psychology, tinted the abolition policy as a religious issue in a bid to gain legitimacy for their cause of war and sympathy from other clans, under the philosophy of Jihad (holy war). Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, the Mad Mullah and leader of the Dervish, assisted the Bimaal cause to that end. The colonial administration recruited soldiers to face the arrogant and unabiding Bimaal. When the battle erupted, several Bimaal villages were torched off. The Bimaal, in retaliation, forged several attempts to overrun the Italian askaris in Dhanane, situated between Merca and Mogadishu. They were all in futility until the Bimaal were relentless subdued.

In a diplomatic move to step up the scale of 'pacification', the colonial officials approached chiefs and notables of the various tribes to win their support and maintain good

relationship between the colonists and the colony. The Somali pastoral tribes seized the opportunity. The two ensuing reasons were for access to the colonial officials (as a medium between the Italians and the community), and secondly for the payroll which displayed a recognition of their social status as the leadership. The Sultan of the Geledi was one of such leaders who subscribed wholeheartedly to this kind of colonial appeasement.²⁹

Skirmishes between the Bimaal and the Italians continued for quite some time, though intermittently.³⁰ The colonial troops got a breakthrough and eventually penetrated the towns of Bariire, Malable, Audegle (Aaw-Dheegle) in the Dhoobooy area of Merca, and Afgoi a few kilometers from Mogadishu. The event has finally tamed Bimaal resistance, widening the aspiration for peace and liberty.

Sheikh Hassan Barsane's Resistance to the Abolition of Slavery

One Sheikh who was exaggeratedly honoured as a hero in Somali history, Sheikh Hassan Barsane of the Gaal-Jecel sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, has resisted abolition of slavery to the extent of misinterpreting the Holy Scripture – the Qur'an, by writing to the Italians:

*"All our slaves escaped and went to you and you have set them free.
We are not happy with the [Antislavery] order. We abandoned our
law, for according to our law we can put slaves in prison or force them to work."*

And what law was the 'respected' Sheikh referring to?

*"The government has its law and we have ours. We accept no law
other than our law. Our law is that of God and of the prophet....
"God has said: The few can defeat the many. The world is near its end;
only 58 years remain...It is better to die following Muslim law. All Muslims are one."*³¹

In the preceding statement, Barsane has made not less than three discrepancies contrary to the Islamic faith. But a Jareer poet who was against enslavement of Muslims, an un-Islamic practice, sets the main response in this verse:

* *Ninki Ashahaato Adoon ma Ahaado*
*Amar Eebe diidi yaa kaa Aqbalaayo*³²

Translation:

Whoever announces the oneness of Allah in submission, no longer remains a slave;
So, nobody abides by your orders regarding what Allah has illegitimated.

Sheikh Hassan Barsane is one of a few heroes honoured in the history of Somalia. He is, as far as we have seen in the history curricula of schools in the country, dignified as a sharp protestant against the Italian colonialists, and one who died for the cause of nationalism. But on the contrary, he died due to his rejection to free Muslim lives in the campaign to the abolition of slavery and of slave trade. As far as Islam is concerned, a good model is Abubakar who paid money to purchase Bilal's freedom after the latter converted to Islam. In this case, the two acts of Abubakar and Sheikh Hassan Barsane are contrary to each other, but the former's gesture accommodates well with the harmonious tenets of Islam. Barsane's, in retrospect, amounts to a villain's misuse and abuse of the Holy Scripture.

Previously, many scholars have written concern over the obstruction of the truth about Somali historiography, ethno-anthropology, culturology and other areas, with the focus and scope of criticism succinctly directed onto the nomadic pastoralist in the north. In fact, it is now in the south that we learn about religious scholars engaging in both misuse and abuse of the Islamic faith for personal gains. And rather than condemning their ill effects to society, the Jileec pastoral authorities have eulogized their villainy by building monuments and naming academic institutions after the great sinners.

Drawing from an archival evidence, Sheikh Hassan Barsane and a large number of the Somali people of his day and even today, have been correctly described by colonial officers as people who corrupt and contaminate the Islamic faith by twisting it for personal goals. An extract of the nature reads:

Sir,

- 1. With reference to attached - in my opinion the Somali...accepts the Sheria just as far as it suits him.**
- 2. He claims to be a Mohammeddan but during my service...both Sir Reginald Wingate – Serdar and Major General Von Slatin Pasha, told me that they did not consider the Somali as a true Mohammeddan...³³**

That this is a persistent paradigm of Somali attitude can also be seen in recent events in the civil anarchy period when the so-called Islamic courts discriminatively arraigned the unarmed and ethnically oppressed communities like the Jareer.³⁴ Suffice it to say that many religious scholars have used their Islamic knowledge as an income generation project rather than preach the doctrine of peace and equality for all muslims. (See Chapter Two, The Barawaan.)

After the war of words, a number of confrontations took place between the Galjel (Gaal-jecel) tribe of Hassan Barsane and colonial forces, which pressed the former into submission. Eventually, the so-called religious leader was captured, as his kinsmen could not save him in their plea at submission. They were disarmed while Barsane was taken to the dungeons in Mogadishu and sentenced to death. Later the death sentence was revoked to life imprisonment where he remained incarcerated till his death.

Italy and the Expropriation of Bantu-Land

An exhaustive feasibility study by Romolo Onor, an Italian agricultural economist, suggested to his government the establishment of “large-scale agricultural development in the area.”³⁵ Towards the implementation of the objectives of this colonial plan, an arable land of about 46,000 hectares on the fertile areas along Juba and Shabelle rivers was illegally written off in concession by the governor. This huge land was conceded to only 15 concessionaires who could not induce the required labour force because the Bantu cultivators were unwilling to work on land other than their own and for their own families.³⁶

The colonists were caged in a fix. With the pastoral Somali's scorn for cultivation, one described as “...lazy... preferring to live by war and rapine,”³⁷ the Jareer muscle was the most viable option for exploitation. The multilayered tragedy exposed to the Jareer farmer was not just the expropriation of his land in the one part and the exploitation of his human resource in the other, but more so to the psychological agony of passing from one type of slavery to another, i.e. from Somali ‘African’ repression to white Italian oppression. In a vigorous comment on the situation, Eno emphasizes, “The Bantu/Jareer people were caught in the middle of a dilemma between two devils.”³⁸

Colonial Italy had to engineer a way out of its mess. As a result, it introduced the ‘colonyo’ (corvee) forced labour system that was among the prime factors of socio-economic disintegration and labour disorientation of the Jareer community. It became also a cause for rural migration, as the male youth could not live freely in their rural villages and among their families. The agenda of the Italian colonial economy denied them sanctity among their people; hence their involuntary divorce from their abode.

Simultaneously, on the part of the Somali ex-slave-owners, the grudge over the abolition policy has been redirected on to the Jareer population. They unscrupulously entered into a new type of solidarity with their colonial masters, coordinating the conscription of the Bantu youths to the Italian plantations. Although from one perspective they revenged against the effects of the emancipation through abolition, the other one served their socio-psychological satisfaction, which placed them in a stratum above the Bantu, an impact they realized through their exemption from the 'colonya' as former masters.

For the Bantu, the situation was from slavery to slavery, literally meaning from a local colonialist to a foreign colonialist supported by the former local colonialist. To a considerable degree, the colonially supported stratification has indiscriminately devastated the social morale and human dignity of the Jareer people, since it was [only] the Jareer, whether emancipated or conscripted native, who supplied the (corvee) work force. Rodd Ronnell had to describe the fascist regime's agricultural enterprise in the interriverine as "...a labour policy of considerable severity in theory and actual brutality in practice...indistinguishable from slavery."³⁹ Obviously it was slavery, a modernized form of colonialistically modified slavery.

In her view, Sylvia Pankhurst portrays the episode as a scheme projected to bankrupt the indigenous of their land, marching them to the Italian plantations by coercion and oppression.⁴⁰ A bulk of oral historians unequivocally support Sylvia's argument. For instance, Mohamed Hussein Hassan, alias Jawaani (Giovanni), narrated occasions in which newly married bridegrooms were targeted for conscription without the knowledge of the brides or their families.⁴¹ They were deprived of their rights as their civil liberty was infringed. Also, the Jileec elders forcibly celebrated marriages to conscripts against the will of the brides and their families.

One Aaytire man known as Deedeaysamoow, had just returned from work one day when he was told that his daughter had been wed off by the Jileec sultan to a conscript scheduled to depart the following day. He followed the man to his house, who peeped him through a crack in the door and stayed inside silently. Deedeaysamoow waited for some time without success. He was vexed beyond control, ran amok and stabbed almost every Jileec male he meet in the street, killing several people.⁴²

Another tragedy, also by the Aaytire of Afgoi, took place after three relatives were conscripted. They were taken to Mogadishu wherefrom they were put on transport to the Dhoobooy area (around Merca). Upon reaching Wiliyoow Cadde (near the modern People's Assembly) they drew out their 'galmaax' daggers and stabbed the Sagaalle/Jileec (Somali pastoral) elders escorting them. There was a huge pandemonium from the frantic scene, and the men escaped in the commotion. Later the elders of the escapees gave a reasonable account of the agitation. The injuries inflicted were settled on customary tribal basis and the men were free.⁴³ According to some of the traditions, after that fatal incident, conscription in Afgoi was brought to abatement.

Somali Nationalism: Cloudy Clanism

A Jareer Poem For Prologue

* *Xaq minaad warrantood xaqiraada dhaafto*
Xurnimo Xabashaa ku Dhammaadi, Xabbadda Xooggeeda
Xil iskama saarin Leegada Xarbigi dhoobooye
Laakin Xeeraraad dejiseen ood Xukun ku qabateene;
Xaabsee Xandha-lahaaw leed dhammaan isku Xineysiine
Xoolo Xad ee ku Xarakoo Xilkas-la'aan waaye
*Xamar soo deg lee miyaa Xurnimo-doonkiina.*⁴⁴

Translation:

In talking reality, without a sense of prejudice

It is the Jareer that succumbed in the struggle for independence and to the merciless bullets

The SYL (as leadership) maintained indifference towards the Dhoobooy confrontation (Keli Asaayle)

But (SYL) enacted a constitution and gained self-determination

Otherwise, your (leadership's) concentration is gauged only to compete for accumulation;

But misappropriation and arrogance are not symbols of wisdom

Is the essence of your nationalism based only on a migration to Mogadishu?

The emergence of Somali “nationalism” and the “struggle for freedom” (halgankii gobanimodoonka), [seem] to have been exaggerated and propagated in a period when, borrowing Ali Jimale’s words, “The political sifting process did not develop an apparatus which could separate the chaff from the seed”.⁴⁵ Apart from its political end, Somali nationalism and nationalists have a long way to go to achieve an admirable credibility for worship as national heroes and models.

The political end, of course, was to elevate to national status characters who otherwise had been notorious for their ruthlessness, antagonism, tyranny and opportunisticism. The blueprint for their acclamation to heroism and national stardom were born with the new class of Barre’s military leadership who, despite the various controversial descriptions and negative biographies, used their political hegemony, available national resources and media propaganda to refigure those of their own and position them at the forefront of the known true nationalists and genuine freedom fighters.

The premeditation responded to a triple objective: (1) to envisage the military Junta’s nationalistic spirit; (2) to create positive image and recognition for certain groups thus erecting some of their own kinship on national monuments to obscure their evil deeds of

past; and (3) to pave the way for the modern recreation of a new national historiography of nomadic protagonism, employing simultaneous inventions and insertions all the way.

The most celebrated national heroes, in the northern nomadic version, come in the persons of Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Ghazi – known to the Somalis as Axmed ‘Gurey’ (the left-handed) and Ahmed ‘Gran’ to the Abyssinians, and Hawo Osman Tacco, popularly known as Xaawo Taako. For reasons known to Siad Barre and his kinsmen, these were made the celebrated heroes and heroine whose recognition was depicted in their monuments, exclusively towering through the skies of Mogadishu.

Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Ghazi (Gurey): Identity Amendment or Historical Error?

Somali history portrays Ahmed Gurey as a hero who, in 1533, leading a multinational army, conquered and heavily defeated Ethiopia. The invasion has gained Ahmed Gran an enormous territory, “...putting him in complete control of south and central Abyssinia.”⁴⁶ Though Gran/Gurey has been deemed a national hero's honour, Somalia's history curriculum does not elaborate his true identity. His Arabness has been erroneously subsumed into Somalia's search for heroes of national class, hence the Somali school-goer's mistaken belief of Gurey as a great Somali hero. The Somali historiographers and curriculum designers also shied away from mentioning the multinationality of Gran's army, thus portraying them all as Somali warriors.

Such works of historical misinterpretation and hero impersonation have been part of the pastoral authorities' agenda to obscure the true history of the country. The negative consequence is that even today the product of that curriculum, like Cabdi Maxamuud Maxamed (Goobe) and Cabdullahi Cusmaan Cumar (Shakespeare), is unsuspectingly disseminating and writing for the students the same misleading history.

An example is the Social Studies syllabus for Grade 6 (Cilmiga Bulshada 6) where the two authors wrote misleadingly that “Axmad Gureey wuxuu ahaa Geesi Soomaaliyeed,” translated, “Ahmed Gurey (the left-handed) was a Somali hero.” It is sad that UNESCO has heavily invested in the publication of this kind of miseducating instruction for the students, without engaging proper material in expertise.

Mohamed Abdulle Hassan: Mad Mullah or Macabre Madness?

Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, given by the Somalis the honorary title ‘Sayid’, but known to the European scholarship as the ‘Mad Mullah’, is another figure of frequent appearance in Somali history: (a) as a leader with exceptional spirit in fighting the British colonialists in northern Somalia, and (b) as a poet with a great talent in oral literature.

According to Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan’s legendary history, the often-promoted version preferred by the Somali ruling elite, he had the ardour and charm as well as leadership potential to put together a large army of nomadic fighters – Dervishes. He engaged the British colonialists in several fierce battles and inflicted them a lot of casualty. He was the only or first African anti-colonialist hero whose troops suffered aerial attacks. Among others, he is reputed for defeating the British-led colonial forces in several confrontations including one in which a British commander was killed.

Sayid Mohamed’s oral poetry regarding the ill-fate of this officer, Mr Richard Corfield, is among the compulsory literature in the school syllabus emphatically recommended for memorization. A few of the verses go as follows:-

* *Adaa Koofiloow jiitayoon dunida joogeyne*
 Adaa jidkii lagugu waday jimic la’aaneede
 Jahanama lageeyoow haddaad aakhiro u jahatay.

Translation:

Oh Corfield, gone you are from this world

Driven through the merciless path thou art

Towards the hereafter you are; destined into its hellfire.

After almost twenty years of disruption and devastation, Sayid Mohamed and his Dervishes were defeated. They ran away in disarray and he died in 1920, after disease and starvation plagued his camp. He was buried unceremoniously, perhaps due to the ugly situation prevailing in his encampment at the time, and possibly a reason behind his erection on a monument in the capital.

The Other Version about Sayid-ka

The hidden version that also shapes the acts and personality of this leader entices our attention in order to treat history with its due balance of truth, regardless of its consequential dissatisfaction in certain quarters. Unlike the known religious leaders, Mohamed Abdulle Hassan's followers mainly consisted of his own Ogaden sub-clan of the pseudo-nobility of the Darood clan. The method he used to employ to obtain support and followers remained incompatible with Islam because of the tools he applied; in that, Hallett asserts, "He resorted to the most ruthless methods,"⁴⁷ because "members of the local Muslim establishment were outraged by his attacks..."⁴⁸ as "...doubtful followers ran the risk of summary execution."⁴⁹ In another page about Mohamed Abdulle Hassan's tyranny, Michael Tidy and Donald Leeming remark, "Muhammad again resorted to military activities against various Somali communities."⁵⁰

Among the discredibility in the mainstay of Sayid Mohamed's theological profession (if it can be called so) is his announcement of being the Mahdi, a statement which no Islamic scholar in his right senses would ever dare say. He kept wandering and attacking

communities in order to coerce them into his accompaniment. "The men were flogged until, sworn on the triple divorce oath ["xila-fur" in Somali], they agreed to obey him."⁵¹ (Text in parentheses mine.) In dissonance with the behaviour requisite of an Islamic scholar, the Mad Mullah must have been a chronic liar and a slanderer of the highest proportion by claiming the possession of powers to turn the white infidels' bullets to water.⁵²

By reading Jardine, one may assume of exaggerations contradictory of this popular Somali character, but a variety of his poetry confirm the kind of heinous policy he engaged and the quality of tyranny he employed. The concealment of this reality about the man's true life in the social history is an attestation of the military regime's hypocritical attitude in dealing with the historiography of the country and its people.

To contribute to the thesis of the hidden picture of the Sayid, Professor Abdalla Omar Mansur cites a verse from a great Somali poet, Ali Dhuux, who looted camels and in defence referred that even a man regarded so 'religious' as Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan permitted and actually indulged in looting other people's camels:

* *Sayidkii wadaad oo dhan xiray, Waris xalaaleeye
Xaaraan haddu yahay Xula ma qaadeene
Xoolaha kaleetiyo isaga waaba kala xeere
Nin kastoo xadreeyaba wuu u xusaa duubaaye
Haddaan xaajiyadu weerareyn xer uma duuleene.*

*...The Sayid, the wise one
Who knows more
than all other men religious in the land
did sanction Waris [camel] by force to take
Xula [camel] he won't take*

*Should this act unlawful be
 Laws superior camels govern
 above other animals all
 any preacher religious
 camels to acquire desires
 though pious pretends he to be
 should Hajis ambitious
 other men's camels raided not
 I, too, would have done the same.⁵³*

The likes of the above verses and other indecent activities of the Sayid in oral literature or in the traditions and the government's super-humanization of the so-called hero Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, have annoyed a Jareer poet who was alternatively concerned about the top officials' expropriation of Bantu farms in the riverine areas of Juba and Shabelle. He said:

* *Tuugadii Tolkiina Taalaa u dhisteeene,
 Tacabkeeyi haleeyseen maxaa ka Tireen?⁵⁴*

Translation:

*You erected monuments for (even) the looters among your kinship,
 But what is the fate of my expropriated lifeline?*

Another poet and a Jareer compatriot responded to him with a clear definition of the situation and the disparity between the Jareer and the Jileec:

* *Tuugga reer Tolkiisaa Toowraadaan ka buuxo
 Yaa ku Taagsaheey oo Tiir kuu naqahaayo?⁵⁵*

Translation:

The thug's kinship dominate the ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council,

You (Jareer) don't have a center-pole to lean on!

The revisionist scholarship acknowledges the insincerity of the ruling elite. One of such scholars is Mukhtar who wrote: "Historical sites were set up where there were no signs of history. Religious heroes were made up where the practice of Islam has been insignificant".⁵⁶ Citing Jama Mohamed, Professor Cassanelli enlightens, "The dervish wars and the dislocation of nomadic groups caused by them left a legacy of mistrust and bitterness which was typically preserved by clan poets in series or "cycles" of poems that kept these rivalries alive."⁵⁷ The Somalist scholar, in a further elucidation of the theme, writes, "For example, the mutual suspicion that has characterized relations between Isaq and Darood Somalis for most of this century almost certainly originated in the events of the dervish period."⁵⁸ Ascertaining the tyrannical leadership of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, Dualeh notes, "His religious movement became despotic. He would kill and loot the tribes that would not lend him support. The tribes in British Somaliland, with the support of the British authorities, took up arms against him. He was finally defeated".⁵⁹

In southern Somalia, many communities and pious religious personalities and sects (tariqas), particularly the Qadiriyya, know Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and his Dervish henchmen, notwithstanding the lavish decoration and monumentation, as unreligious villains operating under cover of Islam. Mohamed Adulle Hassan assigned a team of his Dervish for the assassination of Sheikh Uwees, one of the most celebrated religious leaders of the Jareer in Somalia in the famous rural town of Biyooleey. After the sad and cold blooded gangland style massacre, the Qadiriyya religious poets composed the following (dhikr) religious song in a couplet:

* *Afaraay Ahaayeen Uweesaay dileen*
*Owliya Allaayaay ka Inkaar-sadeen.*⁶⁰

Translation:

Four they were who murdered (Sheikh) Uwees
And (as a result) Accumulated curses from all corners of the pious ones of God.

And the righteous of the Reewing, in whose territory the renowned Sheikh Uwees was killed, went in pursuit of the culprits as they recited:

* *Ankaaraneegii Abdoow (Abdulle) Hassan Aragteey?*
*Usii Amuudee Illeey maddii Aragdo.*⁶¹

Translation:

Who can tell me the whereabouts of the cursed Abdulle Hassan?
Death will be his fate upon my sight of him.

All these evidences from Somalis and non-Somalis, scholars and non-scholars, expose the quality and character of the man for whose aggrandizement so immaculate a monument was towered into the sky. The dubious military administration under the ideological tutelage of nomadic political doctrine deliberately forged a Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan hero-ization scheme in an agenda to exonerate him and his Dervish militia from the genocide they committed against innocent peoples of diverse Somali communities in the north as well as in the south.

The policy that Mohamed Abdulle Hassan exploited was his people's desire for wealth in camel and for women because he preached, contrary to the sound teachings of Islam, the lawfulness in misappropriating the wives of the non-compliants to his way of life. Jardine confirms, "The wife of one of our Somali native officers was divorced from her husband by

the Mullah and appropriated to his own harem.”⁶² His despotism disobeyed all Islamic and human boundaries that “Until they promised to obey him, the tribesmen found their property plundered, their women ravished.”⁶³

By means of this coercive principle of raping and appropriating women, married and unmarried, without doubt, many a great number of unpropitious offsprings were conceived. As a result of this otherwise unbecoming sexual avarice, an undesirable lineage contamination (but nobody mentions) must have drastically spread across the sub-clans subjected to this punishment, a reason why the wounds and grudge will never be healed.

Hawo Osman Tako

The other martyr is a heroine, Hawo Osman Tako. The traditions say, with no credible reference though, especially in the words of Nuruddin Farah, “She was in the Jihad against the Italian infidels and a Somali whose son is now a governor of a region, hit her. The arrow was poisoned, and she died of it.”⁶⁴ Controversial narratives make a definitive understanding of Hawo Tako’s killer somewhat indefinite and unapprehendable. One version notes that protesters were demonstrating against the Italians. Commotion was rife. In the course of the melee and confrontations, one Somali group was on the Italian side which some sources suggest consisted of the security apparatus stationed there to restore law and order while others suggest among the group contained pro-Italian Somalis who were ready to take on their own countrymen in a tough engagement.⁶⁵

I am not quite certain about Nuruddin Farah’s source(s) – whether he was actually an eyewitness to the event or received the account of a reliable eyewitness. The inclination of the notion, with all due subtleties, convinces the reader of Nuruddin’s ‘A Naked Needle’,

that the 'culprit' might have been known by many long before Farah's condemnation of the man. If so it be, then we expect the shooter would have been identified with equal ease and apprehension from both sides -- by all or even a few more of the victims as well as some more of the culprits – so that the credibility of Nuruddin's crucifixion of "the man whose son is now a governor of a region" is accepted with more viable credibility, and beyond the sentiments of tribal rhetoric.

Considering the large number of people involved, it might not have been simple to identify an archer shooting from the midst of wildly agitated crowds. Secondly, was it only one man that had a bow and arrow or was it a weapon conventionally used that day – by one group or both confronting parties? Thirdly, if that were true, and the culprit was not enjoying any kind of immunity, he would have either been taken to custody by the authority or revenged against by Tako's tribesmen or by the zealous on her side under the nationalism euphoria. Of all the casualties on that fateful day, Mohamed Siad Barre and Nuruddin Farah, may be a rare incident, which a scholar agreed with the former dictator, tends to have similar sentiments over the Tako issue. Why neither Siad Barre nor Nuruddin deemed equal importance to the hundreds of other Somalis, who suffered death or injuries in one way or the other on that day, is a subject in line with clan bias.

But reviewing Ali Jimale Ahmed's literature reveals Nuruddin's intention. Through Koschin, the protagonist in Farah's prose (namesake of the author's son), Nuruddin transposes the impact of tribalism on nationalism and vice versa, whence Jimale's postulate that, "Opposing political views within Somali society are evaluated in terms of the consciousness of Koschin."⁶⁶ Relatively, Jimale's disclosure of Farah's tribal image, imparting elements of political consciousness impregnated with clan sentiment, are characteristics dominant in the ethnocentric Somali society. So, when Ahmed interprets the essence of the monument, Koschin's feeling to the lady of the monument with the

arrow pierced through her chest, the donkey-waterman (in Somali “woo-biyoow” or “biyoole”) and then the killer of Hawo Tako, they definitely signify a clear demonstration of Nuruddin’s clan-consciousness, a feeling he attempted to encapsulate in the person of Koschin, a name he deliberately borrowed from his son, closest of kin.

I have surfaced this part of the debate in order to show that records of Somali history are not set straight, not even by the erudite of world fame like Nuruddin, when it comes to clan chauvinism. As Jimale scrutinizes, Koschin’s historiography, hence Nuruddin’s intention, however, is more of discourse intended to twist and manipulate the real history.⁶⁷ Nuruddin Farah’s ethnoconsciousness (or ethnocentricity?) is borne in the essentiality of his prose fiction and the strong message it conveys in the interplay between Somali history and Somali politics on the one part, and Somali intellectuals and ethnocentricness on the other, without undermining the historiographical manipulations and biases executed to favour the section of the society in control of the institutions designated for the respective national duties, such as writing the histories and cultures of the nations of communities within the Somali nation-state.

In bringing to an end the piece of debate about monuments and Somali intellectuals’ temptation in the manipulation of the national history, I cite a discussion in poetry between two Jareer bards who were also disturbed by the killing of the heroine Hawo Tako. The venue was Haji Aden’s house in Hodan where the two poets met incidentally. After talking about various topics, the theme of Hawo Tako’s killer reflected in. One of the poets enquired:

* *Taariikhda Tubteeda yaa ku Toosihaayo,
Taakow ninki Toogti meel iigu Tilmaamo?*⁶⁸

Translation:

*Who can set the historical record straight,
(and) Reveal to me the shooter/killer of Hawo Tako?*

The other bard recited poetically a succinct elaboration of the incidents on that day, before culminating his response in two instant but separate couplets:

* *Taariikhda Tubteeda Turxan kaama Taalo
Taakoowne Tolkeedaa Tawaanta u deesti*⁶⁹

Translation:

*No clouds or mists can overshadow the path of history
Her own kinship exacted the infliction on Tako (the 'heroine').*

* *Taariikhda Tubteedaan kuugu Toosihaa
Taakoow ninki Toogti Tolkeed Tiradeed!*⁷⁰

Translation:

*I set the historical record straight (for your benefit) that
Tako's killer is her kinship, lineage.*

Of course the opinion given here is not in any way or at any authority to conclude a decision over who Hawo Tako's killer was, nor does it suggest support for or bias against any party, except to demonstrate, in the thinnest manner possible, that contrary to the cultural and intellectual prejudice smeared on the Jareer people, they possess a primordially effective awareness of the historical and political events evolving in the distance of the societal span. But the wealth of a social culture cannot enjoy its aesthetic value against Jimale's shocking revelation of the 'intellectuals' of the Somali Academy of Arts and Sciences when he stated, "Some of these "intellectuals" were of the opinion that certain parts of the country did not have literature."⁷¹ Nomadic pseudo-ennoblement and ethnic prejudice apart, these so-called intellectuals lacked an iota of even a grain-size of

understanding that no society could exist without literature as it is part of the cultural fountain nurturing the social life of all the human race.

Alongside such 'intellectuals' prejudice lay a precarious cultural antagonism which negates, in social terms, the celebration possible in the harmonization of a unity in multiculturalism. The effects of the looming disaster in a prejudicial, stereotypical nomadic intellectuality engaged on the destruction and denial of a people's culture is an outright degradation of what P'Bitek summarizes as "The philosophy of life of a people",⁷² and in this context, of the Jareer people. In other words, as Kanwan Mathur says in his work in Intercultural Communication, "Ignorance of values causes intercultural misunderstanding." The above extrapolation was meant to cement the framework for the next corpus of discussion about the core element containing Somali nationalism.

The Subtlety of Somali Nationalism

Somali Nationalism, in similitude to other African countries, has been born out of the furore of colonialism. It was a tool, a weapon devised by the elite in their attempt to dismantle, with the full moral force of a united society, the exploitative grip which colonialism had been exercising over the local people. But what theories are generally based on nation or nationalism? Some of these can be classified as:

- (a) A group of communities settled in a certain geographical location in the principle of which they can be distinguished from other nations or communities of nations.
- (b) Nationalism necessitated by common or shared historical circumstances, which a society has experienced together in a holistic manner.
- (c) Nationalism begotten out of social/public consciousness.

Several other categories can be added to go beyond five or so. But in Somalia, constituents of polyethnically heterogeneous communities, the term nationalism enhances ambiguity, etymologically as much as perceptually. Prior to the amalgamation of the tribes or clans into a cohesive national body in a perceptive political locus for decolonization, each clan or sub-clan was condoning its own cultural liberty/democracy as a nation. Terms like '*Waddanki/dalki baan ka imid*' (I am from the country/nation.) to refer to one's area of origin have universality in Somali social life. Therefore, to every group or sub-group existed a nation more immediate than the newly constituted peripheral nation binding together the diversity of nations for the common purpose of decolonization, in the background of a society whose "basis for political allegiance is blood kinship or genealogy."⁷³ This kinship factor, a display of the veracity of the Somali culture, is what I.M. Lewis, the social anthropologist, gives a perfect description of the nature of the society when he writes, "A Somali does not ask another where he is from, but whom he is from."⁷⁴

In contrast to that, Frederick Hertz thinks of nationality as a group of people "...formed by the will to be a nation."⁷⁵ Ernest Barker presents his definition that what actually is referred to as a nation is, "a body of men inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from different races, but possess a common stock of thought and feelings acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history."⁷⁶ Approaching it from an intuitive spectrum, we can refer to Arnold Tonybee's statement that it is "a subjective psychological feeling in a living people."⁷⁷

When we measure against these definitions, we may perceive that the theory of Somali nationalism emerging primordially as a splash of anti-colonialism, is a thesis of good substance of credit to Professor Hassan Omar Mahadallah,⁷⁸ but the causation that

agitated and instigated what he precisely termed as “*idée-force*” comes in totality from the Somalis’ displeasure with the status quo vis-à-vis the abolition of their internal colonialism over the Jareer people, as far as the southern part of Somalia is concerned.

Upon its inception, the Somali elites’ notion of nationalism was amiss of concrete fundamentals functionable from genuine philosophy of nationalistic perceptions and ideology. At that far time, it built its foundation on a shaky and fragile ‘collectivity jargons’ which in effect were seen as a framework for depriving the people of their more attached tribal identity, particularly the settlers in the fertile riverine regions and more specifically the Jareer and the Digil-Mirifle confederacies.

Investigating through his area of specialization, Mahadallah discusses and differentiates between the various aspects of nationalism; cultural, linguistic, territorial, religious and historical, before adducing to the conclusion that Somali nationalism was devoid of all these necessary factors for it to have created a morally cohesive nation united by a psychological will that would put the nation over and above individual and ethnic interest. His proposal of “traditionalism” and “anti-colonialism”⁷⁹ as the two forces behind Somali nationalism would stand firm against any pertinent scrutiny. But for the sake of corroboration, I would allow myself to extend the debate a bit further. Traditionally, whether ancient or recent, Somali people have formed a larger tribal nation to avert threats of diverse nature. Some instances can be drawn from events very ancient and others of recent occurrences.

Reflections of Somali clan segmentation are very visible against the milieu of the society’s ethno-history. The unification of the clans in time of war under Islamic or nationalistic ideology has been celebrated under Ahmed Gran, (Axmed Gureey) the left-handed leader whose real identity has never been clear in the curriculum of Somali education. Anyway,

in Gran's duel against Abyssinia, Somalis (in conjunction with other nationals) united into the coalition that raided and overwhelmed Abyssinia. The Galla war is very reminiscent of its legacy of pastoral slavery that the Somalist scholarship has not yet sufficiently unraveled. The battle on the pre-Somalia Bantu settlers that significantly uprooted a majority of the Sabaki/Bantu population from their land and coerced the remainder into brutal life of submissiveness represents remarkable Somali clan-alliance. The Wa-Gosha encounter has joined together a giant Absame/Ogadeni composition of Darood tribes to form an alliance to edge out the Jareer from the Jubba Valley. The Somalia-Ethiopia wars of 1963/4 and 1977, the liberation struggle against Kenya over the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) of what is now the Northeastern Province of Kenya, have reasonably all been unifying factors, because what is characteristically uniform about all these wars is the merger of the otherwise disgruntled clans into unity as 'Somali' and in 'defence of the motherland'. As the emotion against the 'collective threat' wanes, so disappears the spirit that amalgamated the clans, melting away the coalition of the otherwise separate nations of clans.

Through the grotesque fulfillment of this preponderous unification, the disintegration into inter-clan and intra-clan segmentations of smaller units retakes the setting as the real order-of-the-day and resumes its course as the normal way of life. Comparably, the struggle against 'colonialism' is an example of one of those unifications in the interest of forestalling or facing a common threat.

But other factors too, have contributed to decolonization, not only in Somalia but Africa as a whole. In Professor Ochieng's assumption, "America, which emerged from the Second World War as the richest nation on earth, and with a glut of capital, was looking for investment possibility all over the world and this was being frustrated by European

colonies.”⁸⁰ Ochieng’ and Maloba both agree that external global dynamics also played a significant political and economic role in the decolonization process of Africa.

Colonialism was being squeezed into a tight corner as the Italian Anti-Schiavista groups pulled the lid off the decaying realities in the colony, as far as Southern Somalia is concerned. Similarly for the north, internal pressure was mounting on the British government, mainly from the public, spearheaded by political institutions. The USSR, in its part, for whatever reasons, was waging criticism on colonialism as a plunder and economic sabotage of the young colonies.

Raising communist concern, R.H.A Merlen hinted at the necessity:

“...to reach the Somali peasants first... and have a series of heart-to-heart talks with them ... that the Somali Intelligentsia merely want to use them as tools for their own gains.... Otherwise we shall experience in Somaliland the sort of thing, which is now happening in Java and Malaya... Ethiopia and Somalia are danger areas for Africa as a whole from the point of view of communism... The tragedy is that a few semi-educated Somalis have been encouraged by the press of the Left and by their appearances before the United Nations.”⁸¹

Therefore in my view, and to a certain reasonable extent, the attainment of independence in Somalia, like elsewhere in Africa, was accelerated by the avoidance of the colonies’ inclination to communist ideologies and the reception of financial assistance from the Soviet bloc. And undoubtedly, some countries did, due to the basis of political interest, which the West was taking long its consideration. Equally important was the economic concerns of the metropolitan countries which in fact suffered drastically as a result of the war, a reality which prompted the USA to design the Marshall Plan to save its allies in Europe from further devastation. These dynamics, which are least discussed in the Somali nationalism discourse, and the ill will the colonial regime inherited as the legacy of

abolition of slavery have in part contributed to change the political atmosphere to object to colonialism in the country.

Variably, the circumstances leading to Somalia's independence have at some prospect come as a result of the fact that at least "there had to be local demands for independence,"⁸² as in other colonies, insofar as this could be seen as a justification for decolonization.⁸³ But at a glance in the Somali situation, the issue of abolition of slavery as a persistent factor at the social interest level of the pastoral Jileec, cannot be overlooked at all.

Basically, what Somalis preach as nationalism was a mere verbal precipitation of what otherwise constituted clan-based protest movements each of which mitigated tribal agenda enshrouded in the vague verbosity of nationalism. This is the reason why, in veritable mode of nationalism, Somalia or the SYL has not achieved to produce a founding father recognized locally or internationally, and equal or comparable to what colonial Africa has experienced and produced in the wake of the struggle towards decolonization and formation of an independent nation-state.

For the sake of this debate encompassing the issue of Somali nationalism, I may contribute in reminiscing the point that initially it was the Somali clans/tribes that have invited or rather offered a leeway to the colonialists [voluntarily], and the right to colonize in the guise of seeking protection. They stipulated treaties with the colonialists in exchange for annual payments, monthly stipends and other benefits which the local Sultans, elders, chiefs and notables of the clans received as acquiescence for solidarity justifying their solemn willingness to welcome the interested colonial powers.

The Somali Youth League

The SYL's collaboration with the Italian colonial administration had multi-diagonal aspects but, the main ones concerned: (a) Political independence as seen separate from economic independence, which had its own dimensions and thus initially undermined. The idea was: not to bring to the surface the economic complexities and frustrations entailing the issue of the white-settlers' land expropriated from the Jareer communities in the riverine area; (b) the safeguarding of the Italian interests in the post-colonial independent state. Of course land was anticipated to be a contentious issue and the Italians would not have considered a hand-over of power to SYL without first putting in place the interests and welfare of their settled citizens in the colony. Because upon attainment of independence, that the Italian concessionaires continued their production and accumulation unabated, gives room for the speculation of government approval on the Somali side.

Notwithstanding the achievement of independence, the colonial legacy was broadly intact in the administrative and economic systems. The precolonial promises and the strong nationalistic jargons were transformed into a bed of neocolonialistic attitudes characterized to serve the political and economic interests of the colonialists. At the cost of all this mayhem, the Jareer had to bear the burden as the SYL government deliberately eluded from engaging the Italian authorities for compensation for their atrocities and expropriation against the autochthonous agrarians.

The new elite in power found themselves in hot competition for resources, jobs and imitation of the lavish living of the replaced colonizers. They procured to themselves a status and class at par with their former masters and embarked on a journey of acquiring what the colonialists had enjoyed from privileges to the purse. To the new nomadic elite,

this was the meaning of independence - Somalization of the eating of the Republic. The newly acquired power, according to the urbanized nomads, was a fast moving vehicle to access riches and capital wealth, which they lacked in their previously impoverished life.

Indeed in Somalia, the SYL is synonymous with nationalism, decolonization and independence. But surprisingly enough, its formation was initially from Sakhawaddin, a Jareer elite, extensively supported by Britain; and the idea of a 'greater Somalia' as a nation under one flag belonged to British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. By Dualeh's confirmation, "It was a British invention."⁸⁴ It was, upon its induction in May 1943, apparently with the approval of the British Military Administration,⁸⁵ known as the Somali Youth Club. It was actually in 1947 that the name took a political shape and official responsibility under the Somali Youth League (SYL), popular in Somalia for "Leego/Leegada" which means 'the League'.

As a political party, the SYL is comparable to the two sides of a coin. On one side, it was the uniting force of a sector of the masses, spearheading an ideology of a Greater Somalia (though at a later date); on the other, it had its base on the two most tragic elements to nationalism, namely self-interest and ethnocentrism. In a real sense of logic, the SYL's clanism and silent clan competition for future posts upon independence have entirely jeopardized the true spirit of nationalism by disorientating the psychological variables of integration. It compromised cheaply the unison of the nation and the motto of nationalism, prioritizing responsiveness to clan interests instead of the sacred national interests.

For a scholar like Professor Mahadallah to paraphrase Somalia's struggle for independence "A Pithless Nationalism," does not beg for intricate queries upon following the track record of the ills and evils the party leadership had committed. The afflictions

caused by internal party rivalry between Hawiye and Darood have derailed the ideological force of focus and national ambitions and goals of the other communities.

When Touval writes, “Political parties are based upon tribes or tribal lines... Recruitment to the police force and the army is also conditioned by the need to preserve a tribal balance... Yet the most westernized Somalis, the most modern ardent nationalists who violently oppose tribalism, are not oblivious of their tribal connections,”⁸⁶ one may respect, with all academic epistemology observed, the truth in Mahadallah’s analytical postulate of ‘Pithless Nationalism’, a rare kind of essay contemporarily debating Somali Nationalism. In his conclusion, the political scientist states, “With the exit of the colonial powers, Somali nationalism lost its twin pillars of anti-colonialism and traditionalism.”⁸⁷ The gist of this rhetoric guides us to the belief that, by losing the pillars of the objectives, the proponents of Somali nationalism then and now, have reeled the goals off rail, as I would describe the episode and its characters, by borrowing Jimale’s words, as a lot “Off the beaten sterile trail.”⁸⁸

The SYL’s treachery becomes evident in its treatment of the non-Hawiye non-Darood members, despite the explicitly outward anti-tribalism. Upon discovering the plot, many supporters including members of its leadership, have abandoned it, lest they were blamed by their communities. The underlying gimmick was that “the political parties and the various tribal groups were mainly occupied with capturing the positions which the Italian trusteeship administration was gradually transferring to the Somalis.”⁸⁹

From this political scene where every individual went in the hunt for post on the basis of the prospective consideration via clan importance or strength, one should not be taken by surprise why true founding fathers and nationalistic figures like the great Jareer leader Abdulkadir Sheikh Sakhawaddin suffered mysterious death, and others like Haji Mohamed

Hussein dismissed on evenly calculated ethnic grounds while the assassination of Ustad Osman was a Somali plan which the SYL government later ignored to investigate while the culprits were still alive. The probe into Ustad Osman's assassination would have been made easier by first summoning the man (friend) who had allured him out of his house. That "friend" was known as a member of the Jiddo community in Lower Shabelle, and might have spilled the beans had he been interrogated over the assassination plot, which he had played a major role.

Deeply dissatisfied with the internal wrangles of the SYL, its unethical power sharing and the alienation of the Jareer and Abdulkadir Shek Sakhawaddin, a poet expressed the Bantu-Jareer community's sentiments concerning the all-mischief grievances:

* *Suleeqa iyo Saxarla nimbo Sadaa gaari/Sakhaawe*
"Somaali ma ahaa" tireen, "Sanbuur weeye" / Silacne
Sakhaawaa badnaay Saxarla Soofkeedi/
Sixinki minaa maashi Salaanti waa diidi/
Soco! Sir nin qabo Saadaadkaba Samaan kuma Sifeeyne.⁹⁰

Translation:

Everybody (clan) got a share of Suleeqa and Saxarla
(She camels symbolizing independence) / But you
alienated Sakhawe (diin) (the Jareer) for his ethnicity,
saying "he is of the (flat nose)" / Though in the search for
Saxarla (independence) it was Sakhawa that bore
The brunt of burden / Once you began enjoying
The butter you became arrogant and above everyone/Begone! For
God has not praised the treacherous lot.

It has never been postulated until recently the other relevant version about Somali nationalism. The post-independence ruling elite, and almost the entire Somalist

scholarship either distorted or ignored the significance of the relationship between the effects of the abolition of slavery, the solicitation for foreign occupation in the guise of protection, and the uprising of slaveholding Somali clans. The historical records are very clear about the Somali people's willingness in invoking and requesting the European colonialists to pay them under concessions and treaties in exchange for access into their territories. Those among them who initially showed resistance were compromised and immediately silenced by the few Maria Theresa thalers put into their pockets, while others received better compensation in monthly stipends and annual payments. These realities may tell their story:

1. When the Italian companies first came and ignored the existence of slave business, there has been neither sentiments of nationalism nor anti-colonial uprising, nor skirmishes, nor confrontations. If anything, the Somalis have not only accelerated colonial occupation but facilitated by rendering services for the settlement of the colonizers through their tribal chiefs, elders, kadis (religious judges) and other elite of good social status who accepted to be employed in preparation for the overwhelming domination.
2. Confrontations started only after the abolition issue became serious and upon the withdrawal of the companies that were leniently tolerant to slavery.
3. The reasons for the 'anti-colonialism' zeal in the years following abolition, are manifested in letters and verbal protests the Somali tribes made regarding the retention of their slaves; some of them justifying the practice as their legitimate Islamic right.
4. After abolition and full occupation for conquest, the Somali clans collaborated with the same 'colonialists' in conscripting the Jareer community – autochthons and ex-slaves alike - to forced labour for Italian concessionaires exploiting the land expropriated from the very Jareer community.

5. The attacks engaged on the settlements of the freed ex-slaves for repossession by the Somali pastoralists make sufficient reasons to support the motive for uprising as economic interest and not with regard to love and affection for the nation.

What one should be conscious of is that, in the first place, nationalism did not take its birth in Somalia as an original stimulus created out of conscious love for the nation. It came as a spurious duplication of what was happening in Europe as a result of the World Wars and the emergence of the formation of young nations on that continent and elsewhere in Africa. As we have learned from the written literature as well as the traditions widely paradigmatic of Somalia, the nomadic Somali who had always been portrayed as an egalitarian enjoying a pastoral democracy, having his loyalty to his lineage, always had his national integrity attached to his abode. Outside this settlement, which he shared with his closest of kin, he did not have a scope or focus to call a Nation, as it did not exist genuinely in the patterns of his social consciousness at any time in the history of the Somali nomadic life. Clear evidence can be taken as the creation of the so-called SYL, the party praised to be the forerunner for Somali independence. According to history, the SYL was not the brainchild of Socio-political consciousness but as an impetus of the British colonial regime that disconcerted the Somali people due to political rivalry with Italy over the control of the Somali peninsula in its entirety.

Different from sedentary societies which have social cohesiveness as a result of their communal nature of living, the pastoral nomad did not have a sanctified moral orientation towards membership of a wider nation save in a possible motivation inspired by opportunities towards political hegemony as seen achievable through tribalism. Mine is to suggest that even within the SYL and the independent administrations in the country, there has not been an emphasis or orientation which drew a common destiny agenda or a nation as it did inversely for individual moieties, subclans and clans of those who were the

perpetuators of the nationalism school of thought. Nor could it be contended by all elaborative means, that economic nationalism could be a figure of attribution since the country lacked the entire basic infrastructure necessary in the mobilization of the exploitable productive sectors. Significantly, communication network across the regions, particularly north and south of the country was not streamlined until independence while certain northern officials needed an interpreter to work among certain communities in the southern regions.

The north-south polarization, further complicated by distinctiveness in prevalent sociocultural diversities, mitigated as a depriving factor that could not enhance for an economic nationalism, due to uncoordinated intelligentsia and disparities in elite thinking. This is perceivable in the context that whereas the nomadic culture maintained an enduring belligerency in stock-rustling for resource augmentation and wealth accumulation, the southern economy had been fostering with slavery as its industrial machine.

Based on the two benchmarks of exploitation and disdain for hard work, it distances from one's understanding the notion that economic nationalism could be a dynamic force behind Somali nationalism. The elite enterprise at the time had not developed an integrative mode capable of accommodating all the masses within the framework of an economy-based community toward national conscience. Therefore, the abstractness of the elites' nationalism ideology, avarice for resource control – legitimated through political incumbency - and other degeneracies, have been inimical to the processes of nationalism for it to have been born out of either historical, social, cultural, political or psychological commonality.

While considering the other universal factors that had their contributions in their own manner, my argument is that the dissatisfaction with the abolition of slavery was the remote cause in continuum, with feuds and grudges which took a rebirth in a modified sense and under newly created terms like 'independence', 'anti-colonialism', and 'nationalism'. I contend that Somalis have lived independently, nationalistically (at clan level), and colonialistically (subjugating the Jareer) prior to their solicitation for the arrival of the Europeans and the enactment of abolition. Therefore, these so-called 'nationalist' sentiments are not the genuine reflections of an intuitive love for nation because no lover of his nation would receive money in exchange for its exploitation by another, unless otherwise the Somali's concept of love for the nation is different.

It also sounds rather ironical that the same people who had received monetary gifts and made treaties with the colonialists would react against their protectors once they had given them leave to settle and protect them. After these related evidences are examined, my opinionation draws that the abolition of slavery was the major factor that at threshold drove a wedge between the protectors (rephrased 'new colonialists') and the protected (rephrased 'former colonialists'), and hence the conditioning of the instigation and sentiments to broader degrees, causing the battle engagements that followed suit.

Differing with the pastoralists' idea of nationalism, one Bantu/Jareer poet chastised the Jileec Somalis for their double standard:

* *Tuugsi ii Tereesaa Talyaani ku keenti*

*Tujaarnimo gaaraa Tolkiin u gadeen!*⁹¹

Translation:

You gave leave to the Italians (to settle) by begging for their money (Maria Theresa thalers)

You sold your country/people (purposely) due to your rapacity for wealth.

The other attributes accorded to Somali nationalism, as criticized above in Mahadallah's and other scholars' theories could not stand verification. Similarly the notion of the SYL as a nationalist political body ignites a lot of doubt especially when the frame of their slogan "nationalism" was not the product of national love but one of clanism. In the first instance, the SYL was dominated by the offspring of the same people who 'sold' their territory to the European colonialists and as such educated possibly from those resources. Their agenda was the repossession from the colonial power of a larger territory, now that the opportunity to use slogans like "nationalism" and "Greater Somalia" as tools for ethno-political motives were commensurate with the fervent atmosphere instigated vehemently, among other things, by the long standing grudge of economic imbalance between former local black colonialists i.e. Somali slave owners and newly settled European colonialists i.e Italian fascist regime.

So, in the grim thick of the nationalism and anti-colonialism atmosphere persisted a consciously hidden conflict of interest over the Jareer manpower and land, between the former slave owners and the Italian colonial administration. The Somalis felt the disenfranchisement of their economic source (slavery), which the new colonialists were now exploiting. In the circumstance, the Bantu land and free labour force were the bone of contention but of different wording for the respective colonialists, Italians and Somali pastoralists.

In another instance, 'nationalism' had variable meanings, relative scopes and interests for the diverse communities, no matter the misinterpretation. While the SYL had its territorial scope mainly within the borders of Italian Somaliland and later British Somaliland, its ambition for a Greater Somalia was very superficial and minimal until later when the greed for grab multiplied. There were no records at that period to support Somali definition of

the area constituting its territorial limits and confines other than the claim that certain Somali speaking people lived therein, a fact that disregards the mixture of the non-Somali speaking population making part of the cultural thread of those settlements.

The establishment of SYL offices in neighbouring countries was done for political sabotage and manipulation between European colonial powers – Britain and Italy. SYL presence therefore should not be approached from the basis of either stimula for a Greater Somalia tutelage or support from the entire Somali people living in those countries. Archival documents reveal that it was a matter of “for and against” as certain clans were in fact opposed to the presence of the SYL in their areas:

The leaders and elders of the Ajuran tribe in Kenya saw what was happening. They realized that the undermining of the British Administration means also the undermining of the tribal law and consequently the elders' authority since the British ruled through the indigenous institutions. Luckily, they realized this whilst they had control of their people and accordingly when they prohibited Ajuran tribes from belonging to the Somali Youth League the minority opposition with which they met was eventually quashed.

Executive committee (of the SYL) started hearing and deciding cases concerning Mohammedan Law and custom...Pressure, in many forms, was brought to bear on any person failing to comply with an order given by the committee.⁹²

Regarding the understanding of nationalism in perspective of the distinguished clans, we should not afford taking the risk of overlooking the social psychology of the communities, the basis of their social belief and behaviour:

- (1) To the Darood, the interpretation of nationalism could have been gauged to a variety of sultanates (communities) to be put under the rulership of one sultan

and his council from the hierarchical lineage, and all to be ruled by one Darood sultan;

- (2) The Hawiye thought the right to the numerical majority should be theirs, after all the capital Mogadishu, “belonged” to them. Other Hawiye groups, specifically like the Abgaal, foresaw the political process as tainted and implausible, thus nurturing the idea of nationalism through the perspective of their own kind of liberalism hence ‘partita liberale’;
- (3) The Digil-Mirifle idea of nationalism had shunned any interest in the nomad’s barren territory in the north but limited within the concerns and interests of their people spreading only through the confines of their specified territorial boundaries, hence federalism, regionalism (Rahaweenism; Digil-Miriflism) rather than nationalism;
- (4) The Jareer anticipation was so optimistic as they thought of nationalism as the return and repossession of their expropriated land and the recognition of their rights as equals according to Islam; and that they should be compensated for the damages caused by both Somali and Italian colonialists;⁹³
- (5) The yardstick of Issak nationalism was erroneously calculated from the belief of submerging and overshadowing the existence of the non-Issak population in the north in order to access a larger portion of the national pie;
- (6) The non-Issak population in the north might have thought of nationalism as the dilution of an Issak-dominated political hegemony and economic disequilibrium and hence the support for unification beyond sectoral or regional nationalism; a unified Somali nation that would recognize them a place (as an independent entity) in the sharing of “Maandeeq”, in the other words, the benefits of independence.

The comparative concepts and scopes make it very clear that different communities had, in their own individual communal rights, divergent ideas about types nationalism and decolonization, while rapacious SYL bigwigs had their own agenda about nationalism; the commotion was soon to be evident in the fragmentation of the party itself.

The fluidity of the alignment and coalition of tribes uniting under the roof of one party and the deceptively persuasive campaign slogan of “Greater Somalia” soon surfaced the reality when loyalty was withdrawn from the party and integrity was shifted along tribal lines and not along national cause. A party that was internally suffering from the pandemics of clanism has been entrusted with the enormous responsibility of running a nation, after negotiations based on safeguarding colonial interests were bilaterally agreed upon by the SYL leadership and the outgoing Italian colonial administration.

During the ten-year period of UN trusteeship in southern Somalia, negotiations were going on for some time for the unification of British Somaliland in the North and Italian Somaliland in the south. On June 26, 1960, the northern regions achieved independence and unified subsequently with their southern brothers on July 1st of the same year, upon the declaration of self-rule for the south. Although sovereignty and self-determination were achieved, what apparently was lacking at the time was, borrowing from Ngugi wa Thiong’o, “Decolonizing the Mind.”⁹⁴

II. POST-COLONIAL SOMALIA AND THE JAREER STIGMA: FROM COLONIALISM TO NEOCOLONIALISM

Upon the rubrics of fictitious nationalism, a government of unity was formed and a ten-year period of UN trusteeship known as Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (AFIS) under Italy, was brought to an end. Prior to independence there existed a

legislative assembly, which was chaired by Aden Abdulle Osman. Under the Assembly, an internal Somali administration was established in preparation for the 1960 take-over. The administration was composed of a Prime Minister, Abdullahi Isse, and five cabinet ministers including Sheikh Ali Jimale, Mohamed A. Nur, Muse Boqor, Haji Farah A. Omar and Salad A. Mohamud. The formation was imbalanced and Hawiye domination was visible. Consequently, the Darood dubbed the internal administration “Governo Sacad” rather than Governo Somalo, the legitimate standard term. The reflection of this attitude goes back to tribal differences and inimical feuds which long existed between sub-clans of the Prime Minister Abdullahi Isse of the Sacad (Hawiye) and Darood sub-clans in their territorial settlements. The implication of the transformation of Governo Somalo to Governo Sacad, the Prime Minister’s sub-clan of his Hawiye clan, meant Darood disapproval even if the dissatisfaction was not made official by open disagreement or protest. It was the first blow of mistrust in the approach towards independence. As Gassim elaborates, the SYL at the time, “was not a feasible tool towards statehood...”⁹⁵ highlighting political immaturity with a scope not beyond the clan domain.

A fracture developed from the disparity in the power sharing system. The Darood withdrew their support and loyalty to the internal government while the Hawiye were more than justified to put their weight behind it. The analysis of political activists like Haji Mohamed Barrow⁹⁶ posit the situation as an acid test for the SYL leaders’ platform for gaining political momentum at both clan and national levels. The Darood’s minimal representation in the internal government, therefore, emerged a dual effect: (1) That clanism is always superior to nationalism in Somali sociopolitical life, and (2) That the Darood had to retreat, strategize and come up with a more effective political roadmap to support their clan supremacy, the psychological food for pastoral pseudo-nobility. From the humdrums of this thought, we see that the spirit of nationalism has waned off into the doldrums. Effectively, clan sentiments and identity not only prevailed but were

reinvigorated as the most powerful vehicle to the top. Untended wounds of centuries supplicated in this political divide of no ends.

In the north, the situation seemed more favourable. The parties of the day shared the parliamentary seats. These included United Somali Party, Somali National League and the National United Front. When the first administrative body of British Somaliland was established in 1959, the seats were allocated in accordance with tribal system. But even so, it is not to rule out that the process was free from anomalies and manipulations.

After unification, the Somaliland members of parliament and politicians felt that they were caught up in an overwhelming Hawiye-Darood dominated political hurricane. Although they were given some cabinet positions in the new government of national unity, they were not the least impressed because they had anticipated a power sharing structure of north-south, which was not responsive to the tenets of the greed that was haunting the south at the time.

When Aden Abdulle Osman was elected the first president of the Republic of Somalia, a Hawiye southerner, the northern politicians expected the Prime Minister would be nominated from them, which did not happen. Instead, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, a Darood from the SYL, was nominated to the helm of the cabinet, probably as acquiescence to the Darood on the one hand, and to SYL supremacy with strong control in the government on the other. A fifteen-member cabinet was entrusted with the administration of the Republic. The clan representation was uneven as Hawiye and Darood scooped the largest numbers, with the Issaq at par with the Digil-Mirifle and the Gudabursi at much smaller representation.

The Issak felt ditched into a double tragedy. For one, the sharing mechanism did not favour them in terms of north against south as per their presumption. For the other, since the north is characterized also by ethnic diversity, they had to succumb some of the seats to representatives from the other northern communities. Dented by the new political trends, coupled with their man-made self-ennoblement in contrast to sections of the northern communities, the Issak aspiration stood daunted and as such vulnerable to northern elite criticism.

In retaliation, some northern officers embarked on a reckless mission to heal their grievance. They attempted a secessionist plot, which was soon averted and landed them in jail. The government had difficulty determining the fate of the officers involved. The problem was bifocal; part political and part social. To contain the precipitating political as well as social temperaments, the government took the raw option that was the release of the officers after a symbolic court hearing.

In this nature of affairs, nepotism, clanism and individualism became the forces of substitute to the outwardly promoted nationalism. To the state coffers, every individual at its vicinity had to help himself and his kinship to the best of his ability, if not to the best of his satisfaction. The syndrome of “the culture of eating”⁹⁷ eroded the national development aspiration. Giving a scholarly based critical analysis of the situation, Somali geographer and Professor, Abdi Ismail Samatar postulates:

*The competitive and Xeer-less nature of the post-colonial social system made state revenues, including foreign assistance, the bone of contention in a stagnant economy. In other words, those first on the scene could reward themselves and their clients.*⁹⁸

The pastoral crave for avarice respected no borders. The government policy was mistranslated into a go-for-the-grabs system, breaking all ethical bonds and moral obligations as leaders. For Sabine and Thorson believe: Unless the state is a community for ethical purposes and unless it is held together by moral ties, it is nothing, as Augustine said later, except “highway robbery on a large scale.”⁹⁹

The preceding theories of state class, presented as “Xeers-less” in Abdi Samatar and “highway robbery on a large scale” by Augustine, refer to two societies of the same immoral image. But in the Somali context, it is not presented in better hypothesis than Abdi Samatar’s observation:

The main way to get access to state funds was to become an elected political representative or, even better, a Minister, and this goes a long way to explain the increase in both the number of parties and candidates in the 1964 and 1969 elections. Mainly because of the understanding that the upcoming contests were all about the ‘privatization’ of state largesse – indeed, many senior civil servants resigned in order to participate in the electoral gamble.¹⁰⁰

From a stagnant economy, Somalia couldn’t cater for its needs internally and externally. Persistent constraints created enormous disequilibria in its balance of payment. As a result making it among the largest recipients of foreign aid in the world. A UN report confirms thus:

Somalia, throughout its first three decades of independence received one of the largest per capita levels of foreign aid in the world. Unfortunately, most of it was squandered on inappropriate projects or lost to massive corruption thus earning Somalia a reputation as a “graveyard of foreign aid.”¹⁰¹

But as the political squabble continued, the focus was diverted from national development. More concentration was regarded to clan politics. Nationhood literally lost its due value, since it was a tool for trade only through the decolonization process because, as it has been seen in many African ethno-cultural contexts, “It was practically developed during independence,”¹⁰² and in effect had no deep roots for it to contrast to the deeper clan affinity and kinship.

The Somali President ignored to contain the brewing clan struggle amid his government. The elite competition for misappropriation of public resources, the expropriation of agricultural land and worsening inter-clan rivalry which characterized in the subsequent regimes, have had their foundation laid in Osman’s period. By allowing the appointment of the cabinet on clan formula, Osman legitimated the emergence of what Lipset calls “a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favoured elite.”¹⁰³

As a result of this competition, rural migration was intensified in search of opportunities for the acquisition and accumulation of ‘hanti qaran’ – public resources. Within a short period of time, competing immigrants flooded the urban areas, particularly the capital Mogadishu, as members of the cabinet and other top civil servants recruited their newly arrived kinsfolk. Many of these immigrants, like our former tenant, one Abdi Hassan, were not only on stipend from public coffers without rendering any service to the public, but were ‘ghost workers’ employed in more ministries than one!

Abdi Hassan lived with his family in a separate apartment of our house till the military take-over. It was after his unlawful salaries were terminated that he confessed to my father about the loss of all the three separate wages he had been earning for the past eight years. He was no longer able to pay for the apartment. He was given two or three months rent-free during which he looked for a room somewhere in the outskirts of

Mogadishu. Later, he had to go to Saudi Arabia where he got employed as a casual worker.

Many top officials resorted to emulating the white colonialists. They stepped up their hunt for wealth and luxury and acquired plantations in the fertile lands of the Bantu, along the Juba valley and in the Shabelle regions, many of them by expropriation. Kenneth Menkhaus agrees that in the 1960s, "Most of the Somali plantation owners were deputies in the national parliament or had other high positions of authority."¹⁰⁴

The chronology of past events unveils that Somalia has been associated with clan feuds, looting and livestock rustling. As Bloom and Ottong emphasized, "The stability of a community depends upon the quality of the groups that compose it."¹⁰⁵ And the quality has been, in the above paragraphs, described as "Xeers-less", meaning defiants of the traditional morals and the customary law. When from a sociological perspective Bloom and Ottong hypothesize, "...corruption is associated with societies...in which there are no widely - accepted norms of sharing power,"¹⁰⁶ they would agree with me to have classified Somalia into that category of societies. The happenings and the moral decay of the ruling elite were prelude to a situation which would make Jemale admit three decades and half later that, "... it is impossible in this age to run a "tribal" government or regime. All trials in this direction have come to nothing."¹⁰⁷

While the cabinet and the whole administration was infinitely suffering from lack of inter-group and intra-group adaptation, mutual adaptation to one another, the first president was inactive, if not ineffective, in utilizing the available modern or traditional methods of conflict resolution. If not in its entirety, the majority who constituted the government were barren of either of the desirable human qualities in life, namely, virtue and knowledge. Arrogance utterly inherited the place of wisdom. And the cause of the conflict, in addition

to other factors, was what Mary Getui would admit as, “The superiority complex of one group over another.”¹⁰⁸

Corruption and squandering of public coffers became the regular business of office duty. The elite built modern villas and purchased property in posh areas, for speculation and profiteering, from the taxpayers’ money. Ahmed Qassim Ali reiterated, the expropriation and land looting with its effects of retrogression and economic vulnerability to small-scale farmers, “was aggravated by successive post-colonial Somali administrations... by coercion and violence.”¹⁰⁹ He laments that the lack of redress for the colonial mischiefs and grave violations of human and property rights against the farmers, “...justifies only the failure of the successive Somali administrations to affect a land reform system.”¹¹⁰ Ahmed Qassim, despite its internal wrangle, blames Aden Abdulle Osman’s regime for inefficiency and unpatriotic sentiments towards the colonial administration. He acknowledges, “The FR (First Republic) was by no means the right government to solve the problems of agriculture in southern Somalia. It maintained the status quo and contributed to the decline of production and consequent deterioration of farmers’ livelihood. It also postponed land reform indefinitely.”¹¹¹

When the first post-colonial regime could not address the complaints of the Jareer/Bantu regarding the land issue, economic participation, political recognition and social development in general, the elite of the day were convinced that the regime was neocolonialistic in ideology and anti-Jareer by policy. Several Jareer ‘Laashimiin’ poets interpreted the social feeling of their community:

* *Aadan ii Alberto Uurkooda halwaaye*
 *Arladeey Isticmaarkaa loogu Aabayeeli.*¹¹²

Translation:

Adan and Alberto (the Italian colonialist) are of the same (colonial) ideology
(No wonder) that My land was made appeasement to the colonialists

- * *Minaa Onoraato Amarkiisa yeeshi*
*Ismaan Istiqlaalki waa Aamin darreysi*¹¹³

Translation:

If you accepted to abide by Onorato's orders (neocolonialistically)
You (Osman) rendered freedom worthless (of the struggle).

- * *Arrinti Asaayle Aadan waa Ogaaye*
*Intareesadissaaw An li Arkiwaayi.*¹¹⁴

Translation:

Adan was knowledgeable of the Asayle massacre,
But due to his self-interest, ignored to consider our (Jareer) grievances.

- * *Onor ii Onoraataa Ushaada Udhiibt*
*Aadanoow Adduun yaa kuugu Aaminaayo!*¹¹⁵

Translation:

Once you have pledged allegiance to Onor & Onorato (colonialists)
(Aden) You are no longer trustworthy on this earth!

Abdi I. Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, who conducted sound studies on the functional nature of the post-independence Somali civil administrations, give a scholarly corroboration, one in agreement with the Jareer poets' verses. They delve into the subject by stating:

*The birth of the Somali post-colonial state was the outcome not of a long and broad-based social struggle, but rather of an accommodative arrangement whereby the cost to the colonial regimes was to relinquish visible power but not to lose decisive influence.*¹¹⁶

To put it bluntly, in Aden Abdulle Osman's era, the genre of the political sociology, in other words the relationship between the nomadic social background and the existing/functional political institutions, shared the same imagery. Therefore, the political behaviour of the parties was the emerging product of the social behaviour eminent in the ethnocentric nomadic culture. In a broader sense, these persistent characteristics can be measured as interrelated variables in a continuum in the social psychology of this group, interacting symbolically in different stages and environments. In that framework, and according to the nomadic philosophy, the political party was used as an advanced tool for attaining clan representation at the national level. The clan system, which functions as the law-making institution according to the ideals of 'pastoral democracy', now transposed into a political establishment with an urbanite outlook which was put in place to shape the national legislation that would satisfy violent pastoral avarice.

Certain scholars, Somalists in particular, tend to approach with promotional philosophy the formational and functional nature of the post-colonial regimes before Barre as 'democratic'. The category of [this] democracy needs to undergo proper test in search of democratic consensus, for what is democratic to one in a sense may be undemocratic to the other in another sense. The major basis of the explication of democracy is often delimited only to the process of formation of the structural body of the government as an institution, hence a "democratically elected government" and a "democratically removed institution". The proceeding events and experiences within the democracies of these democratically elected or removed administrations, their functions, was where actually the rot lay. One of the problems of this thesis of delimitation of democracy to the electoral process only, was perhaps encouraged by loud propaganda outside academic relevance.

Alternatively, we can deem democracy a due consideration in terms of its social effects and relations - in the aspect of the ideals of political sociology - but not only the

compatibility of the electoral system with democracy. By large, the underlying concept of democracy should embrace the foundational ethics of equal opportunity, fair social mobility, meritocracy and reciprocal loyalty between the elite in office and the society that entrusted them with both the power and authority they (elite) exercise.

The absence of an atmosphere plausible to the encouragement of the above factors is itself an indignity to democracy. In this stance, I contend that, apart from the racially/ethnopolitically manipulated electoral processes; none of the post-colonial civil administrations was democratic in practice. According to Held,¹¹⁷ democracy should be viewed as a political system capable of encouraging the purpose and practice of political equality, the protection of liberty and freedom, the defence of common social interests, the response to the requirements of the citizens, the promotion of moral self-development and the ennoblement of unbiased decision-making that takes every citizen's interest and well-being as a priority. When the practice of the 'democratically elected' institution in office abuses the fundamental ethos and moral code of the very democracy that empowered the office holders to their positions, democracy ceases its existence. It illegitimizes, technically and procedurally, the institutions and structures occupying the offices. As a consequence of this philosophy, I propose my contretemps of the first regime as a 'democratic government' since it contravened the basic principles of democracy.

Despite her ethnic bias in approving Aden Abdulle, Mariam Arif Gassim¹¹⁸ is one of very few Somali writers who acknowledge political alienation of the Jareer. Although she praises Aden Abdulle (alias Aden Adde) lavishly, perhaps it did not dawn on her why such a "praiseworthy" president could not see about the Jareer what she could see about their alienation. Secondly, Gassim does not seem to regard as a problem or an issue the farmland expropriated from the Jareer people and their conscription to forced labour. But had the same occurred to the Hawiye, the president would have changed his

neocolonialistic attitude and acted on his clan's behalf to claim and restore their property, with possible demand for reparation. Thirdly, had the oppression the Jareer experienced been exacted on Gassim's sub-clan and the president stayed indifferently as he did in the case of the Jareer, the author's pen would have written through the thickness blood differs with water.

For the average Jareer/Bantu people, the reaction has been manifested in the poetry above, and the neocolonialistic policy of the post-independence civil administrations, Aden Abdulle being the foremost leader, had their roots firmly laid prior to the SYL climb to the top. Mariam Arif hints, but neither emphasizes nor elaborates, as she writes, "The Italian administration began to negotiate and be on good terms with the nationalist party...",¹¹⁹ but in "Land Rush in Somalia" Ahmed Qassim is clear about the government's conscience. David Laitin confirms also in his volume *Politics, Language and Thought* (p. 100) that "the Italian Administrator appointed Cabdullahi Ciise as the first prime minister of an all-Somali government... for Cabdullaahi and the then SYL president, Aaden Cabdulle Cismaan, were both on good terms with the Italian administration."

As I noted earlier, the most critical issue was the illegal concessions and acquisition of Jareer land by the Italian colonialists and their settlers, which was further aggravated by Osman and his colleagues in office as the leaders of the first 'democratic' government. By depth, the Jareer poet did not say, "...Intareesadiisaaw An ii Arkiwaayi" out of sheer vanity or fantasy. He was a voice advocating for the most oppressed people in the peninsula. In such a situation, pain is best felt by its sufferer as the Jareer remind Aden Abdulle Osnman:

* *Mugi Colka yiili Ciidanaan eheene*
 *(Caddoow) Cashadoo hunkeed maa iiga soo Caraawdi!*¹²⁰

Translation:

*During the struggle, we were participants in the war,
(Oh Adde!) Have you now abandoned us (Jareer) because of a dinner (a personal
interest) offered to you by the white colonialists!*

Regarding Mariam's reiterated statements of "no consideration to Jareer" on pages 41, 43, 46, and "the Jareer Weyne of today did not have a special status", also on page 46, the Jareer bard had clarified the point in a vast of oral literature much earlier than the author's published work:

* *Tiro ii Tagoog ii Tacab leeyma gaaro
Tiinteeya hunkeedaa leegu Tiiksahaa!*¹²¹

Translation:

*We are unmatched in Number, and strength in production
But we (Jareer) are alienated (persecuted) due to the
(distinctiveness) of our hair (ethnicity as Jareer).*

* *Aadeey ilmihiisoo Itaaliya joogo
Onor ii Onoraato Eed loo helimaayo.*¹²²

Translation:

*As long as Aadeey's (Aden's) children are studying in Italy
Onor and Onorato (Italian colonialists) remain blameless (fulfilling their part of the
bilateral interests).*

Apparently, as we can grasp from the sentiments of the victims of the first civilian government's neocolonialistic policy, what Gassim describes as "decent parliamentary president... His valid role of adviser to the government and the National Assembly was very much appreciated," is contrarily described by a section of the community as

“indecent, cold, inactive, ineffective and politically shortsighted.”¹²³ And in analyzing Mariam Arif Gassim’s discourse in another statement remarking, “and president Aden was looking the political equilibrium of the country [only] from the Darood /Hawiye angle,”¹²⁴ is in itself a satisfactory evidence of the first President’s ineptitude and political shortsightedness. (Emphasis added)

As the leader of the nation, and as a “decent parliamentary President,” the head of state should have been beyond the “Darood/Hawiye” rhetoric, and should have in essence developed political maturity with a national focus instead. His imprudence and sheerly myopic political vision are also discussed in Dualeh:

*The 1960 Somali State, through the fault of President Aden Abdulle Osman, and his southern supporters, was clearly built on unjust edifice...When Somali history is finally written, President Aden Abdulle Osman and not President Mohamed Siad Barre, as some people erroneously believe, would shoulder responsibility for the agony, death and destruction that emanated from his deliberate historical error. Unfortunately for Siad Barre, he inherited President Aden Abdulle Osman’s unjust legacy... Unfortunately for the Somali people, President Aden Abdulla Osman was neither a visionary nor a great nationalist.*¹²⁵

*Through his unwise action as the first President of the newly independent Somali Republic, Aden Abdulle Osman, has sown the seeds of disenchantment and disintegration of the embryonic Somali State. His action was a setback to the vigorous Somali nationalism and its aspirations to unite all Somali territories. It sent the wrong signals to the other territories that were not part of the union. The signal was, “Don’t join us.”*¹²⁶

With all conscience, President Aden Abdulle’s moral command, in contrast to the negative views of variant Somali communities, converges to the saying that “A guilty conscience

needs no accuser.” But when all is said and done, it is academically, historically as well as socially shameful and hypocritical to attempt at the exoneration of the moral guilt of the incumbent while crucifying the lower ranks in his court as is often done in the issue of the Somali civilian regimes. It has become almost a tradition for certain scholars to condemn and criticize of corruption and embezzlement the officials of the state administrations of these authorities while embarking on an exaltation and glorification scheme of the incumbent at the helm of the same graft-ridden institution.

As SYL executive member and as President of the Republic, the politician turned agrarian committed flounders, particularly in plotting against the Jareer people, by imposing and nominating non-Jareer candidates in Jareer-dominated constituencies, on SYL ticket, and subsequently rigging the votes against the will of the Jareer majority.¹²⁷ If such attitude of ‘highway robbery on a large scale’ makes Aden Abdulle or anyone in his bandwagon exemplary of any rule (cracy), it was not a demo-based or people-driven as erroneously purported by a section of the Somali society and even possibly scholarship, but rather a system that was overtly operating under the aegis of clanism and ethnocentrism, thus [ethnocracy] as the more convenient term.

For instance, the constituents in this poetic verse gave an aspirant of a parliamentary seat on SYL ticket a strong message of disapproval:

* *Dambartii la nuugi aa la Doorahaa*

*Waa Diidi Dayuuro mi'iigu Dageeyso.*¹²⁸

Translation:

We are in favour of electing one of our own

We reject to be landing zone for an aeroplane (foreigner).

The aspirant was exasperated by the message and publicly talked of the importance of his vote in the presidential election, and therefore his assurance of unlimited support [by] the President and the party (SYL) “ad ogni costo”, at any cost, come what may. Finally, when the votes were cast and the SYL candidate was nowhere near victory, the returning officers from the opposition (the people’s party) were thrown out of the counting room,¹²⁹ many voting cards in favour of the opposition were sneaked out and burnt,¹³⁰ while the results were announced prematurely in favour of the SYL, before even opening most of the ballot boxes returned from voting stations heavily populated by the opposition.¹³¹ However, this is just one example of numerous cases of rigging and electoral unjust which the President’s party and men immorally but consciously sought office, and the enumeration and presentation of them all is beyond the discussion of this Chapter.

Another sober contention to Gassim’s excessive commendation of Osman suggests that a diplomatic debacle, as delved in the author’s own words, “Prime Minister Abdirashid signed the military assistance agreement without neither (sic) informing nor (sic) consulting the President”,¹³² could have been avoided and handled with the maturity it deserved had the President shown loyalty, absolute integrity and a sound atmosphere of working relationship between him and his administration. The kind of discrepancy Gassim envisaged uncovers the precarious political divide at the top and the irresponsibility with which crucial national issues were prone to barren nomado-politica, under the weak leadership traits in the person of the first president.

After independence, in 1961, the U.S International Cooperation Administration conducted a study in the Interriverine, coded (Inter-River Economic Exploration). According to the report, the aim was “to evaluate the potential productive capacity of the Inter-River Area of the Somali Republic.”¹³³ The experts assessed the area as capable of improving the livelihood of the people:

“The resources per capita are relatively high. The ratio between the population and the potential resources is such that the per capita income could rise to a level at which people can live fairly well and even begin the processes of saving... Any investment in physical plant must be accompanied by an active, vigorous educational program. A combination of developing the latent skills and the natural resources in the Inter-River Area could provide a backbone of economic stability for the republic. It is stressed throughout this report that both skills and facilities must be upgraded concurrently...”¹³⁴

“If charcoal production is conservatively and systematically carried on under appropriate management, it will bring an income which can partially pay for the development of the project”.¹³⁵

The dating of this study falls in the presidential tenure of Aden Abdulle Osman. And after reading the report, it stimulated my reminiscence of a discussion in mid '70s between Hagi Bashir (a former Deputy Minister?), his right-hand man nicknamed 'Lugo-god' and my father. Hagi Bashir contracted my father for the rehabilitation and renovation works of some of his houses in the capital. The venue was Hagi Bashir's residence in Mogadishu, on the Shabelle-Km 4 road, between Cinema El-Nassar and ex-Fiera Ground. As the political history proceeded, Hagi Bashir disclosed the unexpected, "If not for Aden Adde, the agrarian people and the entire country would have been prosperous." My father asked for explication. Hagi Bashir replied, "Several investments were ready but the president would not approve." My father again asked, "Why?" Hagi Bashir responded, "They were Americans and the President was pro-Italian." My father contributed ironically, "Or development was being denied for the Jareer." Hagi Bashir admitted, "That was obviously there."

According to Osman Kamula Mofi, after meetings with some top Kenyan officials in July - August, 1962 in Mogadishu,¹³⁶ Aden Abdulle and the entire Somali government officials' hatred against the Jareer people maximized. Mofi recounts, "Sackings of the very few Jareer officers in the army and in the police force were unprecedented while the massive

transfers of the junior staff were absolutely uncalled for.”¹³⁷ The old Mofi recalls the untimely summons of the two or three remaining Bantu officers: “The late Omar Abdulle used to be under continuous harassment though he resisted till his unjustified sacking by Siad Barre.”¹³⁸

Aden Abdulle’s anti-Jareer sentiments and neo-colonialistic attitude, as evidenced above, are supported by Hagi Bashir’s statement in the precedence. Significantly, apart from Mofi and the Jareer poets, the other sources are non-Jareer Somalis of diverse ethnic background; Darood, Issak and Hawiye.

Giving me some insights into the colonial and post-colonial politics before his resettlement in the U.S.A, ex-Colonel Omar Abdulle had the opinion that it was due to Aden Abdulle’s political failure, indecisiveness and excessive pro-Italianism that mainly disintegrated members of the SYL, the government and the Somali people as a whole. The aptly ‘democraticized’ Aden Abdulle was practising in the dark a policy and personal ideology only Abraham Lincoln could practise in public, though similarities remain vivid, while differences need not be ignored.

Former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln supported the freedom of the Negroes, as multiple Grammy Award winner Stevie Wonder relates to us as he sings, “...And the leader with a pen, who signed his name to free all men, was a white man.”¹³⁹ But according to independent thinker, Professor Ali Mazrui, the same Lincoln was of the notion “...that blacks and whites did not really ‘belong’ to the same Republic.”¹⁴⁰ Although Aden Abdulle did not support Bantu/Jareer freedom (dissimilarity), but on the contrary upheld colonial laws and enactments regarding acquisition and expropriation of their land. The first President’s silence over the Jareer grievance amounted to his denial as their

representative; that within the concerns of his interest-based moral obligations, they did not indeed 'belong' to the same republic as the other citizens in the country.

However, to the majority of the people, nationally and internationally, Siad Barre's misdeeds and dictatorial hegemony by far overshadowed the actual sources of the defunct military rule or collapse of the so-called Somali State. But in many perspectives, all administrations, civilian or military, have to take responsibility with the endurance it is due. Notwithstanding the diversity in degrees of the concerned moral detriment or material devastation, pragmatically all the post-colonial leaderships have, in multiple ways than mentioned, repressed the indigenous Jareer people into the submission of "sheria ya mwenye nguvu mpishe!"¹⁴¹ close in meaning to 'Might is right!', in this trend 'Might' being all except the Bantu/Jareer people in the inte-riverine area.

In this framework, and according to the nomadic philosophy, the political party was established as a modern instrument replicating clan representation at the national level. The clan system, which functions as the rule-making institution at the rural society by 'xeer' and 'dhaqan', was enshrined into a political party with some fashionable urbanite modernity. But doing so cannot eclipse the fact that "In moving from one group to another an individual generally brings with him certain inclinations, sentiments, attitudes and values, that he has acquired in the group from which he comes,"¹⁴² giving attribute to the nomadization of the political culture and the economic behaviour of the country. The conceptualization pertinent to the first regime was its misapprehension or rather misinterpretation of what Gaetano Mosca theorizes as a relationship developed between the ruler and the ruled, as opposed to dominance by the ruling elite over the masses.

After ousting Aden Abdulle Osman in a presidential election in 1967, new President (former Prime Minister) Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke did not prove any better than his

predecessor. In fact the situation became more deteriorated than previously. Heavy rural migration resulted in urban population pressure agitated by nomadic parasitism, wanting to live better without contribution of labour to the economy. The administrative officials were in office to misappropriate public funds in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary election in what Abdi Samatar accurately termed “a political gamble”, which was also understandable from an artist's song aired from Radio Mogadishu:

* *Dibutaati inaan noqdaa baan Doonayaa*
Dawladda anka qeybgalaa baan Doonayaa
Ama waa ley Dooran
*Ama Daadku iqaadye.*¹⁴³

Translation:

I am set to be a Deputy
I desire to participate in the (forthcoming) government;
So, either elected shall I be
Or swept away in the torrential rains (of political gambling).

The connotation suggests the participation in the government as the ultimate goal because it would position one at the golden gate through which one would endow oneself the siphoning of public funds for one's individual and ethnic gains. Come the next parliamentary elections, certain tribes had a sizeable number of political parties. Consequently, rigging and other electoral injustices marked the 1969 general elections.

The biggest ridicule followed soon when almost all the opposition parliamentarians crossed the floor over to the ruling party, undermining multi-party-ism in favour of a one party Somali parliament. The development meant the members' selling tactic to the top man in the land and to access appointment to a cabinet position where one could drain dry public resources (a fashion duplicated from milking one's she-camel), the difference

being in the nature of the provider concerned because this one was “Maandeeq” the national she-camel which could provide ‘monetized’ milk from the state coffers, abundant money adequate to saturate the financial rapacity of the entire moiety and the gluttony for wealth of the entire sub-clan/clan.

Before the new members could adjust to achieve their aspirational goals, the most unexpected (to some) happened as President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was shot dead by one of his bodyguards while on a tour in Las Anod, probably paying the price for the electoral irregularities. Inter-parliamentary rifts and wrangles ensued regarding a successor, although the constitution was clear about succession and its legal modalities. The death of the President did not only increase the insatiable lust and avarice of the pastoral parliamentarians, but it also emerged claims of dynasty.

III. FROM DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY TO DICTATORSHIP

During the crisis over the president’s death, another class of the same pastoral culture but of different political ideology was closely monitoring the situation of the parliamentarians.

General Mohamed Siad Barre and a group of his army colleagues revolted the civilian regime and took over power in a bloodless military coup d’etat. Here opens another chapter of Somali life and brings in a historical change that did not only subscribe all the citizens to an abrupt nomadic configuration but also to ruralization of urban life. Mariam Arif Gassim presents the episode amazingly but analytically:

“The “ruralization” process was accelerated by the recruitment of pastorals into the Somali National Army and Police Force. In a relatively short time after the takeover, the majority of government high-ranking officials were of pastoral origin.”¹⁴⁴

Interpreting the situation from its nomadic mentality, Abdalla Mansur also demonstrates the mayhem conspicuously in his assumption that “ The state property which consisted in great part of foreign aid, became the best “Mandeeq” to raid.”¹⁴⁵

The coup leaders, ‘Golaha Sare ee Kacaanka’ the Supreme Revolutionary Council, through excessive media coverage and nationalistic rhetoric, won the heart of the masses. They announced zero tolerance to graft as they put officials of the former government in prison. The former constitution was set aside and a new charter was drafted and approved by the SRC. But several episodes preceded the coup. President Sharmarke and his Prime Minister, Mohamed Hagi Ibrahim Egal, were not comfortable with Siad Barre, who had been nominated as the Commander-in-Chief of the Somali Armed Forces by former Prime Minister Abdirizak Hagi Hussein, in First President Aden Abdulle Osman’s tenure. He was seen as little educated old officer, compared to a better trained younger generation in the army, mainly graduates from Italian military academies; some of them with concentration in military administration.

Barre was also sympathetic to former President Aden Abdulle Osman in his presidential race against Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, and when the former was ousted, Barre’s survival as the top-most army man of the land was hanging on the balance. He had won, for whatever reason, the heart of Yassin Nur Hassan, a strong Majerten politician in the cabinet, but Barre was expecting his sacking, sooner or later. “He realized later the mistake he had made by siding with first President Aden Abdulle Osman who was neither a strategizer nor an effective role-player in the political game”.¹⁴⁶ Before Barre went ahead with his adventure of the coup mission, he had calculated the magnitude of his support within the army file and rank. Without the slightest of doubt or suspicion, he managed to effect a well-calculated delegation of authority of vital positions to his loyalists.

Signals of a coup in the making were flickering far in the political backyard, but the civil government was extremely diverted to the milking of “Mandeeq”. The death of Sharmarke has also given ample time to Barre and his colleagues for final touches to their milestone operation. The other advantage was the preoccupation of the civil government within its top-ranks in the commotion of their political entanglement, which further deviated all attention to the process of installing the next successor. Many of the pastoral ministers and parliamentarians, for their separate individual interests, were attempting to manipulate the constitution by harassing Sheikh Mukhtar, the President of the national Assembly from the Reewing/Digil-Mirifle Community. According to some analysts, allegations of a coup were downplayed, underestimating the underlying danger in Siad Barre’s little education. But even so, the coup situation was an all-Jileec affair, considering the composition of camps, the organizers and their victims.

Neither the 25-member SRC nor their nominated cabinet contained a member of the autochthonous Jareer community. Not only that, the Jareer suffered the first casualty of the Supreme Revolutionary Council by having several of their top officers relieved of their duties in the forces.¹⁴⁷

But the worst had to come for other communities when within one year of the Revolution senior coup leaders were arraigned in military tribunal, court-martialed and condemned to death by firing squad. It was clear symptoms of Barre’s tyrannical behaviour and political doom in Somali social life, but most of all an effective way of airing a message of ruthlessness to his colleagues in particular and at sundry to the Somali people. Many zealous workers demonstrated in the streets of the capital in support of the death sentence by the military court against the three accused, chanting: “Qoorsheel Qoorta-gooya; Gabeeyre Geedka Geeya” – Korshel, cut his throat; Gaveire, execute him by firing squad.

With General Salad Gaveire Kediye and General Mohamed Ainanshe Guled was also to die by firing-squad Abdulkadir Dhel Abdi, a former army colonel. Whether the alleged coup attempt was fabricated to avenge personal vendetta or otherwise, is not yet a matter open to public knowledge. The implication of Abdulkadir Dhel Abdi into this intricate military affair raised suspicion as he had retired from his career in the army earlier. It left a very painful multidimensional social enigma. Very few, if any, are in apprehension of the plain truth till today, regarding the nature of the treason case constituted against the three. It is not even clear whether the source of the information was Barre's national security apparatus or whether the KGB, numerous and close to Barre at the time, had an involvement in phone bugging or in any other high-tech surveillance. But Yassin Hagi Ismail's newscast from Radio Mogadishu, which partly read:

* *Maxamed Ceynaanshe Guuleed, Salaad Gabeeyre Kediye, Cabdulqaadir Dheyi
Cabdi, saddexdaba, maxkamad militari ah waxay ku xukuntay in la daldalo,
hantidoodana dawladda la wareegto,*

Translation:

*A military court has found Mohamed Ainanshe Guled, Salad Gaveire Kediye and
Abdulkadir Dhel Abdi, guilty of an attempted coup. The court has sentenced them to
death and the dispossession of their property by the government.,*

was a prenotification of successive events of devastating nature. In later years many citizens had to meet their fate by firing squad, including 10 clergymen executed in one morning.

In spite of the colossal damage and the message of tyranny, the national political ideology was driven into a new subscription rhymed to the heavy drumbeats of Scientific Socialism,

locally termed as 'Hantiwadaagga Cilmiga ku-Dhisan', although Barre himself was not known for knowledge of any science, including military science.

The political atmosphere had an impact on the lore and literature of the socio-political arena because 'geela' (the camel) and 'heesaha kacaanka' (revolutionary songs) took the trend of the ordinary discourse in the offices and in normal social life. Everybody had to be a member of 'bulsho kacaan' revolutionary society, and one way of admitting self-subscription to such a society was by showing one's loyalty either by praising that discourse or by listening to it very often. Accordingly, one would not claim membership to 'bulsho kacaan' wholeheartedly if one was not affluent in 'heesaha kacaanka' and 'suugaanta geela' camel literature, or more precisely, all that appertains to the nomadic culture.

Knowledge of the camel complex was quite necessary because it was the culture of 'Aabe' Siyaad, the father, the teacher and his kinship. It would perfectly decide one's acceptance and place as a 'child' of the nation and a 'pupil' of the teacher. After accepting this rhetoric intuitively, the loyalty had to be pronounced also outwardly, thus traditionalizing the singing of praise songs of the 'father' every morning by adults and youngsters alike, at the start of work or class respectively. A number of delays to the routine would put the "wrong-doer" into the undesirable category of 'dib-u-socod' reactionary to the cause of the revolution and hence a negative consequence of sacking from job or suspension from school.

With the Scientific Socialism came the establishment of various parastatals. Notorious among them were the Agricultural Development Corporation, the Somali National Cooperative Union, Ente Nazionale di Commerce (National Agency for Commerce) and others for numerous purposes and tasks.

The Ente Nazionale di Commercia (ENC) was 'reputable' for hoarding goods and manipulating market prices by creating deliberate shortages in the importation and supply of essential commodities – sugar, cooking oil, wheat flour, and other consumables. Society had to respond with integrity as 'bulsho kacaan' by silence and by queuing for the commodities in the wee hours of the night in front of their respective supply/retail stations before they open in the morning. A Jareer poetess could not hold her anger and disgusted feelings when she said:

* *Sokor ii Sariiraan Saf oogu jirnaaye*
 *Seergooye Siyaadoow Saan maxaaw ahaay?*¹⁴⁸

Translation:

We are queuing for (basic commodities) sugar and cooking-oil
Siad, the one wise in policy-making, what is it that we are experiencing?

The Somali Script

The introduction of the Somali script, just like the clan-based monuments, was celebrated as a major revolutionary, nationalistic achievement through 'hantiwadaagga cilmiga ku qotoma' scientifically driven socialism. It was in fact an achievement, cumulatively to the subscribers of the culture of the camel complex. It was a bright opportunity for the imposition of their language and virtuously their dialect on the masses at large. It was the decision of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, and in accordance with 'mabaadii'da kacaanka' the principles of the revolution, to have an official national language whose derivative influence from the camel culture and the central/northern dialect have been unanimous on the determination of its purity.

It was a bright opportunity because the urbanized camel culture had at their disposal all the necessary device and avenues prerequisite to it, from policy and planning to implementation. However, the core incentive lay in status planning, making the language official. More explicitly, even if this particular language and/or dialect did not have functional base as lingua franca among the poly-ethnic nations of clans, it could be raised to a higher status at the nation-state level. By being at the hegemonial rank of the state, the policy-making nomads could not only design the thematic substance in planning, but by doing so brought for legalization the corpus from their own dialect, so that the agrarian and agro-pastoral southerners would be obliged to transform hastily their cultural corpus to the “superordinated” aesthetics of the northern nomadic pastoral commandments.

The main hidden agenda, as would be evident later, was not the nationalistic step advertised through the mass media but to nomado-culturalize the whole system of governance. Subsequently, they had to conceive a plan of massive urban-implantation of their rural people, with unlimited participation in all the social activities, particularly desirable posts for accessing easy-money. The precursor to that extent was successfully in place through the elite understanding that “formal language policy making...plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and resources in all societies ...”¹⁴⁹ Obviously, the role would fall in a theoretical disagreement with Renan’s idea of language as an effective instrument in civic nationalization because this, contrarily, was ‘national-ethnicization!’

Whether the ruling group was aware or incognizant, it was borrowing heavily from Italian communist Antonio Gramsci,¹⁵⁰ whose work suggested hegemony as a system in which the ruling elite would influence the rest of the society or classes to adopt or assimilate their own cultural and moral values. Perhaps it eluded the great communist thinker that communities of diverse cultures and background cannot be of the same moral and cultural

values because, as Kanwar B. Mathur defines, “To be truly part of a culture, one must grow up in it.”¹⁵¹

A powerful ideological force was put to work. Just as occupationists and colonialists have imposed their language and culture on the indigenous population for colonial gains, Barre and his ruling kinship were designing in advance a formula with the same aim and objective, but in a different context. In simplistic form, it was a means of maintaining parity between the prospective rural migrants and the rest of the non-nomadic urban culture, reinforcing the philosophy of cultural domination by the former against the rest of the masses.

The context of this argument is not to be alluded only in the linguistic form of the Somali language as spoken in the wider sense, but the effect of standardization of the dialect of that language as spoken by a group who were in control of the process of its standardization. Subsequently, the status in cultural and linguistic mobility given to the speakers of that dialect, in contrast to speakers of other dialects of the same language, bears an authentic clan definition. The economic aims and achievement underlying the impact of acquisition and standardization pertinent to the later crisis, moral vulgarity and decline in social values as its result, need to be examined wisely before drawing a definitive conclusion to decide the rate of success of that language.

From another view, the effect of the Somali orthography on the alienation and degradation of other living languages and cultures in the country need also to be studied carefully in order to make a constructive assessment of the persistent disadvantage variables. My linguistic reference here is quite separate from mere accent, which is “only a difference in pronunciation.”¹⁵² For a better comparative understanding of their intricacies, David Abercrombie classifies:

*Accent and dialect are words which are often used vaguely but which can be given more precision by taking the first to refer to the characteristics of the medium only, while the second refers to characteristics of language as well.*¹⁵³

Janet Holmes makes it even more elucidating; though her referral language is English, our assumption is a conversion in Somali:

*The dialect we grace with the name Standard English is spoken in many different accents. But, as illustrated in the discussion of regional dialects, there are also many standard Englishes.*¹⁵⁴

Although Holmes seems to have fallen in the trap of Somali myth of monolinguality, an embarrassing trap many unsuspecting scholars trampled into,¹⁵⁵ I agree with her in the fact that in language standardization or planning, "Numerical dominance is not always what counts, however, political power is the crucial factor,"¹⁵⁶ and that is the factor which, in the Somali social domain, determined the linguistic bias of standardizing a nomad's language to be adopted by all other social cultures regardless of their own language(s).

Commenting on the work of Hodge and Kress, Coupland and Jaworski write, "For them, language styles have symbolic meanings that represent different positions in social conflicts, such as class interests and associated power struggles."¹⁵⁷ By that note, the standardization of one dialect against the other, or in global terms, the nationalization of one language at the disadvantage of others, is in conformity with the avoidance of the cultural diversity prevailing in Somali social life. A subscription to a culture and language in which one was not born means the acceptance of the devaluation of one's cultural values and identity to a subordinate class, and this was the covert vision of 'Aabaha Ummadda Soomaaliyeed' the father of the Somali nation/people, and his henchmen towards other cultures. The impact will be discussed in Chapter Six of this study.

The Cold War

Somalia had a constantly brewing problem with Ethiopia for centuries, over territorial rule and accusations and counter-accusations of expansionism. Barre, viewing the Soviet Union's growing interest in gaining bilateral relations with Ethiopia, was discontented. With signs of discomfort within the army and earlier promises and aspiration of the myth of 'Greater Somalia', he had to find a way out of his simmering political hotbed.

The Ogaden movement, Western Somali Liberation Front, intensified its subversive guerilla warfare before the situation evaporated into a horrific conventional war of massive man and material damage on both countries of the poorest of the world. As the Jareer population can remember, the 1977 Somalia - Ethiopia war was one of the worst periods ever for the community. The youth were discriminatively conscripted and sent to the warfront for a country they never enjoy human dignity, liberty, or good social life and status.

The war bore humiliating impact for Somalia, politically, economically and militarily. It had complicated the entire social infrastructure. After the formidable Somali troops had overrun the Ethiopian forces in an overwhelming military convention, disgruntling them into disarray and pushing them to less than a hundred miles to the capital Addis, Russian, East German and Cuban troops had to save the day for Ethiopia and rescue the new Soviet ally. The stronger communist forces with their more sophisticated military arsenal sent the advancing Somali forces into a retreat. Literally, Somalia defeated Ethiopia on one and one basis, but the Soviet and Cuban troops ultimately won the war for Ethiopia.

Not surprising enough, the Somali officers met some of their Russian trainers and advisers upon their retreat after ceasefire. According to Colonel Mahdi Mohamed Issa (then a Captain), one Russian expert told him, "You made us proud militarily, but ashamed us diplomatically."¹⁵⁸ The senior Russian officer's statement had strong connotation with mixed reaction; one was the 'victory' of the Russian trained Somalis equipped with their Soviet-made military arsenal against American investment in Ethiopian army over the years; the second was that diplomatically, the Somalis shunned the Soviet proposal of a federal system bringing together several of its allies within the neighbourhood of the Horn.

As Lewis said, "Siad's mother was Ogaden and her clan looked to him for support."¹⁵⁹ Accordingly, in Somalia, the war was justified at twofolds, nationally as well as ethnically. Even if the ultimate goal was not achieved, at least Siad's affinity to the Ogaden was paramount as the wider Darood clan and the entire Somali clans witnessed Barre's sacrifice to his mother's people.

The return from the war has changed the psychology of the army personnel and suspicion arose over a coup attempt by some officers. They were rounded up and sentenced while others managed to escape. The result was the founding of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front led by current (at the time of this Dissertation in 2005) interim President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed who at that time was a Colonel in the army. They were based in Ethiopia and received support from Mengistu Haile Mariam's government. It was reciprocal to Somalia's assistance to several anti-Ethiopian liberation fronts such as the Eritrea People's Liberation Front, Tigre People's Liberation Front and the Western Somali Liberation Front. The WSLF became inactive after the war. Citing Compagnon, Cassanelli notes, "Organized opposition to Siad Barre's autocratic rule began in the aftermath of the

abortive Ogaden campaign and continued to grow through the 1980s until virtually every region and clan had produced an anti-Barre movement.”¹⁶⁰

The cold war played a tangible role in the survival of Barre’s political life. The departure of the Soviet Union and the socialist ideology had brought to an abrupt stop the flow of military equipment, but the Cold War opened another door. The US, which had lost Ethiopia due to Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam’s policies, needed to counter-balance the Soviet presence in the Horn and in the vicinity of the Gulf for easy surveillance of the naval movement in the area and along the Indian Ocean. The Americans were most welcome to utilize the Berbera port as a military base as long as they had the willingness to pump their millions into Barre’s government coffers.

In effect, the relationship has resulted the creation of a new class of elite. Illiterates and skilled drivers in public employment were suddenly turned to prominent importers and exporters. They even benefited from (canshuur-dhaaf) ‘duty-free’ for their imports. This is the group which Compagnon describes as “A stratum of wealthy and corrupt businessmen (many of whom were penniless in the 1970s) arose from all the clans.”¹⁶¹ They were opportuned with special status because their recommendation letters to access huge and unsecured bank loans were accompanied with the “Ka aamus” letter from the top office instructing the bank to “keep quiet” and refrain from asking the bearer for repayment.

The West, particularly the US and the Arab countries, have saturated Siad Barre with funds of various categories, from loans to grants. Within a very short period of time, many UN agencies and international NGOs have embarked on the initiation of multi-million dollar projects, some of them political with no feasibility or accountability of any nature. Bloom and Ottong agree: “In Africa many development projects have been launched by governments who want to favour sections of society, regardless of the strict technological

or economic consideration, so there are many uneconomic airlines and other prestige projects.”¹⁶²

So, for their apparent advantage, there had to be created many prestigious projects to reward the parasitic loyals, after all, the money-pump was running appropriately through the different pipelines, for adequate supply. The aid funds played magnificent roles, one of them being “Siad Barre’s manipulation of clans against one another.”¹⁶³ The teacher of the Revolution (Macallinka Kacaanka) was ethnic-conscious as much as he was ethnocentric, for a study shows that by 1988 Barre’s hometown Gedo had 42% households cultivating on irrigated land, while the Middle Juba region had only 4% in contrast.¹⁶⁴

The causal of Barre’s institutionalized looting was the flow of political money from various sources without the slightest accountability whatsoever. According to Menkhaus and Craven:

The political interests of the donors – West Germany, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi - were straightforward. They sought to use generous quantities of foreign aid to wean the Somali government away from its close ties to the Soviet Union...

*Ultimately what mattered was not whether the projects were good investments or whether they integrated local and national needs but whether they satisfied a political elite in Mogadishu whose alliance was sought. High officials in the Somali government were quick to take advantage.*¹⁶⁵

By taking advantage, the officials did not only drain dry development funds but they even went as far as using their offices and influence (like their predecessors) to loot privately owned Bantu land in the riverine area. Farah et al write, “After independence, a new class

of Somali entrepreneurs began acquiring land for irrigation, using their government connections and, if necessary, force, to claim land...”¹⁶⁶

After the defeat in the Ogaden war, and with a fund flow from numerous sources, an internal war was waged on Bantu farmlands in the Shabelle and Juba riverine areas. The colonial land laws enacted for the deliberate purpose of expropriating Jareer land, and upheld in the post-independence civilian administrations, were reinforced by Siad Barre's Land Reform Act of 1975 which re-emphasized the ownership of all land by his government, so that he could allocate to his clients enough hectares right on the bank of the river while the owners would work on it as hired squatters. According to Barre and his entire Jileec government, this was the “justice and equality” which the “Blessed Revolution” was born to achieve its people, specifically the Jileec.

Through these laws, a scenario was created where land alienation projects were implemented under the donor funded national projects, and all to the dismay of the indigenous Jareer land owners. Scholarly studies have revealed the coercion, oppression, persecution and fraudulent formulas employed in the acquisition of the Bantu land. In fact, Barre's men and sections of the pseudo-nobility got engaged in land grabbing competition. And whoever among them that talked of “acquiring” an agricultural land was praised as “dirac dirac-dhalay” translated which means: “ brave son of a brave man”, a term usually reserved for a daring looter of camels.

In order to stifle and contain the Bantu into a permanent economic vulnerability, Barre established the Agricultural Development Corporation which, controversial to development, had an institutional mandate to purchase all cereal produce at its own fixed rate and sell back to the same producers at inflated prices, because competition was outlawed by the existence of the ADC. Luling reports, “The prices of the ADC were

impossibly low, hence farmers to raise money began to switch from grain to other uncontrolled crops.¹⁶⁷ She also notes, "One ex-Italian plantation was owned by the Prime Minister (Jileec outcast), another by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, another by the President's daughter. Two very large ones belonged to Kuwaiti Arabs."¹⁶⁸

One has to note here that land means to the agriculturalist what livestock values to the pastoralist. But the Somali regimes have not made the introduction and enactment of laws classifying livestock as state property, like it was drafted to dispossess the Bantu of their land. Yet when droughts and famine hit some parts of the pastoral regions, the pastoralists and their camels were airlifted in a national rescue campaign and relocated/implanted in the riverine land. It was the collaboration between these pastoral aliens and their kinship in high government positions close to state project funds that encouraged the influence causing the intensification of expropriation. Sedentary cultivators were shrunk to squatters without legal rights to their ancestral land, by means of forgery and fraudulent title deeds acquired by the well-connected total men of the day.

"No Equality for the 'Adoon'"

A community which has been denied its rights for centuries, known only to suppression and deliberate underdevelopment, cannot suddenly rise up and race against another that enjoyed unlimited opportunities for sacrosanctness throughout the centuries, when the former was undergoing all kinds of stigmatization and the historical hardships of time. The Jareer, like other oppressed peoples elsewhere, were tolerating sequenced systems of oppression of varied degrees and of multi-ethnic/multi-racial domination. In their edited work, Herbert Hill and James E. Jones Jr. impart, "Basic to all such systems is a ruling hegemonic consciousness and the denial to the oppressed of important rights and privileges routinely enjoyed by the dominant group."¹⁶⁹

The Jareer/Bantu in Somalia has not known an easy life like his counterpart Somali Jileec 'brother'. Whether free-born/autochthonous, or whether manumitted or fugitive ex-slave, the Bantu/Jareer were all lumped as slaves and suppressed at the bottom line of the social strata. They have been denied economic advancement, political participation as well as social equality in the academics. In the burden of these societal mischiefs, it couldn't be simple for this community to register and legalize the ownership of their land, although they had not had ownership - or expropriation-related phenomena prior to the Italian colonial occupation and the subsequent neocolonialistic civil regimes of post-independence preceding the dictatorial rule of Mohamed Siad Barre.

Under Italian and Somali rules, the Bantu person was situated in a situation much contrastable to Derrick Bell's¹⁷⁰ postulation, that it would be highly unlikely for a white court to exercise any kind of justice unless it suited white interest, only that in the Somali instance, the pastoral Somalis take the place of the 'white-court'. Seeking remedial recourse from the law could often worsen the matter. It has been evidenced severally that expropriation victims who sought redress frequently ended up in jail. (See chapters 8 & 9)

While still within the context of this discussion, I contend against reports of scholars and others who seem to purport Barre's 'equality and justice' policy. Many have the misconception that Barre had introduced policies, laws and acts to uplift the status of the Jareer.¹⁷¹ Obviously, this is not just a misconception but also a miscalculated ideological error against Barre, notorious for his disgust of the community. A clarification of this, despite the ample evidence in this and other chapters, must be made for more comprehensive understanding.

First of all, there was no Jareer who ever occupied a ministerial position or any other top administrative office in any government [in] Somalia, from the corrupt neocolonialistic civil regimes to Barre the dictator. So in those circles, it was an all-Jileec affair.

Second, there was no single Jareer citizen in the Supreme Revolutionary Council but, to everybody's knowledge; there was Tumul/Midgan – Madhiban representation in the SRC and in a manifold of other capacities in Barre's administration and before him. The Tumul, Madhibaan, Midgaan, Yaxar are outcastes as discussed in Chapter Two of this study. In spite of the ranks of friendship, Samatar, the top outcaste in the SRC, was suffering from that social inferiority – if not him, members of his community were. For Barre to acquire Samatar's and other outcaste officials' loyalty, he had to lift up their inferior social status so that their peers and juniors would accept the delegation of duties and instructions as given by the outcaste superiors.

Third, the Jareer, for all known social purposes, are despised, oppressed, taunted, derogated as inferior, but are not outcastes. They are, in the social stratification hierarchy, at a low level of the strata but not as outcastes. Therefore, in a sense, equality would 'uplift' the outcastes into the social strata of whichever level, where the Jareer had already been within – albeit the low level. At this stage, we see a vertical status mobility of the outcastes (Jileec group) but not a reciprocal accommodation for the Jareer up the other rungs of the ladder near where the 'noble' claiming Jileec people were situated.

Fourth, due to the kind of bias in equality and mobility, a Jareer 'Laashin' poet commented as this:

* *"Jilac ii Jareer Jimeeye, Janaraal JaalleSiyaad"*
*Jugaa ku Jirtee, ma Jiro Janaraal Jareer eh.*¹⁷²

Translation:

Comrade General Siad's (misinterpreted) equality of the Jareer and the Jileec

Lacks even vague of sincerity, as there exists not a Jareer General.

I think the verse and the above elaboration about Siad Barre's equality rhetoric should be sufficient argument disproving the existence of any equality, in any sense, of Jareer and Jileec, except in the Qor'anic sense which is hardly in practice in Somalia. The rush for Bantu land and the unabated looting scheme should further provide a sensible evidence declining equality as powerful outcastes were among the expropriators. One good example is: A Jareer Colonel was proposed for promotion on merit after a long period of service in that rank. A general (now deceased) close to Siad Barre went with him to the Presidency with delight and explained to the President in detail on the achievement of the Jareer Colonel in his military career, reminding the president that they had talked about the issue. The late General concluded with a request to the president to promote the colonel to the rank of General as Siad Barre was frowned in an embarrassing silence, because the request and all the briefing took place in the presence of the Jareer Colonel. Like someone from a long slumber, but with cunning smile, the President retorted, "Please, advise me to do for the officer whatever else on earth, but don't advise me to decorate him with the rank of general."

Traditions of this nature are also related about Samatar, opposing similar promotions recommended for long serving Jareer officers. Therefore, the equality purpose was to serve those who would sit at the same table with Barre and other high ranking officials of his pastoral group, but not the Jareer or 'Adoon' who are kept at bay and away from the decision-making circles.

Yusuf Ibrahim, a Jareer teacher, was physically assaulted by his student and a gang she had hired because she was graded low by the teacher. The teacher puked blood in the course of the beating and was hospitalized for a couple of months. After his discharge, he was transferred to another school because the student was from an irreproachable clan that she couldn't even have been suspended. Her parents had given orders that an uncompromising Jareer teacher shouldn't teach in their daughter's school.

I, author, was abused 'adoon' slave by my student in front of her mother, a headmistress in a government primary school in Mogadishu in late 80's. The mother insisted the daughter to apologize, but she refused. Her class teacher, who was the initial source of complaint, declined to take an impolite student back into his class. I mediated to take her to another class of her level (despite her dirty language), but all the teachers refused her into their classes for abusing me, the Director, and above all, for being unapologetic. Because mine was a private institution, I refunded her against the mother's wish. (A long story beyond this study followed later.)

In urban areas, the Jareer were subject of discrimination and exploitation. They make the largest number of technicians, as a result of early grandfathers' migration from the villages in avoidance of conscription and forced labour (corvee) by the Italian colonialists. More often than not, automechanics who maintained cars were imprisoned because they asked for their money days after failure of payment. Masons and building contractors who accomplished their duties were upon completion warned not to take the risk of "rotting"¹⁷³ in prison for keeping asking for the balance of their payment. When contrasted rural and urban dwellers, Barre's people were "balancing" the burden on the Jareer, wherever they might have been in the country.

At the height of frustration and injustice, a group of Jareer people organized themselves and, with assistance and recommendation from insiders, secured an appointment and met Siad Barre one evening in 1985. When he listened to their complaints, together with a few of his aides, he said he knew everything and promised that he would address the problems. Before their departure, he asked whether the Jareer would send fifty cadets to the military academy, but one old man replied, “Jaalle Siad, those (Jareer) who have been in the army for over 18 years are not going above the ranks of Major and Colonel, what can you do about them?” The President had no answer, but another appointment would be set on his personal invitation for about six elders from the community. It came after about eight months but did not bear any fruits.

The suffering escalated. More farms were looted as more donor funds came into the country. Those who were close to ‘Maandeeq’ would milk it more often than the others. It was ‘every man for himself’ in the “Land Rush in Somali...”¹⁷⁴ as “Somalis of certain clans with the support of the state could confiscate land without any due process.”¹⁷⁵ The Italian colonialists, the post-independence neo-colonialistic civilian regimes and the dictatorial rule of Siad Barre, all condoned the ideology of oppressing and distancing the autochthonous Jareer community from the corridors of power in a plot to premature their aspirations for economic advancement and submerge their ethnic identity.

IV. THE CIVIL WAR: DOOM OF DAROOD DYNASTY OR HOLLOWNESS OF HAWIYE HEGEMONY?

Supplement to ethnic-based internal rivalries within the army, the aftermath of the Ogaden war saw the first organized local movement against Siad Barre. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), belonged to the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood clan, diverted a colossal quantity of weaponry for use by their movement. Under the leadership

of current interim President Abdullahi Yusuf and his kinship, the SSDF was based in Ethiopia and waged its attacks, alongside regular Ethiopian forces, from Ethiopian territory, and captured several Somali towns bordering that country. The hundreds of millions of cold war dollars, later played a great role in seducing and re-attracting the Majerteen on board, some of whom were considered for economically “fertile” (jaga qoyan) positions. In time, they acquired the legitimacy to join in the looting of public funds and private land grabbing, abandoning their earlier motives that had pinned them against the lowly educated dictator.

In the north, the Isaaq formed their clan movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), in preparation for secession. In 1988, the SNM waged several attacks on army positions. It experienced a bloody war and a large casualty in civilian massacre. Barre utilized the full force of the army, including aerial bombardment in the most inhuman nature.

The northern regions were no longer a part of the Republic but treated as ‘enemy zone’. The military action and the southerners’ new discourse of “*xabbadi-keento*” immigrants brought by the bullet, to their northern brothers and sisters, were messages for consideration but the best message was tailored in the Isaacs’ responsiveness to the southerners as “*xabbadi-sugto*” those in await of the bullets. The Isaaq were right, although their sociolinguistic discourse might have missed the analysis of a majority of the southerners.

When in the final hours of 1990 the war began in the capital, the Isaacs’ prediction was coming imminently into reality. Several clan elders approached Barre to save the ‘country’ from turmoil but the dictator stood by his word that only by the barrel of the gun he would step down, since that was the formula by which he came and not by election or elders’

negotiation. Stubborn and fierce urban militia of poorly organized youngsters consisting of glue-sniffers (ciyaal-koolo) and street boys, (ciyaal darbi) and (caseeye/baalishle) shoe-shine boys, initially engaged Barre's soldiers for the first few days of the war. It was a cat and mouse sort of streetfighting, which quickly signalled the lack of conviction in the President's men. Within three days or so, bodies of Barre's soldiers of the pseudo-nobility were strewn in almost all the main streets of the capital. The regular militia came, reinforced their urban counterparts and finally extruded the vicious dictator from the presidency. He holed up himself in Garbaharrey, his self-made home village.

The war picture was the Hawiye clan against the Darood clan of Siyad Barre. It seemed that without Barre in Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, it marked not only the end of the dictator's era, but the demise of Darood dynasty of almost a quarter of a century. Several attempts by the ousted self-ennobled Darood to retake the capital failed, and Barre took a short sojourn in Kenya before he was given refugee asylum in Nigeria, where he later died with all the disgrace of pastoral dictatorship. It was disgrace in many aspects, one of which was seeking protection in an all-Jareer land where his 'nobility' was devalued by his status as asylum seeker under "Adoon" rule away from the land of the 'nobles'.

Although the Hawiye fought and toppled Barre with disgrace, intra-clan feuds, jealousy and lust for power undermined their effort and political ideology, if at all they had any. The song of war calling for the amalgamation of the Hawiye nation to ethnic-cleanse the Darood once and for all, was now futile. The Darood were gone, but the Hawiye were politically non-starters. Intra-Hawiye wars proved more detrimental to peace. The lyrics of a clan war song, '*Maanta maanta maanta Hawiye israacye maanta*' improvised from a national song (*Maanta maanta manta madaxeen banaane manta*) translated, 'today we are at liberty' from colonial rule, was implausible. The Hawiye became the first-hand

witnesses of their own political and ideological vanity. While the so-called politicians had their uncompromise, the militia resorted to massive looting and raping spree. Because members of the Hawiye were armed and ‘respected’ each other, the unarmed minorities and the oppressed were every militia’s easy target.

In the urban areas, the Jareer were forced out of their houses to accommodate members of the armed militia. The Reer Xamar and Reer Barawaa communities also suffered drastically under the armed militia. In the riverine zone, mature crops were burnt, grains stored under the ground (bakaar) were opened and looted. The militia forced the Jareer villagers out of their houses, gang-raped the women, killed the men and practically “inherited” the farms. Situations were witnessed where armed militia announced that a bullet was more costly than the life of the Jareer;¹⁷⁶ for that matter, the Jareer had to work on his robbed farm wagelessly, while the produce was taken by the Hawiye militiamen. Describing the mayhem in poetry, a Jareer ‘Laashin’ said:

* *Basal ii Baraajis Bur-soorne ma haasto*
 *Beerteeya Bexeeysaan baahi oola jiifti.*¹⁷⁷

Translation:

I have neither vegetables nor a meager lump of ‘soor’ the staple meal
And I lie down of hunger while everything grows on my farm.

The only recourse and consolation was sought from God the Almighty, as the tribulations magnified and the armed bandits metamorphosed the productive villages into slave quarters and death camps. Ali Jimale’s words explain the situation when he imagines, “The villain is more powerful than the victim who must search far afield for mechanisms to redress the injustice. The helpless victim, more often than not, resorts to a curse by presenting his/her case to God.”¹⁷⁸ In her communication to God, a Jareer poetess produced this verse:

* *Cariiri adduun ii Ciilaan ku Jiraa*
Casiis-Alla-weenaan Ciidankeey ka yeeli ¹⁷⁹

Translation:

I am submerged in resentment and oppressiveness of the world
I made Almighty God my army.

The militia blocked the passage of relief food to the suffering Jareer and Reewing/Digil-Mirifle in the inter-river locations. Even the urbanites were discriminated in the feeding camps. Charles Geshekte remarks:

*Somali nomads were notoriously prejudicial against these dark skinned people against whom they hurled racial slurs. In 1992, a nurse with the Save the Children Fund was shocked to hear Somalis admit they would “rather see our children starve than feed alongside these smelly Bantu.”*¹⁸⁰

While this stays to portray the paradigmatic behaviour of “homogeneous” and Islamic society supposed to cater for the needy and the weaker, it seems more indignant when in reality those seeking better treatment in the feeding center are the cause of all the devastation, since they have been ruling from the so-called civilian regimes to the civil anarchy. They were now segregating against people whom they had been persecuting over the years after their sheer arrogance and unwise nomadic thinking destined them to be fed by the international community alongside their age-old victims.

When Ramjee Singh tells us that, “Gandhi saw God in the starving millions of India,”¹⁸¹ unfortunately Muslim Somalis could not respect their faith and see God in the millions of the Jareer suffering under their harsh oppression as these oppressors are accused of:

* *Soowjaa kufsateen Siifna waa dhacdeen*
“Salaama – caleykum” mi’iigu Sireeysid. ¹⁸²

Translation:

You ravished our women and subsequently looted our fertile farmland

We shall no longer be deception-bound by your Islamic imitateness.

The arrival of the so-called UN Peacekeepers under the logo of UNOSOM was to change the status quo, but their damage to the Jareer community was in many aspects more enormous and painful than the advantages. As I.M. Lewis wrote, “UN Officials have had to recruit the gunmen as ‘guards’ in effect, paying protection money to save food for the hungry.”¹⁸³ But it is in fact this money that contributed to the expansionism of the militia who used the UN dollars to frustrate the living of the unarmed Bantu people in the urban as well as in the rural areas.

Menkhaus and Prendergast have studied the situation, before revealing the social effects the UNOSOM operation took on the riverine community and its benefit to the armed clans:

The faction leaders, ...especially Aideed...greatly benefited from rents, security contracts, employment, currency transactions and a variety of other fringe benefits courtesy of UNOSOM cash cow. One Somali elder remarked, “UNOSOM came to save us from the warlords, and ended up aligning with them.”⁸⁴

The Jareer population experienced the bitter side of Somali annihilation, psychologically and materially. They were captured in between a looming disaster and crossfire of which they were neither causal nor participants. Estimating the effects according to the perceptions of their assessment, Menkhaus and Prendergast report, “Perhaps a third to a half of the Bantu population has disappeared from the Juba Valley; they either died or remain in displacement.”¹⁸⁵

Although Kenneth Menkhaus had written about Gosha history of prosperity in their pre-colonial years of self-autonomy as young polities under their own visionary rulers like Mzee Nasib Bundo, his later contrast was disheartening:

*“On hundred years ago, the ex-slave communities along the Juba river, despite rudimentary technology and chronic harassment from surrounding pastoralists, produced regular yields of surplus grain which they sold to trading posts of the Sultanate of Zanzibar”.*¹⁸⁶

Later, the scholar had to write:

*“Ironically, although the imposition of centralized state authority has been responsible for many of the Gosha’s crisis, the disintegration of the contemporary Somali state has proven even more ruinous to the riverine community.”*¹⁸⁷

When the degree of aggression escalated, those with no means had to remain behind and develop mechanism for more psychological and physical endurance. They had no choice but to accept the unacceptable inhumanity. What might be of a great psychological concern is the nature of aggression to which the Bantu/Jareer are non-partisan. Whenever the militia thugs suffer a certain defeat, or undergo difficulty from a stronger group or individual, the whole anger is unleashed on the innocent and unarmed Bantu people in a form of displaced aggression. It reminds of Hilgard et al., as they define, “Sometimes the person responsible for the frustration is so powerful that an attack would be dangerous. When circumstances block direct attack on the cause of frustration, aggression may be “displaced.” Displaced aggression is an aggressive action against an innocent person or object rather than against the actual cause of the frustration.”¹⁸⁸ The opted solution, therefore, is conditioning to the situation and a combination of tools varying from apathy to obedience.

Conclusion

If Italy engineered the colonial craft in its art of expropriation, the first president dashed the aspiration of the Jareer community and dampened their cause toward the repossession of their land and claim of their rights as equal citizens. The first president was, as chairman of the SYL and Italy's choice as such, instrumental to the imposition of non-Jareer candidates in Bantu settled areas in a plot to distance them away from the proximity of power so as to avert any possible motion in parliament for land repossession and reparations for atrocities committed under the colonial rule of the fascist Italian regime. In his part, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke strengthened and in fact expanded the rate of corruption, that he finally fell victim of its consequences. Mohamed Siad Barre and Mohamed Ali Samatar avoided going into Somali history as the first Jileec leadership who decorated generalship onto a Jareer.

The atrocities and anarchy of the civil war have intently uprooted the Jareer, with more stigmas and apparently wanton acts of massacre resulting massive displacement inside the country and an exodus into refugee life in neighbouring countries. In the next chapter, the discussion will focus on the plight of the Somali refugees in Kenya, particularly the Jareer.

End Notes: Chapter Four

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43. Ibid.
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prophet and pious religious scholars. But in this incident, it was constituted to
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87. Mahadallah, Hassan O., op.cit.
88. Ahmed, Ali Jimale, "Off the Beaten Sterile Trail"; A paper presented at the 47th African Studies Association, New Orleans. November 2004.
89. Touval, Saadia., op.cit., p.87.
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91. Maxmedeey Ismaan, A couplet selected from miscellaneous verses
Maxmedeey had recited on various events.
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113. Garre Oobooy, a Jareer poet of Afgoi District.
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121. Sayid – Ali A. Eno, a Jareer scholar in comparative Islamic – Christian
religions. Sayid – Ali is a cleric devoted to religious teaching and is not a
performing poet now.
122. Ismail Aliyow Baxaar. The verse was selected from a collection of poetry
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128. Garre Oobooy, recollected from Hagia Halima Essow in Atlanta, U.S.A. 2004.
129. Mohamed Osman Mahdi; a returning officer during both national elections in the 1960s.
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE PLIGHT OF THE SOMALI REFUGEES IN KENYA: SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE BANTU/JAREER PEOPLE

I. THE MASS EXODUS

The abortive coup attempt of 1978, and the subsequent execution of its leader Col. Mohamed Sheikh Osman (Iro) together with supporters from his mainly Majerten sub-clan, and the earlier execution of Generals Salad Gaveire Kedie and Mohamed Ainanshe Guled, with ex-Colonel Abdulkadir Dhel Abdi, were clear signs of a bad omen awaiting Somalia ahead in future. But, because the existence of an oppressive authority of extreme dictatorial power stayed in rule, even the most farsighted elite could not do better than applauding the successive events that extended from tribal politics to economic deterioration.

The political chess game was unstable that unsuspecting candidates without prior political, administrative or economic knowledge and experience were appointed to the cabinet through a piece of announcement from the local radio, while the dismissal of many from the cabinet was equally communicated unceremoniously in the same manner. These ethno-political nominations and appointments to top policy-making positions were made according to a clan's or sub-clan's loyalty to 'Guulwade Siyad', the victory pioneer.

In the subsequent years, a major shift in political protectionism policy was outlined, making the army the powerhouse from which all the control mechanism was generated. As a result, a large number of well connected people had to be recruited into the army to

achieve not only numerical supremacy but, more importantly, to hold in a tight grip the file and rank of the armed forces which, to the ruling clan at the time, was taken as highly indispensable.

Functioning directly under the presidency, the army was literally the outlet through which authority and control were dispensed and then distributed for execution. Clan advisors have played a role by sending the literate and semi-literate for intensive military training before awarding multiple promotions to top levels and ranks overnight. The illiterate had to be placed in the lower ranks of the army and in the Military Police for a top-down state of presence within the control nerve of the armed forces.

For one reason, the implementation of this ethno-political strategy has undoubtedly paved the way for a colossal proportion of rural migration into the urban areas, causing a precarious socio-economic situation that worsened the ailing economy of the country. Therefore, to maintain equilibrium between high state expenditure and a fast dwindling economy, monies had to be printed excessively and frequently, inconsiderate of the ill effects of the potential damage an imminent inflation could cause as a result of money minting.

The uprising of the Northern territories towards the late 80's was an early warning of the dangerous trend the country was haphazardly falling into. The cruel annihilation, which the dictatorial junta inflicted to the Northerners, was received in the political circles of the Southern regions as an indication of the deterioration of Barre's tyranny. As he became mean, his people turned more provocative in an effort to scare off renegades and consolidate power. In the backyard of consolidation and a tight grip lay the lack of quality in the dictator's clan and in the people of his choice.

The culmination of the atrocities into uprising in the south in late December of 1990, was initially orchestrated as a “liberation” from a dictatorial regime. But within the first few weeks, it unfolded into controversies exposing a far different reality. The war took the image of a Hawiye-Daarood confrontation and a bloody massacre ensued. The atrocities contributed immensely to the massive exodus that saw the largest displacement of the Somali Society. Heavy artillery bombardment, devastation of human life and property of unknown number and value, have created human influx into the neighboring states of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and Kenya, in search of a safe haven.

Although the reasons for the unrest after Barre's ouster are varied in nature and magnitude, depending on every individual's views, a large school of thought has it that the main objective for the prolongation of the war is one whose objectives dictate the control of the opulent resources in the agricultural regions of the inter-riverine area. However, the concentration of this paper is gathered to lay its focus on the situation and living condition of the Somali refugees in some of the camps in Kenya.

After a long dreadful journey, people of all walks of life found their way across the border into Kenya as early as January 1991, not exempting former top officials from the self-ennobled clans who, due to their low focus, vision and shortsightedness misappropriated the public funds by draining the national resources dry. Most of the people strived on foot to reach the camps; others came by land transportation or by boat. Among these refugees were people who had never before traveled outside Somalia, though now they had to take the risk of confronting all possible uncertainties on the road and on the sea, be it death, rape, looting or starvation etc. which they had never anticipated could encounter them prior to the war.¹ They had never had pessimistic pre-observations of a catastrophe of this nature as they were overwhelmed by realities of the unbelievable.

Those who fled by boat, hence the boat people sailed to Yemen while others arrived at the port of Mombasa in the Coastal Province of Kenya. Mainly the Barawans, the Reer Hamar and a few other Somali communities took this means of travel. As for the Barawans, the mode of seafaring was encouraged by 2 factors: (a) Prior experience by some of them as sea-farers, and (b) An arrangement by community members in Kenya, led by some prominent business people, who sent to Barawa a hired pre-paid ship to ferry the people to Kenya.² Some of the Somalis of Asian origin, mainly Pakistanis of the Shi'ite sect, had also been rescued in a similar mode by community members in Kenya.³

II. LIFE IN A REFUGEE CAMP

Upon arrival at the entry points in Kenya, the UNHCR officers registered the refugees who then fell under their mandate. The new arrivals on sea had to be settled in different camps in the coast, namely:-

- Swaleh Nguru Camp - popularly known as Utange, on the Mombasa-Malindi road, near the sprawling Mtwapa area.
- Jomvu - in Jomvu area on the outskirts of Mombasa.
- Marafa - some Kms from Malindi town, which is also about 90 minutes' drive from Mombasa.
- Jaaliyadda - A Somalized Arabic word for "the community" which means the center for the community. Jaaliyadda, located in the heart of Mombasa town, was a center, which accommodated a good number of the Barawa Community, some of whom also had a settlement within the Swaleh Nguru camp, known as Utange Baraawa.

The other camps which received the majority of the Somali people who trekked on foot, were in the North-eastern Province of Kenya. They are known as the Dadaab Camps and accommodated the highest number of Jareer/Bantu refugees. They are comprised of:

- Ifo - located near Dadaab area.
- Hagardera - a little distance of about 8 kms away from Dadaab town.
- Dhagaxleey - Some few Kms from Dadaab, the center of
operation and residential compound for the UNHCR and other
International Non-governmental Organizations.
- Liboi - the furthest from the refugee command/administrative
center of Dadaab. It was on the Somali-Kenya border
adjoining the Lower Jubba region of Somalia and was among
the earliest to be closed.

While the boat people of the Reer Hamar and Barawa dominated the camps in the coast region, those refugees who persevered the long trot on foot mainly occupied the Northeastern camps of Dadaab. The majority in the Dadaab camps consisted of Bantus from Gosha and other areas of the inter-riverine and their Somali counterparts, the so-called “nobles” from the diverse clans affiliated to the administrations that mismanaged the country successively since independence.

Living in the camps is not an easy way of life. It is miraculous but rather “a means of survival”.⁴ The general infrastructure, from sanitation and shelter to food ration and water, leaves a lot to be desired.⁵ In general sense, the accommodation for the whole household constituted a makeshift hut built of the branches of a tree covered with polythene, under the scourging heat in the coast and in the Northeast. Hygiene, sanitation, health and the

quality of living remain poor and unattractive. The amount of food ration allocated is proportionally very minimal, much less than could satisfy a human being. The situation is unlike refugees elsewhere in Australia, Europe or America where basic essential commodities such as food and shelter remain the primary provisions they benefit.⁶

Ever since the beginning of refugee life in these camps, food ration has existed as an issue of great concern, a nightmare of some sort, regardless of which camp one lives in. An inadequate amount of supply, uncertainty of distribution period and shortage in the variety and quantity of grains are the cause for an extensive trauma, which boggles the average refugee mind. Yet, it is difficult to believe why an organization so formidable as the UNHCR, with international renown, and the recipient of an enormous amount of financial resources in annual budget, finds itself in such a pragmatic quagmire when it comes to primary matters such as food allocation and related refugee welfare.

Perhaps one would find it hard to believe that there were (and still are) a number of refugees living in the camps without ration cards to facilitate their survival and qualify them to benefit from the distribution of food.⁷ Because the UNHCR has denied them ration for survival in the camps and under its mandate, this category of refugees were forced to burden, so frustratingly, the meager portion allocated to another needy relative.⁸ Lack of ration card has prompted so many vulnerable Bantu refugees to render services as housemaids trading their services for nothing more than a meal or two per day. As one refugee remarked, "We are living a life of serfdom."⁹ Even to this date, there exist so many Somali Bantu/Jareer refugees who don't benefit from food provision in certain camps like Kakuma, despite the fact of their presence in the camp for quite some time. "How do you live?" I asked one refugee. The answer was, "Miraculously!"¹⁰

Advantages of The Swaleh Nguru Camp (Utange) and The Reasons Apparent

Although life in the refugee camps in Kenya cannot be associated with fun and harmony, one can distinctively portray the disparity between the distinguished camps. Whereas the Dadaab camps are situated in a remote barren area of the North-eastern region with no promise of prospect whatsoever for the refugee, Swaleh Nguru, better known as Utange, had good prospects, opportunities and advantages. But in saying so, one has to appreciate these advantages as being the result of powerful political and business connections gained earlier by members of the Reer Hamar and Barawa communities who had settled in the Kenyan coast decades ago. These remain to be respected individuals in the top circles of the Kenyan leadership due to their political and/or business influence.¹¹

The boom that took place in Mombasa over the years of Utange's life was virtually not incidental, but rather the separate efforts of these prominent figures. The worthwhile contribution of their influence has availed their newly arrived refugee kinship with a safe haven. The new immigrants did not only rent residential houses in the heart of the city, but took a further step of assimilating and emulating the socio-economic culture of the natives at liberty.¹² The interaction and intervention in the local, regional and national trade markets had their doors opened by the influential, and led to the fast exploitation by these communities' expertise in business and trade and the establishment of import and export links between Mombasa and other parts of the world, not excluding Somalia.

The social links between the "host" and the "immigrant" have been interwoven in the harmony of cultural diversity. The protection necessary for the business operatives from these communities was securely put in place that even members from other Somali communities benefited from the opportunity by venturing into businesses with the Barawans and the Reer Hamar Banadiris. This power of protection was evident from the

fact of having legalized refugee settlement in the name of Jaliyadda (Community), a reference term for the Jaliyadda Reer Barawa (Center of the Barawa Community) within the heart of Mombasa town, which accommodated hundreds of just one community, with valid refugee identification officially issued by the UNHCR. Yet, the Kenya Government at the time had, in more often times than not, reiterated its objection to and discouragement of an urban refugee phenomenon.

A case in hand, one with lucid paradox, is the early closure in 1992/3 of Thika refugee camp situated in Thika, a town in the proximity of Nairobi, which probably suffered as the first casualty in the guise of discouraging urban refugeeism. But under the same government and policy, certain communities and camps thrived competitively with the local population.

The gap the influence has created among the diverse Somali refugee communities was wide that while a huge number of people were denied ration cards to obtain little subsistence food for survival, others were harnessed with advantages which enabled them not just a good living condition but the accumulation of profits from ardently protected business entities. However, an income to boost the family's living condition was positive but the practice itself was not even to all the peoples of the same status.

III. CLOSURE OF THE COASTAL CAMPS

Since the provision of the subsistence food by the UNHCR was drastically much below what one could live on, life has become something of a survival of the fittest with a resort to one's cultural means and skills for livelihood. For those who belonged to the culture of farming, particularly the Bantus and others from the inter-riverine areas, employed their skills with the exertion of a lot of effort in tilling for harvest. This endeavour has taken many by surprise, particularly the local community in the vicinity of Marafa Refugee Camp

where such an unimaginably high level of production was realized.¹³ The officials in the camp thought that kind of activity may lead to independency from the UNHCR and hence to an eventual self-reliance.¹⁴

All of a sudden, a notice for relocation was given to the refugees in this (Marafa) camp. But the most perplexing iota to comprehend was relocation from Marafa to either Kakuma or Dadaab, while there was every possibility of better survival in Utange, in the neighbourhood. Although the refugees sensed a plot by an indomitable and invisible force somewhere, they had no alternative but to abide by the intolerable decision for relocation. Resistance had really cost them mysterious conflagrations that gutted down the poorly structured makeshift houses to ashes.¹⁵

The refugees have tried in their humble manner for persuasion to be relocated at least in Utange, but in vain. The other option of Dadaab was unpalatable because many of them had actually fled from there after having fallen prey to what they called “heinous acts of crime”¹⁶ which heavily infested these camps and targeted only the Jareer and the outcaste.

The security situation of the Dadaab camps has stayed in a state of exacerbation ever since its establishment. Hard core criminal gangsters and gunmen who were exhausted and retired from the war after their defeat sought some security here, smuggling their guns into the camps. The arrival of these notorious criminals has immensely contributed to the insecurity phenomenon, multiplying the vicious scenarios of rape and robbery of the vulnerable communities from the unarmed clans. Women from Bantu and outcaste groups who went for picking firewood hardly returned without having been raped or physically assaulted. It was critical and menace that there was neither control nor solution

to improve the situation for a better living based on mutual respect and the observation of human dignity.

In contrast to their counterparts in the Dadaab camps, the refugees in Utange enjoyed a relatively better security situation. In addition to that, a majority of the people there descended from a culture of peace and orientation for hard work and a sound substance of loyalty in the content of their character.¹⁷ Therefore, the overwhelming prevalence of peace and tranquility in the coast camps were attributed to the pacific nature of the communities that occupied them and the citizens of the area who were more civilized and humane than the bellicose barbaric nomads whose living philosophy has over the centuries been engrained in livestock rustling, culturally eating their heart out over the property of another.

The closure of Utange (Swaleh Nguru) refugee camp in 1998 did not come as a surprise to the far-sighted individuals among the refugees. With the Banadiri (Reer Hamar) and Barawa communities destined for resettlement in the U.S.A. in the previous years, it was obvious that the camp had diminished its significance of interest for those who deemed it protection. The residual refugees had to comply with the forceful relocation to Kakuma camp where a deplorable experience of camp life awaited them in the land of the unruly Turkana tribe in Kenya.

Swaleh Nguru was officially closed down and as the justification always had it, due to the government's discouragement of urban refugee-ism. This has arised a controversy and the question - why has "Jaaliyadda" in the center of Mombasa town remained intact even years after the Utange refugees had been relocated to Kakuma? However, it (Jaaliyadda) had to be closed in the year 2002 after finding itself in the middle of a tough controversy and political crossfire instigated by high-level political hostility.

Meanwhile, small and medium scale business enterprises run by the remnants of these communities are still thriving vibrantly even if somewhat in the midst of an atmosphere of a powerful political hurricane at times. When a massive destruction of illegal business structures and abolition of hawking and hawker businesses were conducted in Mombasa, the Barawa/Banadiri areas were exempted from invasion, raising strong complaints of injustice from the local small scale business operators who fell victim to the demolitions.

IV CLAN STRATIFICATION AND STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

The average Somali person from the former ruling nomadic clans suffers from a rather anomalous socio-political “virus” whose remedy he seeks in supremacy; a supremacy to elevate him to the highest social status, simply because he is from such and such clan or is the son of so and so. Never do his personal qualities, as the basis for judgment of his contribution to the society, relate to his moral values. Evidently, as a community, they imported their paradigmatic of mythical nobility into the refugee camps. Their aim was to extend their domination to maintain over the other refugee communities. No sooner had they recovered from the fatigue of the long excursion than they resorted to framing out mechanism for their indulgence in leadership and power brokering in the camp. Theirs was supersonic that they superseded others by reaching the important UNHCR offices dealing with food distribution, social work, health and the office for resettlement in-charge of finding durable solution for the refugees.

Members belonging to this group of the self-ennobled nomadic culture, adjusted their means of survival in the camp in a different perspective. Not having acquired a competitive skill as a tool for trade, the diverse members of this community did not delay

in rallying behind their semi-literate clan colleagues in their pursuit to dominate the leadership of the respective camps where they had sought refuge.

Very stiff resistance had to be applied against them by the other communities.¹⁸ Debates, discussions and reconciliatory meetings had to be convened severally but didn't materialize to their goals. Instead, they were told to restrict their representation strictly only to their community, and to refrain from gaining extra jurisdiction under the erroneous pseudo-philosophy of being from a "noble" clan. Because everybody was supposed to be equal under the same UNHCR mandate, elite and elders from the stable clans simply reaffirmed that they were destined to the camp due to the self-nobility's poor and unjust administration and the epitome of inability in their thinking and attitude. In the words of one refugee, "Self-ennoblement has crippled the functioning state of Somalia, the reason why we are in a refugee camp. It does not deserve another test anywhere."¹⁹

On several occasions, accusations and counter-accusations disrupted the operation of the UNHCR. Committees were received one after the other and discussed with. The intricate issue surrounded between "[We] are [their] committee," a claim by the 'self-ennobled'; and "They are not," a disclaim by the anti-nobility, "but [we] are the only committee from [our] community."²⁰ As mediators, the UNHCR officers had to resolve the issue by allowing each committee to represent only its own community. But that was too little to satiate the lot that craved for nobility.

In another shift of stratagem, they mentored to establish "leaders' committee" to contain a representative from each community leadership. After the suspicious community leaders discussed during the meeting, the intentions were crystal clear: The community leaders would elect one from among themselves to be the overall chairman of the Somali community leaders' committee, one who could preferably be with experience of how to

work with organizations, probably one who had held [a] senior administrative position. The participants sensed deceit and abandoned the meeting.²¹ because the qualification for the proposed post was carrying a strong message.

Clan stratification and claims for clan supremacy continued. Within the camp, settlement was arranged according to clan, such as Utange Somali, Utange Banadiri, Utange Baraawa, and Utange Somali Sudanese etc. The self-ennobled have even developed schemes to drive a wedge between same community members without much success. All the less-war-like, unarmed clans developed better awareness and more suspicion towards “nobility”. They took a common ground not to be dictated from the peripheral boundaries of their communities. No matter how much the effort, domination by the so-called “noble” clans was humiliated and outdated.

A drama took place a few years later, in 1999, when ‘failed-nobility’ dared to control the Bantu community’s committee in a treacherous plan of forming a Somali Refugee Community in Kakuma. Given the destruction of Somalia by the self-ennobled culture, the idea sounded unacceptable to the Bantu elders. The “nobles” came with full force to coerce and subjugate but, sensing danger from far, the Bantu had approached the Sudanese who supported them in their hot pursuit to disperse the Somali nomad refugees who were encroaching to the Bantu zone of the camp.

It was indeed a showdown. The unified forces of the Bantu and Sudanese overwhelmed the Somalis. They were repulsed and forced into a hasty retreat, leaving behind a number of their crude weapons.²² A very serious propaganda was later spread with a condemnation that indeed the Bantu have converted to Christianity, a reason why the Christian Sudanese assisted them. Because these perpetrators were closely affiliated to the political vagabond of their respective clans, they understood very well how much

damage a war of words could cost to the Jareer refugees.²³ Despite suffering a defeat in their first dangerous plot, the nomadic Somali refugees changed tactics in order for the other Somali communities to blemish the Bantu as unbelievers who compromised and converted against their faith.

However, the people realized later that the whole accusation was fabrication, indeed one aimed at tarnishing the Bantu refugee community's reputation. In fact, the intent was either to marginalize and soar relationship with the Bantu or to force them to submission to live under the supremacy and control of the so-called "camel mentality."²⁴ Generally, though, the people were very skeptical of anything affiliated with nomadic 'nobility'. To date, "Nobility is synonymous with destructiveness, treachery, rapacity and misplaced pride".²⁵

Discussing about the issue of faith, particularly Christianity in Somalia, one clearly gets exposed to the double standard attitude of the Somali people. In the case of one of Somalia's most famous Christian families and figures, Michael Mariano, the Somalis did not only tolerate and harmonize Christianity but even exalted it to a higher degree since the late Mariano was appointed as Ambassador accredited and entrusted with the Somali people's interests overseas. He was seated in Zambia where he served the country for many years.

In Mariano's case, serving the country was acceptable in simultaneity with condoning his Christian faith, but in the concern of the Bantu refugees who fled the country because of annihilation caused to them by Muslims who had not only disposed them of their homes and farms but who also attempted all measures to "rule" and "control" them in a camp where all status are equal as refugees, it had to be purported and given a destructive taunt on them as "infidels".²⁶ Following closely trends of this nature envisage the

hypocrisy moulded in the heart and mind of the concerned category of the Somali people, who even intermarry with “infidel Christian” Westerners regardless of faith.²⁷ For some time, “self-nobility” endeavoured to press hard a case against righteous Jareer people who abide by the Islamic doctrine of pacifism and peacefulness, better than the groups seeking “nobility” for a purpose none other than to create havoc.

V UNHCR REPATRIATIONS: VOLUNTARY OR TRICKY?

Mushrooming, insecurity, hopelessness compounded with lack of proper social welfare, especially in health and education, have enhanced the refugees’ consideration of UNHCR’s offer for repatriation to their distinguished home areas. For one reason, because they felt situated between the hammer and the anvil under UNHCR’s insufficient food allocation and the deterioration of the general security within their respective camps, many refugees have involuntarily ‘volunteered’ to be repatriated to their tribal areas. “They thought they didn’t have much choice left or many alternatives to exhaust.”²⁸

In order to attract large numbers, the High Commission for Refugees had to lure the repatriates with promises including the establishment of projects for reintegration and job creation upon repatriation. The programme had to affect refugees “voluntarily” returning to the regions of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Bari and other areas in the northern, central and eastern regions (now Puntland).

Upon arrival in the hometown, the UNHCR obligations would be to initiate small-scale projects to improve the sanitation system and other necessary factors. These were necessary in the course of rehabilitation of the lives of the returnees and their reintegration to the host residents so as to facilitate for the returnees a faster adaptation to life in the dwelling. The UNHCR initiative was also conceived as an approach to

contribute to the development of the respective communities since post civil war Somalia has been suffering from acute joblessness.

Although several small-scale projects were embarked on for implementation, there were clear signs that, as the donor, UNHCR did not focus on the core sectors. Necessary observation and examination as to assess the feasibility of the selected projects and their future implications were not taken into consideration before funding them. For certain projects, factors such as the availability of raw materials, market survey for the demand and consumption of the final product were not studied. Infrastructure and accessibility in other regional markets have been overlooked, if not deliberately avoided. Several projects which were not conducive to the situation and environment have been approved and funded for reasons more political than developmental.²⁹ They were projects under projects!³⁰

It was under the management of the cross-border office that these projects were executed. But the multifaceted programmes could not have taken off from the ground without the approval of the mighty warlords whose armed militia manned the distinctive areas.³¹ For the warlord, the arrival of this kind of projects implied another project! It did not merely mean a benefit to his community as direct-and-indirect beneficiaries but also as an income generation program for himself, through which he could independently finance his war and arms build-up project. The continuous payment of “consultation fee”³² which he received regularly from the international agencies and organizations visiting and operating in his area confidently gave him a flexibility in maintaining the armed militia, because that could afford him cater for their lavish living and expenditure; monies they needed to purchase intoxicants ranging from “khat”, cannabis to other imported drugs. As for the UNHCR, it didn’t mind much about the payment of “consultation fee” as long as it

could acquire the warlord's blessing for its operations, in other words assuring its staff of their contracts and jobs security.

In the tricky dilemma of voluntary repatriation, whatever the case, the communities from the inter-riverine suffered most. The 'voluntary' repatriation to the home area has brought an unpredicted quagmire. Since their settlements had been occupied by the armed militia, and the truth that the international agencies embraced an extensive blessing and bilateral "cooperation" with the warlords, they (International Agencies) had to allocate reciprocally projects and jobs to local organizations and individuals through the recommendation of the area warlord. And more often than not, it was the close relatives of the warlord and the armed militia themselves who managed to secure accessibility to the acquisition of funds for the implementation of such projects.³³

The negative impact of this programme was that, unfortunately, a big number of 'voluntarily' repatriated Bantu refugees were forced to return to the camps. The repatriation to the home area had therefore done them much worse than before. Their suffering was not only that they felt, and actually were, cheated by the UNHCR; but that all project funds were signed and misappropriated on their name by the warlords' men. Complaints and reports to the UNHCR about the anomalies have cost the lives of the complainants. Some have managed to escape but their family members had to pay the price.³⁴ Several other Bantu returnees lost their lives because those who had dispossessed them of their farms and property were uncomfortable with their return.

At this juncture, one does not find it mysterious to understand why the UNHCR responded with laxity concerning the monitoring of the projects. Sustainability, which is among the primary factors for consideration in any given project and at any given time, has been

compromised. However, whether that was advertent or inadvertent is what raises eyebrows to date, as the funded initiatives have no sustainability.

VI REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: LUCRATIVE BUSINESS FOR UNHCR STAFF SYNDICATE

Because the living condition in the camps is harsh, the international community responded with offers for resettlement. The refugees have to undergo through a process and qualify under certain categories, depending on the regulations laid down by the respective countries. The exact nature of these categories can be known, initially, not by the prospective candidates, but by the record holders. So the information from the host countries is dispatched through their diplomatic missions accredited to Kenya and based in Nairobi, who then transmit the same to the UNHCR with elaboration of all the necessary information, including the requirements for qualification in the diverse categories.

Contemplating the eagerness the refugees had for a durable solution, some of the UNHCR staff capitalized on that and virtually transformed the refugee resettlement opportunity into a lucrative underground business. In collusion with middlemen, all the necessary information would be provided upon a down payment after which the process would begin. Forms were subsequently filled in with the required data, indicating the fulfillments falling under the categories defined. Copies of these were then given to the candidate(s) for study and even memorization, as a suitable strategy to prepare for the final interview. The selection and initial screening conducted by the UNHCR were normally undertaken at the very preliminary stage, which confirmed the nomination of the candidate/s. Over completion of the interview by agents of the sponsoring government, the balance matures for the proposing UNHCR officer and his/her syndicate, who gain income on top of their official salary.

Most crucial to such pact is trust. To satisfy that, a written agreement would be made. The money would then be deposited with a trustworthy businessman or company to be mentioned and agreed upon by both parties. Good choices for safe custody were money transaction and remittance (Xawaalo) offices in Eastleigh, a popular area of vast Somali inhabitation.

Non-refugees and others, who had probably committed crimes against humanity in their home countries, were selected for their money. Comparatively, many genuine candidates who would have had an opportunity for qualification had their pictures removed from the files and exchanged with payers' photographs. Forgery, fraud and file maneuvering were rampant to the extreme that complaints over the discrepancies of file disappearances increased well beyond candidates' tolerance. For instance, one Banadiri elder presently resident in Atlanta was flabbergasted when he was told that the owner of the file number he was looking for had been resettled in a third country for durable solution, although he (the legal file-owner) was in Nairobi after having been told of intractability in the retrieval of his file for quite a long time.

The agitation of the refugees triggered doubt, which treated a heavy casualty on the reputation of the UN agency accredited to the care of the needy refugees. The refugees' displeasure with their caretaker (UNHCR) created a stone-throwing drama at the UNHCR Headquarters in the Westlands area of Nairobi. It continued for several days with the police intervening and making arrests.

The local and foreign media have covered the scandal extensively.³⁵ They interviewed both the refugees and the staff of the UNHCR. The media reports have confirmed from the Agency top brass that the suspects, mainly comprising of local staff, some of them at senior positions, have been relieved of their duties pending investigation.³⁶ The

suspended local staff and the expatriates traded accusations and counter-accusations which finally resorted to legal battles between the employees and their employer in the courtrooms in Nairobi.

For many refugees, staff sacking did not the least address their grievances. They lost a lifetime opportunity after dishonest staff fraudulently sold off their cases to others. The imposters, who squandered the chance to live in the West in harmony, have probably acquired citizenship by now, while the genuine candidates for the opportunity are being lashed by all the ills and stigma of camp life in Kenya. Although physically they remain in the camp in Africa, name-wise their impersonators are living in the lush of the developed Western world, thanks to the bribe-money they could afford.

Upon disclosure of the scandal, as is traditional of large organizations, the UNHCR reacted quickly, of course, in a defensive measure to distance itself (at organization level) from the syndicate of its staff and save its credibility. It symbolically suspended the suspected employees. But contrary to the expectation of many professional observers, none of the top expatriates in charge of the graft-ridden departments resigned on ethical basis. Instead, they tried to consolidate their effort by exonerating themselves while heaping up all the blame squarely on their local counterparts.

It is hard to figure out exactly how much money was involved. But considering that business endured a considerable period of years, what is certain is that it involved an average amount of \$ 3,000 or more per person, depending on negotiations and agreements. Therefore, if we assume only 80 prospective candidates per year paying \$3,000³⁷ each, for three years, we arrive at a hefty figure of about \$720,000 paid in kickbacks to the UNHCR staff, at an average of \$20,000 per month for each of the three years.

Since the process involves various sections or departments within the agency, it was inevitable to operate as a syndicate so as to facilitate the smooth running of each piece of activity within the framework of the process. Some candidates have completed their entire process miraculously in a record time of very few months! Why so soon when it takes over a year or more for others? Because, all possible loopholes and administrative hitches were very well taken care of by the insiders.

To the concerned candidates, who were denied the opportunity, the damage has been done. No amount of consolation will be adequate for those whose candidacy for resettlement was misappropriated in the hands of the UNHCR; nor will any amount of trust be restored in their heart as regards the Agency for refugee care in the near future.

In this aspect, a large gap of suspicion and constant mistrust curtails between the servant and the served. The Agency has done nothing for confidence-building to restore a trust-based relationship with the negatively affected refugees it serves under its mandate, as “East Africans who were not even refugees have been “resettled” by the agency...”³⁸

VII SOMALI BANTU RESETTLEMENT IN THE USA AND THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS ON THEIR PLIGHT

While still in the issue of graft, the Somali Bantu resettlement programme was targeted to suffer the highest casualty. Fortunately the leaders of this refugee community were cautiously on alert. It didn't escape an attempt, though, as unfamiliar names appeared mysteriously in the list of prospective Bantu candidates for resettlement in America. A quick meeting convened by the community leadership, particularly from Kakuma Refugee Camp, and intellectuals in Nairobi, left no stone unturned in contacting the relevant

officials at the US Embassy and the refugee coordination unit in the Kenyan Ministry of Home Affairs, providing an explicit account of the findings. Very meaningful strategies were laid down pragmatically. Cooperation between the US officials in-charge of refugee affairs and the Bantu leaders was therefore streamlined and an enhancement in the scrutinization of the genuine candidates was put on focus. Consequently, the relocation to Kakuma of the Bantu refugees in Dadaab before the commencement of the resettlement exercise came during one of these meetings as part of the mechanism to avoid possible discrepancies, which could arise from mistakes such as experienced in the Banadiri and Barawanese exercises in the past.

Many armed refugees in Dadaab camps who had plundered refugee identification cards under gunpoint from the Bantu, were effectively screened and subsequently dropped by the system. Although the card was bearing a Bantu name, it was clearly visible that the physical features of the bearer were not. Other differences were easily identifiable during the screening conducted before boarding the bus relocating the genuine refugees to Kakuma. Nearly 80% to 90% of imposters were rejected right there, paving way for the true beneficiaries to go through the rest of the process after reaching Kakuma. The relocation issue came as a result of strategic discussions between Bantu leaders consisting of Mzee Mberwa Muya Mberwa, (Chairman of Somali Bantu Refugee community in Kenya), Dr. Yusuf Abdi Salah, Mohamed A. Eno and advocate/elder Osman Kamula Moffi, and Mr. Raymond Collins, the US official in-charge of Refugee affairs at that time. The Bantu group suggested the necessity for the relocation in a bid to avert manipulation by the Somalis in the camps and others dominant in that region of Kenya.

In 1993, a group of Somali Bantu/Jareer elites met in Nairobi, Kenya, and discussed the way forward for the plight of their people suffering in Somalia and in the refugee camps, particularly Kenya which hosted the largest Jareer refugee population. It was considered

at the time the necessity for awareness creation and the significance of advocacy in search of durable solution for the refugees and recognition of equal rights and status for the Jareer populace oppressed at home. At the initial stage, although advocacy and awareness were launched at every meeting the Jareer intellectuals participated, it was not very well coordinated until an astounding moral and technical support, mainly advisory, flowed in from the Jareer intellectuals in North America.

This development has improved the networking as well as the flow of information. Because a strong warlord had told a Jareer leader to seek their rights with the loudest of their voice (implying the Jareer have no right among the Somali), it was timely for the decibels of the Jareer voice to be tested to the highest pitch.

The advocacy campaign has been strong in North America for several reasons. Firstly, it is the second home of many Somali scholars and academics. Secondly, a variety of meetings and conferences on Somalia are organized and held there by the Somalist scholarship. Thirdly, the Jareer living there can afford to travel across the states and continents and meet the financial implications while their respective citizenships opportune them entry into many countries on visa exemption. Fourthly, they are accessible to these meetings and conferences due to the easy infrastructure for networking.

In an inter-state campaign, Dawlay Harganti, a Somali Bantu/Jareer intellectual, has held meetings with several organizations consisting of church and human rights institutions. This took her all the way from Atlanta to Washington where she was deemed an opportunity to acknowledge her case to several relevant institutions. Dawlay's appealing voice "My people are on the brink of extinction," has aroused the humane feelings of many Americans, regardless of colour or creed.

Consequently, she did not only win the heart of her audience but also won their support and the provision of sound advice in getting the whole advocacy campaign organized with focus and appropriateness. It was during this time that the North American Bantu group in the US and Canada consolidated their effort toward the direction of seeking resettlement for the Jareer refugees in Kenya. The idea, however, was conceived in Kenya though midwifed in North America.

In *Unraveling Somalia*, Besteman writes:

At the 1993 International Congress of Somali Studies, a Somali man named Omar Eno presented a paper as part of a panel on "The Invention of Somalia." His powerful words shocked the audience, who responded with a mixture of embarrassment, silence, uncomfortable laughter, awe, and pain. Never before had a self-identified Somali "Bantu/Jareer" attended an International Congress of Somalist scholars to speak about the plight of Somali Jareer....

*His startlingly direct and groundbreaking address helped to open the floodgate of revisionist studies challenging the long-cherished image of Somali nationalist unity...*³⁹

The loud voice of the Bantu elite was growing effectively. If in North America Eno and Harganti were exerting their all, several regions in France, Belgium and Norway were educated about the Somali Bantu/Jareer plight. Excerpts from a French monthly, *Faim Development Magazine*, read:

Mohamed Abdulkadir (Eno) n'a rien d'un ignorant...

"Les clans majoritaires en Somalie considerent la communaut  Jareer comme un classe inferieure, a qui il manque la capacite de penser et de raisonner normalement", explique-t-il calmement... "Nous sommes exploites et opprimes socialement, economiquement et politiquement."

Pour illustrer son propos, Mohamed A. Kadir, dit "Eno" (son nom clanique), deborde d'exemples. L'education? "Elle est limitee dan les zones rurale bantoues et, meme dans les centers urbains,

nos enfants sont l'objet de discrimination.” ... “Nous sommes utilisés comme main-d'œuvre, la meilleure marche' de tout le pays. Beaucoup d'entre nous travaillent comme des esclaves... Jamais un Jareer n'a occupé un poste important dans le gouvernement ou l'administration somalienne.

“Cette discrimination perdure depuis la création de l'Etat somalien, remarque-t il. Et aucun gouvernement n'a fait quoi que ce soit contre elle. Souvent même, elle a été encouragée.”⁴⁰

Dr. Yusuf Abdi Salah visited certain countries within the East and Southern Africa region. A remarkable awareness of Somali Bantu/Jareer community's cause for equality and justice was understood. Dr. Salah invigorated the advocacy drive by meeting officials of human rights organizations as well as presenting papers in various seminars and workshops.

It was through these multifaceted endeavours and a recommendation by the UNHCR and other Bantu/Jareer rights campaigners that emerged the US government approval of Jareer resettlement in the USA in 1999. It was however, after vulnerable Somali minority groups like the Banadiri (Reer Xamar) and Barawaans (Bravans) had been resettled there earlier. It is noteworthy mentioning that scholars like Dan Van Lehman of Portland State University (formerly UNHCR field officer), Ken Menkhaus, Catherine Besteman, Virginia Luling, Lee V. Cassabelli, Abdi M. Kusow and Ali Jimale Ahmed were in support of the Somali Bantu cause, after witnessing in multiple ways the vulnerability of the group and the discrimination and low status they suffered among the Somali communities. These prominent scholars have in one way or the other contributed to the acknowledgement of the existence of oppression and ethnic marginalization against the Jareer population in Somalia.

After UNHCR officially announced the resettlement approval of the Somali Bantu, the Somali refugees plotted a plan to hinder the prospective candidates by employing various

tricks. Many Bantu were coerced to submit their alien cards under death threat, a large number was forced to sign sale of card agreement, numerous of them were forced to include Somali children in their cards, while others were sent forcibly out of the camps after their cards had been plundered by the Somalis, consisting of refugees and others dominant in the Dadaab/Garissa area where the camps are located.

It was a big conspiracy, which was suspected of even UNHCR staff involvement after the discovery of the names of very well known Somalis among the Bantu names. It caused a tremendous alarm as these Somali names constituted over a third of the candidates in the list. Some of these names belonged to non-refugees, in fact Kenyan citizens of Somali origin. How such a large number of people found their names among the “despised” and “smelly” Bantu/Jareer list was mysterious. As a consequence, several elites, including representatives from the various Dadaab camps where the mess was suspected to have emanated, convened in Nairobi for a six-day conference. Kenya’s Daily Nation wrote:

The community’s Chairman Mr. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, said the United States had offered asylum to 10,900 members of the community, but claimed the positions were being sold out to well connected personalities in collusion with UNHCR officials.

“Only when we have been considered for dissent (sic) settlement by the US, we are faced with opposition to ensure the privilege goes to other people,” Mr. Mberwa told the conference...⁴¹

The loud voice, rose to its height during this conference, and other meetings held with US officials in-charge of refugee affairs have culminated in the US government’s decision to relocate the prospective Bantu/Jareer candidates in Kakuma, which was safer for both the refugees and the US officials conducting the process. It had huge financial implications but the safety issue as well as better screening process was paramount and presumably feasible away from the Dadaab camps in Northeastern Kenya.

Although the programme was set, the 9/11 disasters in the US had caused a considerable delay. Later, the relocation scheme was undertaken under Somali disappointment. As their Bantu colleagues of years in the camps were being transported for relocation to Kakuma in preparation for an eventual resettlement in the US as a durable solution, the Somalis were marred by deep resentment. As it shows in one report, Mohamed Aweis Abdi, a Bantu boy in the bus to Kakuma, "...raises his hand toward the window and waves. They (Somalis) are watching but not waving, and when Mohamed sees them, he lowers his hand."⁴² (Clarification in brackets mine)

The report also supports, through Mohamed's description of his mother's activity in the camp, an episode which I elaborated above in this chapter about Maana Isha Mhina, as he says, "Washing the blankets for the Somalis, cleaning their areas, dusting their mattresses, even building houses."⁴³

In another section the report reads: "Then came the announcement that the Bantus would be transferred to Kakuma, and some Somalis began taunting Mohamed, "Who will dig our toilets?" one said. "Why *these* people," asked another, "these people who look like gorillas?"⁴⁴

Whatever the case, the various activities of the resettlement process were commenced in Kakuma. Somali agenda for infiltration was inevitable because of collusion of what looked like a syndicate, involving some blackmailed leaders from Dadaab whose leadership had been contested several occasions but without success. They seemed to be in collaboration with certain IOM field officials in Kakuma, of Kenyan and Kenyan-Somali origin, who were all in accord in the manipulation of the process to benefit their own relatives.

Upon sighting this anomalous conspiracy, the strong voices in North America blew the whistle. Some IOM officials were transferred and others were put under probe. The reasons were not made public although there were talks of non-Somali imposters apprehended upon arrival in the USA.

The development has become cause for the concoction of allegations against Mr. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, the Chairman of the Somali Bantu Refugee Community in Kenya. Based on the fabrication of bribery cases, and despite the ill intentions on which he was accused of several counts of deception by false pretence, the court found him [not guilty] and that he had no case to answer. The judge's decision considered the report of the CID headquarters in Nairobi which confirmed clear distinctions between signatures and stamps alleged to have been used by Mberwa on forged documents brought to court. The Chairman was a victim of Somali vendetta as he was a strong opponent of Somali infiltration into the process, and as such he had to pay the price by being framed for incarceration.

As the US resettlement programme is approaching towards its conclusion, over 12,000 Somali Bantu have been resettled as of November 2005, mainly children. These and others in the country and elsewhere will probably change in a later day in the future the stigma, which their fathers and forefathers have been suffering under Somali domination and subjugation. With better education and civilization, yesterday's "Adoon" or "Habash" may be tomorrow's President of Somalia. If history and the theory of 'circulation of the elites' contain substances of experiential truth, I may draw my hypothesis based on them that a Jareer will one day ascend to the top of the leadership as had existed earlier about Shungwaya and even after it, but also with the expectation that they will defer the notion of "the elevation of the possible and dangerous leaders from the lower classes."⁴⁵

Conclusion

The backyard of the UNHCR is not clean. Almost all the areas of operation, from the camp to the administrative head office, the backlog needs to be improved. A glance at the reception, one sees obviously the lack of definitive delegation of duty among the staff. Before a simple matter is resolved, a client may swing between two to three officers so that a final assistance can be provided. Some of the staff are not aware of what particular activity falls under which officer on what the UN's Board of Auditors described as "inadequate segregation of functions."⁴⁶

This is a clear symbol and sign of the burdens within the administrative hierarchy inside the HCR. One first hand example is flight reservation and/or acquisition of clearance for access to the camp. To see one of the top decision-makers, you are advised to make an appointment by phone from outside the Headquarters, yet you may be at the reception desk at the time and therefore able to do that at ease from the reception.

The appointment may be fixed for after a week, in spite of the time pressure you may have. Endless meetings may coincide with your appointment, which will necessitate it to be pushed farther, probably for another 2 or 3 days or even another week, this time the reason being the officer's unavailability till he/she returns from holiday or a trip from somewhere.

Many refugees have been forced to live in urban areas because they became fed-up with the disgusting routine attendance at the UNHCR offices, inquiring for documentation permitting them to reach the camp. After waiting in vain for several weeks or months for the senior officer in-charge of such matters, the refugees lose hope and abandon the idea of seeking assistance from the UNHCR. The result of such a decision is associated with an undesirable encounter with the Kenyan police. The UNHCR needs to do a lot to

improve its activities, regardless of which sector. The interests of the refugees and their welfare need to be well taken care of. An increase in food ration, an enhanced education system and an improvement of the health sector should be of better priority than the current disdain and neglect.

In general, the refugee camps in Kenya are much below any known standards. They are not conducive for habitation and shelter for people as safe haven. The conditions themselves cause plague rather than comfort. The inhabitants are sad and in despair. In the camps, they fall victim to complicated traumatic stress, grief and unhealing wounds. The psychological as well as emotional effects make them more vulnerable to an accumulation of multi-facial trauma. They remain besieged due to lack of remedy such as counseling. Unless the UNHCR changes its attitude and treats the refugee community under its mandate as respectable humans deserving the prevention of their human dignity and value, the existence of the camps will not change practically from the fields of quarantine, which they currently persist to be.

But at the height of the perpetual problems and anarchy, and to end the Somali refugee problem, the international community has attempted to help in the establishment of a functioning administration in Somalia. Most of these endeavours have failed due to the Somali leadership's lack of focus, vision and patriotism. All the previous peace and reconciliation initiatives were undermined by the Somali people's love for the clan more than for the nation. In the next chapter, I shall explore the general atmosphere of the last reconciliation conference, the background against which the current Transitional Federal Government was established, and of course some insights into the Bantu/Jareer participation and their place in the contemporary political situation in Somalia.

Endnotes: Chapter Five

1. Abdullahi Sheck Mussa, discussion in Mombasa in early 1990s.
2. Abdulkadir Abu, Baravanese intellectual who was a student at the University of Nairobi in early 1990s, but who at present lives in the U.S.
3. Hussein Parpia, a Somali of Pakistani origin from the Shi'ite community. He is well known as "Hussein – Hindi". We were neighbours in the same residential estate in Nairobi in the 1990s.
4. Abdulkadir Osman Mataan, a Somali Bantu elite now resident in the USA. Mataan was, at the time of our discussion in 1997, the chairman of the Somali Bantu Refugees in the coastal refugee camps.
5. Ibid.
6. Salad Atosh, a Digil-Mirifle elite who became an Australian citizen. Atosh returned from a visit to Mombasa to see relatives and our discussion in Nairobi in 1993 was rather formal and meaningful, which also covered a range of issues about the Reewing community.
7. Maana Isha Mhina Mohamedi, a Somali Bantu woman who was among the residents of Swaleh Nguru (Utange) refugee camp for several years without a ration card. She survived, together with her children, as househelps for well-to-do refugees. See also article by Newsweek correspondent Donatella Lorch-
title: Following Freedom's Trail. Downloaded from
www.somalibantu.com/Refugee1.htm on 6/28/2003.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Asha Nuh Maalim, a Somali Bantu/Jareer refugee in Swaleh Nguru camp. She is now in the USA on the Bravanese resettlement programme, which qualified her Barawaan husband, 1995.

11. Mohamed Ali alias Kaaya, a high class Banadiri couturier who was born and brought up in Reewing culture; Kaaya lives in Minnesota, USA.
12. Sakhawe Abu, alias Abti, currently living in Thailand.
13. Sid-Ali Ahmed, former Deputy Chairman of the Somali Bantu community in coastal camps of Kenya. He is presently in Kakuma Refugee Camp, waiting for resettlement process to the USA.
14. Ibid.
15. Abdulkadir Osman Mataan – as above No. 4.
16. Nur Abdulle Kassim, alias Nur Bocorow. Nur lived in Dadaab for some time before he decided to move to Utange refugee camp on the outskirts of Mombasa. Nur now lives in Nairobi.
17. Yusuf Ido Baba, a Somali Bantu goldsmith, recently resettled in the USA.
18. Ali Sidi, A Digil-Mirifle elite of Banadiri origin currently living in Atlanta, the U.S.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Yusuf Ido Baba, as above No. 17.
22. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, Chairman of Somali Bantu Refugee Community in Kenya; personal discussion on various occasions.
23. Yusuf Abdi Salah has challenged one such allegation in the 6th Street Mosque in Eastleigh, Nairobi, where one Somali preacher stood up and claimed, “...Even the word Bantu is not an Islamic (Arabic) etymology.” When Dr. Salah, the astute Bantu scholar asked the Somali Sheikh whether such ethnic Somali etymologies as “Darood, Hawiye, Awl-yahan, Sawaq-roon, Dhulbante, Geledi, Digil-Mirifle etc” are (Arabic) Islamic names, the Sheikh was lost for words.
24. Eno, Mohamed A., “An Approach to the Nature of the Somali Conflict”, a paper read at a workshop on Conflict Resolution for the Great Lakes Region held in Nairobi, 2002.

25. Ibid.
26. Michael Mariano was a very well known Christian Somali from the north. He was an active politician during the years toward independence. During dictator Barre's regime, Mariano was a long serving diplomat in Zambia till his death. In Mariano's case, Christianity has affected neither the Somali socio-political domain nor the religio-cultural sphere, but in the Bantu case it was misinterpreted into an issue of critical concern. See also various issues of Heegan Newspaper of July, 1987, containing a brief biography of Mariano, the former notary turned diplomat.
27. Hagi Mohamud Mahdi, a Somali Bantu elite in Italy; personal conversation, 2002.
28. Yusuf Abdullahi Madhimba, a learned forestry expert from Makalango village. Yusuf has attempted to implement a local small scale project for such returnees in 1997/98, before it was frustrated by what UNHCR preferred to call "appropriate local authorities" in its Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) – Cross-Border Operation Guidelines.
29. Ibid.
30. Abdullahi Ahmed Abdullahi, alias Abdullahi Bantu, discussion in 1998. Abdullahi lives presently in Atlanta, USA.
31. Ibid.
32. In a heated discussion in the UNHCR offices in Westlands one day, an officer in-charge of the Cross-Border projects was annoyed when I (author) mentioned the "consultation fee" issue for the warlord, which safeguards their (UNHCR staff) protection and operations in the area. She said, "Why do you keep asking about it, once you know?" I think I was with Madhimba that day, but after that, I was no longer welcome in those offices.

33. Mohamed Abdi Mohamud, alias Qaate, a Kismayo resident of a sub-sub-clan of the Majerteen who knew well the inside activities and cooperation between the UN agencies and other organizations operating there and the warlordship in control. 1998.
34. Madhimba, as above No. 28.
35. F2 network, Thursday, February 22, 2001 titled "UN staff accused over refugee bribes," by Mark Riley in New York and Andrew Clennell, at <http://old.smh.com.au/news/0102/22/pageone/pageone6.html> (downloaded on 7/7/03)
36. Dawn, the Internet Edition of 21 Feb. 2001, "UN investigating cash-for-asylum scam" downloaded from <http://www.dawn.com/2001/02/21/int 11.htm> on 7/7/03.
37. The two preceding on-line media mention upto \$5,000 per prospective immigrant on the refugee status.
38. David Gough, "The Nairobi Connection", Newsweek, Friday, February 23, 2001. <http://www.somaliwatch.org/archivefeb01/010223101.htm> downloaded on 7/7/03.
39. Omar A. Eno, quoted in Catherine Besteman., Unraveling Somalia. University of Pennsylvania Press (1999:236).
40. Mohamed A. Eno, Interview with Faim Development Magazine; No. 126, November 1996.
41. Mberwa Muya Mberwa, quoted by a NATION Reporter. News. Thursday, October 12, 2000. <http://www.nationaudio.com/News/Daily Nation/12102000/News/News83.html> (downloaded on 9/30/03)
42. <http://www.somalibantu.com/Refugee1.htm> (downloaded on 6/28/03).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.

45. Sorokin, Pitirim., Contemporary Sociological Theories. Kalyani Publishers.
Reprint (2000:58)
46. Thalif Deen, "POLITICS: UN Probe into Extortion of Refugees in Nairobi" IPS
(Inter Press Service; World News, Downloaded from
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/feb01/01/_36_004.html on 7/7/03.

Chapter Six

THE 14th SOMALI NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE AND THE 4.5 CLAN POWER SHARING FORMULA: LEGITIMIZATION OF AN APARTHEID SYNDROME

“Any society that discriminates against any sector of its population is denying itself the opportunity to develop the best talents to engage in the fierce international competition that is upon us,” Ramphela Mamphela.¹

I. CONFLICTING AGENDAS INSIDE A CONFLICT

The peace process in Somalia and a tangible solution to end the senseless war that has ravaged the poor Horn of Africa country for the past fifteen years have been truncated by factors which were not exhausted as substantive, but which stand as the realities perpetually hindering every endeavour. To develop a lasting solution in the case of Somalia’s chaotic situation of a multi-faceted, multi-interest based war will possibly remain as one of the most perplexing traumas of the century. It will not keep consuming the time and thinking of the people in the Horn and in the Africa continent only, but equally those of the concerned world community as a whole.²

In dealing with this tragedy, one has to identify comprehensively the symptoms of the problem before one can expect a considerable agreement achieved and fulfilled by the concerned warlords and their armed factional clan militia. I speculate this because considering the approaches employed throughout the period of a decade and half, and the ground gained so far in this regard, obviously one has to question the practicality of the methodological tools approached as being yet somewhat of a shortcoming; trying to bridge “superficially” a gap that extends in length and breadth in defiance of the effort to narrow it.³

When initially the war broke out in Somalia, it had a certain image; an image which was defined as the conscience of the masses versus the ill administration of an adamant dictator. As it gained momentum and the uprooting of the dictatorial regime became imminent, an abrupt loss of track and diversion from the original philosophy were prevailed. A vision of tribalism and clanism and opportunistic settlement of old feudal scores were deeply injected into a problem whose delicateness required the thinking of sane minds in the approach toward the occupation of the administrative vacuum.

Despite the mass confrontation to topple Barre's "Kacaanka gaamurey" (matured revolution), all the active organizers and financial contributors to the war had their own hidden agenda, whether individually or collectively.⁴ Suffice it to say that, most probably, all these active human ingredients had more hidden agenda individually than they had one or any shared collectively, thus striving to achieve it through the much costlier avenues of moral and material devastation of the masses.

At certain view, the prolongation of the war and the failure to implement the acts and articles signed in the memoranda over a dozen peace agreements hosted and negotiated by individual dignitaries and friendly states in various venues, predictably depict the disregard these articles amass for the achievement of the hidden agenda. Despite that, every war chieftain responds to sacrifice the lives of thousands of youths from his sub-clan and clan. During this course of hatred, large amounts of money received as contributions from the rich clansmen, businesses and as "consultation fees"⁵ from international organizations, were exhausted as contributions to the build-up of war arsenal, mainly for the disadvantage and dehumanization of the unarmed communities.

It is a true revelation, though sad, that more aggravating damages have been inflicted on the unarmed and ethnically oppressed communities in Somalia by the international agencies' 'consultation fees', the purchase package leading to the approval for operation in a certain warlord controlled territory.

The war in Somalia, like other wars elsewhere, has enriched a large number of people who hadn't previously had the thinking of migrating from their areas of inhabitation in 'miyiga' the remote rural areas. Their change of living from rural to urban was merely facilitated by the gun and the dependence on sub-clan and clan who defend the culprit at any possible cost, be it morally or in manpower. Practically, they've proved beyond reasonable doubt that the best way of survival is possible with the gun in the hand and clansmen by the side, factors believed to be the 'authority' to legalize looting, robbing, raping, confiscation of property (movable and immovable), abduction, killing and other disgusting crimes that pass with impunity.⁶

Although in many parts of the world confrontations of civil war have been experienced, the mayhem in Somalia may not be contrastable. Utterly, in the case of the Somali civil war, a lot of factors are fanning the fire as active ingredients. It is due to the multitude of actors, local and foreign, each with an interest to achieve, that the Somali peace endeavours have become more of verbal rhetoric than reality. For example, we have over three foreign players with each particular party holding at least several hidden agendas. When to that you add the number of the Somali factions and individuals with comparably ulterior motives, you lose direction of where the country is heading. The material fact, though, remains that the Somali role players, whether crowned as 'heroes', 'leaders', and 'great men' or by any other description, have shown themselves void of patriotism. Subsequently, that loss of patriotism has earned them a great loss of morality, distinctly

interpreted in the simultaneous failures to implement the articles and charters laid down and agreed upon by themselves in every meeting for peace negotiation.

Another aspect undermining the peace initiatives is the approach and the prime target since the Somali warlords have shown no regard for mercy and courtesy. Their attitude denies conformity with the sound culture that deigns humanity with dignity. It seems as though their average thinking hasn't been detached from the "sheer arrogance and egoism belonged to the culture of uncouth pastoral attitude".⁷ In this case, modern diplomacy, intellectuality and application of sophisticated human and international relations and ideas of peace building are above the comprehension of a "wicked people who do not possess the qualitative characteristics of lordship, in any better sense of the word, except in that of warlordship."⁸

Through the tidings of history, we read about the Somali people as being a homogeneous society of the same culture, - a rich culture -, same religion and also the same language, an erroneous concept, which misinterpreted the realities about the heterogeneity of the Somali nation. Possibly, the organizers of the peace meetings employ their techniques and tools on the basis of that misguided concept,⁹ which does not avail an approach to better solution because the 'self-sameness' they depend on as the baseline does not itself have a real cultural base of commonality to all.¹⁰

Individuals and institutions with wide faculties of thought garnished with conflicting projects and disciplines of strategies have tested their doctrine in the Somali peace context in versatile ways almost a decade and a half, yet to no sign of peace. Billions have been spent in favour of speculations for peace but no tangible achievement waits to be seen to this day.

For the non-Somali outsiders, the exhaustion of resources in the search for peace and reconciliation as is known and applicable in certain parts of the world is one iota, while the average pastoral thinking and attitude and the armed militia's protection of his/her looted property constitute two other factors in divergent axis. It is these three factors belonging to conflicting objectives and philosophies that convene for meetings to invent a merger for the establishment of a Somali state and a lasting peace!¹¹

The negativity of this observation is by no means an interpretation of an inner hatred for peace in the country but the spectacle on stage and the actors in performance leave a lot in winning anybody's admiration, because their intuitive person and posture are quite contradictory to the scene they act on the stage.¹² During the 14th Peace Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, Mohamed Daahir Afrax, the Somali author, wrote about how certain officials of the international community were skeptical about the attitude of the Somali people as he quotes their remark: "*Caqli ay ku heshiidaan hadday leeyihiin horay u heshiin lahaayeen,*" meaning "Had they been bestowed with the wisdom to reconcile, they would have done so earlier than now." (Translation mine.)

From the on set, every initiative has targeted the building of a peace bridge among what we reiterate as the "major clans", better termed as the armed clans. Among them, they have fought and devastated and driven every sector of the Somali civilization into the doldrums. They have killed, maimed, mutilated and dismembered each other, showing individual sub-clan strength for build-up in firearms, warfare and military superiority. During the course they have wiped out their clan youths, illiterate as well as intellectuals, and still seem not to have diagnosed the symptoms in order for them to have a prescriptive dose for treatment. Under the umbrella of warlords and supporters anointed with spiritual clanism, millions of USD worth of military hardware and arsenal were

invested in; it brings us then to contemplate the English saying that “One man can lead the horse to the water, but twenty can’t make it drink,” because it exactly describes the current Somali situation since certain sectors of the society have no interest in peace; and Afrax’s book launched during the early months of the 14th SNRC discusses the subject in detail.

Still, in the phenomenon of loss of trust, a much more effort and guarantee for inclusion, participatory development, justice, equality as well as morality must be a prerequisite if at all the minorities, the unarmed and the ethnically oppressed communities are to be persuaded to put their trust load in clans that have denied the existence of multiracial identities and cultures and resorted to the killing of innocent unarmed people.

Of the numerous so-called local level peace initiatives, hardly any inclusion or equal participation was considered for these communities particularly the Jareer. This humiliating practice by the concerned parties can be deemed as shunning this community on ethnic grounds. In a previous conference in neighbouring Djibouti in early 1990s, a leader of this community, the late Mohamed Ramadan Arbo, was even denied equal presentation time as the other leaders; “it was understandable since the chair was Aden Abdulle Osman,”¹³ the first president, “a character notorious for his anti-Jareer sentiments.”¹⁴

II. CLANISM AT THE HEART OF INTELLECTUALISM

A few years later, a peace organization that was the dream child of some powerful international institutions willing to provide financial back-up and expertise found itself melting sooner than it could gain any momentum. The so-called ring-leaders (intellectuals), couldn’t agree categorically on a few basic suggestions set by the

prospective financiers as a guideline for the operation and good performance of the organization. The 'intellectuals', with all their intellect and superb academic background, could not converge into a genuine consensus over the composition of the members to the secretariat, the delegation of duties and the location of their headquarters.¹⁵

In reality, the financiers did not apprehend promptly at initial stage, about the hidden agenda of the peace propagating 'intellectuals' whose individual concepts, principles and ideologies differed much more than their illusive utterances and outer exposure. A close scrutiny by the international body, and very careful observation of the attitude of the 'intellectuals' during discussions, culminated in the dissatisfaction of the prospective donors. In one of the peace workshops in a neighbouring country, their conflicting motives and ideological confrontations caused a major embarrassment to the well-wishing international agencies and neutral individuals.¹⁶ From the proceedings, the general hostility brewing in the atmosphere among the 'intellectuals' - teaming up into groups adverse to one another, and convening clandestine meetings in the odd hours of the night, discussing strategic measures to sabotage proposals moved by the rival team - sparked reflections of unreliability on the learned Somalis.¹⁷

After failing to hide clan sentiments, motivation and interest, the 'intellectuals' imprudently resorted to pulling in and recommending for a top post one of their kinship, so that in the event of necessity, each of them would rely upon those from their own to push forward whatsoever plan of their proposal.¹⁸

The Somali intellectuals have in their capacity failed to deliver. They have derailed the expectations of the masses from its course. They played much a part in the divergence between the clans by preaching a culture of war instead of encouraging an application of a culture of peace. Quite often, the Somali intellectual has banked on the frail institution

belonging to the philosophy of tribalism at the cost of “disadvantaging nationalism,”¹⁹ shrinking the prospective organization into a clan-based entity exploited by what Ahmed Qassim Ali would describe “docile intellectuals”²⁰ satisfying the whims of their kinsmen.

By compromising the intellectual ethics, the clan based Somali erudite has betrayed the indispensability of the values of the society, a reason why many are not respected above the clan level. Somali intellectuality, on the basis of tribal bias, is faced in recent years with what Eno has warned against about two decades ago when he wrote, “Lose the support and dedication of the people, and you lose all possibilities for building the community and the nation.”²¹

Through the ill fate of tribal politics of war, they failed to create an honest endeavour that amalgamates the masses into a unity of one dynamic force of peace players. Unfortunately, they were swept in the whirlwind and high tides of clan power brokering, unfolding a full-scale machinery of disintegration and disorientation under the umbrella of their intellectuality, drawing a demarcation line between the generalization and the specification of ‘dadkaaga dhinac ka raac’ (flow the tide)²² whose connotation in Barre’s era was the masses in general but given the token of one’s closest patrilineal kinship after the dictator’s ouster.

The reiteration by some agencies to wage a culture of peace might be welcome but, does the Somali pastoral culture embrace peace?²³ If it does, why has it not employed this culture to send the peace message home?²⁴ The acceptance of a defeat is sometimes a gesture of courageousness and hence a challenge to the effort for change and innovation, a motivation to perform the better; thus being neither shame nor sham. It is a process experienced by the living human nature, but one whose acceptance seems a burden to the average clan-oriented Somali society. As a whole, especially the former regimes, the

warlords and the armed clan militia, everyone is exonerating himself or herself from the acceptance of the causal ownership of the problem, the courage to bear the responsibility. In doing so, they are scared of losing many rights since according to Allan Paton, "A person guilty of injustice has partially and temporarily forfeited his rights..."²⁵

III. FOUR COMMUNITIES AND A MESH OF 'HALF' OF A COMMUNITY: THE MEANING OF "EQUALITY" AND "JUSTICE" IN SOMALI SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Although South Africa has succeeded in the eradication of the Apartheid form of administration, Somalia has embarked on legitimating one in a new phenomenon developed under a pastoral philosophy named 4.5 (Four-point-Five) clan power sharing formula. The puzzle, however, lies in the avoidance to substantiate the basis for its introduction, rather than the goal it is to achieve. But what can be deduced from the system is that the socio-political goal of the so-called 4.5 clan power-sharing system is a clear indication of the Apartheid nature of the Somali society. It is a new device for mental oppression. Its aim is fostering in the Jareer mind the acceptance of a socially imposed inferiority in comparison with self-exaltation of the "nobility", suppressing them into "a politically and socially limited life."²⁶

In this system, the Jareer are destined to survive under stiffly controlled social and economic segregation, chronic disabilities associated with them "from the cradle to the grave."²⁷ Notorious experiment of this type of system is probably the testing ground for an eventual introduction of decrees and laws that will constitutionalize "...systematic and quite definite policy of Apartheid,"²⁸ leading to the execution of acts such as: The Somali Bantu Inferiority Act; The Jareer Re-enslavement Law; The Bantu Education Act (like it was in South Africa); The Right to the Bantu Land Expropriation Law; the Jareer-Animal

Equality Act” and many other laws that will please the supremacy status of the non-Jareer populace of Somalia, particularly the ‘tanned’ Arab Somalis.

The 4.5 system is a typical replica of a nomadicized version of the defunct South African Apartheid policy, where Black natives were allowed to elect to the houses Native Representatives of White-European origin. In essence, when one group decides the limitation of the political participation of another group, it is nothing but an effectively legitimized subjugation. It encourages segregation, which is paradigmatic of racist societies where “Onto the neck of a subject people they daily add a yoke which increases to unbearable limits the strain already caused...”²⁹

The elicitation provided for this precarious plot of minority – majority clans, to the general populace, presumes a divergence related to a quantitatively numerical composition of the people differentiated. But in factual circumstance, it is not true and may not have a substance of concrete evidence to support that. The application then arises the hypothesis that, if the Jileec had constituted a more ginormous number than the Jareer, in other words for the nation to have been provided with sufficient agricultural produce, it would have been impossible for the Jareer to have produced adequate surplus as alimentation for feeding nine-times-fold Jileec counterparts.

Historical findings as well as sociological theories do not support the idea of rudimentary societies of a *few* (minimized to less than 10% in Somalia!) feeding a larger number, unless otherwise the numbers of both concerned communities were almost at equilibrium, the difference being marginal if at all the feeder community is considered fewer. K. Oberg³⁰ supports this theory in his discussion regarding the ratio of pastoralists against agriculturalists in Ankole in Uganda, while Jacques J. Maquet³¹ postulates similarly for the Hutu and Tutsi communities of Rwanda.

The Jareer blame the Jileec for their oppressive, antagonistic and mischievous plots to undermine the potential of their number. The intentions contradict the oft-repeated and graced Islamic doctrine of equality of all Muslims regardless of race or colour. It laid a platform for their paternalistic role that focused on exploitation rather than equality and protection of the feeders of the nation. The characteristic of this social behaviour mitigates in its underbelly distinctive fundamentals implying inequality based on unjust principles of governance, deliberately placing the Bantu/Jareer off-board the precincts of the participation in social power.

By this notion, qualifications matter for one to be [a] Somali. It is inadequate to be a mere indigenous born and bred in the country. A Somali has therefore to belong to certain physical features and culture and mode of living characterized by other than pure agrarian. For one to fall in the category of Somaliness, paradigmatically, one has to be slender, not stout; has to have a pointed nose, not flat or broad; has to have soft hair, but not hard, thick or curly; and after all one has to subscribe to the culture of nomadic pastoralism in order to be more Somali.

These characteristics, which are mainly natural, have been recognized as part of the unbendable stick-yard by which Somaliness is literally defined, regardless of birth, indigenusness or long sojourn in the country. The stratification, in this variety, is nurtured from the belief that a Jareer, whatever his intelligence, status or personal characteristics, has to transform into the physical and biogenetical characteristics of Somaliness as approved [by] the dominant Jileec Somalis, prior to hoping for equality. As long as these are absent, then a Jareer remains not a Somali but a “Habash”, an “Adoon”, a “Biddo”, “Beyle-Sanbuur” and a “Sankadhudhi”, all being pejorative epithets implying

non-Somaliness: that of Africanity, of Negritude, as compared to Somali 'Arabness' and 'nobility'.³²

The most deceitful element of colossal apartheid proportion was envisaged in the national document that sets the laws and principles of the country for its citizens, the constitution. This document, the Somali constitution, considered more citizenship rights and opportunities to a Somali born and bred in neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia or in any other country than an autochthonous Jareer/Bantu born and bred in Somalia. As we saw in Chapter Four of this study, Mariam Arif Gassim and Omar Eno have both consented to the easy access of this category of "Somalis" to top government positions, owing to the codification of the constitution which is fundamentally based on "pro-Somali", "anti-Jareer" objectives. More importantly, former Somali Ambassador Hussen A. Dualeh provides a quite succinct evidence on that as he admits: "I had to give Somali passports to these young Somali Kenyans..."³³

At all events, Eno's and Gassim's testimonials aside, the history of the participation in the post-independence Somali cabinets and top administrative ranks portray clear evidence; communities of all the distinguished ethnic backgrounds, with the exception of the Jareer/Bantu, have assumed these responsibilities. The outcaste groups, though considered outside the social strata, had representation that at times enjoyed second to the most incumbent position, which the Jareer at the lowest rung of the social ladder, were negated to approach owing to their contemplated non-Somali ethnic composition and physical properties objectionable to the Somali. Therefore, the ironical statement in Jacques Maquet's general theory that, "people born in different castes [*in here Jareer and Jileec*] are unequal in inborn endowment, physical as well as psychological and have consequently fundamentally different rights,"³⁴ also suggests relevance to the Somali situation. (Clarification in parentheses mine.)

For whatever reasons, and with a little difference to say so, Italy did a duplication of what Britain had before it executed in South Africa, by distancing power at independence from the oppressed autochthonous people and into the hands of the oppressors. But while Britain in 1910 had not given a written constitution to South Africa for reasons apparent, Somalia at minimum had in 1960 a constitution whose content was engrained with the principle Somali ideology of Jareer and Jileec as people in the same nation but separate ethnically and unequal socially.

For all practical purposes, the Italo-Somali policy of post-independence “democracy” functioned on two effectively compounding factors: (1) Italy’s fear of a Jareer retaliation over Italian colonial atrocities upon acquisition of independence, and (2) The Somalis’ socio-psychological belief of being above black Africans (psychological food for Somali self-ennoblement). The interplay, among others, of interests between these two factors (Italian and Somali) has created a wider social gap in independent Somalia, restructuring firmly a legitimization of Jareer/Bantu “African” inferiority at the advantage of Jileec/Somali “Arab” superiority,³⁵ breaking the ground for a political circle impermeable for the Jareer. The policy was aimed at fostering the multiplication of antagonism and the grouping up of all the Jareer into a nation of slaves as a mechanism for the deprivation of their equal status.

The necessary scapegoat fabricated for such social stratification had to be adjusted on ethnic grounds, where Somalis predominantly downgrade Africanism or negritude in favour of Arabism and lighter pigmentation, one whose tutelage displays the Jareer as a people who “know nothing and ...have nothing of value.”³⁶ We are faced here with a situation which Allan Paton, commenting on the European conquest in Africa, describes thus: “even those who had no gifts of invention whatsoever, came to consider themselves

the superiors of all other people.”³⁷ While not undermining or degrading any human race whatsoever, one wonders what the average Somali would think of his ethnic or racial superiority as being above the African, against historically recorded truths in denouncement of even the often purported white geniusness or race supremacy, as Cicero writes to Atticus in the First Century B.C.:

*Do not obtain your slaves from Britain because they are so stupid and so utterly incapable of being taught that they are not fit to form a part of the household of Athens.*³⁸

And Said of Toledo writes in the Eleventh Century:

*Races north of Pyreness are of cold temperatures and never reach maturity; they are of great stature and of a white colour. But they lack all sharpness of wit and penetration of intellect.*³⁹

But Max Muller clarifies:

*“I have declared again and again, that when I say Aryas (Aryans) I mean neither blood nor bones nor hair nor skull; I mean simply those who spoke an Aryan language. When I speak of them I commit myself to no anatomical characteristics. To me an ethnologist who speaks of Aryan race, Aryan blood, Aryan eyes and hair, is as great a sinner as a linguist who speaks of dolichocephalic [narrow-headed] dictionary or a brachycephalic [broad-headed] grammar.”*⁴⁰

Of the three main human racial ramifications, namely: leucodermi (white-skinned), xanthodermi (yellow-skinned) and melanodermi (black-skinned) which practically correlate with Caucasoid (white), Mongoloid (yellow) and Negroid (black), the last fits the group under discussion, but may not satiate the Somali nomad who is a black Negroid by pigmentation and origin but in a long crave for identity transformation, probably ignorant of the fact that “The range in each group is very large and some groups of whites are darker than some Negroes.”⁴¹

IV. THE MYTH OF SOMALI MAJORITY CLANS: BASELESS PASTORAL FABRICATION

Contentious a subject as race is, the more the controversy grows in the Somali context. Considering the apartheid 4.5 clan segregation system is based on ethnic superiority determined according to the thinking of the Somali mind, we are faced with the question of whether this superiority or supremacy is in account of physiological, biological, psychological, historical or theological.

The undergird of the argument extends beyond the sight and thought of these subjects as seen extrinsically from the physical person as a representative of the variable properties affected hereditarily or by inheritance. Nor do I derivatively adhere any of them as a showcase to unjustifiable abstractions in cumulative descriptive form, but in terms of achievement, civilization, invention, a contribution to humanity attributable as the end product of Somali intelligence so that to validate superiority related to one kind of the aforesaid characteristics or the other. But when societal achievement proves devoid of any endowment on the pride in supremacy, the ethnic hygiene of nomadic nobility is yet to provide any to that effect. Probably its failure to adjust to social realities has inherited pseudo-nobility the extravagance to self-position itself in supremacy erected on a delicate foundation of abstract nature, thus abusing nobility by admitting into it people unworthy of its claim.

Observing the lack of any appreciable contribution to the achievement of mankind, Somali pastoral nobility may generously share Ruth Benedict's emphasis that "While certain groups of a given race forge ahead...other groups of the same race may remain primitive nomadic herdsmen."⁴² Supposedly, with no invention or any other praiseworthy

achievement in the historical dictionary of human social life, Somali nobility would heftily stagger itself in Bendict's latter group.

A large number of Somalis and others who think of Somalia as an egalitarian pastoral democracy may not agree with my contentious coining of Apartheid to Somali social life, a theme that takes us to defining the terminology "Apartheid" as was put by the natives of where it was originated. In Moses Mabhida's definition, among others:

The word means segregation, discrimination and so-called separate development...

The idea of segregation is based on a fallacious theory derived from Calvinistic religion,

which is very widespread among the Boer population, who do so far as to claim, on the

*basis of quotation from the Bible, that the black man was created to be the slave of the white man.*⁴³

An analysis of the above definition presents a very rich degree of similitude between the system of segregation and discrimination against the masses of Bantu/Jareer ethnic community in Somalia and those in Apartheid South Africa. The most vivid significance of the similarities rests in (a) The belief in inequality between the different races of Jareer and Jileec, hence Bantu and non-Bantu peoples living within the former Bilad-ul-Bantu (Bantuland/Puntland); and (b) That both dominant groups (South African whites and Somali nomads) also base their subjugation and slavery philosophy on theological grounds, comparatively Christianity in the South African situation, and of course Islam in

the case of Somalia.⁴⁴ Whatever the sphere and magnitude, the common denominator for both situations rests in the exploitation of a self-dignified group against the autochthonous population.

Recent historical fact demonstrates, however, that whereas after national and international condemnations of Apartheid (Somalia being among the anti-Apartheid

forces) South Africa has realized the eventual hand-over of rule to the natives, Somalia has in retrogressive contrast shamefully and callously moved onto a legitimating process by beginning with the adoption of a 4.5 (four – point – five) clan stratification and clan supremacization scheme, abominable evils that are now history in South Africa. The objective of the system is instrumental to the experimentation process through which an ultimately legal Apartheid policy might be formulated and implemented in the Somali peninsula.

To better understand it, the mechanism is framed in the context of an erroneous but general myth of clan division in which all the people are categorically initially put into significant and insignificant tribal groups. The so-called Somaloid groups (Cushites turned Arabs), the significant tribes, are said to contain 4 ‘major’ clans constituting the separate entities of Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Issak, recognized as being of the pure Somaloid blood, excluding the occupational outcaste groups discussed in Chapter Two of this study. Hypothetically, this major-minor clan myth is based on a non-demographically proven but a count-of-the-thumb imagined and executed by a lustful Somali society of the Jileec subgroup.

Perceptually, the socially legalized notion of “major and minor” clans has no basis on a scientifically conducted population study carried out on per head clan demography, but rather a nomadic layman’s wishful process of imagination. This is true because to this date, no single clan or sub-clan has even a rough statistical estimate of the demographic constitution of its membership. No postcolonial census has been implemented in Somalia based on the ‘per head’ constituents of a tribe or clan suggesting a demographic stratum as to justify “majority” and “minority” tribes.

V. MYTHS, CONCOCTIONS, CRAVE AND COWARDICE

For the purpose of this brief discussion, I consider demography not necessarily in the aspect of an abstract spatial distribution per se, due to the heavy and unproportional migration, a cause of demographic disequilibria in the days after independence. One may require in this instance, to consider the academics' perspectives, which approach the topic by the following explanations of demography as:

1. Peter R. Coxi: "...the study of statistical methods of human population involving primarily the measurement of the size, growth and diminution of the numbers of the people, the proportions of living being born or dying within the same region and the related functions of fertility, mortality and marriage."⁴⁵
2. H. Stenford: "...the vital statistics of human population (especially birth, death and migration)..."⁴⁶
3. W.G. Barkley: "The numerical portrayal of human population..."⁴⁷

the variable object being the statistical distribution of each sub-clan and clan within the Republic of Somalia as determined deductively from the outcome of a head-count of its composite membership.

With regard to the Somali issue, the "majority" and "minority" clan concept cannot apparently harmonize itself with objective statistical reality. Illustrative evidence (possibly the only existing one of its kind) can be traced to colonial documents and as referred by academicians, insofar as we know that the Somali census conducted in 1986 by the military government did not regard clan affiliation, owing to the government's denouncement and subsequent eradication ("burial") of tribalism. The British anthropologist most celebrated as an "authority" on Somalia, Ioan M. Lewis, discussed the

subject of tribal statistics descriptively in quantitative terms, referring relevant studies carried out by the colonial administrations in the respective Somali territories of those days.

For the purpose of illustration, it is inevitable to refer to the 5 separate territories according to I. M. Lewis:⁴⁸

1.	French Somaliland (1948)	Total	25,000
2.	British Somaliland (1950)	Total Somali Population	640,000
3.	Harar Territories (1938)	Total Somali Tribal Population	350,000
4.	Somalia (1939)	Total	1,436,706
5.	Northern Frontier Province of Kenya (1948)	Somali population	66,500
Total for the five territories			2,519,206

The most crucial revelation in Lewis' work, however, is carried in what he gives as:

"the latest estimate for Somalia.....2,258,084."

The retired British scholar has referred two distinctive figures for Somalia, (presumably Italian Somaliland); the former figure as "1,436,706" and the latter which he calls "the latest estimate" as "2,258,084". Why are the two sums hugely disproportional? What is Lewis' justification? The scholar illustrates the response (in a footnote!): "This estimate, made for the British Military Administration (from Italian sources?), appears to include the Negroid groups although they are [not] explicitly mentioned, for the Italian estimate for 1952, which [does] gives a total "autochthonous" population of 1,275,584." For the confirmation of his source, Lewis gives (Rapport du gouvernement Italien a l'Assemblee Generale des Nations Unites sur l'Administration de Tutelle de la Somalie, 1952, p.269.)

Though these figures look good enough to disprove the Somali myth of 4 major clans, when the Negroid Jareer/Bantu autochthons constituted a “population of 1,275,584” out of a total southern Somali population of “2,258,084”, a simple subtraction of the two figures leaves us with an autochthonous Negroid majority of 293,084 heads more than the Jileec entirety in the south. Even with these figures, there can be no certainty that the Italians have submitted the results before doctoring them drastically to reduce further the number of the Negroid,⁴⁹ considering their mutual relationship with the Somalis, particularly the Somali Youth League (SYL) party. I am of the hypothesis that, after the necessary tampering, the Italians could not decrease the number of the Negroid autochthons further than 1,275,584 in spite of its lead of almost 300,000 people more than the southern Somaloid.

In a videotaped brain-storming workshop for Somali intellectuals in Mogadishu, (a copy of which is in this author’s possession) one participant (Eng. Sido) mentions how the results of a census by a French institution was downplayed by the nomadic leaders in the military regime after astonishing results displayed the Lower Shabelle Region alone leading all the regions of the north combined together. Barre’s military junta suffered a slap in the face because the majority of the Lower Shabelle residents constitute the “autochthonous” Negroid population, residues of the pre-Cushitic Sabaki/Bantu-speaking tribes who migrated from Shungwaya to the Tana and coastal areas in present day Kenya. (See Chapter 3 of this study.)

What is remarkable for mention is that the Jareer people are not unconscious of their numerical enormity but had no means to reveal that. The main reasons were probably political and academic marginalization, among others; a political voice would have set an approach in the decision-making ranks for the publication of the true tribal statistics, while the academic area would give opportunity for research and further reading to unearth the

long entombed actuality, as is axiomatic of this study. It is not, at this end, out of vanity or unknowledgeability that the Bantu elites on several occasions reported their number approximately at 40% (count-of-the-thumb) of the average population living in the territory known as Somalia.⁵⁰ Just to supplement to the Bantu claim, I quote Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar⁵¹ saying, “When a proper census is conducted, believe me, the .5 (point five) community will be 1.5.” The distinguished Somali scholar was a strong voice advocating against inequality and injustice, phenomena that marred the proceedings of the 14th Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya.

Though there is often an inclination to rely on the scholar’s word as more accountable than the average person’s, we can draw from the Bantu elders’ statement that, “between 30 and 40% of the population in Somalia are Bantu” while not entirely overlooking in their cautious manner as they admit that “no reliable statistics exist.”⁵² Considering the aforementioned statistical documents and other oral and audiovisual material, I politely disagree with Perouse de Montclos in her distribution of unsubstantiated descriptive data without referencing her contention cited in a report reading in part:

“According to Perouse de Montclos, the Bantus of southern Somalia represent a minority whose marginality is more easily seen. They represent less than 2% of the inhabitants of the country.”⁵³

Possibly unaware of Lewis’ referred studies on the Somali tribal censuses, the Bantu elders’ summative 30% - 40% stays more consistent with the available records than several scholars’ and UN officials’⁵⁴ imaginative numerical marginality of the Negroid autochthons of Somalia, thus strengthening unfounded population demography propagated by unreliable pastoral greed.

As I have indicated earlier, the classification of the vast Jareer populace into the “minority” communities stands as yet another attempt to strengthen the legitimation of their oppression as an insignificantly rightless population of a ‘few’ living among an extensively larger group who ascribe to a genealogically rightful people from the self-ennoblement. The plain truth invites for a more careful academic reconsideration of the subject related to Somali tribal census and a comprehensive clan statistics before jumping haphazardly to the unfounded conclusion of Jareer/Bantu minority clan and Jileec/Somali majority clans. This contention may suggest Bantu as minority only and only when contrasted to a cumulative of all the Somali Jileec communities as one group; but the issue is different as the context varies on separate clans. Jareer minority may be possible in the aspect of Jileec-Jareer comparison and not in one Jileec clan i.e. Dir, Issak, Darood, Hawiye, or Digil-Mirifle separately exceeding the whole Jareer population numerically.

An observation akin to the general Somali psycho-philosophy regarding the statistical impregnation of their otherwise minority population contrasted to the Jareer, is remarked in Bloom and Ottong when they contend, “Unfortunately, some governments have deliberately double-counted some groups and left out others in order to swell unfairly particular voting groups.”⁵⁵ In my opinion, subsequently, that unlike other African countries, the swelling of the Somali clan/tribe figures is more multi-purpose and much deeper-rooted. Apart from voting whose main focus lays on garnering more parliamentary entrants and representatives, here the philosophy is more dangerous in that it entails “the automatic alienation of one particular race or African ethnic group from recognition as citizens with equal social rights, to the absolute denial of the existence of their identity.”⁵⁶ This explains the reason why a majority of scholars have portrayed Somalia as a uniquely homogeneous nation of same Arab origin, entirely speaking one language, celebrating the same nomadic culture and a unanimous subscription to the Islamic faith.

VI. STRATA AWARENESS AT CHILDHOOD

But as a matter of perception, the ills of the Conference do not eliminate the fact that Somalis are very contradictory as much as they are hypocritic, discriminatory, racialistic, ethnocentric as well as segregative. These negative psychosocial behaviours are intrinsically hemmed in the social fabric of the Somali and conditioned in the period of development, constantly reshaping them throughout that process. As they grow, these patterns are gradually but firmly modified to characterize as part of the indispensable determinants of the moral development. When it concerns the degradation and alienation of the Jareer/Bantu in particular, it is conditioned sufficiently also throughout the methods and stages of learning specified by psychologists. It thus remains to be an unnegligible part of the attitude formation.

This behaviour, whether acquired as a result of classical conditioning,⁵⁷ subliminal conditioning,⁵⁸ instrumental conditioning⁵⁹ or by observational learning,⁶⁰ has become causal for the elements stimulating the stereotyping and social prejudice against the Jareer community. We may believe the concept as observed by Elizabeth Hurlock⁶¹ who perceives that although it is not well developed, "Social discrimination appears early in childhood," while further suggesting that, "Most prejudices come from imitating the attitude and behaviour of parents, teachers, peers, neighbours."

The practice of social prejudice dominates the cognitive development of the child because, as Hurlock defines: "This influence is greatest during childhood and the early part of adolescence, the time of greatest psychological plasticity."⁶² At such an early age of plasticity, the Somali child is very well educated by his most immediate social environment about the 'nothingness' of the Jareer/Bantu and their place at the lowest rank of the social structure.

Such immoral and discriminative behaviour appears vividly in school as the children bully, degrade and disdain their Jareer peers as aliens intruding into the social group at school because “These expectations are spelled out for all group members in form of laws, customs and rules.”⁶³ The acquisition and maintenance of these factors are common during and after the period of socioemotional development in adolescence in that the relationship with the parents, peer kinship, and the mythically supremacized cultural and ethnic values “contribute to an adolescent’s identity development,”⁶⁴ constructing the negative concepts about the Jareer. It later transdevelops into the creation of an abstract ethnic image formed of “Jareer inferiority”, and “Jareer subordinacy” as contrasted to “Jileec superiority” and “Jileec superordinacy”, leading to the formation of rigid ethnic stratification and the development of subversive attitudes of ethnic discrimination, ethnic-based prejudicial behaviours and indulgence in identity self-esteem based on degradation and dehumanization of the out-group, the Bantu/Jareer community.

Augmentation and escalation of segregation, alienation, degradation, persecution and marginalization have cost the Somali Bantu community an underdevelopment interspersed in all spheres of their social life. These mainly affect their social identity, political participation, economic growth, academic advancement and cultural entity, while not sparing their human dignity; a value shrank to the coinage of derogatory epithets of nationwide practice.

My perception of identity regarding this discussion may not simultaneously conduce with the psychological interpretations of “identity” and/or “identity confusion” per se in the concerns of one’s search for and adoption of a career⁶⁵ in life and personal achievement born out of innate motivational stimulus of desire and willingness to overcome challenges, but that of the ethnic group, the tribe, the clan, sub-clan and the patrilineal moiety which

one is aware of by ascription, as learned from the parents' repetition and recitation of the genealogical path of names leading to the eponymous father, while one is still at younger age before adolescence. Primarily, in the Somali social life, this identity is the mother from which all other identities emanate and are virtually nurtured to suit the variant classifications.

Socio-ethnically, on the other hand, the further north forms, albeit the unproven mythical self-image, at the top of the Somali caste institution, a social rank equivalent to that of the Brahmin of India. In the Somali myth, the Issak and Darod consider themselves (as) the ordained "super-nobles" while the Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle take their places at the "lower" levels but above the Reer Hamar (Banadiri) and Barawaans who stay in their respective places atop of the Jareer at the bottom-most. (See Chapter two of this study.)

VII. COMMOTION AND DISORDER: THE ENIGMA OF AN AMORPHOUS RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE

In Somalia's chaotic situation where armed conflict and related social disintegration have marred the realization of the basic necessities of life, it has become inevitable to explore and discover a domain in which to restore the lost glory of the nation and the harmonious co-existence of the diverse communities suffering under the siege of gun-toting youths and unruly clan bigwigs. But in the indefinite course of the expedition towards peace and reconciliation among the vulnerable communities of the defunct state, the so-called facilitators have time and again missed to implement not only the principle requirements in reconciliation, but have also gravely undermined to reflect on the cultural traits of the communities involved so as to exploit both contemporary as well as traditional approaches in the unfolding events through the process.

After the products of about 13 national peace and reconciliation conferences resulted dysfunctional, the regional member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), with assistance from well wishers of the international community, have considered yet another attempt to convene a Somali conference whose objective would be the reconciliation of that country's communities to overcome the curse of statelessness. It was a mishap in that there was no credible authority to approach to tackle the insecurity, illegal migration and other social evils the region was experiencing as an outcome of Somalia's lawlessness – from the smuggling of illegal arms and narcotics,⁶⁶ and trafficking of illegal immigrants (human cargo), to the fighting in Somalia of "Proxy wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea."⁶⁷

These ills and evils being the realities in the region, compounded with disaffection with the Arte initiative of Djibouti which rose Abdikassim Salad to power, Ethiopia's multidimensional campaigning for the convention of the conference and its ensuing multifaceted maneuvering and manipulation of the proceedings in Eldoret and Mbagathi, were discernible. By all means, the effort regarding the convention of the conference is a compliment to the IGAD member states whose Council of Ministers assigned the Frontline States of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya to plan and organize the conference jointly, while Kenya would be the host.

The flow of the arriving contingents of delegates escalated commotion and crisis that persistently haunted the receptionists and the organizers alike, especially in the provision of accommodation and catering. Within a short period the number of the delegates sprouted up from the "official" 400 or so participants to a soaring 800, most of whom were equipped with official invitation letters. As one delegate remarked, "Participation has become for purchase."⁶⁸

Within the first three days or so, it appeared unweilable that the majority of the participants in IGAD's original list had most probably been selected on terms of "who is for" and "who is against"⁶⁹ a certain frontline State. Another mystery was how certain names got reconsidered into the list of participants, as others were sinisterly expunged from it. As it seemed, there was no proper criterion used for the selection of the delegates to the various categories for participation except that mentioned in this paragraph. An example of this nature is the civil society, which consisted of participants from diverse walks of life, from former warlords and war financiers to former ministers who had performed poorly in Barre's failed regime.

"Mafia-like gangs and syndicates"⁷⁰ were colluding with officials of the IGAD Technical Committee in garnering support of one kind or another as the Chairman once admitted in a plenary that "A lot of things are going on. Dollars have reached even my doorstep."⁷¹ It was an open secret that collusions and business transactions were looming in the corridors of the hotels and offices; every financially potential warlord or prominent personality of the clan or sub-clan bought their way through to compromise the inner circles of the Conference administration, in order to implement their interests.

(a) Condoning the Culprits

There was no palatable justification for the provision of posh cars and luxurious private residences to the perpetrators of the genocide in Somalia unless otherwise the condoning of their criminality was treated as a mediating device for reconciliation. Leave that alone, there was no one single face-to-face meeting throughout the conference, in which the disputing warlords and clans and sub-clans were brought together to discuss on the grievances and subsequently formulate a mechanism for repentance and forgiveness. An approach of this nature would have given reason for rebuilding and restoring trust in each other, but it was a missed opportunity.

Telling the wrongdoers about their shame straight in the eyes would have helped them move a step forward towards the acceptance of responsibility for their mischiefs. This step would help them in the facilitation for overcoming the trauma that has led them to the commitment of those atrocities. But they were not helped to reach that important stage of self-lamentation. Instead, they were honoured above all the other participants and conferred on them the status of 'leaders', although the only associable characteristics of leadership in their portfolio rests only in that of killership.⁷²

(b) Disorganized Conference

Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, once warlord himself, remarked about the conference as "...long and torturous process..."⁷³ short of mention that it was due to a collective foul-play by IGAD, representatives of the international community as well as members of the Somali delegates who all played a part in the undesirable circumstances leading to the prolongation of the process as an amorphous exercise. It was even more torturous to the oppressed, unarmed communities like the Jareer, the minorities and the outcasts who were denied social or human equality in the eyes of the international community.

There were no scheduled agendas before hand, informing the participants of what meeting to attend and in which hall. Most of the meetings were arranged in a humdrum state, either conducting prior to a short notice or, at most, communicating to the concerned delegates over the night on the bulletin board in Sirikwa Hotel, which accommodated the offices of the IGAD Technical Committee and a section of the delegates. The other participants who were putting up in other hotels had to be informed by a friend or would find out about any event when they came to Sirikwa in the following morning.

In the course of the exercise, especially in the early stage, each member of the Technical Committee (TC) focused on an area of its interest:-

- (i) Ethiopia gathered its effort on recruiting a formidable group of clients to subscribe to its policy in the conference and toward Somalia in order to secure a large number of votes for its preferred candidate in the event of the presidential election. Commenting on this concern, Samatar and Samatar reveal, "Ethiopia and allies continued to try to gerrymander both the composition and quantity of the delegates."⁷⁴ Likewise, Adan Mohamed's statement comes in clear support of Samatar and Samatar as he writes, "The latest center of dispute was the claim that Djibouti and Ethiopia were unduly interfering with the talks for their specific interests."⁷⁵
- (ii) Kenya, being the host country and also seeing its partners' undiplomatic attitude, made its concentration on misappropriation of funds by entering into shady business deals with the hoteliers and transporters of the delegates. As the local media later reported, unscrupulous agreements were signed and fattened bills and invoices were concocted and paid for, eventually leading to shame and scandal prompting the donors' reaction and displeasure. It was cooled off in the diplomatic corridors and by the suspension of chairman Elijah Mwangale and part of his team, ushering in the appointment of career diplomat ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. Subsequently, the conference was conveyed from Eldoret to Mbagathi on the outskirts of Nairobi, marking the completion of a Six Committee work deliberated on in the Second Phase.

- (iii) Djibouti, the mentor and host behind the 13th Somali National Peace Conference project behind the grooming of Abdikassim Salad to the presidency after a 4-month long meeting in the town of Arte, was playing soft and shadowy diplomacy in its quest to help reinstall Salad again, but theirs was not as open and visible as Ethiopia's.

VIII. DEFICIENCIES DISDAINED

The shifting of the conference to Mbagathi, Nairobi, envisaged a strategic move to reflect a shift in significance, following regime change in Kenya. Another viable reason was, according to the newly appointed Ambassador Kiplagat, "...to change the image of the conference and give it a wider and positive media coverage."⁷⁶ True to his word, the conference was in a desperate need of a good Samaritan because the nature of events in Eldoret were deplorable, only comparable to the routine activities in the lawless Bakaraha market.⁷⁷

On the other hand, although Kiplagat's scheme to minimize the cost of the conference and improve its image could be commendably attributed to both his professionalism and good intentions, he couldn't save himself from engulfing into Ethiopia's trap of manipulations. In his lenient manner he once indicated, "...whatever the case, I want to keep Ethiopia on board."⁷⁸ Perhaps he was not contemplating at the time the costly way of keeping Ethiopia on board.

Further worse, Ambassador Kiplagat's long career in the world of diplomacy and international relations proved blunt when he couldn't persuade or convince Ethiopia on the appointment of professional reconciliators who could apply a meaningful, ethics-based, unbiased and actual form of reconciliation. However, after the commotion and complains became unbearable, it was no longer secret as Farida Karoney, a Nation TV journalist

revealed in the Daily Nation how, “Critics have accused the moderators in the Nairobi talks of concentrating more on power-sharing than reconciling the various factions.”⁷⁹ Obviously, the agenda IGAD had put in place was power-sharing. The deficiency from the lack of reconciliatory measures ripped off all institutions of the conference without sparing the well-respected Somali primates.

The Somali clerics arrived already split into factions (or sects?) such as Babu-Sufi, Islah, Itihad, Ahlul-Sunna Wal-Jama’a etc. They criticized and frequently called each other names, a behaviour which doesn’t augur well with objective reconciliation. Astonishingly, in the opening sessions of the meetings, especially in the plenary and civil society gatherings, the clerics were at the forefront reciting verses from the Holy Qur’an; they supplicated, and advised the delegates to maintain unity and Somaliness. But when it came to nominations to committees, they would put the Holy Book aside and settle their differences the Somali way before returning to the verses and traditions to recapture from where they had left them.

IX. EXTRINSIC MORAL INTEGRITY VERSUS INTRINSIC MORAL HYPOCRISY: A PARADIGMATIC SOMALI SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Upon completion of the First Phase, marred by complaints, irregularities and confusion, Six Committees were formed to discuss, deliberate and report on respective areas of important national interests. Of these, Committee One, charged with the task of drafting a Provisional Charter, split into two sub-groups. The Committee, which included heavy weights in the legal profession, failed to consent on mainly three core issues: -

- a. Classification, interpretation and acquisition of citizenship;
- b. Adoption of the Federal system of governance; and

- c. Adoption of the national language.

Group A believed in:

(People, Religion and Language)

1. The people of the Somali Republic are one and indivisible, part of the African people and the Arab nation.
2. The law shall establish the manner of acquiring or losing citizenship. No Somali citizen or his offspring may lose his citizenship on account of acquiring citizenship of another country.
3. Somali and Arabic shall be the official languages of the Somali Republic.⁸⁰

(Organization of the State)

1. "The structure of the State shall be decentralized and shall consist of:-
 - (a) Central authority
 - (b) Autonomous regional and district authorities.
 - (c) Authority of the independent agencies."⁸¹

Group B had a different opinion, presenting its ideology as follows: -

The Federal Republic:

1. The Somali Federal Republic comprises of:-
 - (a) A Federal Government.
 - (b) State Government.
 - (c) District and village governments.⁸²

Article 5:

The official languages of Transitional Federal Republic of Somali (sic) (Maay and Maxaatiri) Arabic and English as second languages.⁸³

Article 7 – Citizenship:

The following are citizens of the Somali Federal Democratic Republic:-

- (i) Any person who is a native of the Federal Democratic Republic of Somalia or any person who is born native of the Federal Republic.
- (ii) Any foreigner/s who was born in the Federal Republic ten years before its independence and has continuously state (sic) in Somalia.
- (iii) Any foreigner who was born in Somalia after independence and one of his/her parents is a native of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
- (iv) Any person who was born outside the Federal Republic whom one of his parents or grandparents are or were native of the Federal Republic.
- (v) Any person who was granted the Federal Republic citizenship in accordance with the law.
- (vi) No one shall qualify the Federal Democratic republic citizenship by name, knowledge of Somali language, or short residence in the Republic.
- (vii) Citizens of the Federal Democratic Republic can have double nationality.
- (viii) Any person who obtained citizenship on the conditions mentioned in paragraph 6 of this article shall lose the citizenship of the Federal Republic.
- (ix) The means of acquiring and losing the federal Democratic Republic citizenship of Somalia shall be set by law.⁸⁴

In brief analysis, Group A was in favour of the defunct theory of Greater Somalia according to which, Somalis born in the periphery of the Somali Republic i.e. in Kenya's Northeastern Province (formerly N.F.D – Northern Frontier Districts), Ogaden in Ethiopia

(which makes the part called Zone Five) and Djibouti, (former French Somaliland), would enjoy equal citizenship rights and status as Somalis born in the Republic. The rival Group B was in principle against this idea as those Somalis make a constituent part of other jurisdictions, which are independent sovereign states.

The other contentious issue was the language. Group A preferred Arabic to be on equal footing and importance with Somali Maxaatiri as the official languages, an issue which does not reflect a proper societal justification except on interest basis to please the Arab League countries. Against that concept, Group B had a case to press for Maay language which is spoken as a mother tongue and lingua franca in almost all the Southern regions of the country, rather than the importation and imposition of Arabic, a language that is alien to the Somali people.

Group B, the Digil-Mirifle proponents of the Federal system of governance, had a long dream for Federalism rooted in colonial days when the political leaders of the community unequivocally expressed their sentiment to delegates from the Four Power Commission visiting Somalia for opinion-gathering and fact-finding mission regarding the UN Trusteeship and subsequent independence. Touval visits the federalism political ideology of the Digil-Mirifle:

“On the question of the constitutional form of the proposed union, however, the H.D.M.S. (Hizbi Democratic Mustaqal Somali) retained a distinct point of view, advocating for a federal constitution for the future Somali state.

“This position was reiterated in 1958 when Jelani Sheikh bin Sheikh, at that time the party president, said in a speech to the party convention that “the party has become convinced that the only method of unifying the Somalis... is through a federal constitution which accords full regional autonomy.”⁸⁵

From another community/political leader, Touval brings to our attention:

*Sheikh Abdullah, then the party president, when asked by the Soviet member whether "he is not interested in the political activities of the country," replied: "I have only interest in the Digil Mirifle." In answer to another query, he stated: "When we asked for the trusteeship, we only meant for the country where the Digil Mirifle live, not the rest of the country. We do not mean the rest of Somalia."*⁸⁶

The controversial division of the Charter Committee into two polar sub-groups is historically laden in the pre-independence political philosophies. Group A, therefore, stood for the reminiscent ideology of the SYL whose members were opponents of the federal system, with a tendency for a centralized unitary system of government and a Greater Somalia ideology, which Hussein Ali Dualeh claims "died a natural death"⁸⁷ when Djibouti declined to join the Somali Republic upon attainment of independence in 1977. In any case, one year preceding independence, July 1959, then Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa was quoted as saying:

*In the interest of union among the Somali and in the interest of the very safeguarding of the Nation, the Government herewith declares that it does not pursue any regionalist or federalist goal, because unity alone can ensure the durable existence of a Somali national life."*⁸⁸

It was these two faculties of thought that had a hard political tussle for over 12 months, a scenario which on several intermittent occasions brought the Conference onto the verge of collapse. To save the situation, an arbitration committee, various harmonization committees and a retreat session were established as the approach towards a solution, but the contention was solid. Eventually, a harmonized Charter was agreed upon in a situation where the Digil-Mirifle won the day, particularly with the adoption of the two key elements of Maay-Maay as an official superordinate language parallel with its Maxaatiri

counterpart, and Federalism as the administrative political ideology of a Federal Somali Republic.

Notwithstanding the disputations, disparities and disinclination over the subjects mentioned above, both sub-groups of the Charter, including several of the other committees, were inclusively unequivocal about the question of official legalization of inequality of the divergent communities of the Somali society, particularly where the stakes related to the Negroid/Jareer. With the exception of the Committee on Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Management and the Committee on Regional and International Relations, all the other Committees including the divided two sub-committees on the Charter believed in the 4.5 social inequality system, tutelage of dishonest members at the 13th Somali Reconciliation Conference held in Arte, Djibouti.

Ironically, the draft reports of these Committees, which were to map out guidelines for the way forward, were decoratively enriched with terms such as “justice”, “equality”, and “rights” not less than thirty times, without the morality to consider the controversy within their respective documents as the so-called 4.5 clan power sharing formula contrarily purported injustice, inequality and rightlessness. It becomes more deplorable particularly in the notion that some of the proponents of the discriminatory 4.5 phenomenon of Apartheid consist of respected personalities with life-long career in the legal and jurisprudence profession, with some of them alleged to have participated in the construction of the 1960 constitution!

Dissonant to the ethics of their profession and knowledge, these committees imprudently spearheaded the culture of betrayal and violation of the human and civil rights of a section of the society in the guise of observing the preservation of rights and dignity of the people. Somali delegates from all walks of life, without the exclusion of high ranking officers,

women, lecturers, intellectuals, religious leaders, clan elders, notables, lawyers/advocates, politicians, medical doctors, engineers and representative members of the civil society, were not only unanimously silent about this inexplicable marginalization against the Jareer/Bantu population, but indeed they all advocated for its consequent approval.

Other “intellectuals” who harmonized several versions of the two disputative Charters have also celebrated the repetition, reiteration and upholding of the 4.5 clan power sharing formula ceremoniously as if it were the Holy word of God.⁸⁹

Remarkably, it was only after its omission and denunciation by the first official and IGAD appointed Harmonization Committee under the Co-Chairmanship of Professor Abdi I. Samatar of the University of Minnesota and Professor Mohamoud Jama of the University of Nairobi, and their dedicated committee members, that the number 4.5 disappeared figuratively from the final draft Charter, which was indeed enriched with code and content transposed from the version of Samatar – Jama Harmonization Committee. But literally, the system was effectively in practice as a major formula for appointments at all levels, from members of parliament to cabinet portfolios.

Despite the sound harmonization task, a member of the IGAD TC has pledged to disregard the Samatar – Jama document, in preference of a variety of lower quality versions produced through its backing with the intent to depreciate and sabotage the first harmonized official Charter. The Samatar – Jama version, unlike the others, was produced through a process of unbiased, genuine, professionally and scholarly deliberated sessions in which neither the meager economy of the country nor the public aspiration was condoned.

The Somali delegates and the IGAD Technical Committee of the Frontline states, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, ignored to remember the evils of segregation and discrimination in South Africa and elsewhere, Somalia included, and advise against its continuance. In several sessions of the civil society meetings, IGAD TC and the so-called Leaders' Committee meetings, the 4.5 segregation factor was moved to be struck off by members of the Bantu/Jareer participants in the Conference specifically this author, and the SAMO (Somali African Muki Organization) political wing led by Hussein Mohamud Muse alias Hussein Bantu (the Chairman) and his delegation. It was absolutely impossible to convince the Somali delegates about equality of the citizens in spite of its acknowledgement in the charter. In the civil society, the mention of a reverse from 4.5 displeased members from the armed clans. It would end up in a heated argument and debate and the meeting would break up.

In order to overshadow the sensitive topic of inequality and injustice, the IGAD Technical Committee in conjunction with Somali armed clans, embraced the Apartheid method of clan categorization and adopted the misleading term "all inclusive", betraying the world community that in actual fact, the lack luster named Somali National Reconciliation Conference was devoid of any equality for the Jareer community from day one. In the underneath of the superfluous "all inclusive" pronouncement was, in many respects, an innate ideology of segregation; that of "inclusive but unequal." The context lodges in its underbelly a Jileec modified version of the American racial policy of "separate but equal."

The clans that share inclusivity as well as equality, irrespective of their internal fission, and recognized as "pure" Somalis by all standards permissible during the conference, were classified as Dir, Hawiye, Darod and Digil-Mirifle. Regardless of the geographical and genealogical distance of the other clans from the birthplace of the Somali-Arab contact and origination of Somali nobility, the northern 'super-nobility' had to force down their

throat the bitter pill of parity with the other armed clans, especially after a show of military power had ousted them from state rule and the prestigious Villa Somalia.

After their military supremacy was symbolized in the removal of dictator Siad Barre, the Hawiye won here another recognition of genealogical mobility, a status whose prerogative to determination previously stayed within the jurisdiction of northern “nobility”, which had self-stationed itself at the top. But this mobility, according to the ousters of Barre, would mean insufficient without employing an excessive push of downward mobility against the Jareer so that the status gap and rights and equality between the “very” Somali and the “less” Somali was visibly demarcated as much as it was extensively widened. The Jareer, the Reer Xamar (Banadiri) and the outcaste group of several sub-groups were lumped together to share half of the equivalent of one Somali clan’s share, with the highest group garnering less than 0.3% of the symbolic 0.5% allocated to the totality of the artificially made “minority” groups.

The Reer Xamar (Banadiri), the occupational outcastes, the Bajuni and the Barawaans are marginal in number compared to the Jareer, and according to the last colonial census furnished earlier in this chapter, the Bantu/Jareer or “autochthonous” Negroid in the South numbered statistically well over the rest of the entire Southern Somali Jileec clans. Evidently, therefore, the case of squashing the numerical supremacy of the Jareer and deliberately grouping them with the numerically minority is a concept amiss of exhaustive deliberation. Whatever the fabrication, the reason is at any rate related plainly to ethnicity. Somaliness, according to genealogy, is refined and defined by the physical features of the people concerned. In this regard, the Jareer, being of distinct Negroid features and African origin, cannot be equated to the Somali,⁹⁰ the offspring of “Quraishite” Arabs, notwithstanding their African skin pigmentation and Cushitic origin of recent establishment.

In the case of the Reer Xamar (Banadiri), one may argue of statistical minority because their confederation does not constitute a large population, although one may again claim otherwise due to lack of census data to determine their exact demography. The Barawaans can be put more or less at par with the Reer Xamar, although even for them, no exact population quota is furnishable. But remarkable to this study is that both groups are in the Jileec classification of family (see chapter two), notwithstanding their dump into the 'minority' category, an entailment referable to their being out of the parentheses of Somaliness by genealogy.

The occupational outcaste groups, Tumaal, Reer Xasan, Yaxar, Madhibaan, Midgaan, Muse Dhery etc. are Somalis, or at least [were] Somali 'nobles' (nasab) before the invention of their alleged imperfection of eating to 'satisfaction' the meat of a dead/decayed animal (bakhti) that had not celebrated the legal standard of Islamic legitimization of edible meat. The allegation, which is empty of any reliable proof, is a concoction manufactured from the self-nobility who also participated [in] the eating of that same (bakhti) dead meat but without to the point [of] satisfaction (according to the 'noble' traditions). This group, who are not quite large in number, but who are in many aspects 'more' Somali than their counterparts in the .5 (point 5) bracket, have been rejected not due to original/genealogical location of their eponymous father, but on account of inequality caused centuries ago by that forefather who became a reason for the unwholesomeness to the purity of his descendants ever since.

The concept of 4.5 was designed in Djibouti and effectively implemented during the 13th Somali Peace Conference held in Arte under the auspices of Ismail Omar Guelleh's regime. It was the brainchild of certain Hawiye notables with the intent to exercise supremacy against the unarmed communities. Unfortunately, neither Guelleh and his

government nor the so-called civil society stage – managing that conference, nor the so-called ‘Cuqaal’ wise men of the tribes, nor the power hungry intellectuals cautioned against the ill effects of inequality and discrimination to the image of the Somali society in general, and the un-Islamic social inferiority status the system would afflict on the concerned discriminated people in particular. To add insult to injury, the participants at the Arte (Djibouti) conference were divided into Somali clans and OTHERS, a term which cut open the deepest hunch of Somali racialism and ethnocentrism. In fact, it was in this nihilistic ambiance that Abdikassim Salad’s Transitional National Government (TNG) was created.

X. MAAY AND MAXAATIRI LANGUAGES: AS EQUAL AS DIFFERENT

In another dynamic socio-political turn-around, the Digil-Mirifle, traditionally despised for their distance from the location and genealogy of ‘nobility’, have emerged achievers of tremendous victories in the social, military and political domains, respect and recognition they would have never aspired before taking up arms and liberating the Reewing land from Aideed’s Habar-Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan. After Aideed’s humiliating defeat and other preceding triumphs over certain Darod sub-clans, the Reewing Resistance Army (RRA) and its community became a robust group to reckon with. In Conferences convened prior to the last two or three meetings, the Digil-Mirifle confederation was not deemed equal participation and posts as the Dir, Hawiye and Darod, owing to the invasion and subsequent conquest of key areas of their territory by troops of the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.

Understandably, therefore, the Digil-Mirifle adamanance on the Federal system and the official superordination of the Maay language were invigorated firstly by the military might that erected the Reewing community as equals rubbing shoulders with their Samale

brethren. Only after military might and ethnopolitical equality were realized by the community were the other social issues tabled for debate, discussion and consequent approval. All other things being unequal, it would be beyond imagination for the northerners to have lifted Maay language to official status and equal to the Maxaatiri language adopted to be the official national medium in 1972, when the nomadic northerners were at the helm of their dictatorship.

The charter theme drove a precarious wedge between the Maay and certain communities of Maxaa speakers, creating a dreadful standoff and a stalemate that almost disbanded the conference. Thus, the proposal that each group works on its preferential draft charter has enlivened the inspiration of the multi-ethnogenetic Digil-Mirifle confederacy and the will for their political identity through the exercise of their age-old federalism ideology - a prestige in vertical identity mobility by virtue of their language of culture. Among other things, the factors lending tremendous back-up support to the Digil-Mirifle argument were:-

- (a) Their acquisition of militia power-base which put them militarily at par with the other armed militia, and
- (b) The logical dilemma of which language would qualify to a status of lingua franca – the vastly spoken local Maay language acquired as first and mother tongue by communities of native Somalis, or the alien and imported Arabic, which has to be learned as a third or foreign language?

Most of the proponents of the mythical monolinguality faculty of thought shied away from responding to this question. The Reewing have used the logicity as a main instrument to push for their cause. Eventually, Maay had to be recognized as a national language, a prestige which was long overdue.

XI. SOMALI NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE OR SOUTHERN SOMALI GOVERNMENT FORMATION CONFERENCE?

At a glance, a disparity arises between the misleading 4-word title or theme, 'Somali National Reconciliation Conference' and the actual occurrences that prevailed in the course of the conference, especially when taken into consideration the points elaborated below:-

- (a) Owing to massive foreign domination and manipulation under the umbrella of IGAD, the conference was not Somali-driven. Worse though, it was contrary to the original concept which reads in a report: "The IGAD Council of Ministers emphasized that the Somali Peace Process should be Somali-owned and Somali-driven".⁹¹ In his words, chairman Mwangale confirmed IGAD's role by retorting, "The approach of the Frontline States is not to prescribe solutions but create a basis for dialogue,"⁹² though unfortunately, it remains to everybody's knowledge that no dialogue for reconciliation has taken place.

In contradiction, Hussein Aideed's emotional statement on a local TV that "The whole process is driven by circulars of instructive statements," and that the IGAD TC should remain "...as facilitators, not as managers,"⁹³ portrays the hoodwink and twist administered on the initial guidelines as given by the IGAD Council of Ministers. Aideed even went further to censure the IGAD Frontline States as people who have "...neither will nor desire to continue the conference."⁹⁴

- (b) A major stakeholder and part and parcel of the Union of the Republic of Somalia, the administration of the Northern brothers, was not officially present. Many

farsighted Somali delegates and notables reiterated the necessity of Somaliland to the conference. Similarly, earlier reports confirm IGAD's willingness to bring Somaliland on board, but that was later undermined. According to the initial proposal:

*"The Ministers re-affirmed a need to invite Somaliland to the conference and requested the TC makes efforts to invite Somaliland to attend the conference. They however recognized that Somaliland is not to be equated with factions and that the invitation to Somaliland be worded differently from that of other Somali parties."*⁹⁵

Sheer reluctance and hidden agenda in the part of the IGAD Frontline States have denied the Somali people the opportunity to nationalize the conference. The controversial case surrounding Somaliland's participation suggests the motive that the invitation was probably withheld as a last resort 'lucky-card' to be used for subversive bargains in the enhancement of a particular party's future gains.

- (c) Because the Conference started with the factional philosophy of gaining numerical supremacy of participants, which overshadowed all other sectors of the proceedings, and consequently ended with the same, there was no mention-worthy form of reconciliation convened or achieved. Professor Abdi I. Samatar issued a clear comment on the episode in a workshop in Nairobi, affirming, "We had facilitators, not reconciliators."⁹⁶

In the 2-year life span of the conference, neither the organizers (IGAD) nor the donors are praise-worthy for fulfilling the requirements of a reconciliation necessary to put on track a society so divided and disgruntled along tribal lines, polarized by centuries of feuding vendetta that funneled xenophobia impregnated with hatred and antagonism.

(d) Although it was dubbed a conference, the proceedings of the gathering left a lot to be desired as to call it one. Without the identification of a workable day-to-day agenda; with the delegates locked out of their rooms and denial of meals on several occasions for delay or lack of payment, with the pulling out severally of the warlords and the settlement of conference related disagreements on wars inside the country in contravention of a cease-fire agreement⁹⁷ undertaken at the early stage of the conference and signed by all the warlords and faction leaders, and the contemporaneous dissonances and dissensions within the midst of the IGAD Frontline States, may probably all provide us with a sober perception that the Somali Reconciliation Conference, albeit the thematic title, was derailed from the course expected of such an exhausting and expensive meeting to have taken.

On the other hand, while not entirely disagreeing with Abdi Samatar in his statement of IGAD as facilitators and not reconciliators, because the frontline countries preferred to be seen as such, my own experience and observation as an official participant in the Conference reveal more than that. In a broad spectrum, "Facilitation is the process of helping a group complete a task, solve a problem or come to agreement to the mutual satisfaction of the participants."⁹⁸ Facilitation, in this paradigm, requires some tools and skills, which are essential to equip the facilitator so that he/she is aware of the multiple implications through the process. Secondly, considering the importance of the conference and its input in human and material resources, and the aspirations entwined in the intrinsic national morale, IGAD should have foreseen the prerequisite for professional facilitators and mediators to manage and consult the proceedings of the conference for the attainment of desirable goals.

From day one, the Frontline States have compromised the traditional principles of facilitation. By this, I mean to note that IGAD's role during the 2 - year long process of the

Conference was in no way focused on the tradition of “what would serve the group best?”⁹⁹ but rather what would best serve an individual faction subscribing to a particular member of the Frontline States and its interests. As such, the true qualities for the achievement of effective facilitation were lacking in their totality. By far, rather than as pure facilitators, certain members of the IGAD Technical Committee and other ‘friendly’ countries misconceived their role, putting themselves on equal rivalry with each other and again with the disputing Somali factions.

Practically, the nature of gerrymandering has made IGAD another stakeholder in the status of a faction, facilitating their own participation in multiple roles, manoeuvring and manipulating the proceedings and influencing the decisions. Obviously, there exists a bulk of evidence to support that they were biased against certain factions and individual participants, while at the same time serving as consultants to the opposing rivals. Copies of complaints to the Technical Committee and press reports suggest persistent anomalies of bias and ring-leadership.¹⁰⁰

XII. THE MISSED POINTS

Among other factors, core issues worthy of ample consideration have been neglected:

1. Face-to-face dialogue:-
 - (a) Intra-clan level,
 - (b) Inter-clan level, and
 - (c) National level.
2. Acceptance of responsibility by the warlords and all those who played a role in the flare up of the catastrophe in Somalia.

3. Seeking forgiveness.
4. Conference facilitation and mediation by Somali intellectuals from the country and Diaspora - whether through clan representation / participation or otherwise, and assisted by foreign experts.
5. Knowing the warlords' prerequisite for voluntary disarmament; the variables persistent.
6. Discussion over the hindrance of the restoration of confianza and peace building.
7. Limitation of foreign interference, manipulation and gerrymandering.
8. Minimization of the agitation towards the concept of power sharing during the reconciliation exercise.
9. Emphasis on a time frame to implement the reconciliation process.
10. Assessment, evaluation and up-to-date reports on the segments of activities in order to get an early warning and diffuse/pre-empt possible subversion against the process.
11. The appending of legally binding documents by all the appointed representatives of the sub-clan/clan, rather than only by the warlords/faction-leaders the majority of whom did not practically represent the whole sub-clan or clan.

12. Equal participation for all clans/national stakeholders.
13. An appropriate holistic approach to the transformation of the culture of war into a culture of peace.

XIII. RECONCILIATION OR RETROGRESSION?

The nature of the Somali conflict is as complex as the citizens themselves are. In that context, it was shortsighted and a grave misconception to treat the multi-layered crisis in the manner of a contemporary war instigated by inequitable distribution of insufficient resources perpetrated by colonial doctrine, and continued afterwards by neocolonialist rulers of civil and military regimes. As Dee Kelsey and Pam Plumb have observed, “Often we jump the gun by trying to solve a conflict before we have identified its roots.”¹⁰¹

However, Committee Six confirms in its report, “The underlying sources of conflict have their origin in the pre-colonial period.”¹⁰² Thus, the misapprehension of ‘straight-jacketing’ Somalia’s undoing into a “resources and underdevelopment”¹⁰³ dispute, which is believed by even some African Presidents, harbours strong contradiction to the scholarly observation that “...the superiority complex of one group over another, mainly based on cultural differences”¹⁰⁴ lays bare another aspect of the root causes to the conflict. A truth base exists that part of the divided loyalties was provoked by mismanagement, greed, nepotism and ethnocentrism indulged in by those at the helm, but it lures also a synchronous combination with other segments and series of cultural predicaments, which trailed down the line of Somali social history.

Looking back into the history of Somalia, one may deduce that inter-clan and intra-clan animosities and a living culture of war were the order of the day. As Douglas Collins

reminds us, “The Auliahah are fighting the Marehan, the Garre are fighting the Galgail, the Uadan are fighting the Geledi, the Omar Mohamud are fighting the Habr Ghidir and the Shifta are fighting for the hell of it.”¹⁰⁵ This statement is only one out of many more written about the bellicosity of the Somali people and the depth of the roots of their antagonism against one another.

Perceptually, it was the unfolding of a series of feudal events and other monumentalized traditional animosities in a continuum that burst their banks in an abrupt explosion in search of a healing for stockpiles of psychosocial trauma, bulging into voluminous masses over the decades; and the unleashing of that wrath broke all hell loose that containing it boggles many the mind. It is in fact the failure to diagnose the remote causes from the immediate causal that swerved the precision of the focal point in the conflict.

The Somali conflictants were born into a culture of war, and more often than not, battles fought in rural areas extended to urban towns, executing vengeance on innocent citizens, for a crime committed elsewhere by an unknown kinsman. Likewise, minor personal urban grudges were shifted to remote villages “away from the law” and bloody wars flared up as a consequence. Looking at the problem only as a conflict over resources was the first mistake, while the lack of expert facilitators and reconciliators supported by expert Somalists (Somalis and foreigners)¹⁰⁶ was another of IGAD’s deleterious and premeditated discrepancies. This attitude of one-eyedness has led to the unnecessary prolongation of the Conference and the formation of a government in structure but not in function; over one year after its inception, it is yet to decide the location of its seat, despite the legitimization of Mogadishu as the capital in the readings of the Charter¹⁰⁷ adopted by the Conference. Nairobi, it seems, is still the operational base of several institutions of the Somali Transitional Federal Government while others relocated in Somalia amidst persistent calls from Kenya and the donors to operate from Somalia.

Under the pattern of this reality, undermining or absence of discussions to unearth the nitty-gritty of the above social dynamics envisages an acute delusion and that the crux of the matter still remains unattended to. The thesis of my argument is supported by incidents which created more havoc than could harmonize reconciliation, as new factions were formed and others married into coalitions and alliances during the process of reconciliation!

XIV. THE IGAD ROLE IN THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ALLIANCES DURING THE CONFERENCE

1. The Transitional National Government (TNG) split into two: a faction led by then Interim President Abdikassim Salad, and its rival arm called TNG (Asali) original, which was headed by Abdikassim's then Prime Minister, Hassan Abshir Farah.
2. What was once a strong alliance comprising 8 factions, well known as G8 (Group 8), suffered an abrupt political puncture, shrinking its membership to a toothless 3 – with Mohamed Kanyare and Omar Mohamed 'Finish' of the Hawiye clan and Mowlud Ma'ani of the Jareer community, bewildered as the stout foundation of their coalition was pulled off its balance.
3. The civil society splintered into two parties spearheaded separately by Asha Hagi Elmi (Hawiye) and Shariff Salah (Digil-Mirifle).
4. The National Salvation Council which was also an "off-spring" of the 14th SNRC in Kenya, was dominated by the Hawiye, with the exception of Jama Ali Jama and Ahmed Omar Jees who both belong to sub-clans of the Darood clan family.

5. Abdikassim's section of the TNG was also a Hawiye control-zone save one member each from Ortoble, Lelkase and Dhulbahante, all Darood sub-clans, and an insignificant number from other clans.
6. The Jowhar administration of strong man Mohamed Dhere and the Puntland administration (faction of ex-Colonial Abdullahi Yusuf) made a tactical coalition with the robust Somali Salvation and Reconciliation Council, formed after Arteh with strong backing from Ethiopia to counter-balance and frustrate the Djibouti-backed Abdikassim and his dormant interim government. The 2 new comers (Jowhar administration and Puntland) stretched the SSRC coalition's subscription to a strong membership of 17 factions.
7. Out of the 25 signatories (including Abdikassim) of the National Salvation Council, 17 factions united into a separately independent coalition. Five of the remaining 8 factions chaired by Abdikassim Salad, Bihi, Muse Sudi, Osman Atto and Barre Hirale, instituted an amalgamation, with Abdikassim Salad's TNG arm standing as the power-house. The other 3 consisted of the factions left aloof after the crumbling of the G8; their leader was Mohamed Kanyare Afrah.
8. A noteworthy elaboration here is that although the National Salvation Council was composed of 25 groups or signatories, they were tolerating differences elsewhere on interest and ideological basis, because 17 of those factions were automatic subscribers to the Abyssinian philosophy and school of thought, while 8 groups were inclined to a Djiboutian school of thought, i.e. TNG thinking.

9. The Digil-Mirifle confederation of communities was also affected, although some of their prominent leaders were cautious and secretive, giving an impression of 'neutrality'. However, Sheikh Aden Madobe, Deerow and Shariff Salah were opined as having a tendency toward the Ethiopian camp. Habsade, categorized as a prominent figure in Moallim Madobe's territory, was emitting signals of affiliation with Abdikassim. Ex-Colonel and RRA factional chairman Mohamed Hassan Shati-gadud had a devastating head-on collision with Ethiopia after an RRA splinter group was midwived against him in his own area during the course of the conference. Shati-gadud blamed his former ally, Ethiopia, for masterminding the intra-RRA division, particularly at a time when he was in Kenya participating in the reconciliation conference. Later, Sheikh Aden Madobe had to be invited officially as a faction leader alongside Shati-gadud.

IGAD AND FACTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

1. DAAROOD

(a) Harti

- Dhulbahante
- Warsangeli
- Marjerteen
- Ortoble
- Lelkase

all except few backed Ethiopian despotism in the conference.

- (b) Absame - Majority of the Absame were for Ethiopia although a marginal number opposed.
- (c) Marehan - Part of the Marehan showed a very loyal subscription to Ethiopia while others were hard-core opponents.

2. THE MARGINALIZED / OPPRESSED “LESS” SOMALI COMMUNITIES

The oppressed and marginalized groups, the “unequals” and/or the “second-class citizens”, in other words, the 0.5 communities, mainly supported the Ethiopian backed “fraternity”. Of the 3 Jareer-Weyne groups, approximately a 2/3 majority was for Ethiopia, as a political tactic to (a) encounter Mowlioud Ma’ani’s treacheries and alliances, and (b) have a strong wall to lean on against Somali antagonism that was continuously frustrating Jareer participation.

- 3. **Dir** - About 80% of the Dir at the conference were supporters of the Ethiopia – steered policy towards Somalia.
- 4. **The Digil-Mirifle** - The Digil-Mirifle were mostly in harmony with Ethiopia. Very few of them at times strained relationship with the Frontline State. All the same, eventually they had more factional ‘leaders’ representing them, despite the creation

[of] wider hostilities and intra-clan fighting at home in the course of the reconciliation conference.

- 5. **The Hawiye** - Most of the prominent Hawiye warlords maintained good relationship with Ethiopia although some entertained Arab policy affiliation. Strong G8

proponent, Mohamed Kanyare Afrah of the Murusade sub-clan of the Hawiye clan was in extreme disagreement with Ethiopia, but his coalescing with Ethiopia's choice for the top seat, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, in the waning days to the presidential election, opened another chapter in the study of Somali coalitions, alliances as well as inter-clan and intra-clan politics of interest.

Under this background, Abdullahi Yusuf's election as President was not a surprise considering the campaigning he engaged from day one of the conference, the political back-patting and blessing he enjoyed among the IGAD Frontline States, his close relation with some of the Hawiye factional leaders, and his generosity and 'open-handedness', all of which contributed to his majestically projected ascension up the ladder where the Hawiye clan failed to protagonize in the management of milking Maandeeq, the she-camel.

XV. PROJECT 14

The long, hard and controversy-ridden Somali peace process culminated in the formation of a Transitional Federal Parliament, which as a consequence elected an interim president. Inauguration, oath-taking and ululation marked the outcome of the conference in spite of the paradoxes, and Siad Barre's army colleague ex-Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was crowned as the interim president in October 2004. But, in the sprawling Eastleigh estate, opposing crowds of Hawiye and Darood demonstrated in the streets in the night. One group welcomed the outcome while the other was obviously denouncing it. It was a near-clash as flying stone-bullets were exchanged before elders restored tranquility. It was a clear surfacing of the impasse in the underneath, which the 'Reconciliation' conference had failed to carry on aboard. My premonition related to this

episode is prevailed in the predisposition that yet another bad omen is in pending for Somalia.

A well perceived dialectic chronicling serious criticism has opened among certain circles of the Hawiye, depreciating the result of the process as “from Darood to Darood,”¹⁰⁸ adducing the time, lives and resources devastated in the war to overthrow Barre (a Darood) and its effects over the past decade and half as undeservingly incommensurate with the result.¹⁰⁹ In the other end, the Darood expressed satisfaction and jubilation as they re-established themselves unobtrusively at a position they adore obsessively for its prestige, a seat which they have always believed its occupation as their divine right.

(i) The Negative Implications Of An Anticipated Conference Failure

There was a lot into this conference than the eye could meet. Indeed it continued on an indefinite time limit. Associated with that was the colossal funds consumed to the tune of millions of US dollars. Therefore, the exercise was a political project of regional as well as international dimensions.

The IGAD Technical Committee of the Frontline States on the one end, and representatives of the international donors on the other, had a load on their back and a duty to implement a project whose end product was so anxiously awaited. Wreckage of the conference might have cost certain officials their jobs. Enquiries into the causes of the collapse would have revealed devastating discrepancies and the destinations of monies unaccounted for, but which monies now are covered under the shadow of this concrete indicator which is the morphological existence of a parliament, a president and of course a cabinet structure to steer the government institutions and their obligations. These remain to be not more than structures installed for circumvention, which are now in dire perplexity

of how and where to commence the required institutional functions a government is expected to provide.

The traumatic pressure in the forethought of the precarious consequences entangled in the demise of the conference, preoccupied the officials appointed for the management of this 14th Project dubbed Somali National Reconciliation Conference. The devastating heat from the abortion of the Conference would have obviously jeopardized the credibility of the entire IGAD membership under whose auspices the international community committed voluntarily amounts of domestically needed resources. In a sense, therefore, the propitiation and appeasement with which the warlords and faction heads were approached every time they pulled out of the conference, had an underlying strategic connotation to pre-empt the opening of Pandora's box.

With no tangible reconciliation eminently undertaken during the two-year span of the Conference, there is no doubt that the centuries old wounds were left rotting below the visible surface, while 'prestige' Project 14 dealt with only the dressing of the puss spread on the external. In doing so, IGAD had to create an opportunity to conclude the Project and therefore, borrowing from Ali Jimale Ahmed, "opted for the easy way out."¹¹⁰

(ii) The International Community

The international community commendably responded to requests to help curb the debacle the world community and the regional countries were having difficulty coping with as a result of Somalia's anarchy. They have responded with an intervention in financial sponsorship for the conference and they lived upto their word in their tolerance for the hefty amounts of funds expended.

Although this was a justified good gesture of human philanthropism, they should have also made it their concern that the exercise was carried out smoothly in accordance with the principles of facilitation, mediation and reconciliation. By doing so, the financial sponsors would have stood in a better position to conduct the monitoring of the programme and its evaluation according to the successive stages and their outcome. If anything, they should have provided experts in the divergent areas encompassing the process, to steer, consult and advise in the various aspects of the Conference in order to follow the fundamentals prerequisite to a successful reconciliation.

From an external evaluation, the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, alias "Project 14", consummated a game of robotics than accommodating the true ideals of purposeful politics. Technical and financial blockades have on several occasions brought the exercise almost to its knees. On several occasions, the delegates were abashed and disgraced as hoteliers flashed them out of their hotel rooms in demand of payments for earlier services provided in accommodation and meals.

Considering the magnitude of the conference, the international community should have taken the responsibility to provide expertise in terms of conference management, mediation and reconciliation method, - in general, the engagement of Somalist scholars with profound erudition of the diversity of the Somali community of nations and their respective cultures. They should have also welcomed and appreciated the expertise of distinguished Somali scholars both from inside the country and the Diaspora so as to allow the interplay between the local and foreign expertise enrich each other to benefit the conference.

Hypocritically, this opportunity was not seized since the intellectuals were elbowed out of active participation, at times mistreated and often disgracefully humiliated,¹¹¹ owing to the

heavy handedness of an IGAD TC member. The negative attitude towards the Somali scholars' input was premeditation by the Frontline States who made it their mandate capacitating and further deepening of the Somali clan hostilities. Subsequently, intellectual participation was initially limited while the importance of their presence was eventually withdrawn and ignored altogether. The principled among these scholars have pulled out from the exercise while the others had their role reduced to (kutuba-qaad) personal secretaries to the warlords.

With the neglect of these useful factors, the good intentions of the donors have been thwarted by the monopolization and manipulation by IGAD as the stage-managers. But the donors were not unconscious of the obstructive impasse in the Conference. They have received numerous copies of complaints by the factions and individual participants informing them of the sterile path of the exercise and the emotions inherent to the intense political climate.¹¹² There was an inexcusable and unprecedented neglect in their part.

There is no question that the conference has widened the multi-dimensional psychosocial trauma, which has been afflicting excruciatingly on the Somali people. The solution, in my opinion, did not lie in the formation of a state, but rather in the creation of a viable reconciliation process in which every person would overcome his or her grief. Competition for resources, identity and cultural supremacy only make way for bias and hatred, factors through which social confianza and societal bonds cannot be enhanced.

For Somalia, the way forward is in the restoration of the lost love, rebuilding trust in one another – regardless of one's ethnic background - and the preservation of the uncompromisable unity that was once the symbol of the country.

In the 14th Somali National Reconciliation Conference, the idea was initiated by IGAD, the conference was managed by IGAD, the 'facilitation' was made by IGAD, the Interim Somali government was moulded by IGAD, yet the officials IGAD had delegated the expedition of the conference were diplomats with no possession of a reconciliation record in their portfolio. This factor is another clear representation of the conundrum that haunted the exercise. If under this reality we ask the question: Has any praiseworthy reconciliation been conducted in the SNRC? The true answer is NO. Reversibly, if we may please ourselves metaphorically with an end product, we can reframe the question to suit our illusive dogma and put it this way: Was a government installed? The answer is YES. Then to the latter response we may ask: why is the government neither functioning nor seated together in one place in the country if indeed it was born out of an effective reconciliation conference?

As Eno enlightens, "We have to evaluate the situation in pursuance of what the variable was before the conference, and whether the conference, as the vehicle, has achieved that. If the variable in our search prior to the conference was in the structure of an institution, one was indeed formed; but if it was laid in reconciliation and a functioning institution, veritably this is yet very far from being achieved any time in the near future."¹¹³

Conclusion

This chapter presented a descriptive reflection of ethnic divisions and social discrimination and marginalization. From claims of Arab origination and pre-Somali presence of autochthonous Jareer/Negroid or Bantu population in Somali in the previous chapters, the discussion has landed us into a very recent phenomenon of "4.5 clan power-sharing formula". When we scale these hypotheses against the universal belief of Somali homogeneity, monolinguality, monoculturality and monotheologicality, we may be allowed the tendency to deviate our understanding to deserve it an equal observation of the other

version of a more real Somalia. This version exposes us to yet another extensive debate of: Who is a Somali and by what criteria is the paradigm of Somaliness determined? The birth of the view related to this question was partly agitated by the 4.5 clan superiority-inferiority and partly by the Jareer outcry against discrimination and alienation. In order to find out the truth or otherwise about these claims, the study has considered a quantitative survey to explore in-depth the magnitude of these claims. Therefore, the next segment, PART THREE lays its concern on the mystery underlying the phenomenon of Somaliness and an apparent ethnic marginalization hidden in the soft underbelly of "Somali homogeneity" in the perspective of the autochthonous Bantu/Jareer or Zenj/Negroid race.

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PART THREE

Chapter Seven

AMID ETHNIC MARGINALIZATION AND IDENTITY CONFUSION: WHO IS A SOMALI AND WHAT DETERMINES SOMALINESS?

“Some sociologists argue that exclusion from citizenship remains a central feature of modern day racism as well.”¹ - Anthony Giddens.

If Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816 – 1882) thought of superior intelligence and morality for whites as contrasted to blacks that he considered them as being of low capability close to animal nature, Somaliness draws a lot from that narrative. That is true because it attributes the same to Jareer-ness/Negritude, although the concept of race itself is an ideological construct than biological uniqueness in the suggestion that no race is free from contact with another.

What makes the Somali situation more unbelievable is the perceptual retention of homogeneity and the unthinkable notion underlying a black race practising racial supremacy against another. The scenario is quite unlike black-white distinction as experienced in South Africa, U.S.A. or Brazil or any other country where racial diversity is constructed on the basis of conspicuous colour difference. In Somalia, particularly for the incompetent ‘nobles’, ethnic identity is the main source from which all other streams of identities fringe. Therefore, in their belief, albeit the mythicity, the maintenance of genealogy-based ethnic superiority is sacrosanct because it is “the sacred pillar” on which Somali ‘nobility’ is constructed. Once that is undermined, it means the crumbling of the foundation of pastoral pseudo-nobility.

One of the ethno-traditional philosophies embracing this paradigm is clearly manifested in the interplay between identity politics and political identity. These two can be defined as being in support of Kusow's narrative of genealogy-based and territory-based Somaliness, tools that measure the degree of one's attachment to the place and the birth of 'pseudo-nobility'. Though Kusow approached the phenomenon in its sociological perspective describing it "a continuous process of exclusion and inclusion,"² the effectiveness of the impact of "a process of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion" (with all its undercurrents and crosscurrents) could again be elaborated in the perspective of political sociology where the centrality of 'Maandeeq' was concentrated to selected socio-ethnic segments of the society.

This centrality, by precision, functions as the central yard where identity politics determines the distribution, recognition, inclusion as well as exclusion of social identities into or out of "the social boundary of Somaliness"³ And since it is the control zone effecting recognition and stratification of multi-ethnic identities, it is, by that virtue, the distribution point of the milk from Maandeeq, in other words, the legitimating process through which one was graduated to enable him/her to drain the national economy dry.

It is important to note that though social categorizations had their implications; one cannot overshadow the fact that ethnic members representing the various sub-groups in the bracket of Somaliness have assumed top national responsibilities varying from diplomatic positions to key cabinet posts, despite Kusow's constructive narratives and regardless of their genealogical and/or geographical location of Somaliness. From Ras Aseyr to Ras Kamboni, all the communities in the country (including the outcasts, Banadiri and Barawaan) have in one regime or another or in all regimes had their members serve in a high position, except the Negroid Jareer/Bantu. A re-categorization of the ethnic

composition opens wide the perception of those appointments as not being without some basis of Jileec (Somali-Arab) supremacy compared to Jareer (Bantu-African/Negroid) inferiority.

The identity confusion of the Somalis in general and the Jareer frustration in particular leads one to the more confusing bifocal question: who is a Somali and what criteria is the paradigm of Somaliness/Somalihood determined?

Abdi Kusow, the Somali erudite, debunked an oft-hidden side of Somali social reality. The multifarious characteristics of Somaliness entail the existence of kaleidoscopic identities in conflict. This blend of artificially inter-married concomitant identities of presumed Arabness, according to Abdi Kusow, observes genealogical affiliation and geographical location. In both identities, regardless of the distance one may be from the eponymous ancestor and birth place of 'nobility' and its dignified camel culture, one still remains within "the social boundary of Somaliness"; if not genealogically, at least socially, politically, academically as well as economically.

The Barawaan and the Banadiri may fall in the periphery of Somaliness by lineage but may celebrate social intermingling in the form of legally constituted marriages with any of the clans, be them 'more' Somali or 'less' Somali. If in all other probabilities they are disqualified genealogically, at least their 'other' identity (the non-Somali) has been accepted and allows them a social interaction such as mentioned. The outcast groups, though prone to discrimination and social exclusion in certain ways, yet that has not outlawed them completely from inclusion and acceptance in other ways. Powerful figures of prominence like Samatar (former Vice President) and former cabinet minister Salxaan are the exemplary among many from such groups who have held incumbent positions of various capacities, while others served remarkably in the diplomatic missions.

Additionally, we have the Hawiye, Digil-Mirifle and other communities whose Somaliness is considered 'contaminated' either by genealogical distance or by geographical span, but with potential recognition as shown in the manifestation of their membership as among the "major" Somali clans, whatever that may mean.

Whichever way we analyze, it may be claimed that all the above communities have a consolation of some sort which their Somaliness is recognized, contrasted to the Jareer who neither held any responsible posts at any one time in the national level nor experience social harmony or acceptance in social affiliations or in any other institution to bind them to the other communities forming part of the texture of the social fabric. By their Negroid origin and African appearance, the Jareer/Bantu are untouchable to the social construct of Somaliness, geographically and genealogically. As we have seen from the elaboration made in some of the preceding chapters, and complementary to the relevant postulate by Kusow, Somaliness is also about the look, the physical anatomy and cultural characteristics, substances related to racial/biological and environmental phenomena.

While the Jareer protest about exclusion, marginalization and identity deformation other communities are affected by identity confusion resulting from impurity to the "process of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion." The following sets of extracts intend to display the confusion in Somali identity and genealogy, and by far, that the territory, the land, where Somaliness and the Somali survive and where all the business of inclusion and exclusion is conducted, is not historically a Somali territory as we shall read from the following paragraphs:

- (1) "The Somali race seems to be the most recently arrived of all the inhabitants of north-east Africa. Their early history is extremely obscure, and that of Somaliland before their arrival is no less so."⁴

- (2) "The Asha of Somali proper...tribes are all descendants from two Arab Sheikhs in the twelfth or Thirteenth century."⁵
- (3) "Although the Somalis claim they are homogeneous, the exact origin of their race remains mysterious."⁶
- (4) The proto-Reewin groups were probably the first Cushitic group to enter what is the southern part of modern-day Somalia."⁷
- (5) We can infer that Reewin...are to be regarded as the true ancestors of all the Somali-speaking groups today."⁸
- (6) All Somali claim Quraishitic descent, some through Samale, their eponymous ancestor, others independently through Isaq, Darood, Ajuran or others who were or have been reinterpreted as Arab Sheikhs."⁹
- (7) "By a procedure similar to the genealogical parasitism by which they have attached themselves to Quraish, they [Somalis] now have to incorporate others into their own genealogy."¹⁰
[Clarification in parenthesis mine]
- (8) "The real origin of the Somali people, is wrapped in mystery."¹¹
- (9) "The dawn of the Somali race, could be placed about twelve or thirteen hundred years ago."¹²
- (10) "The Somali people belong to one of five main Kin-based "clan-families," a confederation of genealogically un-related clans. There are no blood-links or other affinity between these five clans, or for that matter between the smaller clans. ¹³
- (11) "The commonality is the language and the religion. Each and every Somali knows his genealogical descent until his patriarch by heart. It is called "Abtirsin." This genealogical descent shows that the five main clans, have no blood-links whatsoever.
- (12) "Historians do also differ, as to when the different clans, took up their modern national name "Somali," or for that matter the meaning of the word "Somali."¹⁴

"This gives credence to the oft-repeated theory, the name "Somali" was an invention of the Muslim Imam of Harar, Imam Ahmed Bin Ibrahim Al-Ghazi, known to the Somali as Ahmey (sic.) "Gurey," the left-handed."¹⁵

"...As to why the Imam, chose the name "Somali," is a mystery."¹⁶

- (13) "The most interesting aspect about the obscurity of the Somali name, though, is its different oral interpretations."¹⁷
- (14) "The first appearance of the name Somali in a written historical record was in the victory-claim song of Negash Yeshak (1414-1429) of Ethiopia over the neighbouring Islamic Sultanate of Adal...Another document containing Somali elements is found in the Arab chronicle dealing with the Jihad wars of Ahmed Gurey. The Somali groups which are found in this chronicle are the ones that are found in today's northwest Somalia."¹⁸
- (15) "In classical times the Somali were known as "Berbers," a designation which survives in the name of the town of Berbera. The usage runs through the writing of the Arab geographers of the Middle ages."¹⁹
- (16) Many of the immigrant Sheikhs to whom the Somali trace descent cannot be shown to have been historical personages, but they are nonetheless type of historical figures, and while individual ancestors cannot be shown to have existed or to have left Arabia and settled in Somaliland at determined dates acceptable to the criteria of historical veracity, history shows that there has been a constant movement of this kind."²⁰
- (17) "The Somali people comprise a vast system of segmented groups which it is convenient to call nation, tribal-family, confederacy, sub-confederacy, and tribe.
- "The Somali nation is composed of two parts, the Somali and the Sab. Strictly, the word "Somali" does not apply to the Sab, who say themselves that they are "Sab", and are so described and distinguished by the "Somali"; nor is the "Sab" group subsumed under the name "Somali" in the total genealogy of the Somali nation. The Sab stand opposed to the Somali and are grouped with them only at a higher genealogical level, when the two ancestors Sab and Somali are traced back in Arabian origins, in the total genealogy of the inhabitants of Somaliland."²¹
- "At a higher level of inclusiveness, all the Somali peoples, both Somali and Sab, trace descent to the Qurayshitic lineage of the Prophet Mohammed. Somali genealogies are extrapolated to the Prophet and Founder of Islam."²².
- (18) The story of the peopling of southern Somalia is still unclear, and a matter of controversy, which has recently taken on a political colouring."²³

"But it was probably not until sometime in the first millennium CE that speakers of the language in its earlier forms began to occupy the region. The consensus among scholars at present is that the Somali people originated in what is now southern Ethiopia, and from there gradually occupied most of the Horn of Africa, carrying with them the Somali language (which in the process evolved into its various dialects) and displacing or mixing with and incorporating whatever peoples may have been there already."²⁴

- (19) "The idea of a common 'Somali' identity was clearly not current in the southern clans, except among a few learned men until about the colonial period, and the name 'Somali' was not used..."²⁵
- (20) Even the learned, though they agree that there is a common scheme of descent, differ as to how it works. With regard to the genealogy of the 'Samaale' clans the genealogies are reasonably consistent (though there are still disagreements, for instance as to whether the Darood are Samaale). When it comes to the 'Sab' clans, however, disagreements are numerous, and not one but several schemes of classification compete, as if the model of the 'total genealogy' turns out to be a poor fit when applied to this society.

"...However, the various genealogical schemes that have been recorded contradict one another, as though, rather than a common tradition, we have the work of different organizing minds who at various times and places tackled the problem of fitting these groups into the approved genealogical mould. No two scholars record the same arrangement. The genealogical structure of the southern Somali is like an image which from a distance appears solid, only to break up on closer view into a multitude of shifting components."²⁶

- (21) "According to more recent studies (Haberland 1963; H. S. Lewis 1966; Braukamper 1980b) the Oromo cradleland has to be looked for in the southeastern highlands of Ethiopia. The Somaloid, who are linguistically related to them and who expanded into the lowlands before they did, may have originated in the same region (Fleming 1964; Schlee 1987a)."²⁷
- (22) "But it is their Arabian ancestry which traditionally is their greatest pride. Ultimately all Somali genealogies go back to Arabian origins to the Prophet's lineage of Quraysh and those of his companions. Yet they do not think of themselves as Arabs, or except in religion, as culturally Arabian. Indeed paradoxical though it may appear, in many ways Somali despise Arabs,

especially those whom they meet in Somaliland as immigrant traders and merchants. Nevertheless, it is their proud pretensions to noble Arabian origins which unite all the Somali clans and lineages into one vast genealogical system.²⁸

The evidence quoted above from various academic sources does not only reflect the genealogical/identity confusion haunting the Somali people but more so about the recentness of their arrival in the area of present-day Somalia. An alignment of a harmonious reconciliation of these crucial paradoxes is dilapidated not just by their numerousness but even by their deepening inconsistencies and simultaneous shift of the subscribers from one genealogical clan camp to the other for reasons none other than gain of interest. This particular culture of clan/identity transformation, mentioned earlier in this study, has become rife in the waning period of dictator Barre's regime and the subsequent era of lawlessness and anarchy. Whatever the case of the Jileec identity confusion and eagerness to configure with the possession of the land as to call it after their eponymous ancestor's name Samaale/Soomaali, the next few paragraphs will quote a comparative literature concerning scholars' evidence about the Jareer/Bantu or Negroid autochthons and their attachment to the land as the earliest settlers before Somali or Galla or any other known groups arrived, an ancient epoch when the nomenclature Berber or Somali had not yet been invented by the Arab immigrants and/or geographers:

- (1) "In the earliest times, north-east Africa was entirely occupied by the Negro race. The aboriginal population of Abyssinia was therefore Negro."²⁹
- (2) "Archaeological and linguistic evidence suggests that there was also a Bantu population in the nearby fertile river valleys of the Jubba and Shabelli. The Swahili culture that evolved in this coast was the result of the contact with the Bantu culture in the hinterland..." The linguistic Somalization of the Banadir coast started around the 13th century, when the first Somali-speaking nomads appeared there."³⁰
- (3) "...the comparatively fertile valleys of the Juba and Shibeli were already occupied by Bantu-speaking Negroid agriculturalists."³¹

- (4) The predecessors of the Eyle, who in modern times are scattered bands of professional hunters, were no doubt already there."³²
- (5) The idea of an early population of, probably Bantu-speaking, farmers has recently gained acceptance among foreign scholars."³³
- (6) These communities today consist in part of original nuclei of pre-Cushitic Negroid inhabitants of Somaliland."³⁴
- (7) In the south, between the Shebelle and Juba rivers and to some extent north of the Shabelle, there appear to have been three movements of population. For before the incursions of the Hamitic Galla and Somali, this region was occupied by a mixed population – the Zengi of medieval Arab geographers – who seem to have comprised two distinct elements. Sedentary agricultural tribes settled in the inter-riverine area and akin to the North-Eastern Coastal Bantu formed one component. And residues of this Bantu, and Swahili-speaking population, supplemented by slaves from further south freed by the suppression of the slave trade at the end of the nineteenth century, survive today in the Shidle, Kaboole, Reer 'lise, Makanni and Shabelle peoples, on the Shabelle River, and on the Juba River in the WaGosha and Gobweyn. To the same group belong the Elaay of Baidoa in the hinterland, and the Tunni Torre of Brava District. The other section of the pre-Hamitic population consisted of Bushmanlike hunters and gatherers, and along the rivers of fishermen, of whom contemporary representatives are the WaRibbi, and WaBooni or Booni of Jubaland and southern Somalia, and the Eyle of Bur Hacaba.

"Through contact with the Galla and the absorption of the few Galla who remained behind and through the influence of the earlier Bantu communities, the Digil and Rahanwiin tribes emerged with their distinctive characteristics. From the Bantu they adopted cultivation and from the Galla temporarily copied their system of military age-grades."³⁵

- (8) "Some mention must be made of the Negroid populations of Somaliland, who in many respects form an integral part of the total Somali social structure. These communities today consist in part of original nuclei of pre-Cushitic Negroid inhabitants of Somaliland (the Zengi) and in part freed slaves of varying provenance.

"Cerulli considers that the present Bantu populations of the Juba are largely a residue of the 12 tribes of the Wanyika, described in the Book of Zengi (an Arab Manuscript), which records the colonization of the African coast...

“...Both the Hawiya and Digil despise them, and there seems good reason to regard them as a pre-Cushitic aboriginal population.

“...Cerulli compares this Brava city language to the Semitic city language of Harar; its isolated occurrence demonstrates, he considers, the presence of Bantu in this region at an early date.”³⁶

- (9) “And in all likelihood, there were along the rivers small farming settlements of a people of distinct origin from the Somali, and much more ‘African’ in appearance. Probably these people were originally speakers of a Bantu language.”³⁷

“The Jareer people have often been thought of as all simply the descendants of freed slaves. Nobles generally think so, and the European writers who first observed Somali society in the 19th and early 20th centuries refer to them in this way, as *liberti* or freedmen.”³⁸

- (10). “I am increasingly convinced...that the current explanation which would make the indisputably Negro population of the Shiidle, Shabelle etc. groups of slaves of the Somali, set free by their masters, can definitely be dismissed. ... as far as I am concerned, there is no doubt the original nucleus of the Shiidle, Shabelle etc. populations was left behind by the Bantu, when they retreated from the region of Webi Shabelle.”³⁹

- (11) “There is another tradition, however, Faay Muudey Shoongo, whose family belongs to the Jareer of East Afgoye, told me that ‘our ancestors were born here; they did not come here.’”⁴⁰

- (12) “Ancient Arabian findings found in Brava demonstrate early presence of Zengi/Bantu people called Wanyika who were scattered in the Juba River area. They owned cattle, goats and chickens and produced agricultural products such as maize and banana. Among their main towns was called Shungwaya. The Wanyika community which the Arabian findings reveal lived very long centuries ago in the inter-riverine area of Juba and Shabelle whose running waters facilitated for them their engagement in farming.”⁴¹

- (13) “The second group of Bantu/Jareer people in Somalia are linked and believed to be the remnants of the Mijikenda people who migrated to the Tana River in modern Kenya...These Jareer people reside mainly along the banks of the Shabelle River in southern Somalia...”⁴²

“Aside from those groups who migrated to the Tana River (in present Kenya), there were those who remained behind, and continue to live in their present locations in southern Somalia...”⁴³

- (14) “We may reckon those [Bantu/Jareer] tribes in all probability represent remnants of a pre-Somali population going back to the first millennium of the Christian era.”⁴⁴

(15) “Before the Somali penetrated the area in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a population of Bantu-speaking cultivators inhabited the river lands...”

Distinctly Negroid in physical type, whereas the Nobles have the “Hamitic” features typical of the Somali in general, these people are probably in part the descendants of the original farming population of the area, the Bantu-speaking “Zanj” of the Arab chronicles.”⁴⁵

The extracts of the above scholarly works provide a succinct demonstration revealing the crux of the truth about Jareer predominance of the territory now known as Somalia, in an ancient period prior to the arrival of even the Galla who preceded the Somalis in the area. The two sets of extrapolations have been compared in order to accommodate the view of the agrarian cultivator who has been outside the social construct of Somaliness, a genealogical reality that bears fruits in many ways. The view at any rate is not a claim for genealogical absorption of the Jareer/Bantu into Somaliness, an identity already struggling with enough burden of its own. Nor does this view entertain a desire to claim the bridging of the geographical distance to the birthplace of Somaliness, criteria and categories which certain Somalis seem to use as the stick-yard for measuring the degree of Somaliness provided to specific clusters of the society. The irrational of the subject, to a broader hypothesis, invites a different perspective from which to view the matter.

We have already seen, as given evidence in the previous chapters, the inadequacy for a Jareer to be born or to have been born in Somalia to qualify for Somaliness without bearing the necessary supporting properties, either physiologically,

biologically/genealogically, geographically (the latter two as hypothesized by Kusow) or a combination of any of them and even may be all of them, depending on the respective community/ies whose degree/s of Somaliness is/are under measurement.

Under this image of affairs, and out of the perplexity of identity confusion, two provocative hypotheses emerge; hypotheses that do not militate against the existence of the two proximity measurement tools for Somaliness highlighted by Kusow as (a) “Genealogical” proximity to the founding fathers of Somaliness, the two or more immigrant Arab Sheikhs, and (b) “Geographical” proximity to the location where the Arab Sheikhs were causal or rather independent variables to the birth of Somaliness in distinct areas in the north, but enabled to unite all their separated offspring into one Somali of the same Arab blood.

These hypotheses propose the possible use of other Somaliness assessment tools, which have validity in their own nature without infringement to Kusow’s formula; just like the hypothesis of Jareer and Jileec. I present the first one as the “proximity of physiological properties to Somaliness” and the second as “Proximity of historical precedence of human habitation in the territory.”

The two sets of illustrations above were referred as a guiding framework for the underpinning validity in the construction of the last two hypotheses. For example: numerous Jareer/Negroid people have been assimilated and subsumed into the genealogies of certain Somali tribes, and so count their patriarchal lineage to that of their assimilators, but yet find themselves outside the system. In this chronicle, the Jareer is already there, accepted for attachment into the lineage ascending its trace to the ancestor, and is regarded as such, but the property exposed in his/her physiology obstacles proper penetration into the social texture, even after overcoming the genealogy barrier. The broad nose (*sanka buuran*), the hard/thick hair (*timaha adag; timaha jareerka*)

and the muscular African/Negroid features (*jir-dhismeedka murqo-murqaha*) indicate other significances to measure acceptability as a “Somali”, for the Jareer/Bantu stock in this case.

The second premise is an alternative that persisted in practice earlier days preceding the dominance in the land by the Somaloid stock.⁴⁶ It recognizes the right of ownership to the earliest settlers, the Negroid/Jareer or autochthons who were the earliest occupants as supported by academic works, a few of which were established above.⁴⁷ Therefore despite the frail name “Somali” in its symbolic nature of today, Puntland/Bantuland or Biladul-Bantu is for the Jareer/Bantu aborigines.

Since Somaliness as a name or origin, had not taken root as a result of the Somalis themselves but by the making of Arabs – Sheikh Issak; Ismail Jabarti, Ahmed Al-Ghazi (Gurey) etc. or by other foreigners - and since culturally they are made of compositions of distinct tribal groups of nations as we see them today,⁴⁸ the genealogical solidness or solidarity in homogeneity has fallen apart and into collapse. But what constitutes Somaliness and who is really a Somali? When, where and how does Somaliness function? Why is the motivational thrust abundant towards the clan institution but comparatively insufficient or void towards Somaliness and the Somali nation? What do these nations of clans share in common and what factors stimulate that commonality?

Somaliness is an emblematic metaphor. It is an abstract image providing refuge for people who are not happy with who they are and what they are, but who from the cradle to the grave, are in search of a better identity: British, American, Australian, French, Dane, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Swedish, Canadian, Finnish; any citizenship other than African black/Negroid. A Somali, according to nomadic social psychology, is driven not by loyalty to a nation (Somali nation), and at times nor even by the often-mentioned lineage or

patrilineal kinship, but primarily by his own intuitive self-interest and egoism. Neither is his delusion delimited by human/cultural values, nor does he observe self-dignity. The personal drive and self-esteem of the Somali pastoral character are those typical of a nation-less, cultureless mercenary.

As has become the knowledge, a Somali and his Somali nation are easily separable but a Somali and his tribal nation remain inseparable, particularly in times of need. According to pastoral thinking, the thesis is simple to explain: Somalia as a nation may not undertake for an individual citizen certain morally binding things which the clan may embark on implementing for the sake of an individual member of the kinship. For instance, Somalia would not allow itself to have been suffered the magnitude of devastation befallen on it by its “Somali” citizens unless other wise those involved were not genuine members of the citizenry and loyal to Somalia. Contrastively but also constructively, the very annihilators of Somalia could not engage (not of any event known in history) similar destruction to the territories of their respective tribal nations. Thus the Somali feeling for the two nations, the remote and the immediate – the Somali nation and the tribal nation respectively - are staked in two divergent horizons.

These nations of clan families and even sub-clan institutions are separately as distinct as the multiplicity of their diverse sub-sub-group entities. Although Dualeh suggests the Somali commonality in the spheres of language and religion, my contention envisages a reality about Somali multilingualism (*Maay, Maxaatiri, Af-Jiido, Af-Garre* etc) as all spoken by Somalis but yet not intelligible with one another. Theologically, majority of the Somali people are Muslims (more so metaphorically than practically) but that should not negate the factual existence of Somali Christians, nevertheless the insignificance of the number, an example of which I have contributed in Chapter FIVE of this study, and to which more known Somalis from the “major” as well as “minority” clans could be added. Therefore

inside the presupposed external commonalities are in fact expansive breeding grounds for true divergences and diversities that puzzle the outsiders, academics and non-academics. But the average Somali, the pastoral democrat, would prefer it to be left untouched, lest the internal rot pollutes the external environment unknown to it.

The other thesis I promulgate, within the context of commonality, focuses on the separation between:

- (a) Commonality shared as a result of common cultural values, common historical tidings, common identity, common national spirit as well as other common factors in mitigation of positive social/human behaviour, and,
- (b) An alliance, an amalgamation constituting layers of pastoral scums in a pseudo-unity, when the doctrine is hinged on the causing of death to human lives and destruction of property for the sake of individual or tribal greed. This amalgamation or temporary fluid solidarity often promoted in the wake of a threat from an enemy or in an unprecedented attack against an “assumed” enemy, doesn’t appeal to the good pattern of a global commonality shared by all Somalis. Instead, notwithstanding the generalized name/identity ‘Somali’, such barbaric acts should be seen and taken as matters particularly limited to the cultural representatives of the concerned culprits. In brief, it is an alliance of unison based on mean rapacity for spoils that in more often times than not drives the ‘Somali people’, ‘Somali nation’ to war and justifies, temporarily for a while, a reason for the resurrection of “Somaliness” which in all other circumstance stays “laid to rest”⁴⁹ in the living person of the ‘Somali’.

According to the agrarian Jareer/Bantu social thought:

Maal ninkiisaa ka naxaayo,

Mood ninkiisaa Maro saarto

Translation:

Wealth is well protected by its owner, and

A deceased is best covered by the kin.

This verse or saying, prefigures the unfolding view in the next few sentences as it subsequently entices to draw a line between categories of Somalinesss/Somalis that are always lumped together to share negative reputation of an unwholesome group despite the wholesome positivistic culture of the other group and their sacrifice for the well-being of the country.

Throughout the rough periods of social evolution in Somalia, the Bantu/Jareer people have been in the forefront from nation building to the struggle for independence. Because they make the highest number of technicians, their contribution to the various sectors and sub-sectors of development and in nation building has been unmatched. Their role toward boosting the economy regime, especially in the sector of agricultural production has been remarkable. Unfortunately, these were mistranslated to inferiority, a status adjusted as *modus operandi* to execute the lowest menial duties.

Although the Bantu human resource was key to the little change the country was undergoing in development, they were subject of oppression and social injustice and discrimination. Yet they had to develop the courage for perseverance due to their attachment to the land, a property that later became up for grabs, through expropriation and looting, rather than developing.

Whatever the inference in interpretation, the Jareer have refrained from participating in the primitive acts of demolition, which dilapidated the country, whether in the process of misappropriation of public funds or in the process of civil war. In a way, this was not because of anything else but the philosophy that “These people have come, so they will go; but the land is ours and it will ever stay with us.” This touching statement is not from the thought of an educated person, but a young Jareer/Bantu man in his late teens at that time, who was pushing a wheelbarrow for a living at the height of the civil anarchy in December 1991, as he concluded: “We are the ones who built it before, and we shall build it again once they are gone; our hand knows how to do it.” This is where I draw the line of Somaliness, between the one who built the country and yet stays firm, dedicated and determined to build it again, regardless of the hardships of abuse, degradation, underdevelopment, discrimination, and other varieties of social evils, and the one who kept bombarding it relentlessly for 15 long years, seeking superiority, pride and self-aggrandizement by destroying lives and properties alike, and then finally migrating to anywhere where he can join the dole queue.

The mythical genealogy, geography and physiology aside, factors which I do not intend to seek transformation of Jareer/Bantu identity for recognition into Somaliness, because they are not and cannot be so according to the instrument measuring Somaliness, it is the aboriginal owner of the land, the autochthonous Bantu/Negroid that has always worked in this country with all his dedication and unreserved effort. It is him/her that resisted all burdens in the course of nation building, and yet possesses the vigour, high morale and spirit to re-build it. This innate feeling is the kind of intuitively driven motivation a true citizen can pledge his/her allegiance towards his/her nation, but not in sharing a merely symbolic nomenclature whose origins are mysterious and is used ‘effectively’ and collectively only when the scheme is to cause harm to others, internally and externally.

According to the Jareer/Bantu girl or Adoon, Xabash, San-buur, Sankadhudhi, Biddo, Beyle-san-buur, Ooji, Dhal-Goleed, Mashuunguli, Boong, Meddo etc., Somaliness is not embraced in foolish pride such as criticized of “Laankruusar gado, soo bari galleey”⁵⁰ [Buy a Land Cruiser, but wander and beg for maize.] According to her, the nexus between the citizen and his/her nation is not manifested in the looting of the public coffers; not in “killings, politically-motivated rape of women and the robbery of state treasury,”⁵¹; not in organizing unruly clan militia to gang-rape innocent virgins as witnessed in Hodan District in Mogadishu;⁵² not at all in the wantonly killing and dehumanization of the elderly, the unarmed and the vulnerable such as women and children.

In the view of the Jareer girl, civil morality is not represented in the heart and mind of one who expresses satisfaction in creating and living in perpetual anarchy, but in one whose sweat mingles with the irrigation water as it trickles from his face and hands in the course of digging his/her farm, generally tolerating and facing gallantly the hardship in nation building. It is through the maintenance of decent attachment to the country and citizenship that the spirit for national love and nation building are portrayed, not in the cowardly association with the gun, a fact contrary to the principles of development.

A mind associated to a hand carrying a gun will not have its thinking beyond the easy use of that gun, hence a dual deprivation to development: (1) Because it has to carry the gun, it can not afford the delivery of other tasks, and (2) Because it is carrying the gun for use, it has to fulfill the “duty” of killing which is the reason behind carrying it, and in this course kill one who was building or would build the nation.

Ever since the wake of independence, the Jareer community has complained about exclusion, inequality and social injustice, oppressions whose roots could be traced back to pre-colonial era. However, after independence, the recognition of the existence of these

oppressions and the possibility to bring them in the limelight beyond the national boundaries was curtailed in the thick clouds of an unholy doctrine of Somali homogeneity that misled many scholars and the world at large.

As we have seen throughout this study, the Somali nation constitutes nations of disintegrated communal clans or entities of diverse origins, some with undisputed ancestry whilst others had the exact origin of their race described as remaining mysterious. Concurrently, ethnic groups among these nations have had their identities deliberately misplaced by adjoining them to one of Somaliness, which in turn heeds a mythical belief of being a branch from an Arabian root. In any case, what remains more undisputable lies in the distinction between Jareer and Jileec, the characteristic paradigm of classification assuming Negritude/Africanness and non-Negritude/Arabness respectively.

This characteristic identification has become a rigid basis for the creation of an eponym-based genealogical stratification of superior/noble clans (Somali-Arabs) and an inferior/ignoble race (Negroid-Africans). As a consequence of that, coupled with colonial interference and support, the Jareer of Negroid African/Bantu origin have been denigrated as a subject people unworthy of any attributable social esteem and achievement – a community destined for exploitation and subjugation and therefore created for benefiting the superior Jileec race of the ‘nobles’.

In the outside world, without the exception of even distinguished scholars, Somalia had an erroneous image of a nation of one homogeneous race. For that matter, it was unthinkable that racial discrimination, ethnic marginalization and acts of apartheid could prevail among such a unique people from the same forefather. It was under the pretext of this misbelief that other factors about Somalia were either overlooked or discouraged. It is

however worthwhile mentioning that a number of Somalist scholars who conducted field research in the country, particularly in the inter-riverine zone, have acquired an early recognition of the reality about the pervading social distinction of what was otherwise promoted by I. M. Lewis as a homogeneous egalitarian society of a pastoral democracy.

The works of Catherine Besteman, Kenneth Menkhaus, Virginia Luling, Omar Eno and Lee Cassanelli, to mention a few, are the most remarkable in recent times, although these could only be conducted by foreigners and/or published outside Somalia during the military regime of late dictator Siad Barre, except Eno's works which approached the issue in different socio-historical perspective after the collapse of the military rule. At any rate, it was during the civil war that the majority of the international community became aware of the massive apartheid maneuvers that dominantly shaped the Somali social system.

Main among those who raised the alarm about the existence of race-related discrimination were international relief workers operating in the country. Also advocacy initiatives to end the rebirth of slavery in the banana plantations in Lower Shabelle region in mid 1990's, heavily mounted by the Jareer/Bantu elite in the Diaspora, the local media (Ali Muse Abdi and Mohamed Shiil being the journalists in the forefront) and SAMO (Somali African Muki Organization), the political organ of the Jareer, have reshaped differently the universal view about Somali homogeneity and cultural pastoralism as the revelation of the truth was no longer preventable.

Later, an academic overturn from homogeneity was justified and a proven heterogeneity emerged. Under this circumstance, the Jareer exploited the opportunity not only in contributing to the prevalence of ethnic diversity but the persistence of ethnic marginalization and social exclusion.

The disclosure pertaining to the unexpected factor of Somali heterogeneity was further aggravated by the more devastating unraveling concerning the practice of elements of apartheid in Somalia. These two factors have attracted a myriad of criticism and denial from the Somali proponents of the self-same school of thought on the one hand and the foreigners of similar belief about Somalia on the other. When the contention over the episode solidified, the non-governmental organization, Bantu Rehabilitation Trust (BRT) undertook a survey on the human rights abuse against the Somali Bantu. Although the results and findings were in support of the existence of marginalization, there was need to conduct an academic study to prove, disprove or amend the existing hypothesis of ethnic segregation, hence the necessity for a study of this kind, which pioneered yet the first initiative to consider the triangulation method of studying the Bantu/Jareer people of Somalia through the perspectives of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Conclusion

Chapter Seven dealt with the phenomenon underlying the multifacial characteristics entangled with Somaliness, the qualifications allowing one into Somaliness and a variety of measures of disqualification preventing certain groups from ‘trespassing’ into the social “purity” of Somaliness. It attempted briefly to display the Jareer concept of citizenship and its affectional attachment to the country, the land, the territory, an interactive relationship that distinguishes the builder and feeder of the nation from the destroyer and killer of the nation, the eater of nationhood and violator of sovereignty.

The unequalness of Somalis to Somaliness and the oppression and social discrimination lurked under the fabricated mass of homogeneity, have become causal to focus part of this study to quantitative evaluation of the reasons and nature of discrimination prevailing in the country. The next chapter, Chapter Eight, will provide the results of a survey data

collected to analyze aspects related to the episode of marginalization as presented by the victims.

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3. Ibid.
4. A Handbook of Abyssinia, op.cit., p.145.
5. Ibid.
6. Mukhtar, "Islam in Somalia" op.cit.,p.19.
7. Kusow, "The Somali Origin: Myth or Reality" op.cit., p. 93.
8. Ibid., p.95.
9. Schlee., op.cit., p.225.
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11. Dualeh, op.cit., p.9.
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13. Ibid., p.10.
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17. Kusow, "The Somali Origin" in Ahmed, A. J. (ed.), op.cit., p.85.
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Abissino." RAL 5: 1889, hymn 2.)
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20. Ibid., p.14.
21. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

22. Ibid., p.17
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42. Eno, Omar A., "Landless landlords" op.cit., pp.137-38.
43. Ibid., p.138.
44. Bulletin of the International Committee of Urgent Anthropological and Ethnical Research., pp. 28-29. No.3, 1960., assisted by UNESCO.

45. Luling, V., "Colonial and Postcolonial Influences on a South Somali Community" op.cit.
46. Notes from a video-taped workshop for Somali Bantu elders in Mogadishu, Somalia, 2003.
47. See also chapter Three of this study.
48. Mansur, Abdalla O., "The Nature of the Somali Clan System," in Ahmed, A. J., (ed.), op.cit.
49. Osman Abdi Osman (alias Oska), personal discussion in Atlanta, USA, Nov. 2004.
50. Title of a radical song by Saada Ali, criticizing Siad Barre's government in late 1980s before the break out of the civil war, when the competition for looting the public treasury was at its peak.
51. Ahmed, Ali J., *Daybreak Is Near*; op.cit. p.133.
52. This event took place in 1991 in Hodan, Mogadishu, after a Somali employer misplaced her gold necklace. She suspected that her Bantu/Jareer house-girl had stolen it. After the poor girl pleaded her innocence the employer called her relatives in the militia and handed the girl over to them "as a revenge for my necklace." After a few hours the poor under-age girl was seen crying and screaming of pain with blood trailing down her legs as she walked back to her house. The chain was found while the girl was still undergoing her ordeal. By the time the employer's message reached the militia, the poor girl had already lost her virginity in the gang-raping spree of the militia. This author and the residents in the area between Baar Raaxo and Suuqa Siigaale of Hodan District know this ugly episode and others, which cannot be recounted here.

Chapter Eight

8.0. INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEY

8.1. Racial Discrimination In The Underbelly Of Racial Homogenization: Unearthing The Untold Apartheid

“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you...”¹

*Race is a biological concept, which classifies people by inherited characteristics such as colour of hair and skin, physique, etc. This would have no particular importance if people were content to be physically different but socially equal.*² – Margaret Peil and Olatunji Oyeneeye

The survey was conducted in the Diaspora as well as in 9 regions in the country where the Jareer/Bantu are the predominant settlers. About 200 questionnaires were sent to be filled in each of the nine regions. The Diaspora here consists of several of the Somali Bantu in Kenya, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Canada and the U.S.A. In the East Africa region, Tanzania and Kenya, the questionnaires were personally administered, while the mailing system was used for countries outside the region. The targeted samples in the Diaspora consisted of 400 interviewees; 300 from within the East Africa region and 100 in Arabia, North America and Italy. Although it was possible to mail more questionnaires to anywhere, this investigator was not in possession of the addresses of all the Diaspora Bantu.

The rate of return was high due to several advantages, from common ethnic interest and loyalty to training of female and male data collectors familiar with the social culture and sociolinguistics of the subjects. The total number of questionnaires distributed was 2,200 with 2,116 returned, a little higher than 96%, whereas 84 questionnaires, approximately 4% were unaccounted for. From the Somali Bantu Diaspora in East Africa, the rate of return was 93% compared to 76% of their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, Arabia and North America. Within the country, the average returned questionnaires was 1,759, not capturing 41 questionnaires of the 1,800 target cases. By all means, an almost 98% return rate for the group makes the findings more stable and reliable.

8.2. Method of Study

The general agreement over the purpose of research makes its definition so large that various disciplines of study have each developed multiple ways of presenting the functions of research. One such definition from Lokesh Koul reads, "Research is scientific, and as such, is not satisfied with isolated facts, but seeks to integrate and systematize its findings. It is concerned with the objective verification of generalization. Such a verification requires logical analysis of problems and devising of appropriate methodologies for obtaining evidence."³ Following Koul's notion, conducting the survey section of this broad work is to seek "the objective verification of generalization" while at the same time using it as an "appropriate" method "for obtaining evidence" regarding the practice of apartheid/discrimination, its nature and causes in the Somali peninsula. Again, viewing the importance of research, Hatch and Farhady provide their insight as they exemplify it as "a systemic approach to finding answers to questions,"⁴ and in this context, why are the autochthonous Negroid/Jareer in this formerly Bantuland of present day Somalia discriminated?

The aim for undertaking this quantitative survey is not focused only on the investigation of the social reality in Somalia, but somehow also to compare and find out whether the qualitative approach utilized in the previous chapters of the study would result a dichotomy with the findings of the quantitative approach or whether the triangulation of both methods would support each other.⁵ The survey was conducted with careful consideration, following the questionnaire as a tool for the data collection. The data collectors were selected according to eligibility regarding their affluence in the languages/dialects and culture of the interviewees; to put it precisely, they were of ethnic Bantu origin. They were trained and had acquired adequate practice in the administration of the questionnaire before sample-testing it. Only after they were confident were these assistants set to their designated fields for data collection. The purpose for selecting this particular category of assistants/interviewers was encouraged by the aims and objectives of the survey, which deemed accessibility into the subjects' information and intuitive feelings among the cluster of its priorities.

8.3. Validity and Reliability

The survey was also meant indirectly to reconfirm or disregard, on the basis of academic investigation, the reliability measure of the BRT survey of 1995, after the lapse of about eight years. Likewise, this study took on board to what degree it may provide concurrent results in case another researcher would investigate a representative sample of the same subject community at a certain given time in the future, so as to maintain a degree of consistency.⁶

Throughout its various stages, the survey was undertaken with a cautious consideration of the reliability of the tool in order to justify its stability, hence the pre-testing of the questionnaire prior to conducting the actual exercise. Concurrently, Ngechu opinionates

that “If the tool is reliable, then responses to it (data) are valid and therefore reliable.”⁷

(Emphasis original)

The questionnaire was chosen as a tool for its convenience and applicability. According to Goode and Hatt⁸, it is a device for receiving responses to a set of questions, thus agreeing with Barr⁹ et al whose definition elucidates the tool as a measure systematically employed for the compilation of data from a sample group. Koul states, “It is widely used in educational research to obtain information about certain conditions and practices and to inquire into opinions and attitudes of an individual or a group.”¹⁰

Discussing about the administration of the questionnaire, Koul acknowledges the opportunity for the person administering the questionnaire to create confidence, relationship and explain to the respondents the objectives of the study, as well as “to explain the meaning of questions to respondents that may not be clear to them.”¹¹ To realize the objective about confidence and relationship, female data collectors were among the trainees so that women from their ethnic group access the Bantu female.

Although Best¹² criticized the mailed questionnaire as “the lazy man’s way of gaining information”, he emphasized elsewhere in the same volume that, as a tool, it can produce effective results and a high rate of return when the subject respondents have a genuine interest in the phenomenon under investigation, know the investigator and/or share a common loyalty.¹³ This study therefore draws from Best’s later suggestion since the Somali Bantu interviewees in the Diaspora who received their questionnaires by ‘drop-and-pick’ either knew the investigator or shared a bonafide interest, or both. Though it was from this category of respondents that was received the least number of questionnaires, again it is noteworthy that their rate of return was commendably high.

The Diaspora, in this case, includes Somali Bantu Refugees in Kenya, Tanzania, residents in Saudi Arabia and others naturalized in Europe and North America, although only respondents outside East Africa received their questionnaires by mail. As Best and Kahn have emphasized, "Ethnic origin seems to be important. Interviewers of the same ethnic background as their subjects seem to be more successful in establishing rapport. When there is an ethnic difference, a certain amount of suspicion and even resentment may be encountered."¹⁴ The ethnic aspect of the relationship between this researcher and his subjects renders further strength to the validity and reliability of the method, the instrument as well as the data provided through the means, making the measure stable, and to an extensive degree free from contamination or tamper. For instance, Drew¹⁵ attributes the technical soundness of a study to its internal validity, a factor the study has deemed due consideration.

For purpose of comprehensibility, the questions were both in English and Somali as a good maneuver to enhance clarity for the literate in the Somali language. For the speakers of Maay and Kizigua languages, trained data collectors fluent in the respective media of communication and born into the respective cultures were available in the respective fields where these social groups are dominant. Whatever the consistency, the researcher had borne in mind the perspectives limiting the scope of every study, an issue that has been mentioned in Chapter One of this work.

8.4. Data Analysis

The mode of analysis employed is based on the inferential statistical approach in that the sample group is assumed as a representative of the population under investigation. Though inferential in nature, factors related to the unknown nature of the precise population distribution of the Jareer/Bantu people in the country, the numerical frequencies of the variables responded advise us on the consideration of the analysis as a

mode of nonparametric test. For the achievement of proper analysis, however, the four modes advised by Good et al¹⁶ were carefully considered. In other words, the statistical measurement is based on the frequencies of the responses to determine the percentage per variable response representation.

In certain responses, further observations and classifications were given to focus on a particular case according to age group, with a clarifying note in the result interpretation. Other cases were not aggregated on cumulative percentage basis but on their frequencies as separate variables representing their individual responses. The results of the analysis are illustrated in tables and charts for easy reading within the text. Six questions were structured to approach and unearth the episode of Apartheid in Somalia from diverse angles.

8.5. APARTHEID AND ABUSE OF BANTU/JAREER RIGHTS: SURVEY FINDINGS AND RESULTS (with illustrations in Tables and Charts)

8.5.1 Personal Data

A sample population of 2116 responded to various questions. They consisted of male and female of Bantu ethnic community (Illustrations 1 & 2). The distribution of age by average mean rate for male was slightly over 48 years while their female counterparts stood at a little above 40 years. The total number of male was 62% compared to 38% for female. Among the male population constituted 24% single contrasted to 38% married. A further observation of the female respondents envisages 11% single and 27% married while the entire female subjects were numerically equivalent to the married men at 38%.

BANTU POPULATION ANALYSIS STUDIED IN SOMALIA AND DIASPORA

BANTU POPULATION ANALYSIS STUDIED IN SOMALIA AND DIASPORA					
CATEGORY	NO	PERCENTAGE			
No of Female	804	38%			
No. of Male	1312	62%			
Male Single	508	24%			
Male Married	804	38%			
Single Female	233	11%			
Married Female	571	27%			
Mean age for Male		48.60 Yrs			
Mean age for Female		40.30 Yrs			

Illustration 1




Illustration 2

8.5.2. Analysis by Level of Education

Approximately over 87% of the Bantu respondents (Illustrations 3 & 4) had not undergone formal education while the majority among the literate were only about 9% and had not studied beyond elementary school or 4th grade. About 2% had an opportunity to join intermediate level 5th – 8th grade, though later less than 2% reached secondary school. An insignificant number, much less than 1% of the Bantu interviewees have had an opportunity for higher education at tertiary level.

SOMALI BANTU EDUCATION ANALYSIS

Level	Male	Female	Total	Percentage	
Uneducated	1156	692	1848	87.333%	
Elementary	104	81	185	8.743%	
Intermediate	25	19	44	2.08%	
Secondary	20	9	29	1.371%	
Tertiary	7	3	10	0.473	*
TOTAL	1312	804	2116	100%	

Illustration 3

* Very insignificant

ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION




Illustration 4

8.5.3 Nature of Abuse

Within the concerns of the variable concentrating on the nature of abuse experienced, over 99% have complained of suffering from *inequality/injustice* (Illustrations 5 & 6) under their ruling Jileec/Somali counterparts. *Persecution* was undergone by 89% of the cases analyzed while the variable regarding '*denial of education*' scored 98% victims, showing a convincing agreement with the Education Analysis enumerated in (8.5.2) above.

Denial of Job Opportunity was suffered by 99%, the perceivable implication being due to the lack of education as well as job placement. Over 98% of the Bantu interviewees who had worked in the country reveal a **denial of promotion as a difficulty**. **Denial of business opportunity** had a negative reaction of over 98% of the sample studied. An insignificant sample population of less than 1% was analyzed for '**Jail without trial**' while **Social degradation** stands at a response of 98% abuse rate.

NATURE OF ABUSE OF JAREER/BANTU COMMUNITY

Nature of abuse	Cases	Percentage
Persecution	1883	89%
Denial of Job Opportunity	2095	99%
Denial of Promotion	2084	98.50%
Denial of Education Opportunity	2074	98%
Denial of Business Opportunity	2023	95.60%
Inequality/Injustice	2108	99.60%
Jail without trial	21	0.01%
Social Degradation	2074	98%
Rape	21	1%
Physical Abuse/Torture	607	59%
Confiscation of property	1716	81.10%

Illustration 5

The victims of rape make 1% of the entire subjects studied but a further analysis of the females elicits the figure higher to approximately 3%.

About 81% of the interviewees, or 1716 cases, have had their **properties confiscated**, irrespective of particular period, while 59% expressed to have undergone **physical /moral torture**.




Illustration 6

8.5.4. Reasons for Abuse

In their view to the question concerning the reason for their abuse, 1967 interviewees (Illustrations 7 & 8) thought it was due to their *ethnic diversity and background*, 58 replied as to both *political and ethnic* implications while 91 cases had it only as a *political opinion*. As percentage, the first figure corresponds to 93%, the next 3% and the last as 4%.

REASONS FOR ABUSE		
Reasons of abuse/Violation	Cases	Percentage
Political Opinion	91	4
Racial/Ethnic Reasons	1967	93
Both	58	3
Other Reasons	-	-
TOTAL	2116	100

Illustration 7




Illustration 8

8.5.5 The Worst Era of Abuse

Six percent of the entire sample group, and 100% of those who were in their teens or twenties during the colonial period, consent to have undergone colonial atrocities and violation of their human rights. The cases falling under this category number about 129 although the response reflects on a representative figure of 128, assuming that one candidate among the 129 had not experienced any colonial violation of his/her rights (Illustrations 9 & 10).

The period 1960 to 1967, under the presidency of Aden Abdulle Osman, is equivalent in the score of abuse to the era of his successor Abdirashid Ali Sharma'arke 1967 - 1969. These two eras of post-colonial civilian administrations have each scored an abuse rate of 68% against the Bantu/Jareer population under study.

The leadership of Siad Barre has recorded nearly 89% and, as such, the highest cases of Jareer rights abuse in a Somali state, compared to his two predecessors of the civilian regimes 1960 to 1969. However, a further analysis in terms of age group, over 90% of the subjects in Barre's era seem to have suffered an abuse of some kind. Bantu rights violation has hit record peak in the civil anarchy 1991 to the current date. An average of 98% of the overall respondents is unanimous about their ill fate in this period with the infliction of atrocities of all sorts.

ERAS OF ABUSE

Era	Year	Cases	Percentage
Italian Colonial Era	1950-1960	128	6.04%
Aden Abdulle Osman	1960-1967	1439	68%
Abdirashid Ali Sharma'ke	1967-1969	1439	68%
Mohamed Siyad Barre	1969-1990	1667	88.80%
Civil War/Anarchy	1990 to date	2074	98%

Illustration 9

ERA OF ABUSE




Illustration 10

8.5.6. Solution For Abuse/Violation

(A) Reaction To Abuse/Violation

A representative number of 1,662 cases or 79% of the overall respondents (Illustrations 11 & 12) stated *obedience/perseverance* as a self-developed mechanism to neutralize the abuse subjected to them; to live with it and be conditioned for its compliance. Twenty-one percent have sought *relocation* elsewhere away from where they had suffered the abuses.

REACTION TO ABUSE		
REACTION		
Reaction to Abuse	Count	Percentage
Obedience/Perseverance	1662	79
Relocation	454	21
TOTAL	2116	100

Illustration 11




Illustration 12

(B) Remedy to Abuse/Violation

Ninety-six percent of the victims, 2,038 cases (Illustrations 13 & 14) did not dare try to seek remedy compared to 4% or 78 respondents who sought some kind of legal intervention to heal their grievance. Despite the attempt, however, a zero representation has reported to have achieved the provision of any legal redress. Subsequently, 99% admit the abuses are still continuing as 1% admits it has been discontinued.

REMEDY TO ABUSE					
ACTION	REMEDY				
	YES	PER.	NO	PER.	TOTAL
Seeking remedy	78	4%	2038	96%	2116
Provision of remedy	-	0%	78	100%	78
Discontinuation of abuse	25	1%	2091	99%	2116

Illustration 13




Illustration 14

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1. The Holy Qur'an, (Sura Al-Hujurat 49:13), English translation of the meanings and commentary. Revised and edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA, Call and Guidance.
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Chapter Nine

9.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

9.1. Analysis

9.1.1. The result shows a general overview of the Somali Bantu/Jareer sample group.

The composition of the respondents represents interviewees from all walks of life and selected randomly. It displays the number of cases replied and the related gender representation, making one believe that single as well as married male and female were represented.

9.1.2. The chart and table on education analysis estimate the meager opportunity of academic acquisition for the average Jareer male and female. According to the statistics, this has been an area of neglect by all the authorities in the country, colonial, civilian as well as the dictatorial military regime.

9.1.3. With statistical figures as high as revealed in this section, the Bantu/Jareer people undergo intolerable abuses and rights violation of multiple characteristics. The variable investigated and results want us to believe that Apartheid, call it racial or ethnic, is prevalent in “orientally homogenized” Somalia. The versatility of the natures of abuse and violation also provide the magnitude of the inherent human suffering this community lives with.

9.1.4. Whatever the propagation of the oriental/colonial scholars, be it Somali homogeneity or pastoral totality, the oppressed voices of the Bantu/Zenj Jareer autochthons have sent their message as an overwhelming majority declare that they are abused, violated, segregated and dehumanized according to their ethnic

background, which is racially and biologically distinct from that of the pastoral Somali, whatever it is.

- 9.1.5.** The factor under observation in this sub-section leaves us with an inferential probability that the 7 years of Osman had an abuse rate equal to the 2 years of Sharma'arke. The deduction may by far presume a possibly for a much higher rate of abuse had the second president continued to lead the country a corresponding period to Osman's era. Sharma'arke, like his predecessor, was notorious for alienating the Jareer from representing their constituencies on SYL ticket, leading to rigging and electoral corruption. Abuse against the pre-Somali, pre-Cushitic Negroid inhabitants of the former Punt/Bantuland reiterate to have undergone violation of their rights and human dignity during all the eras in the context of the survey, from colonial period to the current anarchy.

The higher rate of Bantu rights abuse in Barre's rule of 21 years compared to a total of 9 years shared between the first and second presidents as 7 years and 2 years respectively, might have been influenced by the ethnocentric dictator's longer period in power. Albeit the statistical variation, none of the evaluated eras is more favourable to the community as to have observed their well being and significance of their social role as feeders and builders of the nation. The highest rate, in the sense of frequency, of the human rights violation of the Jareer, according to the analysis described, have reached record peak after the ouster of Barre and in the current *civil anarchy*.

- 9.1.6.** Owing to the enormity of the oppression and the multiplicity of its characteristics and sources, state and social, the Jareer had to condition themselves to obedience in the encapsulation of perseverance. Theirs was, as they utterly disclose, a

vulnerability which attracted inexplicable types of aggression, misplaced or otherwise (in psychological context). Seeking remedy and redress to these violations has created more traumatic distress as it led to more oppression. Relocation is a remedy somehow interpretable to displacement within the country and refuge elsewhere in the neighbouring countries and/or across the continents. One suggestion of discontinuation by a minority of respondents could be because they have either fled the country or relocated/displaced to another area.

9.2. Discussion

As the findings of the study reveal, **education** has been a crucially scarce commodity for the Jareer people, encouraged by a continuum of multiple negative factors. Some of these factors include: (a) Lack of educational establishments in areas heavily inhabited by the Bantu/Jareer. (b) The few agricultural towns, where elementary schools were established, did not have intermediate level institutions, so it was an economic constraint for an undeveloped, rudimentarily equipped traditional farmer to afford upkeep to educate a child in the capital. (c) It is not harmonious for the urban dwellers from this community to study in Jileec dominated schools owing to stereotyping, bullying and even often times harassment and beating from gangs of their Jileec/Somali peers. (d) Stereotypes, names and epithets by some class teachers damaged the psychological emotion of the Jareer pupil and therefore a reason for an early dropout from school. (e) Lack of teacher's motivational remarks for the Jareer/Bantu pupil's outstanding performance. (f) Reference of negative examples and attributes to the Bantu/Jareer culture and community by schoolteachers. (g) Teachers' unfairness to the Jareer student in assessments, marking and grading of exam papers, and (h) Teachers' harsh, unequal punishment and embarrassment of students from the Jareer community: -

Case No. 9.2.1

Abukar Ali Abanur was a very bright Jareer pupil in our 2nd grade in Hodan Boys School. After very good performance in the first term, Abanur has become a subject of punishment both by the teacher and students on daily basis. Our teacher really used to punish the boy, harsher than any other pupil in the class. At times, he was penalized for other boys' misdeeds. During the third term, the boy did not return; instead, his father saw it safer for the young Abanur to be apprentice in an auto-mechanic workshop.

As seen here, apart from the dreadful economic straits, the environment of the school society was emotionally unmotivating, hostile and psychologically traumatizing to the Jareer child for whom the quality of his ethnic properties became a reason for his denigration and alienation from the academic arena at an early age. One such evidence is here: -

Case No. 9.2.2

An Italian teacher one day called for his Jareer student's parent. When the two met, the teacher advised, "Try to transfer your son to another school. In this school, he will not move to the upper grade no matter what." The student's father was perturbed as he was told, on confidential note, "The Somali teachers are hard on him without any valid reason. We can't help the situation but we have to be honest with you. The boy is brilliant and active but that is his disadvantage. I am sorry!"

Consequently, these negative trends have interfered with the domains of the elements stimulating the Jareer desire for education. The effects of prejudice from the environment of the school institution tallied apparently against the Jareer learner's emotions, which again caused scars of psychological wounds by frustrating the potential of his/her

intellectual activity and academic performance in general. The results, at any even trends, do not provide a clean bill of health to the education authorities and society in general, as academic evidence has shown the difficulties the community has been experiencing in the education sector to date. In Somalia, academic participation is seen as a sacrosanct privilege reserved for the non-Jareer who quite often felt disturbed by outstanding Jareer performance:

Case No. 9.2.3

When school headmaster Abdalla Ali Murshid announced the highest scorer in the centralized leaving exam of Casa Popolare Elementary School was “Mohamed Abdulkadir Eno” (this author), a parent from the north could not take it. As I was passing near him to the podium to shake hands with the headmaster, I heard my left-handed northerner classmate’s father saying “Ma kan adoonka ah baa caruurteena ka badiyey?” translated which means “How is it possible that this slave one has outscored our children?” When I reported the incident at home, my parents counseled and encouraged me, a long story beyond this study, but one that has inspired me all the way to this academic stage.

Looking into **Denial of job opportunity** and/or **promotion** in the civil service, it is not at all uncommon for a Jareer with qualification either to wander unemployed or be displaced in an institution and post irrelevant to his academic background. The Jareer constitute the governments’ popular preference for transfer in remote areas and positions shunned by the ‘noble’ pastoral officers in the civil or public service. The fact that none from this community had ever held ministerial portfolio, high diplomatic rank or any other top administrative posts in the parastatal institutions like General Manager, Director General, or even a General in the army, positions that are all political, reveals self-axiomatically the socio-ethnic place of the Jareer. This is another factor that may be linked to the possibilities that the few who were employed in insignificant offices and posts were not

worth the while for promotion to a level or an opportunity commensurate only to the prestige of a Jileec/Somali 'noble'.

The interpretation of **business** in this study observes the activity in its wider scope, contrary to 'business' in the narrow sense of limiting it only to an exchange of items or products. The adjunct aim behind the Jareer denial for education is obviously treated as a prerequisite for denial of business in the sense that an opportunity for potential performance, an academic expertise in a certain discipline, has been pre-matured. In the other aspect, mass confiscation of privately owned Bantu agricultural land from colonial time to date, also features in the denial of business as the right of one's occupation to work on his farm and sustain his family was violated. Another interpretation could yet be related to the deliberate lack of development policy for the small-scale subsistent farmer, a move that would create prosperity and possible business interaction and advancement for the Jareer agriculturalist. The responses seem high for the variable, considering the Bantu/Jareer community's cultural domain in agriculture, but denial remains a paramount obstacle to Jareer achievement. Certain presidential decrees and state laws and acts were not "meant" for the benefit of the Jareer/Bantu:

Case No. 9.2.4

Siad Barre's military regime declared importation of agricultural equipment "duty-free", but when we (author's family) imported a tractor, model "SAME Centauro 45", it took over six months to clear it from the port. The reason: "Duty-free was not meant for people like you", the "you" referring to Bantu/Jareer.

Denial of business opportunity is related also to various villages inhabited by the community that were disfranchised through the private allocation and diversion of the 'communal main canals' (Keli-Gumeed) that irrigate their farms. Forced conscription of

the youth, the backbone of the human resource of the nucleus family, into the army, constitutes another major deprivation affecting the family production business and productivity and hence denying them an opportunity to conduct their business potential un-interfered:

Case No. 9.2.5

Mohamed Abdi Roble, alias Maadeey Barakaale, and his younger brother Ali, were very talented auto-mechanics in Mogadishu. As a result, their workshop attracted a large number of patrons. A Jileec workshop owner in the neighbourhood was not pleased with their competition. The two brothers were severally but alternatively locked up, day in day out, for reasons beyond their understanding, until one day when they saw their arresting officer repairing his car in their neighbour's garage. This time the officer was brief but clear, "You and your brother will either come and work in this workshop, or move your garage elsewhere." Maadeey and Ali reported the matter to their area police station. After a few days, they were traced to their residence, put under custody in their area police station before they were handed over to the higher-ranking police officer against whom they sought redress. When they were released after about 2 weeks, the two Jareer brothers closed their business down and traveled to Saudi Arabia where they are currently residents.

The Somali authority's ill treatment to Jareer education is manifested in this demoralizing incident:

Case No. 9.2.6

A young Jareer man got scholarship to study abroad. Upon reaching Mogadishu International Airport for departure, his passport and ticket were retained at the Immigration counter and he was sent back "upon instructions from the higher authority, which you will be told in your office tomorrow." The following day, he was

told, "The arrangement was made due to "name mix-up", but in fact the scholarship was not for you." In a week's time, he was transferred to a remote pastoral area as assistant veterinary technician although he had graduated as a draughtsman from the Polytechnic. After failing to adjust to his new job for about two months, he came back to Mogadishu and became self-employed.

Imprisonment without trial in a court of law was not punitive measures for an ordinary citizen tolerating (as the Jareer did) and abiding by the dictatorial nature of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. A possible reason in the nature of this kind of punishment is in its exclusiveness for political dissidents and others categorized as reactionary (dib-u-socod) with an undertone of anti-revolutionary (Kacaan-diid) sentiments. The Jareer community, as far as the social politics and political sociology of Somalia is concerned, are situated well beyond the hem of associating, approaching or indulging in activities facilitating competition for political and/or economic power. The low rate of the score in this factor seems to have been interpreted in political significance, which does not of course overrule the fact that many of the community members have experienced this particular version of oppression and injustice, especially the few that had done some of the other non-political social issues that had an overburdening effect on their lives, such as seeking legal action against expropriators.

Alternatively, certain arrests had no mentionable reasons to justify as preferring a crime against the arrested; this personal experience is one of many such unsubstantiated arrests:

Case No. 9.2.7

I (author) was supposed to travel to Dar es Salaam on Somali Airlines, which suspended the route after issuing me with the ticket. They advised me to re-route to

Seychelles and from there take Air Tanzania up to Dar es Salaam, which they made the reservation accordingly. After boarding the aircraft, two policemen entered the plane hastily before ordering me to disembark. I thought I hadn't identified my luggage or something. They led me out of the terminal and into the office of the commanding officer of the Airport Police Station, one Police Captain Mohamed Hassan. He interrogated me about my trip to Seychelles where only "white tourists go." I explained the circumstances leading to that and asked him to enquire and confirm from Somali Airlines. He was not convinced as he kept repeating "you, being a 'simple' Jareer, what are you going to do in Seychelles, a place for rich white tourists?" He ordered one of his junior officers by the name 'Musse' to arrest me. After I stayed in custody for two days without knowing my crime, a friend, Abuu Makhafaay (the goldsmith) contacted his friend, Col. Ali "Apollo", then a prominent Judge in the Military Court. When Captain Mohamed Hassan failed to prefer any crime against me, as requested by "Apollo", I was summoned in the Captain's office. Upon releasing me against his wish, the Captain insulted me in anger of freeing me, although I cannot put his words in writing!

Cases are uncountable where Bantu/Jareer technicians executed tasks and contracts before ending up in cells upon the context of claiming their wages and payment after completion of the task. Others were **sentenced** in Kangaroo courts convened by a District Commissioner or Chairman of the District Security Officer or Party Bureau Chairman and his hand-picked committee who had no legal jurisdiction whatsoever to officiate, judge or sentence, all in absolute violation of the law of the land. Neither had these officials undergone professional training in law to enable them officiate in legal matters, nor were the accused allowed to appoint and be represented by a lawyer.

To put it more explicitly, the diversity of African origin has become sufficient reason for the Negroid autochthons to suffer discrimination, prejudice, stereotype, segregation, epithets

and marginalization against the community, all culminating into stratifying the Jareer as second-class citizens, with half or less the right of the pastoral Jileec citizen (see Chapters Six and Seven above). The existence of ethnic-based degradation and discrimination provides yet again a reason to believe the existence of a fission of multi-ethnic heterogeneity much at variance with the artificially midwifed homogeneity that nurtures pastoral Jileec self-ennoblement. Social degradation, in essence as well as in effect, functions as a paradigmatic reality in the lifeblood of Somali social vein, exclusively more active in the Jareer/Negroid-inferior and Jileec/Somali-superior customary law of social stratification. Central to degradation are a divergence of factors, but core among them is the ethnic distinctiveness of the Bantu/Jareer, according to the findings of the survey and evidenced in the dialogue between the two neighbours (Case No. 9.2.8.) below, a clear presentation of the Somali social psychology towards the social place of the Jareer:

Case No. 9.2.8

As my brother and I (author) were heading to school smartly dressed in our school uniform, our neighbour, Caasha Xajiin, told my mother, “Why do you waste so much time educating children who will never take up a public office.” Caasha’s connotation was clear in terms of our Jareer-ness and social status. My mother replied to her wisely, “Once they are educated, they will not need a post in public office; they will be self-employed.”

In another extremely unbelievable incident, as envisaged in the next case, we see how the Jileec-ness factor played an effective role against Jareer-ness and an innocent man made casualty of gross injustice:

Case No. 9.2.9

One day, around 3 o’clock in the afternoon, a crowd was after a thief who had snatched a gold chain from a teen-age girl. A Jareer boy was fast and caught the

thief. When the case came up in court, the crime was turned over to the Bantu/Jareer witness who had caught the thief. Later it was discovered that the police officer preparing the case and the girl who was the complainant, happened to agree to incriminate the innocent Jareer witness rather than having the Jileec thief behind bars. They ditched the Jareer young man to serve an illegal sentence. The witness-turned-criminal spent four months in prison. Upon completion of his illegal jail term, he had to leave the country in disgust of the injustice he had encountered.

Appropriation and **confiscation** of Bantu property, movable and immovable, has been a daily dilemma. Although the statistics does not furnish a detailed disintegration of the breakdown into the periods and nature of properties involved, a subject beyond the limit of this study, there is little disagreement about expropriation and confiscation of Bantu/Jareer property across the extension of colonial era through the current civil anarchy. In one such state-sponsored violation, **Hussein Kulmiye Afrah**, then Minister for Internal Affairs, and founding member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (Golaha Sare ee Kacanka), was sent in 1971 to speak to complainants in the Lower Shabelle Region who were protesting against losing their land to the government's agricultural Crash Programme Scheme. After listening to the unending complaints of the Bantu/Jareer farmers, he had to tell the thousands of villagers unsympathetically, that even the Italians had expropriated their (villagers') land with neither consent nor compensation, therefore they had no right whatsoever to withstand state policy or to protest against it.

Case No. 9.2.10

A new expropriator of a mango plantation (a top official) came to the wholesale market in Afgoie and said to a Jareer broker, "I have mango farm; how much is a mango?" The Jareer broker asked in a friendly remark with a smile of irony, "If you don't know the price of mangoes, how could it be that you own mango farm." The stranger left and returned after about 30 minutes or so with a few police officers.

The Jareer broker was jailed on 'Emergency', without trial, for "bad conduct" toward a high official of the government.

The Italian colonial regime was the mother that first invented the sequestration of Bantu agricultural land when it designed a blueprint to boom the metropolis economy via the exploitation of appropriated Jareer land worked by forced Jareer human resource. Subsequently, the civilian regimes of independent Somalia borrowed a leaf from their colonial masters as members of parliament, cabinet ministers, the incumbent in the top seat and others in their respective administrative posts waged a huge campaign to seize land directly or by means of dubious and undercover transactions. Some of these alleged transactions involve colonial concessionaires as a clever mechanism to claim legal acquisition and legality of ownership. Certain prominent personalities claim to have "purchased" their agricultural farmland from former Italian concessionaires while they were very well aware of the circumstances under which the colonialist Italians had acquired the Bantu land.

Ironically, these dignitaries have "purchased" the plantations [in] Somalia from the colonial land-looters and land-grabbers instead of condemning colonial atrocities including slavery and expropriation. The paradox becomes more astonishing when after independence the incumbent "purchases" from a colonialist the land the colonialist had expropriated from the citizens the incumbent is/was ruling, a reason to doubt the moral soundness and degree of nationalism and loyalty in the incumbent.

During Barre's military regime, the expropriation of Bantuland, particularly in the riverine areas of Shabelle and Jubba, has become an easy target legitimized through state acts, laws and by-laws for state as well as individual plunder and fraud empowered either by ethnic attachment to the ruling clan or by personal authority of a top official in an

administrative position, or connection with one. Confiscation of Bantu property, including buildings and even household properties, has amazingly become the easiest acquirable material of value from 1991 in the wake of the civil anarchy.

Very many respondents show to have suffered physical and/or moral abuse, most of them probably during the last decade and half beginning 1991. Physical and moral abuse, although persistent in all other administrations, be them colonial, civilian or military, crossed the limit in the recent past in the unruly chaos and crisis led by the warlords and their armed ethnic/clan militia. One example on each could be drawn from: (a) Physical torture while working wagelessly as slaves on banana plantations in Lower Shabelle, and (b) Moral torture by witnessing the gang-raping of women relatives by the armed militia who first hold the Jareer male under gun-point; those who couldn't stand the immorality or reacted to it were summarily executed.

The indication surfaced in the statistics invites us to believe that out of 804 female samples, about 21 have apparently suffered as victims of rape, and that most of these cases were responded from Lower Shabelle, Lower and Middle Jubba as well as the Refugee Camps in Kenya. The question concerning rape may not have presented all the truth. Although women interviewers were active in establishing rapport, it is not culturally easy for a female Jareer to narrate her ordeal about rape. Accordingly, there is likelihood that many rape victims shied away from sharing their abuse due to cultural reservations or avoidance of related psycho-traumatic emotions as almost all these rape victims do not access any trauma counseling to heal their wound.

Remarks

This chapter and the preceding Chapter Eight have constructively but also empirically disagreed with the idea of Somali homogeneity and the other self-sameness universally misleading about the heterogeneity and multi-ethnicity of the communities in this Horn of Africa peninsula. Within the strict confines of this study, and as proven from the perspective of quantitative findings, ethnic marginalization in the form of Apartheid is highly prevalent in Somalia as instituted against the sections of the distinctly Negroid/Jareer community, affecting all aspects of their social life, politically, academically as well as economically. The next chapter, Chapter Ten, presents the general conclusion of the entire study.

APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF CASES ANSWERED IN EVERY REGION AND IN THE DIASPORA

REGION		CASES ANSWERED
1.	Lower Jubba	196
2.	Bay	197
3.	Gedo	196
4.	Middle Shabelle	194
5.	Hiran	195
6.	Bakool	194
7.	Banadir	198
8.	Middle Jubba	194
9.	Lower Shabelle	195
10.	Diaspora	<u>357</u>
TOTAL		2116

APPENDIX II**AREAS WHERE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED****1. LOWER JUBBA**

Kismayo

Jamame

2. HIIRAN

Belet-weyne

3. LOWER SHABELLE

Afgoi

Marka

Shalambod

Golween

4. BAY

Baidoa

Bur-Hakaba

5. MIDDLE SHABELLE

Balcad

Jowhar

Mahadaay

6. MIDDLE JUBBA

Jilib

Dujuma

B/Karim

7. BANAADIR/MOGADISHU

Waaberi

Wadajir

Hawl-Wadaag

8. **GEDO**

Luuq

Baardheere

9. **BAKOOL**

Xudur

Tayeegloow

10. **DIASPORA**

U.S.A

Canada

Italy

Saudi Arabia

Kakuma (Kenya)

Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)

Chogo (Tanzania)

APPENDIX III (Specific areas of interviewees' origin)

Baidoa

Bur-Heybe

Bur-Hakaba

Dinsor

Luq

Xudur

Wajid

Waaberi (Mogadishu)

Wadajir (Mogadishu)

Hawl-Wadaaq (Mogadishu)

Balcad

Barsane

Baarow

Gaafaay

Garsaale

Jowhar
Maagaay
Raqayle
Xawaadley
Kulmis
Maandhere
Mahadaay
Bu'aale
Buulo
Buulo-Gaduud
Baladul-Kariim
Dujuma
Fagan
Gadudey
Saakow
Sablaale
Hargeesa (Jilib)
Jilib
Kaleenga
Kobon
Mareereey
Miyooni
Mugaambo
Saakooki
Yontooy
Baasaay
Jamaame
Kamsuuma
Kamtiireey
Kudha
Mafula
Makalaangoow
Mashaqa
Migwa
Sabaato
Sanguuni

Sabatuuni
 Belet-Weyne
 Buulo-Burte
 Jalalaqsi
 Khallaafo
 Afgooye
 Aw-Gooye
 Baraawa
 Bariire
 Mareereey (Aw Xasan)
 Cumar-Beere
 Maagle
 Jilib-Marka
 Golween
 Janaale
 Marka
 Qoryoley
 Shalambod
 W/Weyn

APPENDIX IV

DISTRIBUTION BY AREA OF ORIGIN IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER

NO.	Towns	Number of Cases
1	Afgoi	26
2	Aw-Gooye	8
3	Buulo-Gaduud	13
4	Buur-Hakaba	48
5	Baladul-Kariim	20
6	Belet Weyne	39
7	Baarow Weyne	16
8	Baasaay	22
9	Baidoa	45
10	Balcad	23
11	Baraawa	6
12	Bariire	2

13	Barsane	6
14	Bu'aalle	14
15	Buulo Burte	13
16	Buur-Heybe	25
17	Buulo	11
18	Cumar Beere	6
19	Dujuuma	41
20.	Buulo Mareer	27
20	Diinsoor	9
21	Fagan	24
22	Gaafaay	21
23	Gaduudeey	14
24	Garsaale	16
25	Goobween	26
26	Hargeesa	21
27	Jalalaqsi	10
28	Jamaame	40
29	Jambaluul	12
30	Janaale	21
31	Jilib	91
32	Jowhar	82
33	Kalaanga	37
34	Kamsuuma	45
35	Kamtirey	47
36	Kawasan	53
37	Kismaayo	153
38	Kobon	24
39	Kudha	81
40	Kulmis	21
41	Luuq	8
42	Maandheere	22
43	Mafula	20
44	Maagle	3
45	Mahadaay	34
46	Makalaangoow	29
47	Marka	32

48	Mareerey (Middle Jubba)	88
49	Mareereey	17
50	Mashaqa	29
51	Migwa	25
52	Miyooni	37
53	Moofi	30
55	Mugaambo	57
56	Qallafo	22
57	Qoryooleey	25
58	Raqayle (Middle Shabelle)	17
59	Saakooki	28
60	Saakow	23
61	Sabaato	36
62	Sablaale	26
63	Sanguuni	19
64	Shalambod	15
65	Sabatuuni	19
66	Wanla Ween (Daafeet)	23
67	Waajid	19
68	Xawaadleey	16
69	Xudur	15
70	Yoontooy	36
71	Jilib-Marka	11
72	Maagaay	13
73.	Tayeegloow	8
74.	Waaberi	17
75.	Wadajir	25
76.	Hawl-Wadaag	<u>13</u>
TOTAL		2116

APPENDIX V

QUESTIONNAIRE**SURVEY ON THE SOMALI BANTU/JAREER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION**

**(DARAASAD KU SAABSAN KU-XADGUDUBKA XUQUUQDA AADANIGA EE
BULSHADA JAREER-KA/BANTU-GA AH EE SOOMAALIYA)**

(PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE YOU ANSWER.)

(FADHLAN SI FIICAN U AKHRI INTA AADAN KA JAWAABIN.)

I. PERSONAL DATA**WARBIXIN SHAKHSIYEED**

1. (a) Age.....
Da'

1. (b) Sex. [] Male [] Female

[] Lab [] Dheddig

1. (c) Place of Birth.....
Meesha aad ku dhalatay

1. (d) Marital Status
[] Married. [] Single.
[] Xaasle [] Doob

II. LEVEL OF EDUCATION**HEERKA WAXBARASHADA**

(Koobaabi jawaabta kugu haboon)

2. (a) Uneducated.
Wax ma Qoro/ma akhriyo.
2. (b) Primary School
Dugsi hoose/dhexe
2. (c) Secondary School.
Dugsi sare.
2. (d) University/College/Institute.
Jaamacad/Kulliyad/Machad.

III. NATURE OF ABUSE

QAABKA XADGUDUBKA

3. Which of the following human rights abuse(s) have you suffered?
Ku-xadgudubka xuguugul aadamiga ee soo socda tee ku gaartay?
(Koobaabi inta ku quseysa).
3. (a) Persecution.
Cadaadis.
3. (b) Discrimination from the Somali society.
Midabtakoor bulshada Soomaaliteed ka yimid..
3. (c) Denial of promotion.
Diidmo dallacaad.
3. (d) Denial of educational opportunity.
Diidmo fursad waxbarasho.

3. (e) Denial of business activity/opportunity.
Xaqiraad/diidmo fursad dhaqdhaqaaq ganacsi.
3. (f) Social inequality/injustice.
Sinnaan la'aan/caddaalad la'aan ka timid dhinaca bulshada.
3. (g) Jail/imprisonment without trial.
Xarig/xabsi xukun la'aan.
3. (h) Social degradation
Liidid/takoor dhanka bulshada ka yimid.
3. (i) Rape.
Kusfi.
3. (j) Physical/moral torture.
Jir-dil/damiir-dil.
3. (k) Confiscation of property.
Hanti lawareegid sharci daro ah.
3. (l) All.
Dhammaan qodobbada kor ku xusan.

IV. REASONS OF ABUSE/VIOLATION OF RIGHTS (SABABAHA DHALIYEEY XADGUDUBKA)

4. You suffered the above abuse(s)/violation(s) because of:
Dhibaatooyinka ku gaaray ee kor ku xusan waxaa ugu wacan:
(Koobaabi tan kugu haboon).

4. (a) Political opinion.
Ra'yi siyaasadeed.

4. (b) Race/Ethnicity.
Isir/Jareernimo

4. (c) Both.
Labadaba.

4. (d) Any other reason.
Sabab kale haddii ay jirto qeex.

V. ERA OF WORST ABUSE.

(XILLIGII XADGUDUBKA UGU XUMAA UU KU GAARAY)

5. Which of the following periods have your rights been abused/violated/denied most?
Xilliyada hoos ku qoran waqtigee xuquuqdaada aad loogu tuntay oo lagu xadgudbay?

(Koobaabi jawaabaha kugu haboon).

5. (a) Era of Italian colonial administration in Somalia - 1950 – 1960.
Xilligii isticmaarka Talyaaniga

5. (b) Era of President Aden Abdulle Osman - 1960 - 1967
Xilligii Madaxweyne Aden Cabdulle Cismaan -

- | | | | | |
|----|-----|--|---|-------------|
| 5. | (c) | Era of President A/Rashid A. Sharmarke. | - | 1967 – 1969 |
| | | Xilligii Madaxweyne C/rashid C. Sharma'arke. | - | |
| 5. | (d) | Era of President Mohamed Siad Barre. | - | |
| | | Xilligii Madaxweyne Maxamed Siyad Barre | - | 1969 – 1990 |
| 5. | (e) | Post-Barre. | - | |
| | | Siyad Barre ka dib (dawlad la'aanta.) | - | 1990 – 2003 |
| 5. | (f) | All. | | |
| | | Dhammaan. | | |

VI. SOLUTION

XAL

6. (1) What was your reaction to the abuse(s)/violation(s)?

Sidee uga hortagtay xadgudubka ku gaaray?

.....

.....

.....

6. (2) Did you seek any remedy/legal redress?

Xal sharciyeed ma u raadisay xadgudubka xuquuqdaada aadmiga?

(Koobaabi tan kugu haboon).

- (a) Yes. (Who helped you?)

Haa. (yaa ku saaciday?)

(b) No.

Maya.

.....

.....

.....

6. (3) Was the remedy/legal redress provided?

Xalkii ma lagu helay?

(Koobaabi tan kugu haboon).

(a) Yes.

Haa.

(b) No.

Maya

6. (4) Have the abuse(s)/violation since been discontinued?

Ku-xadgudubkii ma la joojiyey?

(Koobaabi jawaabta kugu haboon).

(a) Yes

Haa.

(b) Why and how?

Sababtee iyo sidee loo joojiyey?

.....

.....

.....

(c) No.

Maya.

(d) Explain.

Sharax sababta loo joojinwaayey.

.....

.....

.....

.....

Thank you.

MAHADSANID

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

Within its limits, this study has attempted to distinguish between the Jileec and Jareer peoples of Somalia, touching on the controversies surrounding Somali genealogy and homogeneity. The distinction between the two stocks of the larger Jareer nation was also discussed. It is however necessary to conclude the study with some focus on the main highlights.

In Somalia, there is a tangible impact of Arab contact over the centuries, which is apparent in various aspects of Somali social life. Notwithstanding that, the inconsistencies in the diverse patrilineal routes leading back to a supposed eponymous Qureishite ancestor, lack substantive credence. Accordingly, it poses difficulty to reconcile that with the hypothesis of the Somali people's homogeneity linking to Arabness, at least biologically.

A mythical tradition aside, the idea of an entire community 'recreating' itself from a couple of visitors, without significant proof to strengthen that claim, stays hypothetically also implausible. Therefore I argue that the rationale of Somali pastorals' self-attachment to Arabness was responding to their long-sought after noble identity 'above' Africanity. By this, they concocted a biological reason for denigrating those who identify with Africanity.

The Somali people are the latest stock to arrive in what was known earlier as Puntland/Bantuland. Their arrival was after the Cushitic group who had found Zenj/Negroid populations already dominant in the area. Possibly, the remnants of those aborigines are the present day inhabitants of the inter-river areas of Jubba and Shabelle, the stock

popularly referred to as Jareer/Bantu. The oral literature, oral traditions, archival documents as well as linguistic evidence, as elaborated in Chapters Three and Four of this study, are in support of the thesis disagreeing with the oriental/colonial scholars' homogeneity narrative lumping all the distinct identities into a symbolic one-Somali people and culture.

Yet, a sociological approach to the Somali clan system and its functions extensively highlight the complexity of the evolving phenomenon of Somaliness and the variety of criteria for qualification to that identity. Without undermining the existing postulates measuring Somaliness, the Jareer perspective of Somaliness deems credence to antecedence in the inhabitation of the territory by the Negroid/Zenj, despite the accident of the mysterious nomenclature "Somali/Somalia" and its fast gain in popularity.

As the discussion had it in Chapter Seven, the Jareer/Bantu concept of Somaliness is based on constructiveness as contrasted to the Jileec practice of Somaliness based on genealogy and destructiveness. The two types of qualification depict the different characteristics of the social cultures as well as social psychology of the communities under context.

The prevailing suggestion is that perhaps the idea of a self-same Somalia has in part mitigated the post-colonial political dominance of pastoralists over the agrarian population. In time, it has emerged the result of a socio-economically disadvantaged Jareer at the bottom rung of the Somali social strata. Political and economic disadvantages, combined with social degradation and exploitation have, to a greater degree, contributed to the constraints hindering the Jareer community from academic advancement.

From the claims of homogeneity, one fails to explain the phenomenon of ethnic segregation in the new institution dubbed “ ‘4.5’ (four-point five) clan power-sharing formula”. This system contradicts with the harmony and social integration expected from a society widely celebrated for its ‘homogeneity’, a phenomenon which accelerates ethnic polarization and marginalization.

Concerning their social status and causes of their degradation, the Jareer-Weyne have expressed the existence of oppression in spite of the self-sameness supposed to be the Somali socio-psychological food. With that note, I believe the existence of a wide heterogeneity of an otherwise utterly disintegrated multi-ethnicity, in which the ethnic-Bantu population undergoes social marginalization. Exerted between two evils of a kind, colonial exploitation and Somali domination of a similar end but of distinct nature and magnitude, the Bantu/Jareer community endures a myriad of societal damages in the forms of oppression, persecution, discrimination and other inhumane atrocities of Apartheid nature.

Somali identity confusion in the search for nobility, pastoral rapacity, colonial exploitation supported by Somali slave masters, and misinterpretation of the Qur'an, the Holy Book of Islam, have been used to give reason to Jareer exploitation and rights violation. At state level, neocolonialist civilian regimes of post-independence and an oppressive military dictatorship have across distinct periods of time played a collaborative role in amassing deliberate social disadvantages against the aboriginal Jareer autochthons.

For the enhancement of this alienation strategy, it was deemed crucial, among other things, to engage a state policy based on political structures without Jareer representation. The policy was again supplemented by state neglect towards the development of agriculture, an area that would achieve potential economic advancement

for the community. It was this devastating political strategy that has inflicted the Jareer community a drastic limitation in the development of their potential in the economic domain and more destructively also in the academic realm. The social inequality, injustice and segregation are clearly ethnic-based and therefore racially motivated, a fact which was detailed descriptively in the survey in Chapter Eight and discussed in Chapter Nine.

Under this social paradox, one need to prove and approve Somali homogeneity and monoculturality, by first disproving the ethnic diversity of the Jareer/Zenj people from that of the Somali Jileec physically and genealogically. Consequently, if the nomenclature “Somali” represents the portrayal of identity for a section of people with certain physical, cultural and genealogical properties specific to them, regardless of where they live in the country or in the East Africa region, it becomes inevitable to re-establish, re-invent a common nomenclature that addresses and accommodates the other communities in the country since they are characterized by identities distinct from those qualified with Somaliness in its current description.

I suggest further studies on the distinguished areas affecting Bantu/Jareer social life in Somalia, to investigate specific aspects of the subject related to marginalization in order to discover more about the phenomenon. Only after unraveling the deeper roots may we understand more about the complexity of the separate areas of Jaree/Bantu discrimination better. As for now, it seems that more oppression exists on this community than merely meets the eye.

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